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Abstract 
Australia, as a signatory to United Nations and International Labour Organisation 
Conventions on the Principle of Freedom of Association, is obligated in international 
law to implement a right to strike. The express and implicit right to strike within these 
instruments operates as a functional aspect of the principle of freedom of association 
and is an integral component of the normative ILO model of voluntary collective 
bargaining. 
The thesis examines the voluntarily assumed international obligations binding 
Australia with respect to the right to strike, identifying the exact nature of the 
obligation undertaken in international law, and measures the degree to which the 
federal regulatory model complies. Particular attention is paid to the model of 
protected action within the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRA). 
• The measurement of the compliance by the federal legal framework is undertaken 
through examination of the legal framework of voluntary collective bargaining and its 
practical impact. The discussion measures compliance on the basis of the specific 
standards enunciated by international agencies, and on the basis of the appropriate 
role of strike action in a normative model of voluntary collective bargaining based on 
the principle of freedom of association. 
The thesis concludes that the federal model of voluntary collective bargaining 
instituted under the WRA fails to comply with international standards on the right to 
strike from a global perspective, but achieves a degree of compliance on the specific 
level of the WRA protected action regime. There is no right to strike in Australian law 
for a wide variety of strike action that is encompassed by the principle of freedom of 
association in international standards. Where a right to strike is provided in the 
context of protected action, the right is compliant in form but not in substance. 
The failure of the model to comply in substance stems from the differing approaches 
taken in international and Australian law to the. principle of freedom of association 
and the role of strike action within voluntary collective bargaining. International 
standards encompass strike action as an aspect of a functional freedom of association 
designed to operate as a tool of bargaining. Non compliance in Australia stems from 
an approach to strike action that separates strike and freedom of association, using 
strike to facilitate predetermined bargaining outcomes rather than accommodating 
choice in bargaining processes. 
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Introduction 
The phenomenon of the strike is one of the crucial problems of contemporary 
industrial relations because it lies at the very core of the legal regulation of 
industrial conflict. The strike is basic to the distribution of power between 
capital and labour, and also forms part of the problem of the autonomy of 
groups and their relationship to the State. The concept of the strike relates to 
issues which lie at the heart of the ideological conflicts of industrial relations. 
It gives rise to practical as well as to theoretical questions. Social and 
economic crises in virtually every part of the world, changes in the 
composition of the workforce, the integration of increasingly complex 
technologies, the expanding legal regulation of labour relations, changing 
attitudes towards trade unionism, and changes in the social significance of 
concerted action, collectively challenge the scope and extent of strikes.' 
Strike action is controversia1.2 Unlike employment disputes between individual 
employers and employees, broader industrial disputes involving strike action intersect 
with a variety of competing interests and ideologies. Employers stand to lose business 
and profit. Employees stand to lose wages and employment. The public faces 
interruption to the supply of relevant goods or services. Governments face the 
consequences of economic and public disruption and the possible impact at the ballot 
box. Collective action by workers - forming groups, pooling their resources and 
withdrawing their labour - triggers ideological debates concerning collective power, 
individualism, freedom of association and the exercise of private power in public 
markets. In short, strike action is a microcosm of the tensions inherent in the broader 
labour relations context. 
1 R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1988) at 1. 
2 Within this thesis the use of the phrase "strike action" encompasses all forms of concerted action 
undertaken in order to effect an industrial outcome, including total work stoppage and forms of action 
less than total work stoppage: for example go slow, work bans or work to rule. The word "strike" in 
Australian law has generally been used to refer to a total work stoppage. For example, Sykes in his pre-
eminent study of Australian strike law uses the word "strike" to refer to a complete withdrawal of 
labour and the phrases "industrial pressure" or "industrial tactics" to refer to other forms of concerted 
action. Sykes also provides an excellent discussion of the history of the definition of "strike" in 
Australian law: E. I. Sykes, Strike Law in Australia (211d ed., Law Book Company: Sydney, 1982) at 
part II, chapter 6. This approach is also demonstrated in W. B. Creighton, W. Ford and R. Mitchell, 
Labour Law: Materials and Commentary (2nd ed., Law Book Company: Sydney, 1993) at 1133, paras 
32.3-32.9. However, despite the historical use of the word "strike" in the Australian context, this thesis 
adopts the approach used in international law, particularly in the ILO, whereby the word "strike" 
encompasses the broader range of conduct identified above: see B. Creighton and A. Stewart, Labour 
Law: An Introduction (3 rd ed., Federation Press: Sydney, 2000) at 379, para 13.03. The international 
approach has been adopted due to the complexities of definition within the Australian system (common 
law and statute), the relative simplicity of the international approach and for consistency throughout the 
thesis. 
1 
In Australia, the competition of interests and ideologies around collective action has 
generated a heavily regulated system of collective labour relations. There is a 
significant body of law providing prescription and prohibition over the negotiation 
and settlement of pay and conditions of employment, and strike action is a focal point 
of this legal regulation. The ability to take strike action, the reasons for and content of 
such action and the form that the action may take, are all subjected to detailed 
domestic legal regulation. In addition to the domestic framework, labour relations, 
and strike in particular, are the subject of international law, whereby a body of 
international labour standards has developed over, the recognition and protection of 
the right to strike as a human right. The complexity of the array of competing interests 
and ideologies affected by strike action has prompted the development of equally 
complex domestic and international legal frameworks. 
The thesis is a case study of the regulation of strike action from international and 
domestic perspectives, encompassing the legal framework governing strike action, the 
practical operation of those mechanisms and the role that strikes play within the 
broader regulation of employment relations. This involves examining both 
international and domestic law on the right to strike and measuring compliance by 
domestic law with international legal obligations. These steps will provide the basis 
upon which to draw conclusions concerning the right to strike within the domestic and 
international contexts, the role of the right to strike within collective bargaining and 
the fundamental elements that make up a voluntary collective bargaining model. 
Background 
• In measuring the extent to which Australian law complies with voluntarily assumed 
international obligations concerning the right to strike, the study examines the legal 
framework of strike law in the Australian and international context. In order to 
appreciate the modern legal framework, it is important to place the law within the 
historical context of both the national and international regimes. 
2 
The Regulation of Strikes in Australian law 
Strike action has been a central theme of Australian labour law from the earliest days 
of the passage of colonial legislation providing for conciliation and arbitration, 3 
through the negotiation and enactment of the Australian Constitution4 and the first 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1904 that aimed to replace the 
"rude and barbarous processes of strike and lockout" with industrial peace. 5 • 
The conciliation and arbitration model that prevailed in Australia for the better part of 
a century was based on the premise that if parties to industrial conflict were provided 
with an alternative compulsory forum for the resolution of disputes, there would be no 
need to resort to industrial action.6 All disputes could be resolved through the decision 
of an independent and impartial arbitrator, a role played by the Conciliation and 
3 Discussion of the passage of colonial legislation prior to Federation can be found in: S. Macintyre and 
R. Mitchell, (eds.) Foundations of Arbitration: The Origins and Effects of State Compulsory 
Arbitration 1890 — 1914 (Oxford University Press: Melbourne, 1989), in particular chapter 4, R. 
Mitchell, 'State Systems of Conciliation and Arbitration: The Legal Origins of the Australasian Model' 
at 74-103. 
4 The debates of the Australian Constitutional Conventions in the 1890s are peppered with comments 
by delegates to the Conventions concerned with the prevalence of strike action within the colonies and 
the need to ensure the ability of the new Australian State to have adequate mechanisms to deal with 
strike action. For example, Charles Cameron Kingston, an ardent supporter of compulsory conciliation 
and arbitration remarked: "What have we chiefly to deplore at the present day in connexion with our 
various industries? The prevalence of strikes and lock-outs — barbarous modes of settling differences, 
which should, if possible, be adjusted amicably" (Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian 
Federal Convention, (3 rd  Session), 20 th January 1898 to 17 th March 1898, Melbourne at 185). 
5 H. B. Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order (Workers Educational Association of New South 
Wales: Sydney, 1922) at 2. During the second reading speech of the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Bill, Prime Minister Deakin stated: "The central purposes of this Bill is to prevent strikes - 
and lock-outs ..... These are the modes of war which render our industrial system to pieces" (House of 
Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, 22 March 1904, 765). 
6 The motivation to replace strikes with compulsory conciliation and arbitration is demonstrated 
through the commentary reproduced in footnotes 4 and 5 above. In addition, contemporary 
commentaries referred to the Australian and New Zealand models of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration as "great social experiments" or "political laboratories". For example: 'Australia: Strikes 
and Legislation' Round Table, December 1912, 152 — 162; H. D. Lloyd, A Country Without Strikes: A 
Visit to the Compulsory Arbitration Court of New Zealand (Doubleday, Page and Co: New York, 
1900), particularly note the introduction by W.P. Reeves at vii. However, it is also important to note 
that there were a range of other factors at play in the introduction of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration that were not related to the prevalence of strike action. For example, Bennett points to the 
economic depression of the 1890s that exacerbated the power imbalance between employers and 
employees and undermined the potency of collective action: L. Bennett, Making Labour Law in 
Australia: Industrial Relations, Politics and the Law, (Law Book Company: Sydney, 1994) at 11. 
Macintyre demonstrates the effect of the depression and the 1890s maritime disputes on the Australian 
labour movement, and argues that as a result of resounding defeats in the 1890s in the field of industrial 
warfare, the, labour movement became "conscious of its growing strength as a political force to 
influence legislation and judicial appointments": S. Macintyre, 'Neither Capital, nor Labour: The 
Politics of the Establishment of Arbitration' in S. Macintryre and R. Mitchell, (eds.) Foundations of 
Arbitration: The Origins and Effects of State Compulsory Arbitration 1890— 1914 (Oxford University 
Press: Melbourne, 1989), 178 at 198. 
3 
Arbitration Court (later Commission, and later still, the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission). However, the flawed nature of this premise was evident from the 
earliest days of the operation of the system. 7 It was soon accepted that the system did 
not operate in practice to prevent strikes; rather it influenced strike behaviour so that 
Australia consistently maintained a high incidence of strikes, but the duration of 
strikes was shortened. 8 Therefore, conciliation and arbitration produced a system with 
short sharp strikes rather than long drawn out action. 9 
Strikes were uneasily accommodated within the arbitration model, leading to two well 
recognised oddities. First, the conciliation and arbitration system did not resemble 
either free market collective bargaining or conciliation and arbitration (which would 
prohibit strikes). The model was hybrid in nature, drawing upon elements of 
bargaining and of compulsory arbitration. Sykes and Glasbeek observed: 
The notion was simple enough. Employers could try to set the terms of 
employment by individual bargaining or, if the employees had managed to 
create a cohesive group or trade union, by collective bargaining. But in either 
case, if a deadlock ensued, then the disputants had to submit to an external 
settlement of their quarrels. Thus, the scheme theoretically endorsed 
regulation of industrial conditions by a commercial free-for-all limited by the 
law of private contract and by the newly evolved legal and economic concepts 
associated with collective action, and finally, by the forceful imposition of a 
solution agreed to by neither party to the dispute. Once it is stated in this 
fashion one wonders how the originators of the system could ever have 
believed that it would succeed. I° 
Further, as noted by Sykes and Glasbeek, as awards generally operated to set 
minimum terms and conditions of employment, and over-award bargaining was not 
7 The outright ban on strike action contained within s 6 of the original Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1904 was repealed in 1930 by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Amendment Act 1930, partially in recognition of the failure of conciliation and arbitration to effect 
industrial peace. For discussion of the 1930 amending Act see G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics 
and Law 1929— 1949 (Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 1963) at 1-4. 
8 Creighton and Stewart, supra note 2 at 18-19, para 1.43. 
9 For a short history of the relationship of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and 
industrial conflict including strike action over the 100 year history of the Commission see B. Harley, 
'Managing Industrial Conflict' in J. Isaac and S. Macintyre, (eds.) The New Province for Law and 
Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2004), 316. 
I° E.I. Sykes and H.J. Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia (Butterworths: Sydney, 1972) at 368; Sykes 
supra note 2. 
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prohibited, the system could have been considered to encourage industrial action to 
seek outcomes over the minimum set by the award." 
The second oddity of the conciliation and arbitration system was the enforcement 
paradox identified and explored by Creighton. I2 Under conciliation and arbitration 
strike action was unlawful, with the potential to attract a wide range of civil penalties 
or statutory sanctions. However, these measures were rarely utilised in practice and 
led to a dichotomy between the availability of sanctions and the willingness of 
participants in the industrial arena to use them. I3 
The conciliation and arbitration model struggled to accommodate strike action. The 
role of strikes within the system was incongruous. Strikes were unlawful but rampant. 
Enforcement mechanisms abounded, yet until the mid 1980's, few efforts were made 
to enforce them. 14  In addition, there were difficulties with the relationship of 
Australian law and practice to international labour standards, particularly those 
concerning the principle of freedom of association contained within International 
Labour Organization (ILO) 15 Conventions ratified by Australia in the early 1970s. I6 
In 1991, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) determination in the 
Pilots' Dispute drew attention to the difficulties involved in reconciling the 
compulsory aspects of the Australian conciliation and arbitration model with 
I I Sykes and Glasbeek, supra note 10 at 370-372 and 586-587. 
12 B. Creighton, 'Enforcement in the Federal Industrial Relations System: An Australian Paradox' 
(1991) 4 Australian Journal of Labour Law 197. 
3 Ibid át4. 
14 In the 1980s employers in Australia became more prepared to utilise the industrial torts and the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). This preparedness went beyond obtaining injunctive relief and saw the 
award, or negotiated settlement of, substantial damages payouts against trade unions. See for example: 
P. Costello, 'Dollar Sweets: Confronting Union Power' (1985-6) 39 IPA Review 49; M. Pittard, 
`Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd v. Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union' (1986) 14 Australian 
Business Law Review 130; M. Pittard, 'Industrial Law and Relations' (1986) 14 Australian Business 
Law Review 519. 
15 The spelling of 'organization' in this study is consistent with current usage by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). For convenience, spelling of the word 'organization' in all contexts will be 
consistent with the ILO usage, even where the original text uses 'organisation' rather than 
'organization'. 
16  Australia ratified two ILO Conventions on the principle of freedom of association on 28 February, 
1973: The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, No. 87, 
and The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, No. 98 (the 'Freedom of 
Association Conventions'). (Ratification information sourced from the Applis database of international 
labour standards at www.ilo.org ). 
5 
international standards on free collective bargaining and the right to strike. I7 This led 
Creighton to note that: "[i]t is not inconceivable that the entire concept of 
'compulsory arbitration' could be found incompatible with the ILO standards 
regarding freedom of association". 1 8 Further, increasingly globalisation and economic 
integration demanded that the insular approach of successive Australian governments 
to labour relations be abandoned in favour of increased engagement with the 
international community in economic matters. 19 
The perceived need for change within the Australian labour relations system led to the 
passage, in 1993, of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth). 2° Conciliation 
and arbitration was modified substantially, with a model of free collective bargaining 
enshrining an express right to strike. 2I The transformation was consolidated with the 
election of a Coalition Government and the passage of the Workplace Relations and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) (WROLAA). 22 Through the passage of 
these Acts, bargaining was altered from an incidental element of conciliation and 
arbitration, existing in the form of over-award bargaining, to a central plank of the 
new voluntary collective bargaining model, with strike assuming a central role as a 
tool of bargaining. 2 
Australian labour law and practice have altered significantly since the introduction of 
voluntary collective bargaining. This study will explore the modern context, 
examining the role and regulation of strike action within the contemporary federal 
17 Complaint Against the Government of Australia presented by the International Federation of Air 
Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA), Document Vol. LXXIV, 1991, Series B, No. 1, Report 277, Case 
1511. 
18 Creighton supra note 12 at 210. 
19 See B. Creighton, 'The ILO and the Internationalisation of Australian Law' (1995) 11 International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 199; B. Creighton, 'The 
Internationalisation of Labour Law' in R. Mitchell, (ed.) Redefining Labour Law: New Perspectives on 
the Future of Teaching and Research (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law: Parlcville, 
1995), 90 (hereafter cited as Creighton, 1995A). 
" For comprehensive discussion of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) (the Reform Act) 
see the Australian Journal of Labour Law (1994) 7(2). 
21  For discussion of the enactment of a right to strike under the Reform Act see G. McCarry, 'Sanctions 
and Industrial Action: The Impact of the Industrial Relations Reform Act' (1994) 7 Australian Journal 
of Labour Law 198. 
22 For comprehensive discussion of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
1996 (Cth) (WROLAA) see the Australian Journal ofLabour Law (1997) 10(1). 
23 Discussion of the WROLAA in respect to strike action can be found in: G. McCarry, 'Industrial 
Action Under the Workplace Relations Act' (1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 137. 
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labour law regime in the context of international principles concerning the right to 
strike. 
The thesis examines the law prevailing in the federal labour relations system, which is 
the dominant system among the six in Australia. Each of the States (other than 
Victoria, which has transferred jurisdiction to the Commonwealth), has regulated 
strike action in different ways, with more or less commonality of approach to that in 
the Commonwealth. To some extent, then, the analysis in the thesis may be applicable 
to State jurisdictions. 24 
The Australian Relationship with International Labour Standards 
Australia is a founding member of the ILO, maintaining both general membership and 
ILO Governing Body membership for the majority of the history of the 
organization. 25 However, engagement at the domestic level with ILO standards 
involving considered reflection on Australian law did not occur until the beginning of 
the 1990s. Australian engagement before that time was typical of the Western 
developed world. The problems of the third world, such as forced labour and child 
exploitation, were regarded as the realm of the IL0. 26 Developed nations like 
Australia with progressive labour relations systems saw themselves as immune from 
critique.27 However, the 1991 CFA determination in the Pilots' Dispute brought the 
Australian system under scrutiny with a particular focus on the failure of the system to 
accommodate a right to strike. 28 
Since the 1991 determination, Australian labour law has undergone radical changes. It 
has been subject to ILO scrutiny on a number of occasions, and increasingly the ILO 
24 Coverage of the provision of a right to strike within the State industrial relations systems can be 
found in: M. Pittard and R. Naughton, Australian Labour Law: Cases and Materials, (4th ed., 
Butterworths: Chatswood, 2003) at 1062-1064; Creighton and Stewart, supra note 2 at 414-416. 
25  The structure and machinery of the International Labour Organization (ILO) are discussed in detail 
in chapter 3. 
26  R. McCallum, 'International Standards in Industrial Relations and their Application in Australia' 
(1995) 2 Judicial Review 164 at 165. 
7 Ibid. 
28  Complaint Against the Government of Australia, supra note 17. 
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has been prepared to take issue with elements of Australian labour law and practice. 29 
Ironically, this increased scrutiny has come at a time when Australian involvement in 
the ILO has reduced to an historical low. In 1996 the Australian Government resigned 
from the ILO Governing Body, withdrew the Government appointed Special Labour 
Adviser to the ILO and reduced funding for trade union and employer ILO 
participation to the bare minimum required under ILO membership criteria. 30 This 
withdrawal of involvement was accompanied by increased reluctance on the part of 
the Australian Government to engage in meaningful dialogue with the ILO over 
compliance issues relating to ratified Conventions. Observations by ILO bodies, 
particularly the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) relating to Australian adherence to Convention 87 The 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948, 
have involved a fruitless dialogue between the ILO and the Australian Government 
over differing interpretations of the Convention, approaches to the principle of 
freedom of association, and opinions as to the steps necessary in order to fully 
implement and comply with the Convention. 3I 
This fundamental shift in the Australian relationship with the ILO coincides with 
increased international scrutiny of the ILO role in international standard setting. In 
particular, commentators have pointed to the plethora of standards established over 
the history of the organization, the continued application of outdated standards, 
increasing Convention adoption rates alongside decreasing ratification rates and the 
29 For example, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) is responsible for reviewing ILO Member State Reports on ratified 	• 
Conventions. The Observations of the CEACR on the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRA) and 
its compliance with the Freedom of Association Conventions of 2003 and 2004 have been critical of 
the WRA with respect to the restrictions placed on access to the right to take strike action free from 
legal liability. Further, in 2000, an ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) determination 
arising out of the waterfront dispute was critical of aspects of the WRA: Complaint Against the 
Government of Australia presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU), 
the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), Document Vol. LXXXIII, 2000, Series B, No. 1, 
Report 320, Case 1963. For discussion of the criticism of Australian law and practice by the ILO 
bodies see chapter 8. 
30 B. Creighton, 'The ILO and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights in Australia' (1998) 22 
Melbourne University Law Review 239 at 279; M. Davis, 'The International Rules Australia Won't 
Play By' Australian Financial Review, September 11, 1996, 15; N. Ruskin and L. Smith, 'The Role 
and Impact of International Labour Organization Standards in the Australian Workplace' (1998) 40 
Journal of Industrial Relations 314 at 325. 
31 For discussion of this dialogue between the CEACR and the Australian Government see chapter 8, 
page 253-257. 
8 
growth in influential labour norms outside the ILO, in particular in Europe, the old 
power base of the IL0. 32 Partly in response to these perceived problems, and as the 
result of the appointment of a new Director General of the ILO, the organization 
responded in 1998 with the passage of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work. 33 The Declaration reaffirmed the ILO commitment to the four 
fundamental core labour standards: the abolition of forced labour, the abolition of 
child labour, the abolition of discrimination in employment and freedom of 
association. The Declaration committed all Member States of the ILO, regardless of 
their ratification of relevant Conventions, to respect, promote and realise the 
fundamental rights. 34 
The passage of the Fundamental Declaration has assisted in revitalising the role of the 
ILO in the modern human rights context. The consistent and unified manner in which 
the ILO has treated workers' . rights as core human rights has led to human rights 
32 The challenges facing the ILO have been explored by many authors, for example: P. Alston, 'Post-
post-modernism and International Labour Standards: The Quest for a New Complexity' in W. 
Sengenberger and D. Campbell, (eds.) International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence 
(International Institute for Labour Studies: Geneva, 1994), 95; H. G. Bartolomei de la Cruz, 
'International Labour Law: Renewal or Decline?' (1994) 10 International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 201; H. G. Bartolomei de la Cruz, G. von Potobslcy and L. 
Swepston, The International Labor Organization: The International Standards System and Basic 
Human Rights (Westview Press: Boulder, 1996), chapter 5; S. Cooney, 'Testing Times for the ILO: 
Institutional Reform for the New International Political Economy' (1999) 20 Comparative Labor Law 
and Policy Journal 365; E. Cordova, 'Some Reflections on the Overproduction of International Labor 
Standards' (1993) 14 Comparative Labor Law Journal 138; Creighton, supra note 19 at 93; Creighton 
(1995A) supra note 19 at 207; I. A. Donoso Rubio, 'Economic Limits on International Regulation: A 
Case Study of ILO Standard-Setting' (1998) 24 Queens Law Journal 189; L. Swepston, 'The Future of 
ILO Standards' (1994) Monthly Labour Review, September Issue, 16. A. Frazer and C. Nyland, 'In 
Search of the Middle Way: The ILO, Standard Setting and Globalisation' (1997) 10 Australian Journal 
of Labour Law 280 at 280 examined the challenges facing the ILO in the context of the 1997 ILO 
Director General's Report that identified the threats facing the ILO, noting that: "The undermining of 
basic values [experienced in many ILO Member States] is furthered by the wide acceptance of the new 
utopianism which advocates an ideal world in which human action is answerable only to the laws of 
economic rationality". In recent years a new challenge to international labour standards has arisen in 
the form of the "ratcheting labour standards" proposal: J. Murray, 'The Sound of One Hand Clapping? 
The Ratcheting Labour Standards Proposal and International Labour Law' (2001) 14 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 306. 
33 For discussion of the Declaration of Fundamental of Principles and Rights at Work 1998 see: J. 
Bellace, 'The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work' (2001) 17 International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 269; C. Coxson, 'The 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: Promoting Labor Law Reforms Through 
the ILO as an Alternative to Imposing Coercive Trade Sanctions' (1999) 17 Dickinson Journal of 
International Law 469; H. Kellerson, 'The ILO Declaration of 1998 on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights: A Challenge for the Future?' (1998) 137 International Labour Review 223. 
34 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO, 1998, Document 
CIT/1998/PR20A, Article 2. 
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scholars engaging with 'labour law' and looking to the ILO for leadership. 35 The ILO 
has an extremely well developed supervisory structure that has been increasingly 
lauded as a model of effective supervision for systems lacking positive enforcement 
mechanisms. 36 Further, the tripartite nature of the organization provides a forum for 
input from workers, employers and governments in the development of new standards 
and the ongoing supervision of old standards. This lends a degree of legitimacy to the 
standards of the ILO that cannot be claimed by any other international human rights 
body. 37 
The revitalisation of the ILO and its renewed commitment to obtaining compliance 
with core labour standards suggests that Australian compliance with ILO standards is 
of ongoing importance. Since the enactment of the Industrial Relations Reform Act in 
1993 which relied heavily upon international standards for constitutional competence, 
and the opening up of the Australian economy to international competition, the 
Australian labour market has been increasingly internationalised. However, progress 
with internationalisation of the Australian economy has not been matched by a 
corresponding commitment to international standards. Commitment to international • 
labour standards in Australia is necessary in order to maintain domestic labour 
standards, encourage competitor nations to adhere to those standards and enhance the 
role of Australia within the international community. While the ideological approach 
of the Australian Government and the determinative bodies of the ILO may be 
divergent at present, this may not always be the case. In any event, it remains the case 
the Australia has undertaken international legal obligations and cannot escape 
scrutiny. 
35 For example: V. Leary, `Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization' in P. 
Alston, (ed.) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 
1992), 580; V. Leary, 'The Paradox of Workers Rights as Human Rights' in L. Compa and S. 
Diamond, (eds.) Human Rights, Labor Rights and International Trade (University of Pennsylvania 
Press: Philadelphia, 1996), 22; N. Valticos, 'International Labour Standards and Human Rights: 
Approaching the Year 2000' (1998) 137 International Labour Review 135. 
36 Leary 1992, supra note 35. Also see L. Swepston, 'The International Labour Organization and 
Human Rights Access to the ILO' in G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B. Ramcharan and A. de Zayas, 
(eds.) International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms -Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Moller 
(Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001), 485. 
37 Leary 1996, supra note 35 at 42. 
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Contribution Made by the Thesis 
The aim of the thesis is to measure the extent to which the Australian legal framework 
with respect to strike action complies with voluntarily assumed international 
obligations on the right to strike. This will involve engagement with literature 
concerning the nature of the right to strike in international law and the domestic 
implementation of, and compliance with, with international law. It will make 
contributions.to each of these areas, building upon and adding to work undertaken in 
the international and domestic arenas. 
The right to strike in international law 
The first section of the thesis explores the nature of the right to strike in international 
law and reveals the relationship between the right to strike and the fundamental 
principle of freedom of association. This work engages with a relatively small field of 
literature on the topic of strike. 
There are three main treatises on the sources, content and scope of the right to strike 
as expressed within, or implied in, international instruments to which Australia is a 
party. The first is the study, published in 1988, by Ruth Ben-Israel, International 
Labour Standards: the Case of Freedom to Strike in which she sketched the: "full and 
detailed content of the international labour standard concerning the right to strike". 38 
The study made three important contributions to the general understanding of the right 
to strike in international law. First, it provided a detailed historical account of the 
adoption of ILO Conventions 87 The Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
38 Ben-Israel, supra note 1 at 7. Ben-Israel's study of the right to strike in international law represented 
the first systematic and thorough treatise on this issue. The question of scope and extent of the right had 
been considered in less detail before by Betten: L. Betten, The Right to Strike in Community Law 
(Elsevier Science Publishers: North Holland, 1985). Chapter Seven provided a brief outline of the 
supervisory structures, complaint mechanisms of the European Social Charter, the ICESCR and the 
Conventions of the ILO. The chapter further sought to elaborate upon the scope and content of the right 
to strike as expressed (or implicit) within each relevant instrument. In addition, before Ben-Israel 
published her study, the International Labour Review published an article reviewing the determinations 
of the Committee on Freedom of Association on strikes: J. Hodges-Aeberhard, and A. Dios de Odero, 
'Principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association Concerning Strikes' (1987) 126 International 
Labour Review 543. There was also an earlier article, which considered the right to strike within the 
context of the principle of freedom of association: J. M. Servais, 'International Labour Organization 
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Right to Organise Convention 1948, and 98 The Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (the 'Freedom of Association Conventions') and the 
decision of the drafters of the Conventions not to include an express right to strike. 39 
The absence of express inclusion of the right to strike in Conventions 87 and 98 is one 
of the great weaknesses of the right to strike in the ILO context. However, Ben-Israel 
concluded from her analysis that this decision reflected the predominant view of the 
ILO Conference at the time of adoption that the right to strike was an integral 
component of the principle of freedom of association, making it unnecessary to 
provide express or separate protection.° Second, the study documented the right to 
strike in international law and the basis upon which ratifying States are bound to 
recognise the right in domestic law. Ben-Israel concluded that the right to strike is an 
express treaty based right under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and also a treaty based labour standard, implicit in the 
principle of freedom of association, as expressed within the Constitution of the ILO 
and the ILO Freedom of Association Conventions. 4 ' Third, the study provided a 
summary, albeit uncritical, of the scope and extent of the implicit right to strike within 
ILO Freedom of Association Conventions. 42 
The second treatise is a recent compilation of ILO principles on the right to strike by 
Gerningon, Odero and Guido. First published as an article in the International Labour 
Review, 'ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike', and later republished in 
pamphlet form and released by the International Labour Office, the paper summarises 
the views of relevant ILO bodies with respect to the right to strike. 43 The treatise 
represents a useful survey of the principles in this area and gives insight into the 
reasoning of ILO bodies. However, while it consolidated the material compiled by 
Ben-Israel to 1998, it did not engage in any critical assessment of the commentary. 44 
Standards on Freedom of Association and their Implementation' (1984) 123 International Labour 
Review 765. 
39 Ibid at 35-70. 
40 ibid. 
41 Ibid at 70 and 92. 
42 Ibid at Part HI. 
B. Gemigon, A. Odero and H. Guido, 'ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike' (1998) 137 
International Labour Review 441; B. Gemigon, A. Odero and H. Guido, ILO Principles Concerning 
the Right to Strike (International Labour Office: Geneva, 2000). 
44 In between the publication of Ben-Israel's study and this survey, the principles relating to the right to 
strike were also described within the context of other works on the principle of freedom of association 
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The third study is Tonia Novitz's, International and European Protection of the Right 
to Strike (2003). 45 The work is a comparative survey of standards set by the ILO, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. Of relevance to this thesis is the aspect of 
the study that surveys the instruments of the ILO and the United Nations (UN). The 
survey of ILO principles revisits the material covered by Ben-Israel by examining the 
adoption of the Freedom of Association Conventions and the decision to exclude an 
express right to strike. 46 The study also provides a useful comparative survey of the 
principles relating to the right to strike within the European Union, the ILO and UN 
Conventions. 47 
These studies represent the three main secondary sources of coverage of the scope and 
content of the right to strike under international instruments to which Australia is a 
party. The ground has been traversed by other authors in the context of specialist 
studies or in the context of general treatises on international labour law. 48 With 
respect to specialist texts, Matthew Craven in his study of the ICESCR pays some 
attention to the scope of Article 8(1)(d) of the Covenant, which sets out an express 
obligation on ratifying States to recognise the right to strike.49 However this study is 
not exhaustive with respect to the scope of the right to strike. It focuses on other 
provisions within Article 8, particularly the limitation provisions. Also in this vein is 
within the ILO, for example: L. Swepston, 'Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association: 
Development through ILO Supervision' (1998) 137 International Labour Review 169 at 186-190. 
45 T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike, (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2003). Fenwick discusses this study in the Australian context: C. Fenwick, 'International Law 
on the Right to Strike' (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Labour Law 125. 
46 Ibid at 109— 124. 
47 Ibid. Comparative jurisprudence relating to the scope of the right to strike within European, ILO and 
UN instruments is set out in Part IV, chapters 11-14. 
48 There is also some coverage of the right to strike within generalist international labour law texts. The 
two texts of significance are L. Betten, International Labour Law: Selected Issues (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1993) and N. Valticos and G. von Potobslcy, International Labour Law 
(2nd ed., Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1995). Each contains limited surveys of the 
scope of the right to strike as expressed in international law and implicit in the ILO Freedom of 
Association Conventions, but these studies are not comprehensive and draw largely upon Ben-Israel. 
Betten dicussed the right to strike implicit in the Conventions of the ILO and the express right to strike 
within the European Social Charter at 110-118 but does not look at the ICES CR. Valticos and von 
Potobslcy examine the right to strike within the European Social Charter at 94-95 and the implicit right 
to strike in the Conventions of the ILO at 85-86. A recent example of coverage of ILO principles on the 
right to strike in the context of coverage of the principle of freedom of association is B. Creighton, 
'Freedom of Association' in R. Blanpain, (ed.) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
Industrialised Market Economies (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2004), 233 at 267-271. 
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an article by Rolf Birk, 'Derogations and Restrictions on the Right to Strike Under 
International Law', surveying permissible derogations and restrictions upon the right 
to strike as expressed in Article 8(1)(d). 5° 
Accordingly, the survey of the international right to strike in this thesis makes two 
important contributions to the literature. First, it consolidates, updates and expands the 
work of Ben-Israel and Gerningon, Odero and Guido, and complements the 
comparative study undertaken by Novitz. Secondly, it critically examines and 
explores the right to strike as a facet of the principle of freedom of association in 
international law, an area which is under-developed in the literature. 
International Standards and Domestic Compliance 
The second aspect of this thesis is to explore the Australian federal legal framework 
regulating strike action and measure the extent to which it complies with the 
voluntarily assumed international obligations previously established. This aspect of 
the study is consistent with the recent trend in Australian academic literature to 
actively engage with international labour standards and provide critical analysis of the 
extent of Australian compliance. 
As discussed above, in the context of engagement by Australian governments with 
international labour standards, the 'internationalisation' of Australian labour law can 
be traced from ILO criticism of Australia in 1991 and the passage of the Industrial 
Relations Reform Act (Cth) in 1993. Contemporary commentary was largely focused 
on the role of the ILO, the continued relevance of international labour standards and 
49 M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on 
its Development (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995) at chapter 7. 
50 R. Birk, 'Derogations and Restrictions on the Right to Strike Under International Law' in R. 
Blanpain, (ed.) Labour Law, Human Rights and Social Justice (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 
2001), 95. Birk also considers permissible derogations and restrictions on the right to strike within the 
European Social Charter and the implied right to strike recognised by the ILO. However, the paper 
does not provide in-depth coverage of the ILO right to strike and the sedtions on the European Social 
Charter are outside the scope of this discussion. Also of relevance is P. Alston and G. Quinn, 'The 
Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under the International Covenant of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights' (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156. This article provides guidance for the 
interpretation of the ICESCR and the nature and scope of States Parties' obligations under the 
Covenant. While the article is useful with respect to the appropriate interpretation of the Covenant, and 
the meaning and effect of the limitations clauses, it does not give any consideration of the meaning or 
extent of Article 8(1)(d) of the ICESCR. 
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the changing nature of Australia's relationship with international standards. 51 
Alongside this general engagement with international standards, a focus on the issue 
of compliance by Australian law with applicable standards began to emerge in the 
literature. In addition, recent Australian literature has engaged with ILO standards as 
an independent topic of scholarly interest. 52 
In terms of consideration of compliance issues on a broad scale, Creighton has 
produced a significant and important body of literature examining the issue of 
Australian engagement with international standards and the degree to which various 
areas of Australian labour law t an be considered to comply with these standards. As 
early as 1991, Creighton questioned the degree to which compulsion within the 
conciliation and arbitration system was compatible with international standards on the 
principle of freedom of association. 53 In 1997, Creighton took a whole of Act 
approach to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) examining the extent to which 
the Act was consistent with Australia's international obligations in the area of labour 
standards. 54 This study was enhanced in 1998 by Creighton in a study of Australian 
compliance with the four core labour standards now embodied within the ILO 
Fundamental Declaration of Principles and Rights at Work1998. 55 
51 For example: Creighton, supra note 19; Creighton 1995A, supra note 19; McCallum, supra note 26; 
R. McCallum, 'The Internationalisation of Australian Industrial Law: The Industrial Relations Reform 
Act 1993' (1994) 15 Sydney Law Review 122; and M. Pittard, 'International Labour Standards in 
Australia: Wages, Equal Pay, Leave and Termination of Employment' (1994) 7 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 170. Further, in 1993 Creighton examined the question of the legal application of 
international law in Australia, specifically with respect to international labour standards: B. Creighton, 
'Industrial Regulation and Australia's International Obligations' .in P. Ronfeldt and R. McCallum, 
(eds.) A New Province for Legalism: Legal Issues and the Deregulation of Industrial Relations 
(ACCIRT: Sydney, 1993), 101. 
52  For example Cooney, supra note 32; C. Fenwicic, 'The ILO Commission of Inquiry into Forced 
Labour in Burma' (1999) 12 Australian Journal of Labour Law 43; M. Kirby, 'Human Rights and 
Industrial Relations' (2002) 44 Journal of Industrial Relations 562; R. Layton, 'Forced Labour in 
Burma: A Summary of the International Labour Organization Report and Subsequent Developments' 
(2000) 4 Southern Cross University Law Review 148; J. Murray, Social Justice for Women? The ILO 's 
Convention on Part-Time Work, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Working Paper 
No. 15 (CELRL, University of Melbourne: Parlcville, 1999); J. Murray, Transnational Labour 
Regulation: The ILO and EC Compared (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001); Murray, supra 
note 32. 
53  Creighton, supra note 12 at 210— 212. This issue was also examined in 1993 by McEvoy and Owens 
commenting on the CFA determination in the Pilots' Dispute: K. McEvoy and R. Owens, 'On a Wing 
and a Prayer: The Pilots Dispute in the International Context' (1993) 6 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 1. 
54 B. Creighton, 'The Workplace Relations Act in International Perspective' (1997) 10 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 31. 
15 	• 
In addition to this body of work on compliance issues at a general level, there is a 
growing body of literature examining issues related to compliance with specific 
instruments. For example, Chapman has examined the influence of ILO standards on 
unfair dismissa1,56 Creighton has measured compliance with child labour 
Conventions, 57 Fenwick has drawn upon ILO Conventions in discussing the 
regulation of prison labour, 58 Murray has discussed the issue of freedom of 
association in the context of the maritime dispute, 59 and Sharard has considered the 
ILO collective bargaining principles in the context of the Industrial Relations Act (as 
amended in 1993). 60 However, there has been no systematic study of Australian 
compliance with international labour standards on the right to strike and the principle 
of freedom of association considered from the perspective of strike action. 6I 
Therefore, this thesis complements the existing literature, drawing upon and 
expanding previous studies and represents the first systematic study of Australian 
compliance with respect to international standards on the right to strike. 
Measuring Compliance 
Approach of Thesis 
The approach to the task of measuring compliance will be canvassed in detail in 
chapter 8. Briefly, there are three main components. First, the thesis will examine the 
legal structures within both the ILO and the federal workplace relations system in 
order to establish the manner in which both structures accommodate the right to . 
strike. Second, the thesis will consider any areas of practical divergence from the 
55 Creighton, supra note 30. 
56 A Chapman, 'The Declining Influence of ILO Standards in Shaping Australian Statutory Provisions 
on Unfair Dismissal' (2003) 29 Monash University Law Review 104. 
57 B. Creighton, 'ILO Convention No 138 and Australian Law and Practice Relating to Child Labour' 
(1996) 2 Australian Journal of Human Rights 293. 
8 C. Fenwicic, 'Regulating Prisoners' Labour in Australia: A Preliminary View' (2003) 16 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 284. 
59 J. Murray, 'Australia in the Dock: the ILO's decision on the Waterfront Dispute' (2000) 13 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 167. 
60 T Sharard, Competing Models of Worker Representation — the ILO Collective Bargaining Principles 
and Part VIB of the Industrial Relations Act 1988, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
Working Paper No. 10 (CELRL, University of Melbourne: Parkville, 1996). 
61 Note S. McCrystal, 'The Right to Strike: International Treaties and Covenants', Appendix One in 
The Law Relating to Industrial Action in the Building and Construction Industry, A paper prepared by 
the Faculty of Law at Monash University for the Royal Commission into the Building and Construction 
Industry, Discussion Paper 18, November, 2002, 150. This paper surveys international instruments and 
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legal framework to measure compliance from both a legal and practical perspective. 
Finally, drawing upon the literature and the legal and practical framework, the study 
will draw conclusions about the nature of the right to strike in both the international 
and domestic contexts. " 
Comparative Literature 
The objective of the thesis is to examine the extent to which domestic Australian law 
complies with international legal standards. While this is not a comparative exercise 
(in the sense of comparing alternate legal systems), the literature exploring 
comparative labour law provides useful guidance with respect to. the task undertaken 
by this thesis. 
There is a wealth of comparative work on strike law, providing a basis for comparison 
of the laws concerning strikes within domestic systems. A core resource is NATLEX, 
a database maintained by the ILO which contains references to over 55,000 national 
laws on labour, social security and related human rights. 62 Another core resource is 
the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Labour Law that sets out 
comparative analysis of the labour laws of different nations. 63 Further, the regularly 
published work Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised 
Market Economies always contains a chapter on strikes and lockouts, frequently one 
on freedom of association and chapters on the resolution of industrial disputes 
outlining the law in a variety of systems. 64 A more specific study in the context of 
laws regulating strike action is Strikes and Lockouts in Industrialised Market 
related commentary of ILO bodies in respect to Australian compliance but does not systematically 
analyse Australian compliance with international standards on the right to strike. 
62 ILO, NATLEX database — http://natlex.ilo.org. 
63 See for example, R. Ben-Israel, 'Strikes, Lockouts and Other Kinds of Hostile Actions' in B. Hepple, 
(ed.) International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1997), 
vol 15; J. de Givry, 'Prevention and Settlement of Labour Disputes, Other than Conflicts of Rights', 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,(JCB Mohr, Tubingen and Sitjthoff and Noordhoff: 
Alphen, 1978). 
64 R. Blanpain, (ed.) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised Market 
Economies (Wil ed., Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2004) contains the following relevant 
chapters: chapter 11, 'Freedom of Association' by B. Creighton; chapter 21, 'The Law of Strikes and 
Lock-Outs' by A.T.J.M. Jacobs; chapter 22, 'Settlement of Disputes Over Rights' by A. Gladstone; and 
chapter 23, 'Settlement of Disputes Over Interests' by A. Goldman. 
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Economies. 65 This is a comparative study, published in 1994, detailing the law 
relating to strikes and lockouts across eleven countries including an introduction to 
the law of strikes and lockouts by Ben-Israel. 66 
Of particular value to the study undertaken in this thesis is the theoretical and critical 
literature on comparativism. It is best exemplified by the works of Kahn-Freund, 67 
Blanpain68 and Mitchell (with other authors). 69 Kahn-Freund, while encouraging 
comparative study, warns against the wholesale transplantation of laws and 
institutions, especially between countries with different political power structures, 
arguing that "we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable". 7° 
He considers that there would be difficulty in accommodating a new system, if power 
in one society operated differently in the other. Further, in a recent paper, Cooney and 
Mitchell demonstrate that while the location of political power is an important factor 
in transplantation, other factors, including social and economic forces, will also 
mitigate against the transplantation of labour laws. 71 
In a similar vein, considering the domestic application of international standards, Von 
Prondzynski warns that "[Ole danger in applying international standards is to 
assume that there is one global scale on which performance of individual states can be 
65 R. Blanpain and R. Ben-Israel, (eds.) Strikes and Lock-Outs in Industrialised Market Economies 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1994). 
66 R. Ben-Israel, 'Introduction to Strikes and Lock-outs: a Comparative Perspective' in R. Blanpain and 
R. Ben-Israel, (eds.) Strikes and Lock-Outs in Industrialised Market Economies (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1994), 1. 
67 O. Kahn-Freund,. 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1. 
68 R. Blanpain, `Comparativism in Labour Law and Industrial Relations' in R. Blanpain and C. Engels, 
(eds.) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (Kluwer 
Law International: The Hague, 2001), 3. 
69 S. Cooney, T. Lindsey, R. Mitchell and Y. Zhu, 'Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation in East 
Asian States' in S. Cooney, T. Lindsey, R. Mitchell and Y. Zhu, (eds.) Law and Labour Market 
Regulation in East Asia (Routledge: London and New York, 2002), 3; R. Mitchell and J. MM Aun Wu, 
'Introduction: Pressures on the Concept of Labour Law in the Asia-Pacific Region' in R. Mitchell and 
J. Min Aun Wu, (eds.) Facing the Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Themes and 
Issues in Labour Law (Occasional Monograph No. 5, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
University of Melbourne: Parkville, 1997), x; S. Cooney and R. Mitchell, 'Labour Relations and the Law 
in Three East Asian NICS: Some Problems and Issues For Comparative Labour Law Inquiry' (Paper 
presented at the Global Integration and Challenges for Industrial Relations and Human Resource 
Management in the Twenty-First Century, Tokyo, 29 May - 2 June 2000). 
" Kahn-Freund, supra note 67 at 27. 
71 Cooney and Mitchell, supra note 69. • 
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measured". 72 Herein lies the difficulty — do international labour standards truly 
constitute universal standards that can be implemented without reference to historical, 
cultural and ideological factors? For Blanpain, international standards that set 
minimum protective standards readily lend themselves to domestic application. 73 
However, those standards affected by power relations in domestic systems, like 
freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike, are "resistant to 
transplantation", because their implementation and application depend more heavily 
upon acceptance by existing societalpower structures. 74. It is for this reason, argues 
Blanpain, that ILO standards on freedom of association are drafted in cautious 
flexible terms adaptive to a range of legal structures. 75 Forde advocates caution with 
respect to standards adjusted through the interpretation of instruments by international 
jurists, due to the complexities involved in setting out common standards: 
[e]specially at the international level, there is a grave danger of amateurs, no 
matter how eminent they may be as jurists, tinkering with arrangements they 
do not fully understand, and tending to impose standards that may work in 
their own countries upon the entirely different labor market systems of other 
States. 76 
The insight from this literature is that the assessment of the compatibility of 
Australian law with international standards must not ignore the political and 
ideological factors at play in the formulation and application of those standards. Just 
as domestic systems do not develop law in a vacuum; neither do international 
standards emerge fully formed without the influence of political and ideological 
factors. Accordingly, in the assessment of the content of international standards with 
respect to the right to strike, the analysis will take into account the factors that have 
shaped those standards. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is a case study of the Australian domestic implementation of voluntarily 
assumed international standards on the right to strike. Coverage of the topic will 
72  F. von Prondzynslci, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study 
(Mansell Publishing Ltd: London, 1987) at 25. 
73 Blanpain, supra note 68. 
74 Ibid at 20. 
75 Ibid. 
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require examination of both the international regime and the federal legal structure. 
This will set up a framework against which the thesis will measure the degree to 
which the federal model in Australia complies with the relevant international 
obligations. 
Chapter 1 will outline the existence of the right to strike in international law, 
establishing the basis for recognition of the right and exploring its philosophical and 
ideological underpinnings. The chapter will discuss the nature of the right to strike as 
an implicit element of the principle of freedom of association and the extent of 
recognition of this principle within international law instruments and relevant 
domestic constitutions. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will outline the content of the international obligation to respect the 
right to strike'in detail through analysis of UN and ILO instruments, the principle of 
freedom of association and the commentary of international supervisory bodies. 
Chapter 4 will draw together a series of observations on the right to strike in 
international law. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will explore Australian federal law and practice concerning the right 
to strike. Beginning with a discussion of foundation and jurisdictional questions 
concerning Australian law and practice relating to the right to strike, the chapters will 
then examine the applicable legal framework in detail, covering contract, tort, 
criminal law, the TPA, and the WRA. 
• Chapter 7 will draw upon the survey of federal law relating to strike action undertaken 
in chapters 5 and 6, providing general observations on the nature of the right to strike 
within the federal system. 
Chapter 8 will analyse and measure the extent to which the federal law (combining 
legislation and common law) complies with voluntarily assumed international 
76 M Forde, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and Labor Law' (1983) 31 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 301 at 332. 
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obligations with respect to the right to strike. Compliance will be assessed as to 
specific aspects of the law and, equally important as to the sum of the parts. 
The Conclusion will set out the key compliance findings arising out of the analysis 
undertaken in chapter 8. The Conclusion will set out the nature of Australian 
compliance with international standards on the right to strike, drawing upon the 




The Right to Strike and Freedom of Association 
Introduction 
This study, in exploring the scope and content of the right to strike in international 
law, must first grapple with the legal basis of the obligation to provide a right to 
strike. As Ben-Israel observed,' the right to strike is an express treaty based right 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and a treaty based labour standard, implicit in the principle of freedom of association, 
as expressed within the Constitution of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the ILO's Freedom of Association Conventions (Conventions 87 and 98). 2 The 
express right will be examined in chapter 2 and the implicit right in chapter 3. This 
chapter will explore the philosophical underpinning'of the right to strike in 
international law, and in particular the connection between strike action and collective 
bargaining and the overarching principle of freedom of association which is 
recognised within international law instruments and some domestic Constitutions. 
Philosophical Underpinnings of the Right to Strike in International Law 
The following discussion will examine the nature of the right to strike in international 
law, with specific attention to the relationship between the right to strike and the 
principle of freedom of association. 
'Noted in the Introduction at 11-12: R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of 
Freedom to Strike (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1988) at 70 and 92. 
2 ILO Convention 87, Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention 1948 and ILO 
Convention 98, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (the 'Freedom of 
Association Conventions'). 
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Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike 
[T]he ongoing debate between individualists and collectivists ... is often the 
background on these issues ... the general principle that individual freedom is 
a central value ... [as opposed to] the principle that collective strength and 
trade union autonomy should be protected. 3 
Strike action is collective activity. The withdrawal of labour by an individual worker 
may occur in protest or as an exercise of bargaining power, but to engage in action 
properly considered 'strike action', the individual needs to act in concert: one 
component of a group withdrawal of labour.4 The ability to strike pre-supposes the 
freedom of workers to act in association. From this view, it can be seen that the 
freedom to associate with others is a prerequisite to the right to strike. However, the 
more difficult question relates to the issue of whether the freedom to associate 
necessarily involves the right to strike. The answer to this question alters depending 
on whether the answer is viewed through the prism of individual or collective rights. 
It is important to review the relationship between freedom of association and the right 
to strike because recognition of the legitimacy of strike action by ILO bodies is based 
on the assumption of an implicit right to strike within the principle of freedom of 
association as expressed within ILO instruments. The ILO Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has consistently 
reaffirmed the existence of the implicit right to strike: 
[u]nder Article 3(1) of Convention No. 87, the right to organize activities and 
to formulate programmes is recognized for workers' and employers' 
organizations. In the vie* of the Committee, strike action is part of these 
activities under the provisions of Article 3; it is a collective right exercised, in 
the case of workers, by a group of persons who decide not to work in order to 
have their demands met ... the Committee confirms its basic position that the 
right to strike is an intrinsic corollary of the right to organize protected by 
Convention No 87. 5 
3 S. Leader, 'The European Convention on Human Rights, The Employment Act of 1988 and the Right 
to Refuse to Strike' (1991) 20 Industrial Law Journal 39 at 40-41. 
Examples of this view: 0. Kahn-Freund and B. Hepple, Laws Against Strikes (Fabian Research 
Series: London, 1972) at 4; S. Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labor Law and Political 
Theory (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1992) at 25; L. J. McFarlane, The Right to Strike (Penguin 
Books: Middlesex, 1981) at 20. 
5 International Labour Office, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, General Survey of 
the Reports on the Freedom ofAssociation and the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), 1948 and 
the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) 1949, Report of the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 
81' Session 1994, Report III (Part 4B), Geneva (The 'General Survey, 1994'), paragraphs 149 and 151. 
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The ILO construction of an implicit right to strike within the principle of freedom of 
association is one of the principal, and the most comprehensive, sources of the 
Australian obligation to recognise the right to strike. In this context the first task is to 
construct the content of the principle of freedom of association. The second task is to 
examine the manner in which the content of the principle of freedom of association 
has been construed by national and supra national bodies. 
Constructing the principle of freedom of association 
Literature exploring whether or not the right to strike is implicit in the principle of 
freedom of association contains two divergent viewpoints. The first presents freedom 
of association as a freedom exercised by the individual, in which the individual 
member of society is free to join with other individuals within association. Once in 
association, the individual is free to do whatever they are at liberty to do within 
society as an individual, but no more. 6 This view of freedom of association constructs 
the freedom as an individual freedom, offering the individual the freedom to associate 
with other individuals, but no protection for the purposes or activities of that 
association. It is based in the liberal tradition of Locke, Smith and more recently, 
Hayek, whereby the individual is the core unit of society, and all freedoms flow from 
the right of the individual to be free of interference from the State. 7 Freedoms and 
rights, from a liberal perspective, are designed to leave the individual free from 
interference. Therefore, an association formed by a group of individuals has no more 
rights than each individual possesses. The freedom is not designed to facilitate the 	, 
purposes of the individuals in associating, merely to protect their right to associate. In 
this sense, freedom of association is seen as a static, non-facilitative freedom. 8 
6 Examples of this view: P. A. Gall, 'Freedom of Association and Trade Unions: A Double Edged 
Constitutional Sword' in J. Weiler and R. Elliot, (eds.) Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Carswell: Toronto, 1986), 245; T. Sheppard, 'Liberalism and the 
Charter: Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike' (1996) 5 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 
117. For discussion of the individualist view of freedom of association within a broader context see: 
Leader, supra note 4 at chapter 3, 'The Source and Nature of the Right to Freedom of Association'; F. 
von Prondzynslci, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study (Mansell 
Publishing Lid: London, 1987), chapter 11; Lord Wedderburn, 'Freedom of Association and 
Philosophies of Labour Law' (1989) 18 Industrial Law Journal 1. 
7 Discussed in M. Moir, 'Individual and Collective Bargaining in Australian Labour Law: The CRA 
Weipa Case' (1996) 18 Sydney Law Review 350 at 356-360. 
8  While the majority of liberal theorists construct the principle of freedom of association in this fashion, 
exclusive of collective bargaining and the right to strike, this view is not universal. Sheppard, supra 
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This construction of the principle of freedom of association also embraces the 
negative construction of the freedom, the freedom not to associate. As individuals 
must be free to do in association that which they can do as individuals, so must they 
be free to remain outside of association. 9 This aspect of the liberal construction of 
freedom of association provides an interesting counterpoint to the second construction 
of the freedom advocated, the functional and collective view: 
Those who place a premium on the right to disassociate usually begin from 
broadly individualist premises, while those who give it a lower priority usually 
do so because their sympathies are collectivist. I° 
As opposed to the static construction of the principle of freedom of association 
advocated by liberal theorists, those with collectivist sympathies construct freedom of 
association from a dynamic functional perspective. These theorists view the 
employment relationship through the prism of power imbalance. Freedom of 
association provides an essential means of correcting the imbalance allowing for 
parity within the industrial relations process." The functional collectivist perspective 
constructs freedom of association as three-dimensional: 
[f]reedom of association is in fact a principle with at least three dimensions ... 
The first is the right to be in association with others and not to suffer 
disadvantage as a result... 
[the] second ... is the freedom of individuals to determine who they will 
associate with and on what terms ...[and] 
The third is the right to act in association with others, for example to bargain 
collectively or to strike. I2 
The collective functional perspective constructs freedom of association within the 
context of industrial relations and power imbalance, serving the function of sustaining 
note 6, advocates the liberal construction of freedom of association, but considers that the freedom 
embraces strike action as a freedom from non-interference. Sheppard argues at 149 that "[w]hat the 
unions are really seeking is the right to enter into the labour negotiation process without the fear of the 
State's coercive powers being used against them. It is a freedcim they seek, the same freedom liberals 
seek for all individuals - the freedom from governmental interference". He further asserts at 164 that 
"[Ole moral imperative of liberalism demands that workers take care of their own well being and not 
rely upon their employers to do so. The liberal who objects to workers presenting a united front to their 
employer has not properly considered the key role that freedom of association has played in 
liberalism". 
9 For discussion of the existence or otherwise of the negative aspect of the principle of freedom of 
association see: Leader, supra note 4, chapter 3; Prondzynski, supra note 6, chapter 11. 
I° Leader, supra note 4 at 6. 
1i For example see Leader, supra note 4, chapter 11; P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New 
Directions in Canadian Labour Law (The Carswell Company Ltd: Toronto, 1980) at 32-33. 
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the rights and enhancing the power of workers. 13 The right to bargain and the right to 
strike flow naturally from the right of workers to form associations. Unlike the liberal 
individualist perspective whereby the development of freedom of association is 
perceived as having been for the protection of individual liberty, the collective 
functional perspective postulates that the development of the freedom was to protect 
collective actions: 
[i]t is important to bear in mind, therefore, that the reason why freedom of 
association was given protection in national and international law was not to 
protect individual interests, but rather to seek to secure a more equitable 
distribution of power within the working environment and beyond that, society 
as a whole. It would be both unfortunate and strange if the main substance of 
freedom of association, which was first introduced to allow workers to 
combine, were now to be seen in the right of individuals to an isolated 
existence. 14 
This dichotomy of views with respect to the principle of freedom of association is 
further reflected within interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by 
national and supra national bodies, when called upon to consider the meaning of an 
enactment of freedom of association in a national constitution or international treaty. 
Freedom of Association in National and Supra National Jurisprudence 
The principle of freedom of association is enacted in a range of international and 
national instruments. The construction of the freedom by relevant interpretative 
bodies as inclusive or exclusive of collective bargaining and the right to strike follows 
the individual/collective dichotomy outlined in the preceding discussion. In addition, 
the enactments of the freedom reflect an historic division within human rights 
jurisprudence between civil/political rights and social/economic rights. 15 
Rights can be divided into those traditionally considered to be negative, in the sense 
that no government intervention is required to ensure the existence of the right, and 
those which are positive, in the sense that government action.is  required to give 
'2 K D. Ewing, 'The Implications of Wilson and Palmer' (2003) 32 Industrial Law Journall at 17. 
13  Prondzynski, supra note 6 at 151. 
14 Ibid at 232-233. 
15 Social and economic rights are usually grouped with cultural rights. The exclusion of cultural rights 
from this thesis is not intended to suggest that they are less valuable or important than social and 
economic rights. Rather, cultural rights are excluded for the sake of brevity, because the right to strike 
could constitute either a social or an economic right, but is not a cultural right. 
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substance to the right. 16 For example, in the UN context, civil and political rights, 
considered to be negative, were enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), while economic and social rights, considered to be positive, 
requiring positive and usually financial action on the part of the State, were enacted in 
the ICESCR. 17 There is continuing debate over the value of this division of human 
rights. In practical terms the economic/social rights have been afforded less priority in 
the international context than the civil/political rights. A timely example is the failure 
to develop a complaints protocol for the ICESCR, while a functional complaints 
protocol has been in place for the ICCPR since 1976. 18 Recent commentary considers 
the continued division of rights as unjustified: 
This subdivision can only be termed regrettable because, in truth, human rights 
consist of rights relating to both categories and no essential difference exists 
between them. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, this division has no 
logical or legal explanation but, in truth, resides on political disparities 
between States of different persuasions at the time of their negotiation and 
adoption. 19 
In general terms, where the principle of freedom of association is enacted in a rubric 
of civil/political rights, it is constructed from the individualist framework. Conversely, 
where the freedom is enacted within a rubric of economic/social rights, it is 
constructed from the collectivist framework. The study will now briefly consider the 
enactment and construction of the principle of freedom of association within a range 
of international and national instruments.20 
16 McFarlane, supra note 4 at 14. 
17 For a detailed description of the history and development of the differentiation between the 
civil/political and economic/social rights see A. Eide and A. Rosas, 'Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Universal Challenge' in A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas, (eds.) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1995), 15; D. Montgomery, 'Labor Rights 
and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective' in L. Compa and S. Diamond, (eds.) Human Rights, 
Labor Rights and International Trade (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 1996), 13. 
18 For further discussion of the complaints protocol under the ICCPR see chapter 2. 
19 N. Valticos, 'International Labour Standards and Human Rights: Approaching the Year 2000' (1998) 
137 International Labour Review 135 at 148. 
29 The following discussion will examine enactments of the principle of freedom of association in a 
range of instruments. The examination is not intended to be exhaustive but demonstrative of the 
approach taken by domestic and international interpretative bodies. 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 21 
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) constitute the international code of human rights. While the UDHR is not 
binding in international law, the ICCPR and ICESCR represent the enforceable 
enactment of the principles set out within the UDHR. Those rights considered 
civil/political rights are enacted within the ICCPR, whereas economic/social rights are 
enacted within the ICESCR. The principle of freedom of association is enacted in 
both Covenants. 22 
Article 22 of the ICCPR provides that "[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests". The ICESCR contains a more extensive enactment of - 
trade union rights. Article 8 provides that State Parties to the ICESCR undertake to 
ensure the right of everyone to form and join trade unions for the promotion and 
protection of their economic and social interests, for trade unions to function freely 
and for the right to strike. 
In line with the individual/collective dichotomy and the civil/political versus 
social/economic split, jurisprudence with respect to these Conventions is divergent. 
Responsibility for interpretation of the ICCPR falls to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC), which, in a non-binding determination, has indicated 
that the ICCPR principle of freedom of association does not extend to the right to 
strike: 23 
Article 8, paragraph 1(d), of the [ICESCR] recognizes the right to strike ..... 
Consequently, the fact that the [ICCPR] does not similarly provide expressly 
for the right to strike in article 22, paragraph 1, shows that this right is not 
21 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), General Assembly Res 2200 21 
UN GAOR, Supp (No 16) 52, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) (UNTS 14668); The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), General Assembly Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR 
Supp (No 16) 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) (UNTS 14531). 
22  For detailed discussion of the ICCPR and the ICESCR in the context of the international law relating 
to the right to strike see chapter 2. 
23 j B. et al v Canada, Decision of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Twenty-Eighth session, UN Doc CCPR/C/28/D, 
Communication No. 118/1982 (hereafter referred to as 'the Alberta Union Case'). 
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included in the scope of this article, while it enjor protection under the 
procedures and mechanisms of the [ICESCR].... 4 
The determination supports the proposition that the principle of freedom of 
association within the civil/political ICCPR has been interpreted from an individual 
rights perspective. While the right to join trade unions is mentioned within the 
expression of the right in Article 22, it has not been interpreted as an enactment of a 
workers' right. Rather, the inclusion of Article 8 within the more 'worker' orientated 
ICESCR provides the expression of the principle of freedom of association extending 
beyond a mere right to associate. Here, workers are provided with the right to form 
and join trade unions to protect their occupational interes ts and an express right to 
strike.25 
The principle of freedom of association encompassing, as it does, both an individual 
and collective element, is not easily classified in either of the two traditional human 
rights divisions. The ongoing differentiation of treatment of the principle where it is 
expressed in Covenants containing different 'types' of human rights is regrettable and 
causes unwarranted confusion over the content of the principle of freedom of 
association. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); 
The European Social Charter (ESC) 26 
The enactment of the principle of freedom of association within the ECHR and the 
ESC is a further manifestation of the division of human rights. Civil/political rights 
are enacted within the ECHR, while social/economic rights are enacted within the 
24  Ibid, para 6.4. 
25 D. Beetham, 'What Future for Economic and Social Rights?' in D. Beetham, (ed.) Politics and 
Human Rights (Blackwell: Cambridge, 1995), 41. Beetham explicitly draws a connection between the 
ICCPR and ICESCR enactments of freedom of association, arguing that the ICESCR enactment is "a 
special case of the general right of association protected under the ICCPR", at 50. 
26 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.X1.1950, 
Council of Europe, ETS No. 5; The European Social Charter, Turin, 18.X.1961, Council of Europe, 
ETS No. 35. For a recent discussion of the principle of freedom of association and the right to strike 
within European Law, see: P. Germanotta and T. Novitz, `Globalisation and the Right to Strike: The 
Case for European-Level Protection of Secondary Action' (2002) 18 International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 67; T. Novitz, International and European 
Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003). 
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ESC.27 Further entrenching this division, the supervisory bodies for the two 
instruments are different. The European Court of Human Rights supervises the ECHR 
while a Committee of Experts is responsible for the ESC. 
The principle of freedom of association is enacted in Article 11 of the ECHR: 
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests". 28 The ESC contains a more extensive enactment of 
workers' rights in Articles 5 and 6, setting out the right to organise, the right to 
bargain collectively and the right to strike. Jurisprudence with respect to the 
provisions of the ECHR further demonstrates the dichotomy under discussion. 
In a series of cases during the 1970s the European Court of Human Rights considered 
the scope of Article 11 of the ECHR and the question of whether or not it extends 
beyond a simple guarantee of association. 29 The court adopted an individualist 
perspective, while also recognising that the freedom to associate achieves little 
without a concomitant right to act in association. The court determinations sit between 
two extremes, holding that trade unions under Article 11 must have the right to 
represent the interests of their members, but that Article 11 does not prescribe the 
means to achieve this. 3° The court left this matter to the discretion of each individual 
State. Noting that collective bargaining and strike action are means by which a trade 
union could be enabled to represent the interests of their members, the court stated 
that they are not the only means and are therefore not protected under Article 11. 31 
Provided that a State has provided a mechanism for unions to represent the interests of 
their members, then it will be in compliance with Article 11. 
27 G. S. Morris, 'Freedom of Association and the Interests of the State' in K. Ewing, C. Gearty and B. 
Hepple, (eds.) Human Rights and Labour Law: Essays for Paul O'Higgins (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers: Deventer, 1994), 29 at 31 —33. 
28 For discussion of Article 11 see D. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Butterworths: London, 1995) at chapter 12. 
29 These determinations of the European Court of Human Rights were National Union of Belgian 
Police v Belgium (1975) 1 EHRR 578; Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden (1975) 1 EHRR 637 and 
Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v Sweden (1975) 1 EHRR 617. For a detailed discussion of these cases 
see M. Forde, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and Labor Law' (1983) 31 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 301; J. Hendy, 'The Human Rights Act, Article 11 and the Right to 
Strike' (1998) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 582. 
39 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1975) 1 EHRR 578; [1975] ECHR 2, at paras 38 and 
39. 
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This construction of Article 11 in regard to industrial association contrasts with the 
approach of the court to political association. In three complaints determined in 1998, 
the Court considered that Article 11 does extend to the protection of political 
association. 32 However, unlike the case of association for industrial purposes, 
whereby regulation of the means of pursuing the interests of the association is left to 
each individual State, in the case of political affiliation the means of pursuing political 
association must be left to the association. In the words of Cullen, the "margin of 
State appreciation", or the extent to which the State is left to determine the boundaries 
in which the freedom may be exercised, is much narrower for political association 
than for industrial association: 
The Court of Human Rights, whether consciously or not, is making a clear 
distinction in the level of review it applies to different types of freedom of 
association case. While subjecting restrictions on political freedom of 
association to strict scrutiny and limiting the State's margin of appreciation, 
the Court of Human Rights has affirmed a broad margin of appreciation in the 
organization of employment matters. 33 
It may be possible to explain this differentiation of application through the traditional 
view of political association as a genuine civil/political concern while trade union 
association is generally considered to occupy the realm of economic/social rights. 
Therefore, the approach taken to political association is consistent with the approach 
that industrial association is considered to be more appropriately protected under 
economic/social instruments. 
Despite the trend in the earlier cases, a recent determination has demonstrated a thaw 
in the approach of the court to Article 11. 34 The determination reaffirmed that Article 
11 does not extend to a right to collective bargaining or a right to strike. 35 However, 
the court held that trade union members should not be prevented from engaging their 
trade unions to represent their interests in an attempt to regulate their relations with 
31 Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden (1975) 1 EHRR 637; [1976] ECHR 1 at paras 34 and 36. 
32 United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey (1998)26 EHRR 121; Sidiropoulos v Greece (1998) 
BHRC 500; The Socialist Party v Turkey (1998) 27 EHRR 51. For discussion of the cases see: 
H. Cullen, 'Freedom of Association as a Political Right' (1999) 24 European Law Review 30. 
33 Cullen, supra note 32 at 30. 
34 Wilson and the National Union of Journalists, Palmer, Wyeth and National Union of Rail, Maritime 
and Transport Workers, Doolan and others v United Kingdom [2002] IRLR 128; ECHR 547; for 
discussion of this determination see Ewing, supra note 12. 
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their employer. 36 Ewing concludes that the right to strike has a "twilight" status under 
Article 11, given that it is not protected, but it is a means by which trade unions can 
represent the interests of their members. 37 The capacity of Article 11 to encompass 
collective bargaining and the right to strike will ultimately come down to where the 
European Court of Human Rights is prepared to set the margins of State appreciation 
of the industrial freedom of associatiOn at any particular time. 
The right to strike and more specific worker orientated elements of the principle of 
freedom of association are contained within the ESC. Of particular relevance is 
Article 6, which regulates the right to bargain collectively and includes "the right of 
workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including 
the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements 
previously entered into". 38 This broader expression of the principle of freedom of 
association, demonstrates that a functional view of freedom of association is taken 
when freedom of association is enacted within a social/economic rights instrument. 
As noted earlier, different bodies supervise these two European instruments. 
Wedderburn considers that this assists in explaining the individual rights approach 
35 Wilson and the National Union of Journalists, para 42 and 44. 
36 Ibid, para 46. 
37 Ewing, supra note 12 at 18. 
38 Articles 5 and 6 of the ESC provide: 
Article 5: The right to organise: 
With a view to ensuring or promoting the freedom of workers and employers to form local, 
national or international organizations for the protection of their economic and social interests and 
to join those organizations, the Contracting Parties undertake that national law shall not be such as • 
to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, this freedom. The extent to which the guarantees 
provided for in this article shall apply to the police shall be determined by national laws or 
regulations. The principle governing the application to the members of the armed forces of these 
guarantees and the extent to which they shall apply to persons in this category shall equally be 
determined by national laws or regulations. 
Article 6: The right to bargain collectively: 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Contracting 
Parties undertake: 
1. to promote joint consultation between workers and employers; 
2. to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary negotiations between 
employers or employers' organizations and workers' organizations, with a view to the 
regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements; 
3. to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for conciliation and voluntary 
arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes; 
and recognise: 
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adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Article ii cases. 39 He argues that 
the ESC represents a supplementation of the rights contained within the ECHR but as 
the European Court of Human Rights examines the ECHR independently of the ESC, 
its view is skewed to an individual construction of those rights.° The individualist 
focus of the court has also been noted by Novitz, in the context of commenting on a 
case relating to the question of whether or not Article ii encompasses the negative 
freedom of association.4I Novitz concludes that in its interpretation of Article lithe  
court has been too concerned with the rights of the individual over collective 
interests. 42 Determinations concerning the ECHR have maintained the dichotomy 
under discussion where civil/political rights are interpreted through the prism of 
individual rights and economic/social rights are interpreted through the prism of 
collective interests. 
International Labour Organization 
The ILO does not apply the civil/political versus economic/social division to the 
enactment of standards. Preferring the terms 'social justice' and more recently 'human 
rights', the ILO does not categorise rights in the fashion adopted in other human rights 
instruments. 43  
The principle of freedom of association is firmly entrenched in ILO instruments, 
principally the Constitution of the ILO and the Freedom of Association Conventions. 
ILO bodies construct the principle of freedom of association in a functional manner 
wherein the right to strike operates as an implicit facet of freedom of association. 
4. the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, 
including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective 
agreements previously entered into. 
39 Lord Wedderbum, Employment Rights in Britain and Europe: Selected Papers in Labour Law 
(Lawrence and Wisehart: London, 1991), in particular chapter 6: 'Freedom of Association or the Right 
to Organise? The Common Law and International Sources'. 
Ibid at 142-143. 
41 T. Novitz, 'Negative Freedom of Association: Gustafsson v Sweden' (1997) 26 Industrial Law 
Journal 79. 
42 Ibid at 87. 
43 L. Swepston, 'The International Labour Organization and Human Rights Access to the ILO' in G. 
Alfredsson, (ed.) International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms - Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. 
Moller (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001), 485 at 486; H. Bartolomei de la Cruz, G. von 
Potobslcy and L. Swepston, The International Labor Organization: The International Standards System 
and Basic Human Rights (Westview Press: Boulder, 1996) at 127. For historical accounts of the 
approach of the ILO see, for example: C. W. Jenks, Human Rights and International Labour Standards 
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The ILO bodies adopt a three dimensional interpretative approach to the principle of 
freedom of association." Ben-Israel notes that for the ILO, freedom of association is 
constructed within the context of providing a counterweight to the power of 
employers, ensuring reciprocity in labour relations. 45 If it is accepted that labour 
relations require reciprocity, it is not possible to view freedom of association from a 
single dimension involving only the right of individuals to associate together. Instead: 
[t]he freedom to associate and to bargain collectively must be supplemented 
by an additional freedom, which is the freedom to strike. Hence freedom to 
strike is a complementary freedom of the freedom of association since both are 
meant to help in achieving a common goal which is to place the employer — 
employee relationship on an equal basis. 46 
The ILO expression of the principle of freedom of association is the same as that used 
within the ESC and the ICESCR, which is the economic/social rights construction. 
Swepston notes that the approach of international bodies to freedom of association in 
the social/economic context is standardised and developed out of the approach of the 
ILO: 
[i]nternational law is thus fairly clear and remarkably consistent on the 
question of freedom of association and protection of the right to organise and 
bargain collectively. It is also clear that all these provisions [ESC and 
ICESCR] emerge more or less directly from Convention 87. 47 
The collective functional view of freedom of association has predominated within the 
ILO. However, ILO commentary with respect to freedom of association is not 
insensitive to the individualist view. While affirming the collectivist functional 
approach to freedom of association, ILO bodies make concessions to the individualist 
perspective by avoiding negative pronouncements about individual rights within the 
context of freedom of association. In line with one of the three dimensions of freedom 
of association, the right of individuals to determine who they will associate with, ILO 
(Stevens and Sons: London, 1960); C. W. Jenks, Social Justice in the Law of Nations (Oxford 
University Press: London, 1970); Valticos, supra note 19. 
44  See discussion of the three dimensional approach above at 25-27. 
45 Ben-Israel, supra note 1 at 25. 
46 ibid. 
47  L. Swepston, 'Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association: Development through ILO 
Supervision' (1998) 137 International Labour Review 169 at 174. 
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bodies do not mandate compulsory union membership or closed shops." Rather, they 
insist that collective bargaining should be voluntary and issues relating to compulsion 
in the context of the relationship of the individual to the trade union or with respect to 
the trade union and employer are left to the domestic policies and laws of Member 
States.49  This flexibility demonstrates that the principle of freedom of association can 
embrace a collectivist functional view without mandating the overriding of the 
individualist perspective concerning the relationship of individuals, employers and 
trade unions. While some commentators from the collectivist functional viewpoint 
have perceived this as a weakening of collective power, 5° from a holistic point of view 
it represents a flexible approach that assists in accommodating seemingly divergent 
and inconsistent perspectives. 
National Jurisdictions — Canada, England and Europe 
The meaning of the principle of freedom of association has been explored within the 
domestic legal systems of a number of States. In Canada and some European States, 51 
the principle has been constitutionally entrenched, while in the United Kingdom, the 
principle has been considered in the context of the development of the common law 
and the constitutions of former colonies. 
In Canada the principle of freedom of association is constitutionally entrenched in 
s 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 52 The meaning of the section 
48 See ILO General Survey, 1994, supra note 5 at para 100: "Systems which prohibit union security 
practices in order to guarantee the right not to join an organization, as well as systems which authorize 
such practices, are compatible with the Convention [87]". 
49 See ILO General Survey, 1994, supra note 5 at para 265: "The two essential elements of Article 4 of 
Convention No. 98 refer to action by the public authorities to promote bargaining between the social 
partners and the voluntary nature of such bargaining". (Emphasis added). 
50 Creighton argues that the ILO approach to trade union recognition, whereby compulsory trade union 
recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining is not mandated under the Freedom of Association 
Conventions, fundamentally weakens the ILO enactment of freedom of association: B. Creighton, 'The 
ILO and Protection of Freedom of Association in the United Kingdom' in K. Ewing, C. Gearty and B. 
Hepple, (eds.) Human Rights and Labour Law: Essays for Paul O'Higgins (Mansell Publishing Ltd: 
London, 1994), 1. 
51 The right to strike is constitutionally entrenched in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland: A. Jacobs, 'The Law of Strikes and Lockouts' in R. Blanpain and C. Engels, (eds.) 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (7 th ed., Kluwer 
Law International: The Hague, 2001), 585 at 586. 
52 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that: 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(d) freedom of association. 
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was explored by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Collective Bargaining Trilogy in 
1987. 53 These cases considered the scope of s 2(d) generally, while the decision in 
Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (the Alberta Reference Case) 54 
looked specifically at the question of whether or not the principle of freedom of 
association encompasses the right to strike. The Court split 4:2 along individualist 
versus collectivist lines. 
The majority determined that freedom of association within the Charter is a right 
belonging solely to the individual and represents the right of Canadian citizens to do 
in association those things already protected under the Charter. As collective 
bargaining and strike are not expressly protected by the Charter, the freedom to 
associate does not extend to those activities. 55 In dissent, Dickson CJ (Wilson J in 
agreement) argued that the principle of freedom of association protects group 
activities and invalidates legislation preventing activities on,the grounds of their 
associational nature. 56 Dickson CJ argued that: 
[i]f freedom of association only protects the joining together of persons for 
common purposes, but not the pursuit of the very activities for which the 
association was formed, then the freedom is indeed legalistic, ungenerous, 
indeed vapid. 57 
The principle of freedom of association as enshrined in the Constitution of Trinidad 
was considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Collymore v 
Attorney General. 58  The court held that the right of freedom of association is a right to 
associate, not a right to pursue the objectives of association. Thus the court held that 
free collective bargaining and freedom to strike are not aspects of the principle of 
freedom of association in the Trinidad Constitution. 
53 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act [1987] 1 SCR 313 (Alberta Reference Case); 
Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada [1987] 1 SCR 424 (Public Service Alliance Case); Retail, 
Wholesale and Department Store Union v Saskatchewan [1987] 1 SCR 460 (Saskatchewan Dairy 
Workers Case). For detailed discussion of the collective bargaining trilogy see: P. cavalluzzo, 
'Freedom of Association: Its Effect Upon Collective Bargaining and Trade Unions' (1988) Conference 
Proceedings.: Labour Law under the Charter, Queens Law Journal 267; T. J. Christian and K. D. 
Ewing, 'Labouring under the Canadian Constitution' (1988) 17 Industrial Law Journal 73; L. Harmer, 
'The Right to Strike: Charter Implications and Interpretations' (1989) 47 University of Toronto Faculty 
of Law Review 420; Wedderburn, supra note 39 at 146-9. 
5 Alberta Reference Case, supra note 53. 
55  Ibid, per Beetz, Le Dain and La Forest JJ at 390; McIntyre J at 407. 
56 Ibid at 367. 
57 Ibid at 362-363. 
58  [1970] AC 538 (PC). For discussion of this case see Wedderburn, supra note 39 at 145-6. 
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In the legal systems of Continental Europe the collectivist functional approach 
predominates. Lord Wedderburn notes that the "major systems of labour law on the 
continent tend to take a different view and recognise considerable collective content 
in the fundamental right to freedom of association". 59 Wedderburn surveys West 
Germany, France, Sweden and Italy, the legal systems of all of which interpret 
freedom of association functionally to encompass considerable collective content. 60 
Is the Right to Strike a Facet of the Principle of Freedom of Association? 
This survey of the philosophical debate and jurisprudence on the scope of the 
principle of freedom of association has demonstrated that there is no one universally 
accepted and applied construction of freedom of association. Individual libertarians 
argue that the right to associate lends no greater rights to an association than the rights 
possessed by the individuals of that group. Functional collectivists see freedom of 
association as devoid of meaning when separated from the ability to pursue collective 
interests. In the words of Lord Wedderburn, proponents of the collective perspective 
consider that the individualist interpretation risks "reducing freedom of association to 
a mere freedom of assembly; a right to meet together without anything more". 61 
A further theme within this survey is the division of human rights into the 
civil/political and social/economic categories. In many of the instances co. nsidered, 
the principle of freedom of association was construed in an individualist manner when 
associated with civil/political rights and only from a collectivist 'worker' perspective 
when placed in a rubric of economic/social rights. This emphasises the historical 
sidelining of workers' rights and the failure of mainstream human rights theorists to 
overcome the outdated civil/political versus economic/social divide, and the 
perception that workers' rights do not constitute true human rights. 62 Leary notes that 
59  Wedderburn, supra note 39 at 149. 
60 The constitutions of these countries (except the then West Germany) include an express right to 
strike. However, Wedderbum demonstrates that the inclusion of an express right to strike has not 
prevented an expansive interpretation of the principle of freedom of association extending to the 
activities of trade unions in any of these States: Wedderbum, supra note 39 at 149-150. 
61  Wedderbum supra note 6 at 16-17. 
62 v. Leary,  'The Paradox of Workers Rights as Human Rights' in L. Compa and S. Diamond, (eds.) 
Human Rights, Labor Rights and International Trade (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 
1996), 22; 'Introduction: Labour Rights, Human Rights' (1998) 137 International Labour Review 127. 
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this division is regrettable and "the human rights movement and the labour movement 
run on tracks that are sometimes parallel and rarely meet". 63 
The ILO has consistently dismissed these dichotomies, asserting the unity of rights 
regardless of the labels attached to them. The approach of the ILO in this area is a 
neglected, but extremely important and holistic approach to human rights. The 
centrality of workers' rights to the human rights context cannot be overstated: 
United Nations human rights activities have attracted widespread interest: less 
attention has been given to the International Labour Organization and 
questions relating to labour and human rights. Yet, the extent to which the 
rights of workers are protected provides a touchstone for evaluating a nation's 
respect for human rights. 64 
This thesis suggests that the right to strike has always constituted a legitimate 
component of the principle of freedom of association when the freedom is viewed 
through a prism of economic/social rights. This is reflected in the inclusion of an 
express statement of the right within the ICESCR and the ESC. Accordingly, this 
approach to freedom of association is valid, appropriate and binding on Australia (via 
the ICESCR and ILO instruments). The challenge for the future is to remove the false 
dichotomy between civil/political rights and economic/social rights, enabling the 
principle of freedom of association to be approached as a basic human right 
encompassing both the concept of individual rights and the three dimensional 
functional perspective65 needed to ensure workers are able to organise in order to 
counterbalance the power of employers. It remains unclear where the concept of 
disassociation would fit within this model, however that is a matter beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 66 The functional construction of the principle of freedom of association 
provides a balanced, integrated approach capable of embracing both individual and 
collective views. 
63 Leary, supra note 62 at 22. 
64 V. Leary, 'Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization' in P. Alston, (ed.) 
The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992), 580 at 
583. 
65 See discussion above at 25-27. 
MacDermott notes that it remains unclear whether or not international instruments require the 
recognition and protection of the negative right of association. ILO bodies have consistently viewed 
this as an issue within the purview of Member States: T. MacDermott, 'Labour Law and Human 
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Right to Strike or Freedom to Strike? 
A final issue to consider in this discussion is the debate on the question of whether or 
not the ability to strike should be construed as a right or a freedom. Should we, as 
Ben-Israel does, refer to a 'freedom' to strike or should we refer to a 'right' to strike 
and does it make any practical difference? 
The difference between recognising the ability to strike as a right or a freedom is 
considered by Kahn-Freund and Hepple in their study of the causes of, and 
justifications for, strike behaviour.67 In terms echoing Hohfeld's classic analytical 
framework, they note that freedoms tend to be expressed in terms of immunities 
whereby activities covered by a freedom are immune from State interference. Rights 
are supported by a correlative duty, thus requiring a positive act, a guarantee of action, 
rather than the mere freedom to act unimpeded. 68 
There exists within the literature a clear distinction between rights and freedoms. The 
philosophical distinction does not have direct practical consequences for this thesis. 
The examination of Australian law will demonstrate that domestically there is a 
complex web of overlapping rules (permissions and prohibitions; privileges and 
immunities), which allow scope for strike action in some circumstances but not in 
others. It is difficult to conceive of strike in the Australian context from either 
perspective in toto. 
In this thesis, the right to strike is viewed as a dimension of the principle of freedom 
of association. In consequence, fulfilment of the right flows from the functional 
collective construction of freedom of association. Therefore, the right versus freedom 
debate is unhelpful from this perspective. The thesis adopts the view of Weiler, who 
contends that the ability to strike is not an inherent or intrinsic freedom or right, rather 
it is necessary from the functional view of the fundamental principle of freedom of 
Rights' in D. Kinley, (ed.) Human Rights in Australian Law: Principles, Practice and Potential 
(Federation Press: Sydney, 1998), 194 at 206-207. 
67 Kahn-Freund and Hepple, supra note 4 at 9. Ben-Israel also canvasses the debate in R. Ben-Israel, 
'Introduction to Strikes and Lock-outs: a Comparative Perspective' in R. Blanpain, (ed.) Strikes and 
Lock-Outs in Industrialised Market Economies (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1994), 
1 at 8-10. 
68 ibid. 
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association. 69 Therefore, the proper focus is not on whether the ability to strike 
constitutes a right or a freedom, but rather the extent to which a legal system allows 
strikes to occur unimpeded in order to fulfil their functional role as a facet of freedom 
of association. However, the phrase "right to strike" is the common usage, and it is 
used in this thesis in the non-technical sense, that is, free of the philosophical 
baggage. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the issues surrounding the international recognition of the 
right to strike. The discussion illustrated a number of key debates and attempted to 
locate a commonality of approach within divergent perspectives. 
This chapter has demonstrated that a unified approach to the right to strike exists 
within international law where the right to strike is constructed as a facet of the 
principle of freedom of association from an economic/social rights perspective. This 
is the lowest common denominator unifying the approaches taken under different 
international instruments and national constitutions. The ILO, in particular, adopts an 
approach that transcends this common base through rejection of the economic/social 
versus civil/political human rights division, an approach which is in keeping with the 
move away from the division in human rights more generally. It is argued in this 
chapter that the ILO approach to freedom of association and the right to strike is 
capable of being accommodated either within a unified vision of human rights or 
within a civil/political construction of human rights, provided that the rights of the 
individual are respected in order to accommodate the liberal perspective. 
This chapter has examined the legal basis in international law for the recognition of 
the right to strike. The following chapters (2-3) will explore the precise scope and 
content of the right to strike in international law, building upon this theoretical 
foundation. 




The Right to Strike in United Nations Instruments 
Introduction 
There are three United Nations (UN) instruments directly relevant to Australia's 
international obligation to implement a right to strike. These are the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which are collectively known as the International Bill of 
Rights. This chapter will survey these UN instruments and establish the basis of the 
obligation expressed therein to recognise and implement the right to strike. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 2 
The principle of freedom of association is expressed in Article 20 of the UDHR: 3 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
The UDHR is not a convention or treaty, but a declaration made by the General 
Assembly of the UN. The Declaration acts as a general guide and "source of 
I For an overview and critical assessment of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights regime see: P. 
Alston, 'Appraising the United Nations Human Rights Regime' in P. Alston, (ed.) The United Nations 
and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992), 1. In addition to these 
Instruments, Australia is party to a number of other UN Conventions which have indirect relevance to 
the obligation to provide a right to strike: The International Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNTS 27531), The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (UNTS 20378), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (UNTS 9464) all prevent the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms on the 
grounds of age, race or gender. For example, Article 5(e)(ii) of the Convention on the Elimination of 
all forms of Racial Discrimination provides that "States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate 
racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to 
race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the 
following rights 	Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: ... The right to form and join 
trade unions". 
2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
UN on 10 December, 1948: General Assembly Res 2174 (III), UN Doc A/810, (1948). For detailed 
discussion of the UDHR see G. Alfredsson and A. Eide, (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1999). 
3 For detailed discussion of Article 20 see M. Scheinin, 'Article 20' in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide, 
(eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1999) at 417. 
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inspiration" for the passage of other international human rights instruments. 4 While 
not a direct source of binding international law, the Declaration "remains the primary 
source of global human rights standards", and many of its provisions constitute 
customary international law. 5 
The principle of freedom of association expressed in the UDHR has been further 
developed within the UN's Human Rights Conventions, specifically the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 6 
The principle of freedom of association is enacted in Article 22(1) of the ICCPR: 
[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 7 
The implementation of the ICCPR is monitored by the UN Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC), established pursuant to ICCPR Article 28. It consists of 18 members 
elected by State parties to the ICCPR, serving in a personal capacity. 8 Article 40 of 
the ICCPR requires State parties to make regular reports to the UNHRC on progress 
4 A. Hegarty and S. Leonard, (eds.) Human Rights: Agenda for the 21st Century (Cavendish Publishing 
Ltd: London, 1999) at 6. 
5 H. Hamium, 'The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International 
Law' (1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 287 at 289. Hannum notes that 
the right to form and join trade unions could be considered to constitute a norm of customary 	• 
international law although the exact content of the right has not yet been firmly settled. As the 
following discussion will demonstrate, the question of whether or not the right to form and join trade 
unions within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a right to strike is 
unsettled. Further, the High Court of Australia (for the purposes of domestic law) considers that there is 
no customary international law providing a right to strike: Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 
416 at 545 where the majority judgment of Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ 
found that there was no basis on the material presented to the court for the existence of a right to strike 
in customary international law. 
6 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) entered into force on 23 March, 
1976 and was ratified by Australia on 13 November, 1980: ICCPR, General Assembly Res 2200 21 
UN GAOR, Supp (No 16) 52, UN Doc A16316 (1966) (UNTS 14668). Ratification information 
sourced from Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of 
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, 9 December, 2002. Online, 
Available: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. For further discussion of the ICCPR see S. Joseph, J. 
Schultz and M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, 
and Commentary (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000); D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights 
Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1991), chapter 1. 
For detailed discussion of Article 22 of the ICCPR see M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel: Kehl am Rhein, 1993). 
8 R. Piotrowicz and S. Kaye, Human Rights in International and Australian Law (Butterworths: 
Chatswood, 2000) at 36. 
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made to implement the Convention at the domestic level. Reports are due every five 
years, unless the UNHRC requests a report earlier. 9 The UNHRC reviews information 
provided in State Reports and produces Concluding Observations with respect to the 
law and practice of each State. 
Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the UNHRC may receive and consider 
communications from individuals alleging violations of any of the rights set forth in 
the ICCPR. 1° Under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, ratifying parties recognise the 
competence of the UNHRC to receive and consider communications from individuals 
subject to their domestic jurisdiction. Decisions of the UNHRC under the individual 
complaints procedure and statements made in General Comments or Concluding 
Observations are not formally binding under international law. 11 However, committee 
members of the International Law Association suggest that such determinations have 
considerable persuasive force on Member States and add to the development of 
substantial interpretive jurisprudence of the human rights instruments. 12 
The principle of freedom of association within the ICCPR is expressed as an 
enactment of a trade union freedom in a civil / political rights context. As such, the 
expression is limited in scope and does not include the right to strike. However, the 
UNHRC had cause to consider whether or not the principle of freedom of association 
expressed in Article 22(1) encompasses the right to strike in J. B. eta! v .Canada • 
(hereafter the 'Alberta Union Case). 13 On behalf of affected applicants, the Alberta 
9 Article 40 of the ICCPR provides that: 
(1) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures 
they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress 
made in the enjoyment of those rights; 
(a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties 
concerned; 
(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests. 
io Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Adopted by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) GA res. 2200A (OCI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 
59, UN Doc. A16316 (1966), 999 UNTS 302, entered into force March 23, 1976. For discussion of the 
Optional Protocol see McGoldrick, supra note 6, chapter 4. The Optional Protocol was acceded to by 
Australia on 25 September 1991. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Status of Ratifications of the Principal Human Rights Treaties, Geneva, 9 December, 2002. 
11 International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice, Interim 
Report on the Impact of the work of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty. Bodies on National 
Courts and Tribunals, 2002, New Dehli Conference at 12. 
12 Ibid at 15. 
13 Decision of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant. 
on Civil and Political Rights, Twenty-Eighth session, UN Doc,CCPR/C/28/D, Communication No. 
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Union of Public Employees challenged the Public Service Employee Relations Act 
1977 (Alberta) which prohibited public employees from engaging in strike action. The 
Union argued that the Act contravened Article 22(1) because it prohibited the right to 
strike, guaranteed as a facet of the principle of freedom of association. In order to 
address the merits of the argument made by the Union, the UNHRC needed to 
establish, as a matter of jurisdiction, that it had competence to deal with the 
communication. Article 3 of the Optional Protocol provides that the UNHRC shall 
not consider any communication that is incompatible with the ICCPR. I4 In this case, a 
primary jurisdictional matter was whether or not the absence of explicit protection of 
the right to strike within the ICCPR rendered the communication incompatible with 
the Convention and therefore inadmissible. 
The majority of the UNHRC held that it did not have competence to hear the 
communication. The majority considered that the right to strike is not a facet of the 
principle of freedom of association guaranteed in Article 22. In reaching this 
determination, the majority referred to the explicit protection of the right to strike 
enacted within the ICESCR. I5 
The majority examined the drafting history of the ICCPR, comparing the provisions 
with the comparable provisions of the ICESCR. They determined that the explicit 
recognition of the right to strike within the ICESCR, expressed separately from the 
right to form and join trade unions, makes it clear that the right to strike cannot be 
considered as an implicit component of the right to form and join trade unions under 
the ICESCR or ICCPR. I6 Consequently, the majority found that the lack of explicit 
recognition of the right to strike within the ICCPR demonstrates that the right was not 
118/1982 (hereafter referred to as 'the Alberta Union Case'). For further discussion of this decision see 
V. A. Leary, 'The Paradox of Workers Rights as Human Rights' in L. Compa and S. Diamond, (eds.) 
Human Rights, Labor Rights and International Trade (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 
1996), 22 at 34; K. D. Ewing, 'Freedom of Association and Trade Union Rights' in D. Harris and S. 
Joseph, (eds.) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom Law 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995), 465 at 467-469; Nowak, supra note 7 at 390-393. 
14 Article 3 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR states that: 
The Committee shall consider inadmissible any communication under the present Protocol 
which is anonymous, or which it considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such 
communications or to be incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant. 
15 The ICESCR, Article 8(1)(d) contains an express statement of the right to strike. 
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intended to be included within the scope of Article 22(1) and the right to form and 
join trade unions therein expressed. 
A joint dissenting individual opinion was delivered by five members of the 
UNHRC. 17 This opinion argued that Article 22(1) guarantees a broad right of freedom 
of association and the exercise of this right requires that some measure of concerted 
activities be allowed in order to ensure that the right of freedom of association serves 
its purpose. The opinion concluded that the communication from the Alberta Union of 
Public Employees was admissible because the right to strike was protected as a facet 
of freedom of association within Article 22(1). 
The determination of the majority in the Alberta Union Case would appear to settle 
the question of whether the principle of freedom of association within the ICCPR 
implicitly protects the right to strike and has not yet been expressly overturned. 
However, it has been criticised on several grounds. Leary asserts that it is 
"unpersuasive", suggesting that the credibility of the determination is undermined by 
the dissenting individual opinion, signed, by "five of the most respected members of 
the Committee". I8 Further, both McGoldrick and Nowak agree with the minority view 
that the question of whether the principle of freedom of association within Article 
22(1) incorporates a right to strike is a question more appropriately determined on the 
merits rather than on the admissibility of the communication. I9 
The majority finding is based on a technical approach to the interpretation of the 
ICCPR, made entirely on an assessment of the travaux preparatoires and the wording 
of Article 8 of the ICESCR, rather than any functional evaluation of the meaning of 
the principle of freedom of association. 20 In contrast, the dissenting individual opinion 
considered the principle of freedom of association to represent a "broad right of 
16 Article 8(1) of the ICESCR contains 4 sub-articles (a-d). Sub-articles (a-c) deal with trade union 
rights in general, whilst the right to strike is expressed in sub-article (d). See the subsequent discussion 
of the ICESCR right to strike. 
17 Individual Opinion, Submitted by Ms. Rosalyn Higgins and Messrs. Rajsoom Lallah, Andreas 
Mavrommatis, Torkel Opsahl and S. Amos Wako; Appendix to the decision in J. B. et al v Canada, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/281D, Communication No. 118/1982. 
18 Leary, supra note 13 at 34. See also M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995) at 278. 
19 McGoldrick, supra note 6 at 166; Nowak, supra note 7 at 392. 
20  Ibid, para 6.3 — 6.4. 
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freedom of association", the exercise of which "requires that some measure of 
concerted activities be allowed". 21 Nowak suggests that the minority opinion 
corresponds "more to the wording, object, purpose and historical background of the 
provisions" and that the majority decision "contributes to a complete undermining of 
[the] right".22 
Furthermore, the finding of the majority does not pay adequate attention to the 
interpretation of the principle of freedom of association within ILO "quasi-
jurisprudence". 23 The finding notes that it accepts the interpretation of those treaties 
"as correct and just", however each international treaty has a "life of its own" and 
must be interpreted accordingly. 24 This approach does not fully or adequately address 
the consequences of enshrining differing approaches to the principle of freedom of 
association under different international instruments. 25 It is also not consistent with 
the practice of other treaty bodies. For example, the Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights interpreting the ICESCR often 
make use of or reference to the principles established under the ILO freedom of 
association conventions. 26 
The current status of the decision in the Alberta Union Case is unclear. As shown, the 
decision is open to criticism for defects within the reasoning. Further, pre 1990 
21 Individual Opinion, Alberta Union Case, supra note 17 at para 3. 
22 Now • , ax supra note 7 at 392 and 393. 
23 For discussion of the nature of the commentary made by ILO bodies and its categorisation as "quasi-
jurisprudence" see chapter 3 at 80-82. 
24 Alberta Union Case, supra note 13 at para 6.2. 
25 In contrast, the dissenting individual opinion took into account the difficulties of providing a 
different interpretation of freedom of association under the ICCPR than the approach prevailing in 
other international treaties. The dissenting opinion examined the ICESCR, arguing that the specific 
enumeration of rights within the ICESCR was not incompatible with the implication of the right to 
strike within the ICCPR. With respect to ILO determinations, the minority determination noted that 
"[w]e cannot see that a manner of exercising a right which has, under certain leading and widely 
ratified international instruments, been declared to be in principle lawful, should be declared to be 
incompatible with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights". Individual Opinion, Alberta Union 
Case, supra note 17 at para 8. 
26 For example, recent Concluding Observations relating to State Reports on the ICESCR of the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with respect to Article 8(1)(d) have 
referred favourably to ILO Conventions. In a Concluding Observation relating to Australia (ICESCR, 
E/2001/22 (2000) 62 at para 394), the CESCR recommended that restrictions on the right to strike in 
essential Services in Australia be limited "in accordance with ILO Convention No. 87". A further 
example can be drawn from a Concluding Observation in relation to Japan (ICESCR, E/2002/22 (2001) 
90 at para 627) where the CESCR recommended that Japan "[In line with the ILO, ... ensure the right 
of civil servants and public employees not working in essential services to organize strikes". 
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determinations of the UNHRC have been widely criticised for the literalist and 
unreasoned approach generally adopted in interpreting the Convention. 27 However, 
the UNHRC has not reconsidered the determination, as Article 22 has not been the 
subject of a General Comment and the issue has not been raised and considered in the 
Context of an individual communication. 
The current approach of the Committee may be more sympathetic and the Concluding 
Observations of the UNHRC with respect to State Reports submitted under the 
ICCPR reporting mechanisms provide guidance. The discussion of State practice with 
respect to the principle of freedom of association enshrined in Article 22 suggests that 
the UNHRC has become more prepared to consider that Article 22 could protect the 
right to strike. In Concluding Observations concerning Germany made in 1996, the 
committee noted with concern the prohibition of strikes by German public servants: 
"Nile Committee is concerned that there is an absolute ban on strikes by public 
servants who are not exercising authority in the name of the State and are not engaged 
in essential services which may violate Article 22 of the Covenant". 28 This statement 
suggests that the Committee may consider restrictions upon the right to strike to be in 
violation of Article 22. This could only be correct if Article 22 encompassed a right to 
strike. These comments of the Committee correspond with the views of the ILO 
bodies relating to legitimate restrictions on strike action. 
The specific enactment of the right to strike within the ICESCR may suggest that it is 
unnecessary to engage in such detailed consideration of the ICCPR. However, the 
issue is not merely academic. Controversy remains as to the proper status of the 
economic, social and cultural rights as human rights and therefore of any such rights 
contained within the ICESCR. While this thesis accepts that economic, social and 
cultural rights are properly considered to be human rights, a finding of an implicit 
right to strike within the ICCPR would ensure that the legitimacy of the right to strike 
is not challenged on such grounds. A consistent approach to the interpretation of the 
27  See ILA Report, supra note 11 at 9-10. The Interim Report cites a number of commentators with 
respect to the holdings of the UNHRC, noting in particular the comment of Opsahl (T. Opsahl, 'The 
Human Rights Committee' in P. Alston, (ed.) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical 
Appraisal (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992 at 427)) that up to the early.! 990s "[Ole views are not 
reasoned in great detail". 
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principle of freedom of association in international law would assist in maintaining 
the legitimacy of the interpretation adopted by the ILO organs within the ILO bodies. 
An additional reason relates to States, like the United States of America, that have 
ratified the ICCPR but have not ratified the ICESCR or the ILO freedom of 
association Conventions.29 While it can be argued that the USA is subject to an 
international obligation to provide a right to strike through the Constitution of the ILO 
and the ILO Fundamental Declaration on Rights and Principles at work, it is not 
subject to any express statement of this right. 30 A strict adherence to the conclusions 
in the Alberta Union Case allows such States to avoid the obligation to provide a right 
to strike by only committing to the principle of freedom of association through Article 
22. If the Alberta Union Case were to stand as the correct interpretative approach, the 
freedom of association principle within the ICCPR will continue to have limited 
functional meaning. 
An approach which finds that the right to strike is protected by Article 22 of the 
ICCPR would be preferable to ensure that States that fall into this category are 
subjected to the broader principle of freedom of association encompassing collective 
bargaining and strike action. Further, such an approach would provide consistency in 
interpretation of the principle of freedom of association in international law and 
would avoid the civil/political — economic/social rights distinction. 
Article 22(3) 
A further factor to consider with respect to the interpretation of Article 22(1) is 
Article 22(3), 
[n]othing in this article shall authorise States Parties to the International 
Labour Organization Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise to take legislative measures which 
28 Concluding Observations, United Nations Committee on Human Rights, CCPR A/52/40 (1997), 
para. 188 (emphasis added). 
29 The United States of America became a signatory to the ICESCR on 5 October 1977. However, to 
date they have not ratified the ICESCR - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, 9 December, 
2002. Online, Available: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  
30 Determinations of ILO bodies indicate that the obligation to respect the principle of freedom of 
association within the ILO Constitution and the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles 
at work encompasses an obligation to guarantee a right to strike and is imposed on all ILO member 
States regardless of the non-ratification by those States of the freedom of association Conventions. See 
discussion in chapter three at 69-72. 
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would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the 
guarantees provided for in that Convention. 
The significance of Article 22(3) in this context lies within the reference to ILO 
Convention 87: The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948. While not containing an express right to strike, ILO bodies have 
found that the principle of freedom of association protected by the Convention 
contains an implicit right to strike. 31 Therefore, Article 22(3) raises the issue of 
whether the interpretation of Article 22(1) should reflect the interpretation of freedom 
of association adopted by the ILO in respect of Convention 87. 
Nowak argues that the adoption of Article 22(3) was made, for largely "cosmetic 
reasons" in order to stress that the UN had not overlooked the efforts of the ILO with 
respect to the principle of freedom of association. 32 In consequence, the conventional 
approach to Article 22(3) has been to view it as insignificant, and not expansive of the 
obligations agreed to by a State that had ratified the ICCPR but not ILO Convention 
87. 33 
Ewing suggests that the presence of Article 22(3) could mean two different things. 
One interpretation could be that in order to comply with Article 22, ratifying States' 
domestic law and practice must comply with ILO Convention 87. 34 This would 
necessitate the provision of a right to strike. Alternatively, Article 22(3) is only 
relevant to the limitations that may be imposed on the exercise of trade union rights 
protected by Article 22, as set out in Article 22(2), requiring such limitations to be 
consistent with ILO standards. 35 If Article 22(1) does not protect the right to strike, 
then the limitations in Article 22(2) would not be affected by ILO determinations on 
the right to strike, but only by those in the area of general trade union rights. The 
decision of the UNHRC in the Alberta Union Case would appear to support this 
31 See discussion in chapter one at 34-36 and below in chapter three at 68-86. 
32 Nowak, supra note 7 at 399. 
33 Ibid at 400. 
34 Ewing, supra note 13 at 482-483. 
35 Article 22(2) provides that 103 restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of 
lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right". For 
discussion see: Ewing, supra note 13 at 483. 
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interpretation of Article 22(3) although the determination did not consider the 
meaning of Article 22(3). 
The more generous reading of the principle of freedom of association in Article 22(1) 
as reflected in the recent Concluding Observations of the UNHRC and the reference 
to ILO Convention 87 in Article 22(3) could provide the basis for holding that the 
principle of freedom of association protected by the ICCPR does protect the right to 
strike. Such an approach would assist in overcoming the difficulties identified with 
the majority decision in the Alberta Union Case, and would avoid an interpretation of 
Article 22(1) that left it with limited functional meaning. Further, it would provide a 
meaningful interpretation of Article 22(3). As Nowak suggests "[s]ince an express 
provision of a law or an international treaty is not to be assumed to be superfluous or 
meaningless", such an interpretation is preferable. 36 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(IcEscR) 37 
Operation of the ICESCR 
The principle of freedom of association including an express statement of the right to 
strike is found in Article 8 of the ICESCR: 38 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure, 39 
36 Nowak, supra note 7 at 400. 
37 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) entered into force 
on 3 January, 1976 and was ratified by Australia on 10 December 1975: ICESCR, General Assembly 
Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) 49, UN Doc A16316 (1966) (UNTS 14531). 
Ratification information sourced from Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, 8 February, 2002. 
Online, Available: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdfreport.pdf. For discussion of the ICESCR see Craven, 
supra note 18; P. Alston and G. Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under the 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 
156. For specific discussion of Article 8 of the ICESCR see C. Fenwick, 'Minimum Obligations with 
Respect to Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in A. 
Chapman and S. Russell, (eds.) Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Intersentia: Antwerp, 2002), 53. 
38 For detailed history of the drafting and adoption of Article 8 of the ICESCR see Craven, supra note 
18 at 257 — 259; and R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1988) at 72-83. 
39 Both Craven and Ben-Israel note that while Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides that the rights under 
the Covenant are to be achieved progressively, the use of the word ensure in Article 8 indicates that 
Article 8 is to be implemented immediately and is not subject to progressive implementation; Craven, 
supra note 18 at 261-262; Ben-Israel, supra note 38 at 86. 
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(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with 
the laws of the particular country. 
The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the body responsible for 
supervision of State party implementation and adherence to the ICESCR. ECOSOC 
established the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) to 
monitor State reporting requirements, produce Concluding Observations noting 
positive aspects of compliance, principal subjects of concern, and to make 
recommendations regarding future compliance. ° 
Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not contain an individual (as opposed to State 
activated) complaint mechanism. 4I Therefore, there are no determinations to assist 
with ascertaining the application of the Convention in a given situation. However, the 
Concluding Observations of the CESCR, surveying State law and practice, do provide 
guidance for the application of the Convention. 42 While this source is not as useful as 
a complaint mechanism, Rosas and Scheinin suggest that the procedures of the 
CESCR are thorough enough to constitute a quasi-judicial or unofficial complaint 
process.43 In order to clarify uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of the 
ICESCR for the purposes of ratifying States' reporting obligations, the CESCR 
authors General Comments. 44 However the Committee has not yet produced a General 
Comment with respect to Article 8. Due to the absence of jurisprudence establishing 
40 Provisions regarding reporting requirements and the obligations of ECOSOC (as carried out by the 
CESCR) are contained within Part IV of the ICESCR, Article 16— 25. The CESCR was established 
under ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17, UNESCOR Supp (No.1), at 15, UN Doc. E/1985/85, (1985). 
41 The United Nations is currently looking at a Draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, considered by 
the CESCR in 1996. The Draft Optional Protocol would incorporate a complaints procedure granting 
individuals or groups the right to submit communications to the CESCR concerning non-compliance 
with the Covenant. See Commission on Human Rights, Status of the International Covenants on 
Human Rights, Draft Optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Note by the Secretary General, United Nations Document E/CN.4/1997/105, 18 
December 1996. For discussion of the development until 2000 of the Draft Optional Protocol see 
A. Byrnes, 'An Effective Complaints Procedure in the Context of International Human Rights Law' in 
A. Bayefsky, (ed.) The UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century (Kluwer International: 
London, 2000), 139 at 160-162. 
42 For a general discussion of the supervision, implementation and complaint mechanisms with respect 
to the economic, social and cultural rights in international law see A. Rosas and M. Scheinin, 
'Implementation Mechanisms and Remedies' in A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas, (eds.) Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Text Book (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: London, 1995), 355. 
43 Ibid at 357. 
" General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have been 
consolidated by the United Nations: Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, United Nations Document: HRUGEN/1/Rev.5, 26 April, 
2001. 
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the boundaries and scope of the right to strike as enumerated within Article 8, resort 
must be had to the express wording of the Convention in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 45 (hereafter the ' Vienna Convention'), ICESCR 
State party reports, Concluding Observations of the CESCR and academic 
commentary.46 
The main issues that arise with respect to the interpretation of the ICESCR right to 
strike relate to the relationship between the express right to strike in Article 8(1)(d) 
and the general trade union rights elaborated in other subparagraphs of Article 8(1). 47 
The following discussion will canvass these issues to clarify the extent of the right set 
out in the ICESCR. 
Article 8(1)(d) 
Article 8(1)(d) provides that the right to strike is to be ensured 'provided that it is 
exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country'. The expression of the 
right is not further elaborated within the text of the ICESCR and the scope of the right 
remains substantially undefined. 48 
In his study of the ICESCR, Craven analyses CESCR reporting guidelines and 
Concluding Observations concerning Article 8(1)(d) to ascertain the scope of the right 
to strike. 49 Craven's discussion is necessarily circumspect, providing tentative 
conclusions at best, but discerns the following trends within CESCR commentary: 
protection extends beyond the trade union to the individual against dismissal 
for strike (as the right is expressed as an individual right); 
45 Article 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflect the customary rules of 
international law relating to interpretation of treaties. See Alston and Quinn, supra note 37 at 160 for 
articulation of these rules. 
46 See ILA Report, supra note 11 at 4. 
47 Articles 8(1)(a) — (c) set out general trade union rights as an expression of the principle of freedom of 
association relating to the right to form and join trade unions. 
48 The fmal draft of the ICESCR was debated within the UN Commission on Human Rights. Ben-Israel 
argues that the failure of the Commission to defme the boundaries of the right to strike resulted from a 
divergence of opinion on the consequences of definition, exacerbated by Cold War tensions. Ben-Israel 
notes that, in general, socialist countries advocated an expansive definition of the right to strike in order 
to safeguard the full expression of the right. However, Western nations advocated caution, noting that 
the right to strike was protected as an element of collective bargaining, and further sought to ensure the 
enactment of suitable limitations on the exercise of the right to accommodate national interests. Ben-
Israel, supra note 38 at 72-79. 
49 Craven supra note 18 at 278. 
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• some members of the CESCR consider the right to strike operates as a facet of 
the principle of freedom of association and an essential element of collective 
bargaining; 
• the CESCR considers the entrenchment of the right in legislation to constitute 
a priority for ratifying States; and 
• such legislation should be clear, precise and no impediment to the exercise of 
the right. 50 
However, Craven's conclusions only encompass CESCR commentary until 1995. 
Concluding Observations made since 1995 reveal willingness on the part of the 
CESCR to accept and apply quasi jurisprudence developed by ILO bodies on the 
boundaries of the right to strike, particularly with respect to restriction of strikes in 
essential services. 51 At least three recent Concluding Observations have noted that 
restrictions on strikes in the States concerned have exceeded the restrictions 
permissible under Article 8(2) which allow lawful restrictions on the right to strike for 
the police or for those involved in the administration of the State. To determine the 
meaning of "workers involved in the administration of the State", the CESCR has 
referred to the principle of freedom of association within ILO Conventions 87 and 
98. 52 In 2001, the CESCR concluded that Japanese teachers were not involved in the 
administration of the State, referring to UNHRC and ILO commentary expressly 
excluding teachers from this category. 53 In addition to cases where the CESCR draws 
direct parallels with the ILO, other Concluding Observations include CESCR 
50 Ibid at 278-281. 
51 For further discussion of the willingness of the CESCR to consider ILO jurisprudence in the area of 
strikes and essential services see Fenwick, supra note 37, at 67-68. 
52 Convention 98: The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949. See Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, 24/09/2001, 
E/C.12/1/Add.68, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 26 th Session, para 22; 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Benin, 
05/06/2002, E/C.12/1/Add.78, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 28 th Session, 
para 35; Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Japan, 
24/09/2001; E/C.12/1/Add.67, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 26 th Session, 
para 21. 
33 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Japan, 
24/09/2001; E/C.12/1/Add.67, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 26 th Session, 
para 21. The observation also canvassed whether or not the judiciary were considered to be exercising• 
the authority of the State. While the Observation concluded that they were not exercising the authority 
of the State, ILO quasi-jurisprudence suggests that members of the judiciary are engaged in the 
administration of the State. For further discussion of the view of ILO bodies on this issue see chapter 3 
at 100-101. 
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commentary that is in line with ILO quasi jurisprudence with respect to the scope of 
permissible restrictions on the right to strike. 
The CESCR concluding observation relating to Bolivia in 2001 commented adversely 
on the Bolivian General Labour Act which requires endorsement of a strike by three 
quarters of eligible workers to undertake a legal strike. 54 The CESCR observed that 
this was excessive and constituted "a restriction on the right provided for in article 
8(1)(d) of the Convention". 55 Further, the CESCR has made repeated comments with 
respect to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The CESCR 
stated in 1997, and reiterated in 2002, that the failure of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to incorporate the right to strike into domestic law is a breach of Article 
8(1)(d). Further, the position in the British common law whereby strike action 
constitutes a breach of contract giving rise to a right to dismiss the employee "is not 
consistent with protection of the right to strike". 56 The CESCR also stated that "Nile 
Committee does not find satisfactory the proposal to enable employees who go on 
strike to have a remedy for unfair dismissal. Employees participating in a lawful strike 
should not ipso facto be regarded as having committed a breach of the employment 
contract". 57 This observation by the CESCR constitutes a strong statement concerning 
not only the right to strike, but also the form that the provision of that right should 
take. This indicates a willingness by the CESCR to move away from an interpretation 
of the right enacted in Article 8(1)(d) that permits a wide variation of State practice, to 
one that embraces a narrower conception of permissible restrictions on the right, an 
approach which is in line with that adopted by the IL0. 58 
54 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
Observation: Bolivia, Convention 87, 73 rd Session, 2002. 
55 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Bolivia, 
21/05/2001; E/C.12/1/Add.60, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 28 th Session, 
para 18. The view of the implementation of the right to strike in Bolivia is shared by the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO with respect to the 
implementation of the right to strike. The CEACR notes "with regret" the imposition of the 3/4 
requirement for the declaration of a legal strike: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations, Observation: Bolivia, Convention 87, 73"1 Session, 2002, 
para B. III. 
56 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 04/12/97, E/C.12/1/Add.19, Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, para 11; Reiterated in 2002— 05/05/2002, E/C.12/1/Add.79, 28 th Session, 
para 34. 
57 Ibid. 
58  The view of the CESCR on strike as breach of contract is consistent with the views of the ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) that "the [CFA] cannot view with equanimity a set of 
56 
The willingness of the CESCR to refer to ILO quasi jurisprudence and to engage with 
the form that the provision of the right to strike should take suggests that 
Article 8(1)(d) should become increasingly relevant and more closely resemble ILO 
standards. The observations also suggest that it is permissible to refer to ILO 
jurisprudence for assistance in ascertaining the scope of the right within Article 
8(1)(d) of the ICESCR. 
The limitation clause in Article 8(1)(d) 
Article 8(1)(d) subjects the exercise of the right to strike to the domestic laws of the 
ratifying country. The difficulty posed is to determine permissible restrictions on 
strike action before the provision of the right under Article 8(1)(d) is impaired. 
The nature of the limitation contained within Article 8(1)(d) needs to be read within 
the context in which it appears and the general approach to the interpretation of 
treaties as set down within the Vienna Convention. Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose". This suggests that Article 8(1)(d) should not be 
given a restrictive interpretation whereby any domestic law restricting the right to 
strike would be valid. Instead, the provision must be read in good faith, that is, 
provisions restricting the right to strike should not detract from the object and purpose 
of the Convention. Therefore, State parties are under an obligation to guarantee a right 
to strike and national laws affecting the exercise of the right should not be so 
restrictive that the right is stripped of meaning or content or that the existence of the 
right is vitiated. 59.Within this context, academic observations suggest that the 
limitation provision within Article 8(1)(d) should be interpreted as permitting 
procedural limitations upon the exercise of the right to strike, rather than allowing 
substantive limitations to affect the operation of the right. 6° 
legal rules which: (i) appears to treat virtually all industrial action as a breach of contract on the part of 
those who participate therein". Complaint Against the Government of Australia presented by the 
International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA), Document Vol. LXXIV, 1991, 
Series B, No. 1, Report 277, Case 1511, para 236. 
59 Ben-Israel supra note 38 at 87. 
60 Craven supra note 18 at 281; Ben Israel supra note 38 at 87-89: 
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A further suggestion with respect to the interpretation of the limitation provision 
within Article 8(1)(d) relates to Article 4 of the ICESCR that operates as a general 
limitation provision for the entire Covenant. State parties agree that the guarantees 
under the Covenant can only be limited in so far as this may be compatible with the 
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a 
democratic society. Ben-Israel suggests that Article 4 affects the interpretation of the 
limitation within Article 8(1)(d), whereby the right to strike can only be limited in so 
far as such a limitation is compatible with the general nature of the right, and solely 
for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 6I However, 
Craven suggests that the limitation in Article 4 only applies to articles of the Covenant 
that are not subject to an existing internal restriction. 62 Therefore, opinion is divided 
on the effect of Article 4 on the limitation within Article 8(1)(d). 
Article 8(2) 
ICESCR Article 8(2) provides: 
[t]his article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of 
the administration of the State. 
• Article 8(2) of the ICESCR allows for the State to impose greater restrictions on the 
exercise of the right to strike by the military, the police or workers involved in the 
administration of the State. 63 It is suggested by Ben-Israel that the inclusion of Article 
8(2) provides guidance for the interpretation of Article 8(1)(d) as these specific 
categories of workers are singled out as groups whose right to strike the State can 
legitimately restrict. 64 
61  Ben-Israel, supra note 38 at 88. 
62 Craven, supra note 18 at 271. 
63 Alston and Quinn, supra note 37 at 214. Craven suggests that the meaning of Article 8(2) may be 
affected by Article 5(2) of the ICESCR. Article 5(2) provides that "[n]o restriction upon or derogation 
from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any county in virtue of law, 
conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not 
recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent". Craven argues that this article may 
be interpreted to suggest that restrictions on the right to strike of the police, military or of workers in 
the administration of the State will only be valid under Article 8(2) if they were imposed before 
ratification of the ICESCR by a ratifying State, otherwise it would be a restriction of the rights of an 
individual previously enjoyed under the laws of the ratifying State. See Craven, supra note 18 at 284. 
64  R. Ben-Israel, 'Strikes, Lockouts and Other Kinds of Hostile Actions' in B. Hepple, (ed.) 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1997) at 7. 
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Article 8(3) 
ICESCR Article 8(3) provides, 
[n]othing in this article shall authorise State Parties to the International Labour 
Organization Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise to take legislative measures which would 
prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the 
guarantees provided for in that Convention. 
This provision is almost identical to Article 22(3) of the ICCPR and, accordingly, 
raises the same questions of interpretation. State parties who have ratified the relevant 
ILO Convention will be bound by its terms irrespective of their ratification of the 
ICESCR. It has been suggested that the Article was included to stop States who have 
ratified ILO Convention 87 from invoking the provisions of the ICESCR to reduce the 
obligations contained in Convention 87. 65 Further, Ben-Israel argues that for States 
who have ratified ILO Convention 87, Article 8(3) implies that the right to strike 
within their domestic laws cannot fall below ILO standards. 66 
The inclusion of the article could also suggest that ILO Convention 87 may provide a 
basis to assist in evaluating the content of the right in the ICESCR. 67 Support for this 
suggestion may be found in the fact that CECSCR makes reference to ILO 
Conventions in assessing the progress of a State with respect to ICESCR 
obligations. 68 However, ILO Conventions do not constitute a recognised source of 
interpretative material for the ICESCR in international law. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 has set out the basis of Australia's obligation under the UN human rights 
regime to respect and implement a domestic right to strike. Australia is bound by both 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR and is subject to an express obligation under the ICESCR 
and may be subject to an implicit obligation under the ICCPR. However, while the 
65 Alston and Quinn, supra note 37 at 215. 
66 Ben-Israel, supra note 64 at 7. 
67 Craven, supra note 18 at 260 and 263. 
68 For example, the CESCR within its Concluding Observations on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Australia, 01/09/2000, E/C.12/1Add.50 at para 29, recommended that Australia limit the 
prohibitions on the right to strike in essential services, in accordance with ILO Convention No. 87 
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. 
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existence of the obligation within the ICESCR is clear, the nature and scope of the 
right to strike has not been sufficiently delineated. 
Chapter 3 will consider the obligation to respect the right to strike encompassed as an 
implicit element in the principle of freedom of association contained within the 
instruments of the ILO. 
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. Chapter Three 
The Right to Strike and the International Labour Organization 
Introduction 
The right of employers and workers to organise and freedom of action for their 
organizations are of special significance for the activities of an Organization 
that is composed not only of government representatives but also of those of 
national employers' and workers' organizations. 1 
The most significant and well-developed international obligation to recognise the 
right to strike comes from the instruments of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO). This is the case despite the fact that these instruments do not entrench an 
express statement of the right to strike. Instead, the right to strike operates as an 
implicit element of the core ILO principle of freedom of association. 
The absence of a direct expression of the right is surprising in the context of an 
organization dedicated to the improvement of workers rights and working conditions. 
However, it has not hampered the development of extensive quasi jurisprudence 
expressing the right to strike and delineating its boundaries within the framework of 
its expression as an implicit component of freedom of association. 2 Freedom of action 
for worker and employer organizations is a core principle for an organization unique 
in international law for its representation of States and civil society, specifically, 
tripartite representation of governments, workers and employers. No other 
international organization provides non-State actors with a central role or an equal 
vote throughout all levels and decisions of the organization. 3 It is this tripartite 
composition, the strong entrenchment of the principle of freedom of association and 
an explicit commitment to the functional collective interpretation of freedom of 
association that makes ILO instruments the most significant source of the obligation 
J. M. Servais, 'International Labour Organization Standards on Freedom of Association and their 
Implementation' (1984) 123 International Labour Review 765 at 769. 
2 For discussion of the term quasi-jurisprudence when referring to the commentary of ILO bodies see 
the discussion to follow in this chapter at 80-82. 
3 For an extensive study of tripartism within the ILO see: A. Tilcriti, Tripartism and the International 
Labour Organization (Almqvist and Wiksell International: Stockholm, 1982). 
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to provide a right to strike in international law, despite the absence of an express 
entrenched statement. 
In order to canvass the right to strike implicit within ILO instruments it will be 
necessary to outline the organizational structure of the ILO and demonstrate the 
importance of the principle of freedom of association. To achieve this, chapter 3 will: 
• outline the constitutional and legislative structure of the ILO; 
• discuss the source of the right to strike within ILO instruments, namely the 
ILO Constitution, the Fundamental Declaration of Rights and Principles at 
Work 1998 and the ILO Freedom of Association Conventions; and 
• undertake detailed examination of the content of the right to strike expressed 
in the quasi jurisprudence of ILO supervisory bodies. 
Constitutional and Legislative Structure of the ILO 
The ILO was established in 1919 as an organ of the League of Nations and has 
operated as an agency of the United Nations since 1946. 4 The Constitution of the ILO, 
along with the Declaration of Philadephia, sets out the aims of the Organization and 
governs the legislative structure. In addition, the preamble of the Constitution 
dedicates the organization to the principles of social justice: "whereas universal and 
lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice". 
The Declaration of Philadelphia, designed to restate the basic aims and purposes of 
the organization and to expand the mandate of the ILO into the field of social justice, 
was annexed to the Constitution of the ILO in 1944. 5 The Declaration restated the 
4 There are many studies of the ILO that set out the history of the Organization. A sample includes A. 
Alcock, History of the International Labour Organization (MacMillan: Great Britain, 1971); C. W. 
Jenks, Social Justice in the Law of Nations (Oxford University Press: London, 1970); C. W. Jenks, 
'Human Rights, Social Justice and Peace: The Broader Significance of the International Labour 
Organization Experience' (Paper presented at International Protection of Human Rights: Proceedings 
of the Seventh Nobel Symposium, Oslo, September 25-27, 1967); G. A. Johnston, The International 
Labour Organization (Europa Publishers: London, 1970); D. A. Morse, The Origin and Evolution of 
the International Labour Organization and its Role in the World Community (New York State School 
of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University: New York, 1969); T. Shotwell, The Origins of 
the International Labour Organization (Columbia University Press: Columbia, 1934). A further oft 
cited source of references for the origins of the ILO is a bibliography: G. von Potobslcy and H. G. 
Bartolemei de la Cruz, La Organisacion Internacional del Trabajo (Astrea, Buenos Aires 1990); the 
author has not sighted this work. 
5 Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organization, annexed to 
the Constitution of the ILO at the twenty-sixth session, General Conference on 10 May, 1944. For 
discussion of the adoption of the Declaration of Philadelphia see J. D. French, 'The Declaration of 
Philadelphia and the Global Social Charter of the United Nations, 1944-45' in W. Sengenberger and D. 
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original Constitutional commitment that lasting peace can be established only if it is 
based on social justice. It also expanded the ILO's role beyond a focus on the 
employment relationship into broader questions facing workers and their 
organizations. An important element of this commitment is the principle of freedom 
of association and the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining. 6 This 
ongoing commitment to freedom of association will be the focus of this discussion of 
the organizational structure, canvassing areas of the ILO directly relevant to the 
discussion. Under Article 2 of the Constitution, the ILO consists of three separate 
bodies — the International Labour Conference, the International Labour Office and the 
Governing Body. 
The International Labour Conference 
The International Labour Conference (the Conference) constitutes the legislative arm 
of the ILO and is the ultimate authority for all resolutions of the ILO] The 
Conference is tripartite in composition, comprising four delegates from each ILO 
Member State, two delegates representing government, one representing the most 
representative employer organization, and one representing the most representative 
employee organization. 8 Each delegate to the Conference votes individually and the 
government delegates do not control the votes of employer and employee delegates 
Campbell, (eds.) International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence (International 
Institute for Labour Studies: Geneva, 1994), 19 at 19; E. Lee, 'The Declaration of Philadelphia: 
Retrospect and Prospect' (1994) 133 International Labour Review 467. 
6 Article III(e), Declaration of Philadelphia, ILO. 
7 The concept of the International Labour Office as the Organizations' Legislative Arm is used by 
Bartolomei de la Cruz who notes that the Conference has often been called the "International Social 
Parliament": H. G. Bartolothei de la Cruz, 'International Labour Law: Renewal or Decline? (1994) 10 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 201 at 202. This 
phraseology is repeated by Bartolomei de la Cruz in writings undertaken in conjunction with von 
Potobslcy and Swepston who refer to the Conventions of the ILO as "legislative instruments": H. 
Bartolomei de la Cruz, G. von Potobsky and L. Swepston, The International Labor Organization: The 
International Standards System and Basic Human Rights (Westview Press: Boulder, 1996) at 23. 
8 ILO Constitution, Article 3(1). Throughout the history of the ILO, difficulties have been encountered 
with the concept of the 'most representative' worker and employer organizations. The difficulties in 
definition have related to communist nations during the cold war and more recently difficulties 
resulting from declining union density. For detailed accounts of these difficulties see S. Cooney, 
'Testing times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New International Political Economy' (1999) 
20 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 365 at 370 — 373; E. Osieke, Constitutional Law and 
Practice in the International Labour Organization (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1985); N. 
Valticos and G. von Potobslcy, International Labour Law (2nd ed., Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers: Deventer, 1995). 
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from the same State. 9 Decisions of the Conference, unlike those made by any other 
international agency, reflect the input of a significant proportion of potential affected 
parties, lending greater legitimacy to Conference decisions. 1° 
The Conference convenes in Geneva each year for approximately three weeks, during 
which time it is responsible for resolutions of the ILO and the passage of Conventions 
and Recommendations. Conventions and Recommendations are the "principal 
instruments by which international labor standards are expressed".' 1 Conventions 
create international legal obligations, binding when ratified and Recommendations 
represent non-binding guidelines for national action. 12 The Governing Body of the 
ILO, which acts as the Organizations' executive arm, determines the agenda of the 
Conference. 13 The Governing Body is responsible for ensuring that agenda items 
receive technical preparation, and that prior consultation with Member States takes 
place." Such preparation is extremely thorough in order to maintain the quality of 
ILO standards: 
The intense technical preparation that precedes and accompanies the framing 
of Conventions and Recommendations is the best possible guarantee that an 
international instrument will be adopted only when its subject matter has 
reached a high degree of maturity internationally. 15 
Conventions and Recommendations can only be passed by a two third majority of the 
Conference, ensuring that no one 'grouping' of government, employers or employees 
can successfully pass a Convention or Recommendation without the support of at 
least one other of the groupings. 16 Further, as they represent only 50% of the 
Conference, employers and employees cannot combine to out-vote Member States. 
This ensures that Conventions or Recommendations attain a measure of State support 
9  ILO Constitution, Article 4(1). In order to ensure parity between employer and employee delegates, if 
one of the Member States fails to nominate one of the non governmental (employer/employee) 
delegates, or one is refused entry, the other shall not have voting rights — Article 4(2) and (3) ILO 
Constitution. 
I° B. Creighton, 'The Workplace Relations Act in International Perspective' (1997) 10 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 31; Valticos and von Potobsky, supra note 8 at 35. 
I I Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 7 at 20. 
12 Ibid. For discussion of the legal nature of Conventions and Recommendations see pages 21-24: 
13 ILO Constitution, Article 14(1). 
14 ILO Constitution, Article 14(2). 
15 Bartolomei de la Cruz, supra note 7 at 203. For discussion of the technical preparation undertaken by 
the International Labour Office see Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobslcy and Swepston, supra note 7 at 
37-48. 
16 ILO Constitution, Article 19(2). 
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prior to passage. If Conventions and Recommendations could be passed without 
Member State support, they might not attract ratifications and the result could be a 
proliferation of instruments redundant in the sense that Member States have 
demonstrated no commitment to them." 
In the process of framing Conventions and Recommendations of general application, 
the Conference is directed to "have due regard" to those countries in which climatic 
Conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization, or other special 
circumstances make the industrial conditions of those nations substantially different, 
and suggest modifications where appropriate. I8 This is aimed at ensuring that 
Conventions are written with sufficient flexibility to allow them to be incorporated 
into the domestic laws of all Member States. I9 Osieke notes that flexibility clauses 
"help in making the ILO's standards much more acceptable to the developing 
countries, and applicable by the general membership". 2° Further, as the ILO 
Constitution does not allow for ratification with reservations, flexibility clauses allow 
Conventions to cater to the maximum number of Member State legal, economic and 
political environments. 21 Finally, denunciation of ratified Conventions may only 
occur in accordance with the terms of each particular Convention, usually at ten-year 
intervals from adoption. 22 
• After an adopted Convention has been communicated to Member States, each 
Member undertakes to bring the Convention before its "competent authority" for the 
enactment of legislation or other measures within one year. 23 Member States are 
17 Osieke, supra note 8 at 52. 
18  ILO Constitution, Article 13(3). For discussion of the importance of ensuring that non-prescriptive 
international labour standards are phrased in an adaptable and flexible manner see the discussion of 
comparativism in the Introduction at 17-19. 
19  Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 7 at 42; Osieke, supra note 8 at 147. 
20 Osieke, supra note 8 at 147-148. 
21 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobslcy and Swepston, supra note 7 at 50. 
22  Ibid at 55. In 1997, as a part of the ILO program to rationalise Conventions, the International Labour 
Conference passed an. amendment to the ILO Constitution inserting a new Article 19(9). The new 
provision will allow for the abrogation of any Convention adopted by the Conference if it appears that 
it has lost its purpose or no longer makes a useful contribution to attaining the objectives of the ILO: 
Constitution of the International Labour Organization Instrument of Amendment, 1997. As at the date 
of writing, the amendment has received 79 of the 118 ratifications that it needs to come into force. 
23  ILO Constitution, Article 19(5). The competent authority is the authority with "the power to legislate 
or take other action in order to implement Conventions and Recommendations": Memorandum 
Concerning the Obligation to Submit Conventions and Recommendations to the Competent Authority, 
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required to inform the ILO Director-General of the measures taken to comply with 
this requirement, the authorities to whom the Convention was publicised and any 
action taken by those authorities. A Member must then communicate either the fact of 
formal ratification or, if no ratification has taken place, comply with reporting 
requirements set down by the Governing Body on the relevant law of the Member 
State and obstacles to ratification. 24 
Ratification of a Convention by a Member State entails an obligation, under the terms' 
of the ILO Constitution Article 19(5)(d) to "take such action as may be necessary to 
make effective the provisions of such Convention". Such steps will frequently be 
legislative but may also entail administrative, practical or promotional activities. The 
nature of the activities required will always depend upon the terms of each 
Convention.25 A similar procedure applies with respect to Recommendations adopted 
by the Conference. Adopted Recommendations are to be communicated to all 
Members, who undertake to bring the Recommendation before the relevant national 
authorities within one year. As Recommendations are not open to ratification, 
Member States undertake to report at appropriate intervals to the ILO Director-
General on the status of their law and practice with regard to the terms of the 
Recomniendation.26 
In addition to these provisions for ratification and reporting, the Constitution of the 
ILO ensures that Conventions and Recommendations operate as minimum standards. 
The adoption by the Conference or ratification by a Member State of any Convention 
or Recommendation of the ILO cannot be 'deemed to affect any law, award, custom or 
agreement in a Member State that provides for more favourable conditions. 27 
Therefore, in unitary states where ratification of a Convention has the effect of 
applying that Convention in national law, ratification will not automatically reduce 
more favourable working standards. 28 Finally, the ILO Constitution contains 
Principal Conclusions of the CEACR and of the Conference Committee, cited in Bartolomei de la 
Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 7 at 46. 
24 ILO Constitution, Article 19(5). 
25 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 7 at 52. 
26 ILO Constitution, Article 19(6). 
27 ILO Constitution, Article 19(8). 
28 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobslcy and Swepston, supra note 7 at 43 — 44. In unitary States, 
ratification of an international instrument has the effect of implementing that instrument into domestic 
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mechanisms for reporting on the status of ratified Conventions, a complaint 
mechanism and an interpretative mechanism. These will be addressed in turn as the 
chapter explores the source of the right to strike within ILO instruments and 
monitoring by ILO agencies. 
The International Labour Office 
The International Labour Office (the Office) is the permanent secretariat of the ILO, 
controlled by the Governing Body and managed by the Director-Genera1. 29 The 
Director-General is appointed by and responsible to the Governing Body.3° The 
Director-General is obliged to attend all meetings of the Governing Body and acts as 
the Secretary-General of the Conference. 31 The current Director-General is Juan 
Somavia of Chile who was appointed in March 1999. 32 
The functions of the International Labour Office include management and document 
preparation for the Conference, assistance to Member States with the implementation 
of Conference decisions and improvement of domestic regulation, production of 
appropriate publications and such other powers and duties as the Conference or the 
• Governing Body determine. 33 
The Governing Body 
The Governing Body is constituted under Article 2 of the ILO Constitution and acts as 
the executive arm of the International Labour Office, providing executive decision 
making and policy guidance for the ILO. The Governing Body consists of fifty-six 
delegates, twenty-eight of which represent governments, fourteen represent employers 
and fourteen represent workers. Ten of the twenty-eight government representatives 
are appointed by "Members of chief industrial importance" and the other eighteen are 
law. In dualist States, ratification constitutes an agreement to be bound in international law but does not 
have any effect on domestic legislation. In dualist States international instruments will have limited 
effect in domestic law until legislation is passed to give effect to those obligations. For information of 
the effect of ratification in unitary jurisdictions see V. Leary, International Labour Conventions and 
National Law: The Effectiveness of the Automatic Incorporation of Treaties in National Legal Systems 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1982): 
29 ILO Constitution, Article 2. 
3° ILO Constitution, Article 8. 
31 ILO Constitution, Articles 8(2) and 15(1). 
32 Information sourced from the ILO website at www.ilo.org . 
33 ILO Constitution, Article 10. 
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appointed by States chosen from remaining Member States during the Conference. 34 
The employer and worker delegates elect the employer and worker representatives 
respectively at the Conference. 35 The term of office of each respective Governing 
Body is three years. 36 During the annual session of the Conference, the Governing 
Body is responsible for setting the agenda, tabling the annual budget and detailing the 
work of the various Governing Body Committees. 37 
Sources of the Right to Strike in ILO Instruments 
While there is no express statement of the right to strike within the instruments of the 
ILO, the ILO recognises the existence of an obligation on the part of all Member 
States to provide a right to strike. This obligation exists as a component of the 
obligation upon all Member States to uphold the principle of freedom of association. 
A survey of the sources of the obligation to uphold freedom of association will 
provide a concurrent survey of the sources of the implicit right to strike within the 
principle of freedom of association. 38 
The Constitution of the ILO 
The Constitution of the ILO, adopted in 1919, is binding upon all Member States. The 
principle of freedom of association is contained within the preamble of the 	. 
Constitution as one of the core principles which the ILO was established to achieve: 
34 ILO Constitution, Article 7(2). The Members of chief industrial importance who hold the ten 
permanent seats on the Governing Body are Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the 
Russian Federation, The United Kingdom and the United States. Information sourced from Governing 
Body, Composition of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, Geneva, GB.05 (2002- 
2005) (Rev.1). 
35 ILO Constitution, Article 7(4). While Australia has not had a Government representative on the 
Governing Body since 1996, the current titular membership contains two Australians, Mr B. Noakes, 
an employer representative and Ms S. Burrow, a worker representative. Information sourced from 
Governing Body, Composition of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, Geneva, 
GB.05 (2002-2005) (Rev.1). 
36 ILO Constitution, Article 7(5). The current Governing Body was elected on 10 June 2002. 
Information sourced from Governing Body, Composition of the Governing Body of the International 
Labour Office, Geneva, GB.05 (2002-2005) (Rev. 1). 
37 Each year the Chairperson of the Governing Body submits a Report to the Conference detailing the 
activities of the Governiiig Body over the preceding year - See - ILO, Report of the Chairperson of the 
Governing Body to the Conference for the year 2003 -2004, 92nd Session, Geneva 2004, ILC 92-PR3- 
2004-05-0160-1-En.Doc. 
38 For discussion of the centrality of freedom of association within the ILO see B. Creighton, 'Freedom 
of Association' in R. Blanplain and C. Engels, (eds.) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations In Industrialized Market Economies (7th ed., Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001), 
227; L. Swepston, 'Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association: Development through ILO 
Supervision' (1998) 137 International Labour Review 169. 
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[w]hereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based 
upon social justice; And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such 
injustice hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce 
unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an 
improvement of those conditions is urgently required; as, for example, by ... 
recognition of the principle of freedom of association ... The High 
Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as 
by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, and with a view to 
attaining the objectives set forth in this Preamble, agree to the following 
Constitution of the International Labour Organization. 39 
The commitment of the ILO to the principle of freedom of association was 
strengthened by the Constitutional annexation of the Declaration of Philadelphia in 
1944. Article I(b) of the Declaration reaffirms the fundamental principles of the ILO, 
in particular that "freedom of association is essential to sustained progress". 
The consequence of the ILO Constitutional commitment to the principle of freedom 
of association is that Member States of the ILO are bound to respect the principle 
even if they have not ratified the relevant ILO Conventions. ° The ILO Constitution 
operates as an alternative source of international legal obligations upon Member 
States: 
[w]hile the Constitution of the ILO contains mainly provisions relating to the 
organs and the functioning of the Organization, it also lays down a number of 
general principles which have come to be regarded in certain respects as a 
direct source of law .... ILO bodies have frequently drawn legal consequences 
from them, particularly in the field of freedom of association ... and States 
Members of the ILO have been regarded as bound to some extent by these 
Constitutional principles. 4 ' 
There are no formal mechanisms in place to govern non-compliance with the general 
principles contained within the ILO Constitution. However, the Governing Body's 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) which hears complaints relating to 
39 Preamble, ILO Constitution, emphasis added. 
40 International Labour Office, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining; General Survey of 
the Reports on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), 1948 and 
the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) 1949, Report of the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 
81' Session 1994, Report III (Part 4B), Geneva (The 'General Survey, 1994'), para 7. Two examples of 
Member States that have not ratified the Freedom of Association Conventions but would be taken to 
have committed to the principle by virtue of their membership of the Organization are New Zealand 
and the United States of America. Ratification information sourced from the Applis (Application of 
International Labour Standards) database on the ILO website — www.ilo.org . 
41 Valticos and Von Potobsky, supra note 8 at 49. 
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breaches of the specific freedom of association Conventions, also entertains 
complaints alleging violation of the Constitutional principle of freedom of 
association. In Complaint against the Government of New Zealand presented by the 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZ,CTU) (the New Zealand determination) 
the Committee on Freedom of Association determined that the New Zealand 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 was in breach of the obligation to promote collective 
bargaining, an express facet of the principle of freedom of association contained in the 
Declaration of Philadelphia. 42 The New Zealand government questioned the mandate 
of the Committee, arguing that it had no jurisdiction given that New Zealand had not 
ratified the freedom of association Conventions. However, the Committee affirmed 
that: 
[b]y membership of the International Labour Organization, each member State 
is bound to respect a certain number of principles, including the principles of 
freedom of association which have become rules above the Conventions ... 
Such complaints may be presented whether or not the country concerned has 
ratified the freedom of association Conventions. 43 
The issue that remains less clear is the nature of the Constitutional commitment to 
freedom of association and whether this extends to a right to strike. Ben-Israel 
discusses a complaint made against Spain that was determined by the Committee on 
Freedom of Association. 44 Spain had not ratified the freedom of association 
Conventions at the time; however the CFA determined that Spain was obliged to 
provide a right to strike as a facet of its obligation to observe the principle of freedom 
of association.45 Ben-Israel concluded that: 
the labour standard laid out in Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 [the freedom of 
association conventions], served the CFA as a yardstick to measure the 
fundamental principle of freedom of association and its complementary right 
to strike which were safeguarded by the ILO Constitution. 46 
42 Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint against the Government of New Zealand 
presented by the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, Document Vol. DOCVII, 1994, Series B, 
No. 3, Report No. 295, Case No. 1698. 
43 Ibid, para 240; The Committee cited the General Survey 1994 of the CEACR at paras 34 and 53 in 
further support of their decision that the CFA did have the jurisdiction to hear the complaint. 
44 Committee on Freedom of Association, Report 149, Case 678, cited in R. Ben-Israel, International 
Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 
1988) at 69. 
45 Spain subsequently ratified both Freedom of Association Conventions in 1977. Ratification 
information sourced from the Applis (Application of International Labour Standards) database on the 
ILO website: 
46  Ben-Israel, 1988, supra note 44 at 70. 
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This argument is supported by the finding in the New Zealand determination. It was 
alleged that a prohibition of strikes and lockouts in certain circumstances within the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 (NZ) was in breach of the obligation to provide a 
right to strike. The Committee on Freedom of Association agreed, recalling principles 
set down through the interpretation of the freedom of association Conventions as to 
the appropriate limitations that may be placed on otherwise legitimate strike action. 47 
This illustrates that the CFA is prepared to apply the principles developed under the 
freedom of association Conventions, including the implied right to strike, to the 
Constitutional obligation on Member States to respect and implement the principle of 
freedom of association. 
In summary, the Constitution of the ILO commits Member States to the principle of 
freedom of association, and therefore to the implicit right to strike. This commitment 
accrues to Member States irrespective of their ratification of the freedom of 
association Conventions. 
There are two other sources of the obligation to provide a right to strike, in the 
Fundamental Declaration of Rights and Principles at Work 1998 and the Freedom of 
Association Conventions. 
The 1998 Fundamental Declaration on Principles and Rights at Work 
In 1998 the Conference adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work ('the Declaration'). 48 The Declaration was the result of a four year 
campaign by then Director-General Michael Hansenne to increase the number of 
ratifications of the 'core' or 'fundamental' labour standards. 49 The Declaration is 
promotional in character, to encourage future ratification of the core Conventions. 50 
47 New Zealand Determination, supra note 42 at para 259. 
48 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO, 1998, Document 
CIT/19981PR20A. For general information on the Declaration see H. Kellerson, 'The ILO Declaration 
of 1998 on Fundamental Principles and Rights: A Challenge for the Future?' (1998) 137 International 
Labour Review 223; J. R. Bellace, 'The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work' (2001) 17 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 269. 
49 Bellace, supra note 48 at 269 — 272. 
5° L. Swepston, 'The International Labour Organization and Human Rights Access to the ILO' in G. 
Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B. Ramcharan and A. de Zayas, (eds.) International Human Rights 
Monitoring Mechanisms - Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Moller (Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague, 2001), 485 at 503. 	' 
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The Declaration commits Members of the ILO to respect, promote and realise four 
'core' or 'fundamental' principles irrespective of ratification of the relevant 
Conventions. 51 The text of the Declaration provides that: 
all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have 
an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization, to 
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the 
Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the 
subject of those Conventions. 
The first principle set out within the Declaration is freedom of association and 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. As ILO bodies have 
consistently interpreted the principle of freedom of association as expressed within 
ILO instruments to contain an implicit right to strike, the Declaration constitutes a 
second source of the obligation placed on Member States of the ILO to provide a right 
to strike. 
The Declaration contains a follow up device to "encourage the efforts made by the 
Members of the Organization to promote the fundamental principles and rights 
enshrined in the Constitution of the ILO and the Declaration of Philadelphia and 
reaffirmed in this Declaration". 52 This entails reports from Member States who have 
not ratified one or more of the fundamental conventions and an annual global report 
on the status of one of the four principles. 53 
The Freedom of Association Conventions 
There are two core freedom of association Conventions setting out the substance of 
the principle of freedom of association. The Conventions are The Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, No. 87 and 
The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, No. 98. In order 
to understand the elaboration of the implicit right to strike within the ILO, it is 
necessary to understand the supervisorial structures that monitor compliance with 
51 Article 2, Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998. 
52 Follow-Up to the Declaration, Annex, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, ILO, 1998, Document CIT/19981PR20A. 
53 The first Global Report on freedom of association was tabled at the International Labour Conference 
in 2000 — Your Voice at Work, Report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference, 88 th 
Session, 2000, Report I(B). For coverage of the follow up process for the Declaration see Bellace, 
supra note 48. 
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these Conventions and provide the parameters in which interpretation of the 
Conventions takes place. 
The ILO supervisory structure is considered to be the most elaborate and well 
developed structure of all international organizations that monitor human rights. 54 It 
"relies on the principle that all parts of the supervisory system must be mutually 
supportive, and that all the concerned parties have their role to play in assuring the 
implementation of standards". 55 
Reporting and Complaint Procedures for Ratified ILO Conventions 56 
The ILO has developed a sophisticated supervision system consisting of two main 
mechanisms — reporting processes, whereby Member States report to the ILO on the 
progress and status of their implementation of ratified Conventions, and a complaints 
procedure to allow for allegations of non-compliance to be lodged by either another 
Member State or by individuals. The operation of these mechanisms . enables the ILO 
to bring pressure to bear on non-complying Member States. More importantly for the 
purposes of this study, it is through these mechanisms that the implicit right to strike 
was recognised and the content of the right was elaborated. 
Reporting Mechanisms 
The process that applies to the supervision of Member State implementation of 
ratified Conventions is set out in Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of the ILO. 
Under Article 22, Member States agree to provide annual reports to the International 
Labour Office on the measures undertaken to give effect to ratified Conventions. The 
annual reports of Member States are presented to the International Labour Conference 
each year along with a summary provided by the Director-Genera1. 57 
54  M. Rood, 'New Developments Within the ILO Supervisory System' in R. Blanpain, (ed.) Labour 
Law, Human Rights and Social Justice (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001), 87 at 87 — 88; 
Bartolomei de la Cruz, supra note 7 at 221. 
55  L. Swepston, 'International Labour Organization (ILO) Standards and Human Rights' in Y. Daniele, 
E. Stamatopoulou and C. J. Dias, (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Right: Fifty Years and 
Beyond (Haywood Publishing Company Inc: New York, 1999), 37 at 38. 
56  The following discussion of ILO supervision, reporting and complaint procedures has been sourced 
generally from primary ILO Sources, and Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobslcy and Swepston, 
supra note 7, part 3; Osieke, supra note 19; D. Tajgman and K. Curtis, Freedom of Association: A 
User's Guide (International Labour Office: Geneva, 2000) and Valticos and von Potobsky, supra note 
41. 
57 ILO Constitution, Article 23. 
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The annual reporting process created an onerous burden on Member States and the 
supervision mechanisms of the ILO. To reduce the workload, Member State reports 
are now submitted on a cyclical rotational basis. 58 Member States report to the ILO 
one year after ratification of a Convention, and then three years after ratification. 
After this, Member States are required to report on the basis of a five year reporting 
cycle for each Convention, except for certain Conventions of "special importance", 
including Conventions 87 and 98, which are maintained on two-year cycles. 59 
Once Article 22 Reports have been submitted by Member States, they are reviewed 
under a supervision system carried out by two committees of the Conference: the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) and the Committee on the Application of Standards of the International 
Labour Conference (Conference Committee). 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations  
The CEACR was established by resolution of the International Labour Conference in 
1926 and consists of up to 20 expert jurists, appointed in a personal capacity. 6° The 
Committee is responsible for reviewing reports submitted under Article 22 and noting 
the extent to which each State appears to be in conformity with the obligations 
undertaken. In addition, the CEACR reviews reports on unratified Conventions under 
the Fundamental Declaration, reports on the submission of instruments to the 
competent authorities and reports concerning non-metropolitan territories. The 
Committee is required to conduct this work with impartiality and objectivity. 61 
The CEACR interacts with Member States through the use of Direct Requests and 
Observations. A Direct Request seeks to clarify issues raised, to ask questions or to 
seek further information and is communicated directly to the Member State 
58 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 7 at 67. 
59 Ibid, page 68. 
60 There are currently 19 members of the CEACR. An Australian, Ms. Robyn A. Layton QC is the 
current chairperson, elected at the 73 r1 session of the CEACR held in Geneva from 28 November to 13 
December, 2002. See General Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations, ILO Report III (Part IB), ILC, 92nd Session, 2004. 
61 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 7 at 76. 
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concerned. 62 An Observation is made when the CEACR considers that a Member 
State has failed to implement or comply with a ratified Convention and is a public 
statement by the CEACR that, in its opinion, the member concerned is not complying 
with their agreed obligations. Observations are published by the CEACR in the annual 
report of the committee to the Conference. 63 
The CEACR reports to each session of the Conference on ratification levels and 
Member State compliance. Part 4B of the CEACR Report constitutes a general survey 
of CEACR Reports in a particular area of international labour law. This survey 
provides a mechanism for the CEACR to examine a Convention (or particular issue) 
and make a statement of the scope of the standards set down in that Convention, 
assessing the general level of compliance. The CEACR carried out a survey of the 
scope of freedom of association in 1994, followed up by a 'mini' survey focusing on 
states that had not ratified the Freedom of Association Conventions in 1998. 64 
Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference 
The Conference Committee is a Committee of the Conference responsible for 
examining measures taken by Member States to give effect to ratified Conventions. 
The Conference Committee is established under Article 7 of the Standing Orders of 
the Conference and provides a tripartite forum for the public discussion of CEACR 
reports and General Surveys. 65  The Officers of the Conference Committee select 
62 Direct Requests are now made available on-line at 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/index.cfm?lang=EN  in the Applis database. 
63 Valticos and von Potobsky, supra note 8 at 285-86. 
64 International Labour Office, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, General Survey of 
the Reports on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), 1948 and 
the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) 1949, Report of the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 
81' Session 1994, Report III (Part 4B), Geneva (The 'General Survey 1994'). The 'mini survey' of 
Member States that have not ratified the Freedom of Association Conventions was published in the 
1999 General Report of the CEACR. This mini survey occurred prior to the introduction of General 
Surveys under the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and was aimed at 
furthering ratification rates of core ILO Conventions amongst Member States. See CEACR General 
Report, ILO Report III (Part-1B), ILC 87 th Session, 1999, paragraphs 113 — 162. 
65 Article 7 of the Standing Orders of the International Labour Conference provide that the Conference 
Committee shall consider: 
(a) the measures taken by Members to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which 
th'ey are parties and the information furnished by Members concerning the results of 
inspections; 
(b) the information and reports concerning Conventions and Recommendations 
communicated by Members in accordance with Article 19 of the Constitution ...; and 
(c) the measures taken by Members in accordance with Article 35 of the Constitution. 
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Observations made by the CEACR for individual discussion and invite the 
Government of the Member State concerned to publicly explain the domestic 
application of the Convention. 66 Observations chosen by the Officers are usually cases 
of serious non-compliance and inclusion of a Member State in this part of the 
Conference represents one of the more public measures available to the supervisory 
organs of the ILO.° 
The Conference Committee prepares a report that is submitted to the Conference. The 
report reproduces the discussions of the Committee and identifies recalcitrant Member 
States that have systematically failed to comply with ratified ILO Conventions or 
other obligations. 68 This list is not intended to operate as a sanctioning device, 
however Valticos and von Potobsky point out that it "sometimes gives rise to sharp 
discussions". 69 
The reporting system of the ILO is designed to ensure that Member States undertake 
timely revision of their compliance status and that the ILO maintains an effective and 
up to date assessment of the implementation of its Conventions in practice. 
Furthermore, the interaction of the CEACR and the Conference Committee provides a 
balance between commentary by independent experts (CEACR) and public tripartite 
debate (Conference Committee). Bartolomei de la Cruz notes the importance of this 
balance: 
The two supervisory bodies complement each other effectively. The 
Committee of Experts conducts a technical and impartial examination of the 
cases and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards — whose 
conclusions are submitted to the plenary sitting of the Conference — 
contributes the political weight and influence of an international forum in 
which governments, employers and workers may speak freely." 
Complaint Procedures 
The ILO has procedures that enable a Member State or a worker/employer 
organization to complain about the failure of a Member State to comply with the 
66  Tajgman and Curtis, supra note 56 at 55. 
67 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 7 at 82; Valticos and von Potobsky, 
supra note 8 at 286-287. 
68 ibid. 
Valticos and von Potobslcy, supra note 8 at 286. 
70  Bartolomei de la Cruz, supra note 7 at 209. 
76 
provisions of a ratified Convention or with the obligations contained within the 
Constitution of the ILO. The complaint procedures fall into two categories — 
complaints made by one Member State against another Member State or complaints 
made by worker/employer organizations against a Member State. 
Member State Complaints  
The procedure for a complaint by one Member State against another Member State 
regarding the failure of that Member State to observe ratified Conventions is set out in 
the ILO Constitution, Articles 26— 28. 
Any Member State of the ILO has the right to file a complaint with the International 
Labour Office that another Member State is not securing effective observation of a 
Convention that both states have ratified. The complaint is considered by the 
Governing Body, which may appoint a Commission of Inquiry to examine the 
complaint and report back. 71 Where the Governing Body is considering a complaint 
made under this process, the Member State complained of is entitled to send a 
representative to the Governing Body to participate in relevant proceedings. 72 
If the Governing Body appoints a Commission of Inquiry, it will not function 
adequately unless Member States agree to cooperate with the Inquiry and place any 
relevant information at the disposal of the Commission. The Commission prepares a 
report that contains findings of fact and makes recommendations as to the steps that 
should be taken to meet the complaint. The report is communicated to the Governing 
Body and the Member States involved and published in the ILO Official Bulletin. 73 
Each Member State involved has the option of refusing to accept the findings of the 
Commission of Inquiry and referring the complaint to the International Court of 
71 A Commission of Inquiry is made up of "eminent persons chosen for their impartiality": J. M. 
Servais, 'International Labour Organization Standards on Freedom of Association and their 
Implementation' (1984) 123 International Labour Review 765 at 768. There were two Commissions' 
of Inquiry appointed in 1998 relating to Myanmar (forced labour) and Nigeria (freedom of association), 
Swepston, supra note 55 at 39. In addition, the Governing Body considered establishing a Commission 
of Inquiry to look into a complaint made against Colombia alleging breaches of the Freedom of 
Association Conventions, however in 2000 the Governing Body appointed a Special Representative for 
Cooperation with Colombia for ongoing review - General Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, ILO Report III (Part D3), ILC, 89th Session, 2001, 
para 30. 
72 ILO Constitution, Article 26(5). 
73  Bartolemei de la Cruz, supra note 7 at 207. 
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Justice:74 Where a complaint is referred to the International Court of Justice, its 
decision on the matter is final: 75 
Worker / Employer Complaints  
There are two procedures that allow worker or employer groups to complain about the 
failure of a Member State to observe a ratified Convention. The first procedure is set 
out in the Constitution of the ILO and the second procedure relates to a failure to 
observe the principle of freedom of association. 
Constitutional Complaint Mechanism 
Article 24 of the ILO Constitution allows for representations to be made to the 
Governing Body by industrial associations of workers or employers alleging that a 
Member State has failed to secure effective observation of a ratified Convention. 
Where a representation is made, the Governing Body may communicate the 
representation to the government of the Member State concerned and invite a 
response. If no response is received from the government or if the Governing Body 
deems the response to be unsatisfactory, the Governing Body has the right to publish 
the representation and the response (if any) to it. 76 
74 ILO Constitution, Article 29. 
75 ILO Constitution, Article 31. 
76 ILO Constitution, Article 25. Each year the General Report of the CEACR details representations 
made to the Governing Body in the preceding 12 months and notes whether they were declared 
receivable. Over the years 2001 — 2003 a number of representations were made, demonstrating that this 
Constitutional procedure remains in use, mainly from workers' organizations. In 2001 representations 
were deemed receivable against Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Chile, the Republic of Moldova and 
Turkey - ILO Report III (Part B3), ILC, 89th Session, 2001; In 2002 representations were deemed 
receivable against Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and New Zealand - ILO 
Report III (Part IB), ILC, 90th Session, 2002; In 2003 Representations were deemed receivable against 
Mexico and Guatemala - ILO Report III (Part IB),ILC, 91 s1 Session, 2003. 
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Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) 
An independent complaint mechanism operates to enable worker and employer 
organizations, both national and internationa1, 77 to make formal complaints to the 
CFA with respect to breaches of the principle of freedom of association. 78 
The CFA, a tripartite body of 9 members, was established by the Governing Body in 
1951 and hears complaints alleging breaches of the principle of freedom of 
association. 79 The CFA operates in a quasi-judicial manner. 8° It receives written 
documents of complaint from the complainant and seeks a response from the 
Government of the Member State concerned. It does not require the consent of the 
Member State to examine a complaint and will proceed without obtaining consent or 
cooperation. 81  After gathering written arguments from the complainant and Member 
State, the CFA will formulate conclusions. The conclusions assess whether an 
allegation of infringement has been substantiated, and, if made out, make 
recommendations requesting that the Member State take remedial action. 82 CFA 
determinations are submitted to the Governing Body for approval and the conclusions 
are published. 83 
Where CFA conclusions contain recommendations for remedial action by a Member 
State that has ratified the freedom of association conventions, the CEACR will follow 
up the recommendations under normal reporting mechanisms." The reporting and 
77 Complaints by an organization can only be submitted by a national occupational organization with a 
direct interest in the matter, by an international organization of employers or workers having 
consultative status with the ILO or by another international organization of employers or workers 
where the allegations relate to matters directly affecting its affiliated organizations: G. von-Potobslcy, 
'Protection of Trade Union Rights: Twenty Years' Work by the Committee on Freedom of 
Association' (1972) 105 International Labour Review 69 at 70, footnote 2. 
78 Rood, supra note 54 at 90. There is also the theoretical right of a Member State to complain to the 
CFA regarding the breach of another Member State of the principle of freedom of association — . see 
Servais, supra note 1 at 770. However, to date, no Member State has exercised this opportunity. 
79 The basis of the jurisdiction of the CFA is an agreement between the Economic and Social Council 
and the Governing Body. For a description of the history of the establishment of the CFA see 
Bartolemei de la Cruz, supra note 7 at 209 — 210. 
Von-Potobslcy, supra note 77 at 70. 
81 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobslcy and Swepston, supra note 7 at 101. 
82 Von-Potobslcy, supra note 77 at 70. 
83 CFA decisions are reported as Reports of tile Committee of Freedom of Association of the Governing 
Body of the ILO and are published in Official Bulletin (Geneva), Series B. In addition, all CFA 
decisions are summarised in the Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association 
Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO (`The Digest'). The Digest is currently in its fourth 
edition, published in 1996. 
84 Von Potobsky, supra note 77 at 82. 
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supervision mechanisms of the ILO work in tandem with the complaint mechanisms 
to encourage Member States to implement and comply with their obligations. 
Status of Reports, Recommendations and Conclusions of the CFA and CEACR 
The ILO right to strike is elaborated within CEACR and CFA interpretations of the 
principle of freedom of association. Over time these reports and conclusions have 
come to constitute a significant body of commentary, interpreting the principle of 
freedom of association, establishing its boundaries and assessing State compliance. 
However, neither body enjoys an ILO Constitutional mandate to provide authoritative 
interpretations of Conventions. Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution provides that 
any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of the Constitution or of any 
subsequent Convention shall be referred for decision to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). Accordingly, the ICJ is the only body able to make binding authoritative 
determinations on the meaning of ILO Conventions, although in practice this 
mechanism is rarely used and the ICJ has not had an opportunity to consider the quasi 
jurisprudence on the implicit right to strike. 85 This means that in Constitutional terms, 
the implicit right to strike has not yet been confirmed in a binding determination of 
the ICJ. 
In the absence of a referral to the ICJ for interpretation of the principle of freedom of 
association, CEACR and CFA conclusions and recommendations represent the most 
comprehensive and authoritative source available on the principle of freedom of 
association contained within ILO Conventions and the implicit right to strike. 
However, it is important to recognise that the decisions are not jurisprudence and the 
bodies are not courts. 86 The material is not written in a judicial style and does not 
adhere to the principles of legal reasoning and analysis. It can be difficult to locate the 
reasoning behind the recommendations or conclusions, or to ascertain legal method or 
systematic analysis within the material. Where conclusions are to be drawn in a report 
or a complaint the committees will 'note' facts, express 'regret' or 'request' that the 
Member State bring their law and practice into compliance. The most powerful 
85 Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky and Swepston, supra note 8 at 35 point out that the ICJ 
procedure has only been used once, in 1932 with respect to a question concerning the Night Work 
(Women) Convention, 1919 (No. 4). 
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statement of the CEACR is the phrase 'deep regret' and is intended to convey that the 
Member State concerned is in flagrant or long standing violation of a ratified 
Convention. The language of the committees can be very difficult to follow, as 
explored by Bellace: 
[t]he official report of the Committee of Experts is written in a technical, 
highly formulaic and understated fashion. Those who follow the ILO closely 
and regular attendees at the Conference pick up the nuanced differences 
between an Observation that begins 'the Committee notes' compared to one 
that begins 'the Committee notes with concern'. They will be aware that the 
latter phrase is actually quite strong. Others, including labor law academics 
and students, who may wish to read the Committee of Experts' report to 
ascertain the current situation in a given country with regard to a specific 
situation, are invariably frustrated for it is often impossible to understand the 
Committees' comments without having seen past reports, without having seen 
the governments' report, and without an understanding of how the Committee 
of Experts uses language. 87 
Despite these shortcomings, CEACR and CFA commentary is well respected, 
effective in practice and is considered to constitute a form of quasi-jurisprudence. 88 
Servais argues that high status attaches to CEACR commentary because CEACR 
members are independent experts and the critique process is public. 89 Servais further 
contends that CEACR and CFA decisions are objective, with accurate analysis and 
commentary designed to encourage cooperation and greater dialogue. 90 The advantage 
of CFA determinations, according to Hodges-Aaberhart and Odero, is the flexibility 
that the absence of an express statement of the right to strike gives the CFA: 
[t]hough it suffers from the disadvantages inevitably arising from the absence 
of formal international obligations, such as those that result from the 
ratification of a Convention, this case law has the advantage of developing 
principles that are capable of growth and adaptation in the light of changing 
circumstances ... [and are more able to] grapple with the unforeseen case than 
a procedure applying rules, which are either precise, therefore in some 
measure preconceived, or so general in character as to be of limited value as 
either rules or obligations. 91 
86  Committee on Freedom of Association, Report 234, doc GB.226/5/18, para 27, cited in Servais, 
supra note 1 at 771. 
87 Bellace, supra note 48 at 280. 
88  The Committee on Freedom of Association 'considers itself to be a quasi-judicial body — Bartolemei 
de la Cruz, von Potobslcy and Swepston, supra note 8 at 36. 
89 Servais, supra note 1 at 767. 
9° Ibid at 780. 
91  J. Hodges-Aeberhard and A. Dios de Odero, 'Principles of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association Concerning Strikes' (1987) 126 International Labour Review 543 at 561. 
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In conclusion, the commentary under consideration is not formally binding or 
authoritative. However, both the CFA and the CEACR have built up consistent, 
systematic sets of interpretative principles based on the reports and complaints that 
they are responsible for examining. In the absence of a referral to the ICJ, this body of 
quasi-jurisprudence is the most authoritative source for the proposition that the right 
to strike is implicit in the principle of freedom of association expressed within ILO 
sources. 
Quasi-Jurisprudence Establishing the Existence of the Implicit Right to Strike 
The main expressions of the principle of freedom of association and the contexts in 
which the implicit right to strike has been developed are the freedom of association 
Conventions. 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, 
No. 8792 
Whilst there is no express statement of the right to strike in Comiention 87, the 
CEACR and CFA have consistently found an implicit right to strike in the principle of 
freedom of association as expressed in the following Articles: 
Article 2 
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to 
establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous authorisation. 
Article 3 
1. Workers' and employers' organizations shall have the right to draw up 
their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, 
to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their 
programmes. 
2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would 
restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. 
92 For discussion of the history of Convention No. 87 see H. Dunning, 'The Origins of Convention No 
87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise' (1998) 137 International Labour Review 149. 
For discussion of the impact of the Convention see von Potobslcy, supra note 63. 
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Article 10 
In this Convention the term organization means any organization of workers 
or of employers for furthering and defending the interests of workers or of 
employers. 
Articles 2, 3 and 10 combine to ensure that workers and employers have the right to 
form and join organizations established for the purposes of furthering and defending 
their interests. They also have the explicit right to draw up their constitutions and 
rules, elect their representatives in full freedom, organise their administration and 
activities and formulate their programs. According to the CEACR, the right to strike 
is an essential and intrinsic element of these activities: 
[t]he right to strike is one of the essential means available to workers and their 
organizations for the promotion and protection of their economic and social 
interests. These interests not only have to do with better working conditions 
and pursuing collective demands of an occupational nature, but also with 
seeking solutions to economic and social policy questions and to labour 
problems of any kind .which are of direct concern to workers. 93 
In the 1994 General Survey of the principles of freedom of association the CEACR 
restated its commitment to this construction of freedom of association: "the 
Committee confirms its basic position that the right to strike is an intrinsic corollary 
of the right to organise protected by Convention 87". 	contrast to the trend towards 
individualism evident in many ILO Member States, the CEACR reaffirmed that the 
right implicit within the Convention is a collective right: 95 
Under Article 3(1) of Convention No. 87, the right to organise activities and to 
formulate programmes is recognised for workers' and employers' organizations. 
In the view of the Committee, strike action is part of these activities under the 
provisions of Article 3; it is a collective right exercised, in the case of workers, by 
a group of persons who decide not to work in order to have their demands met. 
The right to strike is therefore considered as an activity of workers' organizations 
within the meaning of Article 3. 96 
93 ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, General Survey by the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of the Conventions on Freedom of Association, the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining and the Convention and Recommendation concerning rural workers' 
organizations, Report III (Part 4B), International Labour Conference, 1983, 69 th Session, paras 200 and 
205. Affirmed in the General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 147. 
94 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 151. 
95  In the 1994 General Survey, the CEACR expressed "concern at two trends occurring in certain 
industrialized countries in particular, which have a negative impact on collective rights and collective 
bargaining. First, in several countries there has been a recent tendency for the legislature to give 
precedence to individual rights over collective rights in employment matters. Second ... structural 
change may be used to undermine the trade unions if the necessary measures are not taken by the 
authorities". General Survey, supra note 40 at para 236. 
96 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 149, italics in original. 
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In recognising the right to strike as collective in nature, the CEACR does not dictate 
that the right is only exercisable by trade unions. Novitz points out that both the 
CEACR and CFA have been careful to note that the right belongs to groups rather 
than trade unions. 97 This construction of the right recognises that workers may form 
groups in pursuit of their own interests that may not take the traditional form of a 
trade union but that have an equal right to exercise the rights inherent in the principle 
of freedom of association. 
The right to strike implicit in Convention 87 is not an absolute right and may be 
governed by provisions imposing conditions or restrictions on its exercise. 98 There is 
extensive CEACR and CFA commentary on the scope of legitimate restrictions on the 
right to strike. After an examination of the implicit right to strike in Convention 98, 
the remainder of this chapter will consider the commentary exploring the right to 
strike. 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, No. 98 
The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) deals with 
issues related to the right of workers' and employers' organizations to organise and 
engage in collective bargaining. Articles 1-3 of the Convention seek to protect the 
right of workers to exercise their right to organise against employers and the right of 
workers' and employers' organizations against interference from each other. Article 4 
of the Convention seeks to ensure the promotion of voluntary collective bargaining 
within the labour law systems of ratifying Member States. 
The relevant provisions of the Convention with respect to the implicit right to strike 
are set out in Article 1: 
(1) Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination in respect of their employment. 
(2) Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to - 
(a) make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall 
not join a union or shall relinquish trade union membership; 
97 Tonia Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2003) at 277. 
98 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 151. 
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(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of 
union membership or because of participation in union activities 
outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within 
working hours. 
Convention 98 and Convention 87 operate in tandem, in that Convention 98 protects 
parties against discrimination for engaging in the activities protected by Convention 
87. The CEACR recognises this relationship and considers that without Convention 
98, the guarantees set out in Convention 87 may be rendered nugatory: 
[t]he protection afforded to workers and trade union officials against acts of 
anti-union discrimination constitutes an essential aspect of freedom of 
association, since such acts may result in practice in denial of the guarantees 
laid down in Convention 87. 99 
The extension of protection for workers against discrimination for engaging in strike 
action is a facet of the relationship between Convention 87 and Convention 98, 
"[s]ince the maintaining of the employment relationship is a normal consequence of 
recognition of the right to strike, its exercise should not result in workers being 
dismissed or discriminated against". 100 
Under Article 6, the guarantees provided in Convention 98 do not apply to public 
servants engaged in the administration of the State. The CEACR has adopted a 
restrictive approach to the interpretation of Article 6 whereby only those public 
servants that are by their functions directly employed in the administration of the 
State are excluded from the application of the Convention. 101 Further, in 1978 the 
Conference adopted Convention 151, the Labour Relations (Public Service 
Convention) 1978 to extend the protection against acts of anti-union discrimination 
found in Convention No 98 to public employees engaged in the administration of the 
State. However Australia has not ratified this Convention. 102 
99 Ibia, para 202. 
100 Ibid, para 179. 
Ibid, para 200. 
102 The preamble to Convention 151 provides: 
Taking into account the particular problems arising as to the scope of, and definitions for the 
purpose of, any international instrument, owing to the differences in many countries between 
private and public employment, as well as the difficulties of interpretation which have arisen 
in respect of the application of relevant provisions of the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949, to public servants, and the observations of the supervisory 
bodies of the ILO) on a number of occasions that some governments have applied these 
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The Content and Scope of the Right to Strike in International Labour 
Organization Instruments 
CFA and CEACR commentaries have discussed the content and scope of the right to 
strike that is implicit in the principle of freedom of association enshrined within 
Conventions 87 and 98, the Constitution of the ILO and the Fundamental Declaration 
of Rights and Principles at Work. 1°3 Through consideration of Article 22 Reports and 
complaints made to the CFA, the CEACR and CFA have defined the boundaries of 
the implicit right to strike within the principle of freedom of association. 
The Defmition of Strike 
Industrial action can assume a variety of forms including rolling stoppages, work to 
rule, go slow or the complete cessation of work. At the outset it is important to 
ascertain which forms of industrial action are protected by the 'right to strike' implicit 
provisions in a manner which excludes large groups of public employees from coverage by 
that Convention ... 
103 CEACR and CFA commentaries have been sourced from the following primary and secondary 
materials: 
Primary: 
1. ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, General Survey of the Reports on the 
Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), 1948 and the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), 1949. Report III (Part 4B), International 
Labour Conference, 81 s1 Session, 1994, 'General Survey'. 
2. ILO, Reports of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations: General reports and observations concerning particular countries, Report III, 
(Part 1A), International Labour Conference, Geneva. 
3. ILO, Reports of the Committee of Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO - 
published in Official Bulletin (Geneva), Series B. 
4. ILO, Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
Governing Body of the ILO, Geneva, 4th Edition, 1996, 'The Digest'. 
A note on CFA commentary: CFA determinations are reported as Reports of the Committee of Freedom 
of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO and are published in the Official Bulletin (Geneva), 
Series B. Access to CFA determinations has been obtained through three methods. First, all CFA 
decisions are summarised in the Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association 
Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO (The Digest). The Digest is published by the International 
Labour Office and is currently in its fourth edition, published in 1996 and is also available on line at 
www.ilo.org . Second, the full texts of all CFA determinations are available on line at www.ilo.org in 
the LibSynd Database. Third, the full text of some determinations before 1985 were obtained from the 
Official Bulletin, Series B, supplied by the International Labour Office, Geneva before these were 
available on-line. 
Secondary: 
1. B. Gemigon, A. Odero and H. Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike (International 
Labour Office: Geneva, 2000). 
2. Ben-Israel, supra note 44. 
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within the principle of freedom of association. 104 There are two issues to be addressed 
in this context, namely, who may exercise the right to strike and the form that strike 
action can take. 
Who May Exercise the Right to Strike? 
The implicit right to strike within.the context of the principle of freedom of 
association has been interpreted by ILO bodies as a right belonging to workers and 
their organizations. As discussed above, the right is collective, in that it may be 
exercised by workers as a group or as a trade union. 1°5 However, the other 
qualification is that it belongs only to the workers. While the right to strike has been 
interpreted as an aspect of the right of both workers' and employers' organizations to 
pursue the interests of their members expressed in Articles 2, 3 and 10 of Convention 
87, the ability to take strike action belongs only to workers. 1°6 This construction of the 
right to strike as a right belonging to workers, despite the references in the 
Convention to employers' organizations, is a result of the definition of strike action by 
the CFA and CEACR as a right of workers to withdraw their labour. The definition 
has not been extended to include employers' organizations as lockouts are not 
considered to constitute strike action. 
The Form that Strike Action May Take 
The CFA adopts a broad construction of activities falling within the definition of 
'strike action': "the narrow definition of strike as a work stoppage only has now been 
replaced by a wide one and includes all the nuances [of strike action] as recognised 
weapons in collective action". 107 All forms of strike action are considered legitimate 
provided they remain peaceful. Restrictions on the form that strike action can take 
will only be justifiable in so far as those restrictions are designed to ensure that strike 
action remains peaceful. 
104  The ILO use of the term 'strike action' is not limited to the complete cessation of labour but is a 
broader concept and is inclusive of all forms of labour withdrawal, or industrial action. See the 
Introduction at 1, footnote 2. 
105 See above at 84. 
106 According to the CEACR: "In the view of the Committee, strike action is part of these activities 
under the provisions of Article 3; it is a collective right exercised, in the case of workers, by a group of 
persons who decide not to work in order to have their demands met. The right to strike is therefore 
considered as an activity of workers' organizations within the meaning of Article 3". General Survey 
1994, supra note 40 at para 149. 
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In 1993 the CFA considered a complaint brought by the General Confederation of 
Workers of Peru (CGTP) against the Government of Peru alleging that certain 
provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1992 (Peru) were in breach of the implicit 
right to strike within the principle of freedom of association. 1°8 Section 84(c) of the 
Peruvian Act outlawed the sudden halting of operations in the nerve centres of 
enterprise, labour slowdowns, go slow strikes or working to rule. The legal right to 
strike within the Act involved only the complete cessation of all work and did not 
encompass variations on this form of action. 1°9 The Government of Peru argued that 
the existence of a regulated right to strike within the Act meant that strikes "should be 
exercised in such a manner [the legal manner] so as not to jeopardise the right of 
others or the national interest". 11° The CFA rejected this argument, determining that 
restrictions upon the form of strike action that may be pursued by employees and 
employee organizations may only be justified where strike action ceases to be 
peaceful." 1 
Therefore, according to ILO quasi-jurisprudence, the form that peaceful strike action 
takes should be a matter for the parties to determine and should not be limited by 
legislative prescription of the form that a valid strike should take. Provided that a 
strike is peaceful, parties to strike action should be able to choose the form of strike 
action that suits their circumstances and objectives. Restrictions on form can 
excessively limit the right to strike by restricting the exercise of the right to less 
effective or more cumbersome methods. 
The Legitimate Objectives of Strikes 
The reasons that participants choose to engage in strike action are complex and 
varied. The issue for the CFA and CEACR is to ascertain the scope of reasons for 
107 Ben-Israel, supra note 44 at 93. 
108 Complaints against the Government of Peru presented by General Confederation of Workers of 
Peru (CGTP) eta!, Document Vol. DOCVI, 1993, Series B, No.3, Report 291, Case 1648 and 1650. 
1°9 Ibid, para 440. 
Ibid, para 444. 
Ibid, para 466. Elsewhere the CFA has concluded that "restrictions on working to rule, occupations 
of work premises and sit down strikes can only be justified if the action ceases to be peaceful": 
Complaints against the Government of Turkey presented by the World Confederation of Labour (WLC) 
et al, Document Vol. DOG, 1988, Series B, No.3, Report 260, Case 997, 999, 1029, para 39. 
88 
engaging in strike action that constitute the legitimate exercise of the right to strike 
implicit in the principle of freedom of association. 
Article 10 of Convention 87 specifies that the organizations to whom the Convention 
applies are "organizations of workers or of employers established for furthering and 
defending the interests of workers or of employers". CFA and CEACR commentary 
•provides that the right to strike will encompass strike action that is designed to further 
and defend the interests of workers or employers. This is a broader concept than those 
matters that impact on individuals through the employment relationship. 
The CFA considers that the furtherance and defence of the interests of workers or 
employers is not confined to strikes that are aimed at securing the terms of a 
collective bargain. The CFA has stated that "the right to strike should not be limited 
solely to industrial disputes that are likely to be resolved through the signing of a 
collective agreement". 112 Rather, the furtherance and defence of interests is a concept 
that extends beyond the boundaries of the employment relationship, in appropriate 
circumstances enabling strike action to be utilised in support of a broad range of 
objectives. 
Strikes aimed at resolving disputes about occupational matters of concern to workers 
or employers generally will have legitimate objectives for the purposes of the 
principle of freedom of association. In considering the scope of the legitimate exercise 
of the right to strike, the CEACR and CFA consider that strikes with political 
motivations are not legitimate but strikes undertaken for sympathy or trade union 
purposes are legitimate. 
Political Objectives 
Strikes undertaken for purely political purposes do not fall within the scope of 
freedom of association and are outside the jurisdiction of the CFA: 113 
112 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 484. 
113 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 482; General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 165. As strikes 
of a purely political nature are not encompassed by the principle of freedom of association they fall 
outside the mandate of the CFA. However the CFA may consider a complaint where the actions of the 
Member State constitute a significant repression of trade union rights even though the strike concerned 
is political in nature. In 1985 the CFA considered a complaint against Chile alleging repressive 
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[T]he prohibition of strikes designed to coerce a government, if they are non 
occupational in character, does not constitute an infringement of the principles 
of freedom of association and strikes of a purely political nature do not fall 
within the scope of the principles of freedom of association. 114 
The difficulty that arises is how political strikes are differentiated from non-political 
strikes. Strikes that protest against the economic and social policies of a government 
or seek solutions to economic and social policy matters of direct concern to workers 
are considered to relate to occupational matters and not to be solely political in 
character. 115 The difficulty is to tell political and occupationally related strikes apart 
when it "is often difficult to distinguish in practice between the political and 
occupational aspects of a strike". 116 The CEACR and CFA achieve the distinction in 
practice through untangling the motivations of those involved in strike action and 
recognising the legitimacy of those motivations related to occupational interests. 
Social and economic concerns constitute legitimate occupational motivations. 
Untangling Political and Occupational Motivations 
Gernigon, Odero and Guido indicate that the approach of the CFA when 
distinguishing between politically and occupationally motivated strikes will depend 
upon the actions of the participants in the strike action. Where the occupational 
demands expressed by the organization appear to be "merely a pretext" to disguise 
purely political motivations, the CFA will not usually recognise the legitimacy of 
government action against trade unions after a 'day of protest'. The CFA recalled that "[t]he rights 
conferred upon workers' and employers' organizations must be based on respect for those civil liberties 
which have been enunciated in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and that the absence of these civil liberties 
removes all meaning from the concept of trade union rights", and heard the complaint despite the lack 
of direct mandate: Complaints presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and 
other trade union organizations against the Government of Chile, Document Vol. LXVIII, 1985, Series 
B, No. 1, Report 214, Case 1309, para 795. 
114 Complaint against the Government of Ecuador presented by the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Document Vol. LXX, 1987, Series B, No. 1, Report 248, Case 1381, para 
412. This principle is echoed in many other cases, see for example: Complaint presented by the World 
Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession against the Government of Ethiopia, 
Document Vol. LXII, 1979, Series B, No. 2, Report 194, Case 887, para 85; Complaints against the 
Government of Turkey presented by the World Confederation of Labour (WLC) et al, Document Vol. 
LXXI, 1988, Series B, No.3, Report 260, Case 997, 999, 1029, para 39. This conclusion is consistent 
with the CEACR view expressed in the 1983 General Survey supra note 93 that "strikes that are purely 
political in character do not fall within the scope of the principles of freedom of association": at para 
216. 
115 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 165; Digest 1996, supra note 103 at paras 479,480 and 
482. 
116 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 165. 
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such a strike. 117 However, the problem often remains difficult to resolve and "there 
have been Strikes in which the political and occupational aspects were intertwined to 
the extent that it was almost impossible to separate one from the other". 118 
The difficulties of untangling political from occupational motivations are 
demonstrated in a complaint made to the CFA by the Antigua Workers' Union against 
the Government of the United Kingdom / Antigua.' 19  At the time of the complaint, 
Antigua had two political parties, both formed from the ranks of trade unions, the 
Antigua Trades and Labour Union and the Antigua Workers Union. When either of 
these political parties was in power, the members of the government of the day 
consisted of high ranking officials from the relevant union. This led to a highly 
politicised labour relations system. When one of the two trade unions challenged 
legislation enacted by the government of the day to the CFA, the overtly political 
nature of the complaint could not be ignored. However, the CFA stated that "even 
though cases may be political in origin or present certain political aspects, they should 
be examined in substance if they raise questions directly concerning the exercise of 
trade union rights". 120 
The question of whether or not a strike is politically or occupationally motivated is a 
question of fact in the circumstances of any complaint. Therefore, CFA 
determinations can only act as guidance with respect to the conclusions that the CFA 
may reach in a similar case. The CFA has concluded that where strike action is 
intended to coerce the government of a State to accede to non-occupational demands, 
the strike action is political and not an exercise of the right to strike implicit in the 
principle of freedom of association. 121 To take some very specific examples, the CFA 
has also concluded that the following objectives are occupational: restoration of 
rations of rice; restoration of democratic rights and civil liberties; cessation of attacks 
117 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, supra note 103 at 15. 
118 Ben-Israel, supra note 44 at 96: 
119  Complaint presented by the Antigua Workers' Union against the Government of the United 
Kingdom /Antigua, Document Vol. LXI, 1978, Series B, No. 3 Report 187, Case 857. 
120 Ibid, para 263. 
121  Complaint presented by the Ceylon Federation of Labour against the Government of Sri Lanka, 
Document Vol. LXII, 1979, Series B, No. 1, Report 190, case 913, (Ceylon), para 450. 
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upon trade unions and cancellation of orders of dismissal; immediate grant of a wage 
increase and a reduction in the prices of essential commodities. I22 
Strikes with Economic or Social Objectives 
[W]orkers and their organizations should be able to express in a broader 
context ... their dissatisfaction as regards economic and social matters 
affecting their members interests. I23 
Strikes in pursuit of economic and social objectives constitute a legitimate exercise of 
the right to strike implicit in the principle of freedom of association: 
the [CFA] has always regarded the right to strike as constituting a fundamental 
right of workers and their organizations and as an essential means of defending 
their economic and social interests. 124 
Accordingly, it is legitimate for workers and their organizations to strike in order to 
seek "solutions to economic and social policy questions and problems ... , which are 
of direct concern to the workers". I25 
The CFA has concluded that economic and social objectives include employment 
generally, social protection, the standard of living, economic policy and the minimum 
wage. 126  Further, the CEACR considers general protest strikes to be protected by the 
right to strike, particularly "where aimed at criticising a government's economic and 
social policies". 127 
This extension of legitimate strike action beyond the immediate employment 
relationship into broader economic and social objectives is consistent with the impact 
that social and economic policy can have upon workers. Changes to the terms and 
conditions of the employment of workers at a local level may only have a limited 
122 Ibid. 
123 Complaint against the Government of Nigeria presented by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICTFU), the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) and the World 
Confederation of Labour (WCL), Document Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 3, Report 295, Case 
1793, para 603. 
124 Complaints against the Government of Dominican Republic presented by the World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WI , TL) eta!, Document Vol. LXXIV, 1991, Series B, No. 1, Report 277, Case 1549, 
para 441, (emphasis added). 
25 ibid. 
126 Complaint against the Government of Nigeria, supra note 123, para 603; Complaint against the 
Government of Ecuador, supra note 114, para 413. 
127 General Survey, 1983, supra note 93, para 216. 
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effect in comparison with national and social policy. As Ben-Israel suggests, "workers 
interests are often determined by national economic policy, or affected by minimum 
standards provided by legislation". 128 The recognition by the CFA and CEACR of the 
legitimacy of social and economic objectives reflects this broader perspective. 
Further, it is consistent with the provisions of Convention 87 whereby workers' 
organizations are entitled to organise in order to further the interests of their workers, 
where workers' interests are interpreted in a broad rather than narrow sense. 
Strikes Undertaken in Sympathy with Other Workers (Sympathy Strikes) 
A sympathy strike is a strike undertaken by workers in sympathy with or in support of 
workers employed by another employer (the primary dispute). The motivations of the 
strikers involved are not related to their own individual occupational objectives or to 
economic or social matters of direct effect on them. Rather, their action is aimed at 
resolving or influencing a dispute or policy issue affecting the occupational interests 
of the workers involved in a primary dispute. The disconnection between the strikers 
involved and the objective of the strike means that the CEACR and the CFA face 
difficulties establishing that the participants in the strike action have a legitimate 
occupational objective. 129 . 
Nevertheless, the CEACR and the CFA consider sympathy strikes to be a legitimate 
exercise of the right to strike implicit in the principle of freedom of association. Both 
committees consider that "a general prohibition on sympathy strikes could lead to 
abuse and that workers should be able to take such action, provided the initial strike 
they are supporting is lawful". 130 
The views of the CEACR and CFA on sympathy strikes are not explored or reasoned 
in detail within the CEACR Reports or CFA determinations. However, the position 
that workers should be able to take sympathy action accords with the principles that 
workers should be able to take strike action for trade union purposes and in support of 
128 Ben-Israel, supra note 44 at 95. 
129 Gemignon, Odero and Guido, supra note 103 at 16. 
139 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 486 (emphasis in original). See also General Survey 1994, supra 
note 40 at para 168 where the CEACR noted that sympathy strikes "are becoming increasingly frequent 
because of the move towards the concentration of enterprises, the globalization of the economy and the 
delocalization of work centres". 
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socio — economic goals. The occupational interests of other workers in a sympathy 
strike scenario may not always constitute a direct occupational objective, however in 
an indirect sense, the terms and conditions of other workers may have a significant 
impact upon the ability of workers to obtain their own industrial outcomes. Further, 
sympathy strikes may accord with the objectives of a trade union, which are 
considered to be a legitimate subject for strike action. It would be desirable for the 
CFA and CEACR to provide more analysis to support their view that sympathy 
strikes are a legitimate expression of the right to strike, as this is a controversial area. 
Another difficulty with the CFA and CEACR commentary in this area is the uncertain 
status of sympathy action that takes the form of a secondary boycott. In a secondary 
boycott, workers unconnected to a primary dispute place pressure upon employers 
that are also unconnected to the primary dispute, in order to influence the outcome of 
that dispute. The boycott is unconnected with the direct occupational interests of the 
workers concerned and involves pressure against unconnected third parties. However, 
the secondary boycott is a sympathy strike. 
Examining the issue of secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes, Creighton notes that 
the third edition of the Digest of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association published in 1985 contained the CFA determination that the prohibition 
of secondary boycotts by law may not constitute interference with trade union 
rights. 131 However subsequent CFA and CEACR commentary consistently notes that 
a general prohibition on sympathy strikes can lead to abuse, but lacks clarity with 
respect to the more specific issue of secondary boycotts. Novitz notes that the ILO 
bodies are alive to the more insidious effects that a general prohibition of sympathy 
strikes or secondary boycotts could have. I32 Novitz demonstrates that the CEACR is 
aware, for example, of the potential for corporate restructures that have the effect of 
making primary boycotts into secondary boycotts, and of the possible need for 
international sympathy action as a result of the increasing power of multinational 
131 B. Creighton, 'Freedom of Association' in R. Blanpain, (ed.) Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations in Industrialised Market Economies (86 ed., Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague, 2004), 233 at 270. 
132 Novitz, supra note 97 at 292. 
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corporations. I33 A ban on sympathy action that encompasses secondary boycotts 
would have a significant effect on the right to strike in these areas. 
Novitz manages to explore and justify the determinations of the CFA and CEACR 
with respect to sympathy strikes and secondary boycotts in a way that neither body 
has done. There is a clear and pressing need for clear and comprehensive 
consideration of secondary boycotts by the ILO bodies. 
Trade Union Objectives 
According to CFA and CEACR quasi-jurisprudence, the pursuit of trade union 
objectives is a valid exercise of the right to strike implicit in the principle of freedom 
of association and is consistent with Article 4 of Convention 98 that requires the 
promotion of voluntary collective bargaining. Voluntary collective bargaining may 
involve disputes between workers and employers relating to trade union recognition, 
industrial coverage or the level at which bargaining takes place, and strike action may 
be a tool used in relation to this bargaining. 
The CFA considers that the right to strike protects action undertaken in support of 
multi-employer agreements or for the purposes of trade union recognition. 134 A ban 
on such strikes will not be in conformity with the principle of freedom of 
association. I35 The CEACR considers the right to strike to be a collective right and 
"an activity of workers organization within the meaning of Article 3 [of Convention 
I " Ibid. 
134 Complaint against the Government of New Zealand presented by the New Zealand Council of Trade 
Unions (NZCTU), Document Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 1, Report 292, Case 1698, para 737; 
Also see Complaint against the Government of New Zealand, supra note 42 at para 259. 
135 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at paras 487 and 488. While the recognition of trade unions for the 
purposes of collective bargaining is a fundamental element of the promotion of collective bargaining 
within Article 4 of Convention 98, this principle does not extend to the compulsory recognition of trade ' 
unions. The CEACR argues that such compulsory "intervention of this nature would alter the voluntary 
nature of bargaining": CEACR Individual Observation concerning Convention 98, Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949: United Kingdom, published 1991, para 3(b). Creighton 
argues that one of the most vexed issues facing trade unions is the refusal of employers to recognise 
them for the purposes of collective bargaining and that ILO instruments provide little support for the 
resolution of this problem. Creighton argues that Article 4 of Convention 98 and Article 3 of 
Convention 87 could provide a sound jurisprudential basis for a mechanism requiring compulsory 
recognition of trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining - see B. Creighton, 'The ILO and 
Protection of Freedom of Association in the United Kingdom' in K. Ewing, C. Gerty and B. Hepple, 
(eds.) Human Rights and Labour Law: Essays for Paul O'Higgins (Mansell Publishing Ltd: London, 
1994), 1 and Creighton, supra note 131 at 264-265. 
135 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 194. 
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87. 136 The nature of the right as a collective right exercised by workers' 
organizations is consistent with the interpretation that strikes in support of trade union 
objectives are a valid exercise of the right. 
Prohibitions on Strike Action 
CFA and CEACR quasi-jurisprudence permits a prohibition of strike action only in 
two circumstances: the general prohibition of strike action during the currency of a 
collective agreement or in relation to workers employed in the context of essential 
services or involved in the administration of the State. These are the only 
circumstances where a prohibition of strikes will be in accordance with the principle 
of freedom of association. 
Strikes and Collective Bargaining 
The CEACR has stated that it is legitimate to restrict the ability of organizations to 
strike during the currency of collective agreements provided that the parties are 
afforded impartial and adequate arbitration machinery in order to resolve disputes 
over the interpretation or application of the collective agreement. 137 Restrictions on 
strike action during the currency of an agreement may only relate to those rights 
established under the relevant collective agreement. The presence of a fixed term 
collective agreement should not prevent a workers' organization from taking strike 
action against social and economic policy affecting the occupational interests of the 
members of the organization, or in relation to the future interests of the parties. 138 
The construction of the principle of freedom of association in this manner reflects the 
willingness of the CEACR to accept the legitimacy of a 'rights versus interests' 
approach to collective agreements. The approach requires parties to use dispute 
resolution machinery, rather than strike action, where a dispute relates to those rights 
already established under the agreement. Strike action may only be used for matters 
136 ibid. 
137 Ibid at paras 166 and 167. 
138 Ibid at para 166. 
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not covered under the agreement, future interests or social/economic policy 
concerns. 139 
Work Undertaken in Essential Services 
A total prohibition of strike action will also be permissible in areas where strike action 
is undertaken by workers in essential services and therefore would constitute a danger 
to the health and safety of the public. Under this approach the right to strike for an 
organization may be restricted or completely prohibited: 
• in essential services where essential service is defined as a service, the 
interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the 
whole or part of the population; or 
• in circumstances of acute national ernergency. 140 
Essential Services 
Workers, both public and private sector, in industries considered to be essential may 
be legitimately barred from participating in strike action. 141  However, this only 
applies to workers in essential services, the interruption of which would endanger the 
life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. 142 To prevent 
abuse of these restrictions, the word essential is defined in an intentionally narrow 
manner requiring "the existence of a clear and imminent threat" to life, personal 
safety or health. 143 
The CEACR considers that it is undesirable to draw up a complete and fixed list of 
services considered essential for the purposes of the legitimate restriction of strike 
action. 144 However the Digest of decisions of the CFA contains a list of services that 
139 Ibid at para 166; B. Creighton, 'The Workplace Relations Act in International Perspective' (1997) 
10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 31 at 45. For an overview of the rights versus interests debate see 
C. Provis, 'Rights Disputes v Interests Disputes: A Distinction for Australia?' (1993) 6 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 205. 
140 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at paras 526 and 527. 
141 Swepston, supra note 38 at 188. 
142 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at paras 536 and 540; General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 159. 
143 Complaint against the Government of Norway presented by the Norwegian Trade Union Federation 
of Oil Workers (OFS), Document Vol. LXXIV, 1991, Series B, No. 3, Report 279, Case 1576, para 
114. 
I" General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 159. 
97 
the CFA has determined, in the circumstances of particular complaints, to come 
within or to be excluded by the narrow view of essential services. 
The following may be considered to be essential services: the hospital sector; 
electricity services; water supply services; telephone services; and air traffic 
contro1. 145 The following are not considered essential services in the strict sense of the' 
term: radio and television; the petroleum sector; ports: loading and unloading; 
banking; computer services for the collection of taxes; department stores; pleasure 
parks; the metal and mining sectors; transport generally; refrigeration enterprises; 
hotel services; construction; automobile manufacturing; aircraft repairs; agricultural 
activities; the supply and distribution of foodstuffs; the mint and government printing; 
state alcohol, salt and tobacco monopolies; the education sector; and postal 
services. 146 
The lists are not exhaustive or definitive. What is considered 'essential' may depend 
upon special circumstances that exist in one State but not in another or may change 
from time to time: 
[A]ccount must be taken of the special circumstances existing in the various 
member States, since the interruption of certain services which in some 
countries might at worst cause economic hardship could prove disastrous in 
other countries and rapidly lead to conditions which might endanger the life, 
personal safety or health of the population. I47 
An example of this occurred in a complaint made to the CFA against Australia. 148 The 
complainant alleged that provisions of the Australian Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) that restrict access to legally protected strike actiorf , where the strike action 
threatens to cause significant damage to the Australian economy, breach the 
145 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 544. 
146 Ibid at para 545. 
147 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 160. 
148 Complaint against the Government of Australia presented by the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), Document Vol 
LXXXIII, 2000, Series B, No. 1, Report 320, Case 1963. For discussion of this complaint see J. 
Murray, 'Australia in the Dock: The ILO's Decision on the Waterfront Dispute' (2000) 13 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 167. For discussion of the dispute out of which the complaint arose see H. 
Trinca and A. Davies, Waterfront: The Battle that Changed Australia (Doubleday: Milsons Point, 
2000); G. On, 'Conspiracy on the Waterfront' (1998)11 Australian Journal of Labour Law 159. 
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obligation to provide a right to krike. 149 The CFA concluded that denial of protection 
to strike action that threatens to cause significant damage to the economy is not in 
accordance with the obligation to provide a right to strike, concluding that "economic 
damage is not of itself relevant". 150 However, the CFA was prepared to acknowledge 
the argument put by the Australian Government that the stevedoring industry in 
Australia could constitute an essential service given that prolonged disputation could 
lead to an essential service crisis through blockage of all ports. 151 The CFA concluded 
that it might be permissible to declare the stevedoring industry of an island nation "a 
public service", justifying provisions establishing a negotiated minimum service that 
must be maintained in times of dispute. 152 
The CFA is also alert to the potential for misrepresentation of circumstances as 
specific conditions that could allow the prohibition of strikes and imposition of 
compulsory arbitration in the context of essential services. In 1987 the Philippine 
employees of Nestle were engaged in strike action when the Philippine government 
declared the action illegal arguing that the Nestle operations were "indispensable to 
the national interest". 153 The CFA concluded that "the activities carried out by this 
enterprise may in no way be classified as essential services in the strict sense of the 
term". 154 
Acute National Emergency 
The ILO bodies consider that a general prohibition of strikes applying to all workers 
can only be justified in the event of an acute national emergency, for a limited period 
of time and to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation. 155 This 
would be applicable in genuine crisis situations like serious conflict, insurrection or 
natural disaster. 156  The CFA has found that stoppages affecting transport companies, 
149 Australia, Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s 170MW(3). 
150 Complaint against the Government of Australia, supra note 148 at para 229. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid, para 231. The CFA used the phrase 'public service' in the original determination and it would 
appear to mean a service that is not essential in the strict sense of the term, but provides an important 
public service. 
153  Complaint against the Government of the Philippines presented by the Drug, Food and Allied 
Workers' Federation (DFA), Document Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 3, Report 295, Case 1718, 
para 291. 
154 Ibid, para 298. 
155  Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 527; General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 153. 
156 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 152. 
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railway, telecommunications or electricity, while disturbing the normal life of the 
community, would not normally cause an acute national emergency. 157 
Public Servants Exercising Authority in the Name of the State 
The CFA and the CEACR consider that, with respect to the right to strike in the 
context of government administration, only those public servants exercising authority 
in the name of the State can legitimately be prohibited from taking strike action.' 58 
This requires that before strike action is prohibited, an assessment of the nature of the 
functions carried out by public servants must be made. A prohibition based on the 
mere fact of employment by the State will not be legitimate and would infringe the 
right to strike. 159 Assessing when a public servant exercises authority in the name of 
the State may be difficult in practice and each scenario must be assessed on its own 
merits. 160 However, in CFA determinations, teachers or workers in State owned 
industries have not been considered to exercise authority in the name of the State, 
while judges and officials working in the administration of justice are considered to 
exercise the authority of the State. 161 
The difficulties surrounding the right to strike of persons working in court systems are 
illustrated by a complaint brought to the CFA against the Government of Peru. 162 
Generally speaking, administrative staff managing and operating a court system do 
not exercise authority in the name of the State. However in this case, significant 
staffing reductions had led to "support and close cooperation" between administrative 
staff and judicial staff. The CFA concluded that the development of extremely close • 
links with the judiciary had elevated certain administrative staff into the category of 
157 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 530. 
158 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at paras 534 and 535; General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 158. 
Public Servants are also covered by Convention No. 151- Convention concerning Protection of the 
Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service. In 
addition, Article 9 of Convention 87 impacts directly upon the freedom of association exercisable by 
armed forces and police, providing that, "[t]he extent to which the guarantees provided for in this 
Convention shall apply to the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national laws or 
regulations". 
159 Gemigon, Odero and Guido 2000, supra note 103 at 18. 
160 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 158. 
161 Digest 1996, supra note 40 at paras 532, 537 and 538. 
162 Complaint against the Government of Peru presented by the National Federation of Workers of the 
Judiciary, Document Vol. LXXVI, 1993, Series B, No. 3, Report 291, Case 1706. 
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public servants exercising the authority of the State whose right to strike could be 
legitimately restricted. 163 
If it is impossible to strictly categorise workers, the CEACR suggests a compromise 
solution. Strike action may be permitted on condition that a defined and limited 
negotiated minimum service is provided, especially if a total and prolonged stoppage 
could result in serious consequences for the public. 164 
Compensatory Guarantees for the Loss of the Right to Strike. 
Where a total prohibition of strikes has occurred in circumstances according with the 
principle of freedom of association, the CFA and the CEACR require appropriate 
compensatory guarantees to be made available to the workers concerned, to 
compensate them for the deprivation of an essential means of defending their socio-
economic and occupational interests. Such guarantees should include conciliation and 
mediation leading to adequate, impartial and speedy arbitration procedures in the 
event of deadlock. I65 Arbitration measures applied in these situations must not only be 
impartial, but must appear to be impartial in order to maintain the trust and 
cooperation of the employees involved. I66 
The question of appropriate compensatory guarantees for the loss of the right to strike 
arose in a complaint by the General Confederation of Labour of the Argentine 
Republic against the Government of Argentina in 1992.167  Industrial unrest within the 
Argentine judiciary had led to the Supreme Court of Argentina issuing orders 
establishing a compulsory conciliation period and assuming supervisory rights, 
including the right to unilaterally suspend any measures in force. 168  The CFA 
concluded that, regardless of the reality of impartiality, the assumption of supervision 
by the Supreme Court, which was also the employer in question, lacked the requisite 
163 Ibid, para 480 and 485. 
164  General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 158. 
165  Digest 1996, supra note 103 at paras 546 and 547; General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 164. 
166 Digest, 1996, supra note 103 at 549. 
167  Complaints against the Government of Argentina presented by the General Confederation of 
Labour of the Argentine Republic (CGT) and the Union of Employees of the National Judiciary, 
Document Vol. UOCVI, 1993, Series B, No. 3, Report 291, Case 1653, 1660. 
168 Ibid, para 95. 
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appearance of impartiality and would not "ensure the confidence of the trade unions 
of the staff in the judiciary". 169 
Prerequisites to Undertaking Strike Action 
Given the potential damage that prolonged or widespread strike action can have on a 
national economy, States may require the parties to a dispute to comply with 
prerequisites before taking strike action, aimed at facilitating the resolution of 
disputes. In principle, the CFA and CEACR do not object to the imposition of 
prerequisites to strike action provided that the requirements do not impede the lawful 
exercise of the right to strike: 
the conditions that have to be fulfilled under the law in order to render a strike 
lawful should be reasonable and in any event not such as to place a substantial 
limitation on the means of action open to trade union organizations. 170 
Prerequisites to strike action should not render the right to strike illusory or so 
onerous that strike action becomes effectively impossible. 17I This may occur through 
highly technical legislation imposing onerous requirements or a requirement for the 
consent of the State before strike action can commence. I72 
In accordance with these general principles, the CFA and the CEACR have 
considered the legitimacy of a range of prerequisites to strike action, discussed in turn 
below. 
Negotiation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
The right to strike may be restricted temporarily while parties exhaust negotiation, 
conciliation and arbitration procedures. However, binding arbitration will only be 
compatible with the principle of freedom of association if it is undertaken voluntarily 
. by both parties. I73 
169 Ibid, para 109. 
170 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 498. 
171 Complaint against the Government of Peru presented by the Intersectoral Confederation of State 
Workers (CITE) et al, Document Vol. LXXIV, 1991, Series B, No. 3, Report 279, Case 1566, para 89. 
172 /bid. 
173 The Digest, 1996, supra note 103 at paras 500 and 501. 
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With respect to the issue of compulsory arbitration, the CEACR considers that 
imposing non consensual binding arbitration on parties to a dispute would be 
incompatible with the principle of voluntary collective bargaining established in 
Article 4 of Convention 98. 174 The CFA considers that a provision which permits 
"either party unilaterally to request the intervention of the labour authority may 
effectively undermine the right of workers to call a strike ... and does not promote 
voluntary collective bargaining". 175 These determinations indicate that the decision to 
undertake strike action should not be prevented by the imposition of compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration proceedings either unilaterally by one of the parties to the 
dispute, or by the State. 
Despite this general approach, the CEACR concedes that compulsory arbitration may 
be a last resort answer, where parties are engaged in protracted and fruitless 
negotiations. However: 
[i]n the Committee's opinion, it would be highly advisable that the parties be 
given every opportunity to bargain collectively, during a sufficient period, with 
the help of independent facilitators (mediator, conciliator, etc.) and machinery 
and procedures designed with the foremost objective of facilitating collective 
bargaining. Based on the premise that a negotiated agreement, however 
unsatisfactory, is to be preferred to an imposed solution, the parties should 
always retain the option of returning voluntarily to the bargaining table, which 
implies that whatever disputes settlement mechanism is adopted should 
incorporate the possibility of suspendin* the compulsory arbitration process, if 
the parties want to resume negotiations. 76 
Strike Ballots 
A common prerequisite to undertaking strike action is a strike ballot and this 
requirement is acceptable to both the CFA and CEACR. I77 The ballot method, 
quorum and majority required should not make the exercise of strike very difficult or 
impossible in practice. 178 Each strike ballot must be assessed on its own merits in 
order to ensure that it does not unduly restrict the exercise of the right to strike. 
Guidance on the appropriate use of strike ballots can be found through determinations 
of the CFA. 
174 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 258. 
175  Complaint against the Government of Peru presented by the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU), Document Vol. LXXII, 1989, Series B, No. 2, Report 265, Case 1478, 1484, para 547. 
76  General Survey 1994, para 259, Italics in original. 
177 Digest 1996, para. 503; General Survey 1994, para 170. 
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Secret Ballots 
The CFA considers that an obligation to make a strike decision by secret ballot is 
acceptable, that secret ballots are a reasonable requirement and do not hinder the 
exercise of the right to strike. 179 
Second Strike Vote 
The obligation to take a second strike vote after the lapse of a set time is regarded as 
being in accordance with the right to strike provided that it is not unreasonable or 
unduly onerous and is not required within a short time after the initial ballot. 180 In a 
complaint against the Canadian government made by the Canadian Labour Congress, 
the CFA held that an obligation to hold a second strike ballot, if a strike had not taken 
place within 3 months of the first vote, did not constitute an infringement of the 
principle of freedom of association. I81 The CFA considered that the second ballot 
allowed parties to reconsider their decision in the event of a lengthy delay. 182 
Absolute Majority 
The CFA considers that a requirements of a ballot requiring an absolute majority (a 
majority of all eligible voters not just those who actually vote) could excessively limit 
the right to strike, hindering the ability of parties to strike at al1. 183 The CFA has noted 
that while an absolute majority would be more accurate in ascertaining the views of 
all workers concerned, a lesser "requirement of a majority of those voting would 
undoubtedly lessen the risk of obstacles to calling a strike". 184 
The issue of majority has been brought to the CFA on a number of occasions, in 
which the CFA has consistently concluded that requirements for absolute majorities 
178 General Survey 1994, para 170. 
179 Complaint against the Government of Fiji presented by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Public Services International (PSI), Document Vol. DCXV, 1992, 
Series B, No. 3, Report 284, Case 1622, para 700. 
180 Complaint against the Government of Canada (British Columbia) presented by the Canadian 
Labour Congress, Document Vol. LXXI, 1988, Series B, No. 2, Report 256, Case 1430, para 191. 
181 ibid. 
182 ibid. 
183 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at paras 507 and 508. 
184 Complaint presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World 
Confederation of Labour against the Government of Poland, Document Vol. LXV, 1982, Series B, 
No. 3, Report 221, Case 1097, para 83. 
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or two-thirds majorities excessively hinder the right to strike. I85 However, these 
complaints have largely been in the context of industry wide bargaining or large trade 
unions. In consequence, the conclusions of the CFA are punctuated with the phrases 
"in particular where trade unions have large numbers of members or cover a large 
area", 186 "particularly in the case of a trade union having a large number of 
members", 187 and "in the case of large undertakings". 188 It remains unclear if a 
requirement of an absolute majority in a dispute involving an enterprise based trade 
union would be unduly restrictive given that there are significantly fewer obstacles to 
achieving an absolute majority. 
Notice Provisions 
The requirement of a notice period before strike action can be taken, so far as it is 
designed to encourage parties to engage in final negotiation before resorting to strike 
action, is not regarded as contrary to the principle of freedom of association. A 
requirement of notice should not operate as an obstacle to bargaining and should not, 
in practice, amount to a situation where workers simply wait "for its expiry in order to 
be able to exercise their right to strike". 189 
Where resort to strike action is permitted within essential services or for public 
servants exercising the authority, of the State, it will be consistent with the principle of 
freedom of association to impose a lengthy notice requirement. The CFA has 
concluded that where an interruption to service could endanger the life, personal 
safety or health of a whole or part of the population, the imposition of longer notice 
periods will be acceptable. I9° A cooling off period of 40 days in the public sector, 191 
185 For example see Complaints presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 
the Federation of Peruvian Light and Power Workers and Various other Trade Union Organizations 
against the Government of Peru, Document Vol. LXV, 1982, Series B, No. 1, Report 214, Case 1081, 
para 266; Complaints presented by the National Labour Front, et al against the Government of Brazil, 
Document Vol. LXII, 1979, Series B, No. 3, Report 197, Case 927, para 355. 
186 Complaint against the Government of Brazil, supra note 185, para 355. 
187 Complaints presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, et al against the 
Government of Chile, Document Vol. LXII, 1979, Series B, No. 3, Report 197, Case 823, para 414. 
188 Complaint against the Government of Poland, supra note 184 at para 83. 
189 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 172. 
190 Complaint against the Government of Peru, supra note 171 at para 86. 
191 Complaint against the Government of Canada, supra note 181 at para 186. 
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and a 20 day notice period for services of social or public interest, 192 were held to be 
in accordance with the principles of freedom of association. 
Responsibility for Determining that Prerequisites Have Not Been Met or Declaring 
a Strike Unlawful 
According to the CFA, where reasonable prerequisites exist for the taking of lawful 
strike action, the responsibility for determining whether or not those prerequisites 
have been met must be located within an impartial independent authority and 
"responsibility for declaring a strike illegal should not lie with the government but 
with an independent body, such as the courts". 193 
The arbiter of whether strike prerequisites have been met should never be the 
employer concerned due to the inherent conflict of interest involved. 194 Further, a 
government should never be the arbiter for its own employees. 195 A government 
should also refrain from resolving disputes relating to non-governmental employees 
due to the potential pressure of public opinion seeking the speedy resolution of the 
dispute on a Government. 
Examples of circumstances where the CFA has held that the vesting of arbitral power 
has occurred inappropriately are the heads of public institutions for Peruvian civil 
192 Complaint against the Government of Ecuador presented by the Confederation of Workers of 
Ecuador (CTE), the Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (CEOSL) and the 
Latin American Central of Workers (CLAT), Document Vol. LXXVI, 1993, Series B, No. 2, Report 
287, Case 1617, para 61. 
193 Complaint against the Government of Peru presented by the World Confederation of Organizations 
of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP), Document Vol. LXXV, 1992, Series B, No. 1, Report 281, Case 
1598, para 477; Complaint against the Government ofNicaragua presented by the Sandinista Workers' 
Confederation (CST) and the National Union of Workers (UNE), Document Vol. LXXV, 1992, Series 
B, No. 3, Report 284, Case 1586, para 934; Complaint against the Government of Argentina presented 
by the General Confederation of Labour (CGT), et al, Document Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 1, 
Report 292, Case 1679, para 95. 
194 Complaints presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, et al, Document 
Vol. LXVIII, 1985, Series B, No. 2, Report 239, Case 1190, para 235: "The unlawful nature of a strike 
should be determined by a judicial authority and not an administrative authority, and must not be 
declared by the employer, who would thus be playing the role of judge and party to the dispute". 
195 Complaint against the Government of Nicaragua, supra note 193 at para 934; Complaint against the 
Government of Argentina, supra note 193 at para 95. 
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servants, 196 the Government for Peruvian teachers 197 and the administrative authorities 
for Coast Rican public servants. 198 
The Course of the Strike 
In CEACR and CFA quasi-jurisprudence, government intervention designed to end a 
lawful strike will be contrary to the principle of freedom of association unless 
interference is only exercised when the life, health or personal safety of the population 
might be endangered. I99 In this context the CFA has concluded that back to work or 
requisition orders, the hiring of replacement workers or use of military workers in • 
order to break a strike, or the intervention of the police or military are in 
contravention of the right to strike as implied from the principle of freedom of 
association.200 
Three areas relating to government intervention in the course of a strike that have 
been considered more specifically by the CFA in this context include the hiring of 
replacement workers, the use of the police or military to restore 'public order' and the 
concept of peaceful picketing. These contentious areas will be explored in further 
detail. 
The Hiring of Replacement Workers by Employers 
A difficult question faced by the CFA is whether it will be legitimate or not for 
employers to hire replacement workers during the course of a strike to maintain the 
functions of their business. This would not deny the right of workers to strike, but 
would undermine the impact of strike action. 
The CFA has stated that "the hiring of workers to break a strike in a sector ... which 
cannot be regarded as essential .. constitutes a serious violation of freedom of 
196 /bid. 
197 Complaint against the Government of Peru, supra note 193. 
198 Representation made by the Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CTC), et al, Document Vol. 
LXVIII, 1985, Series B, No. 2, Report 240, Case 1304, para 96. 
199 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 572. 
200 Ibid at paras 573 and 574. 
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association". 201 However, the use of non striking pre-existing workers is not in 
violation of the principle of freedom of association. 202 Equally, it will be legitimate to 
use replacement workers during strike action provided that their use does not threaten 
the ability of the striking workers to pursue their interests through strike action and is 
not designed to break the strike. 203 The conclusions suggest that the State must take 
steps to ban the hiring of replacement workers by employers, in order to ensure that 
the exercise of the right to strike is not hindered. This is supported by CEACR 
commentary: 
A special problem arises when legislation or practice allows enterprises to 
recruit workers to replace their own employees on legal strike .... The 
Committee considers that this type of provision or practice seriously impairs 
the right to strike and affects the free exercise of trade union rights.204 
In a complaint against the Government of Malta brought by the International 
Federation of Free Teachers' Unions, 205 it was alleged that the Maltese Government 
had directed members of the police force to instruct pupils during the course of a 
teacher's strike.206 However, it subsequently transpired that the police force had given 
a limited number of talks on matters unrelated to school curriculum, and had 
organised visits for the school children to see displays of police dogs. 207 The CFA 
concluded that the police force had not affected the exercise of the right to strike by 
the teachers or the ability of the teachers to pursue their interests through strike 
action.2°8 
201 Complaint presented by the Local Federation of Trade Unions of Casablanca (Moroccan 
Federation of Labour against the Government of Morocco), Document Vol. LXVIII, 1985, Series B, 
No. 3, Report 241, Case 1282, para 419. 
202 Complaints presented by the United Trade Unions of Casablanca (Moroccan Union of Labour) 
against the Government of Morocco, Document Vol. LXV, 1982, Series B, No. 1, Report 214, Case 
992 and 1018, para 91. 
203 Complaint presented by the International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions and the World 
Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession against the Government of Malta, 
Document Vol. LXIII, 1980, Series B, No. 2, Report 202, Case 949. 
204 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 175. The issue of employers' using replacement labour 
is also discussed by Novitz who points out that the CFA has, on occasion, requested States to repeal 
national legislation that permits the hiring of replacement workers. See Novitz, supra note 97 at 319. 
However, the difficulty with both the CEACR and CFA commentary is that it does not address the 
issue of whether or not a State is expected to ban the practice of hiring replacement workers when such 
action is possible without specific enabling legislation. The logic of the commentary of both the CFA 
and CEACR suggests that this is the case although neither body has specifically made this point. 
205 ibid. 
206 Ibid, para 266. 
Ibid, para 279. 
108 
The conclusions of the CFA demonstrate the existence of a tension between the 
principle of freedom of association and the consequences of the full expression of the 
principle for the broader society. The conclusion that employers cannot replace 
striking workers exercising their legitimate right to strike endorses the argument that 
the rights of others within the community must, at times, give way to the exercise of 
the principle of freedom of association. The ability to pursue the right to strike is 
placed before an employer's right to hire workers and the right of individuals to seek 
temporary employment from an employer during the course of a strike. 
The Use of the Police or Military to Restore 'Public Order' 
It is further argued by the CFA that the use of police or of the military to intervene in 
lawful strike action is contrary to the implicit right to strike in the principle of 
freedom of association. The CFA has stated that "intervention by security forces in a 
strike should be strictly limited to the maintenance of public order' , ,209 and States 
should only resort to the use of force where "grave situations arise and public order is 
seriously threatened". 21° Where force is necessary to maintain public order, such force 
should be in proportion to the threat posed and should avoid any use of violence. 211 
In practice, the concept of 'public order' may prove open to interpretation. In a 
complaint made by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions against the 
Government of Iran, the CFA faced difficulties assessing whether there had been a 
threat to public order due to the differences evident in the parties' written 
submissions.212 The complainant alleged that during strike action by factory workers 
"five units from the Prosecutor's Office, accompanied by armed guards, arrived at the 
site and, while ctontinuously firing into the air, they wounded, beat and arrested the 
workers". 213 In response the Iranian Government alleged that the strikers were a 
208 Ibid, paras 279-280. 
209 Complaint presented by the Centre of Indian Trade Unions against the Government of India, 
Document Vol. LXVII, 1984, Series B, No. 2, Report 234, Case 1227, para 309; Complaint presented 
by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions against the Government of Iran, Document 
Vol. LXVI, 1983, Series B, No. 3, Report 230, Case 1187, para 674. 
210 Complaint against the Government of Morocco presented by the Moroccan Labour Union, 
Document Vol. DCXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 2, Report 294, Case 1724, para 368. 
211  Complaint against the Government of Peru presented by the General Confederation of Peruvian 
Workers (GCTP), Document Vol. LXXIV, 1991, Series B, No. 2, Report 278, Case 1541, para 255. 
212 Complaint against the Government of Iran, supra note 209. 
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"group of terrorists ... [that] intended to close the factory and prevent production by 
creating a disturbance". 2I4 In the absence of conclusive evidence to support either 
version of events, the CFA was unable to make a definitive conclusion. 2I5 Another 
complaint against the Government of India alleged that "a large contingent of state 
police broke up the sit-in strike, confiscated the strikers' property and arrested about 
60 people". 216 However, in response the Indian Government argued that "the police 
were called only to ensure the maintenance of law and order and was [sic] withdrawn 
as soon as the situation returned to normal". 217 
The main difficulty with the concept of public order is the need for interpretation and 
establishment of what will actually constitute a threat to the public order. Actions 
considered to constitute a 'peaceful strike' by workers organizations' may be viewed 
as a 'serious threat to law and order' by the relevant authorities. 'This can create 
significant evidentiary difficulties for the CFA and make it difficult to ascertain 
whether or not there has been a violation of the principle of freedom of association. 
Peaceful Picketing 
A general principle established by the CFA is that a strike should not of itself create 
unlawfulness and those actions that are lawful outside the context of strikes should 
remain lawful during strike action. This applies equally to unlawful behaviour. 218 
Strike action involving picketing commonly faces difficulties in this context. A picket 
involving otherwise lawful conduct should not be rendered unlawful merely due to the 
fact of picketing: 
[flaking part in picketing and firmly but peacefully inciting other workers to 
keep away from their workplace cannot be considered unlawful. The case is 
different, however, when picketing is accompanied by violence or coercion of 
non-strikers in an attempt to interfere with their freedom to work. 219 
214 Ibid, para 667. 
215 Ibid, para 674. 
216 Complaint against the Government of India, supra note 209 at para 303. 
217 Ibid, para 309. 
218 In this context, the CFA has concluded that striking employees who resort to violence and the 
commission of criminal acts are not protected by the principles of freedom of association with respect 
to those violent or criminal actions: Complaint against the Government of Nicaragua presented by the 
Sandinista Workers' Confederation (CST) and the Agricultural Workers' Association (ATQ, 
Document Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 2, Report 294, case 1719, para 668. 
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In carrying out a picket, picketers should behave lawfully, conform to the principle of 
freedom of association, and not interfere with the freedom of others to associate. In a 
complaint made against the Government of Morocco concerning the operation of a 
picket line, the CFA determined that action opposing the recruitment of outside labour 
to break a picket was acceptable, but action interfering with the rights of existing 
employees to attend work did not attract protection under the principle of freedom of 
association. 220 
The Repercussions of Strike Action 
The right to strike may be rendered meaningless if participation in strike action 
attracts repercussions that make it non-viable as a tool of collective bargaining. This 
section will consider the possible repercussions of strike action and CFA and CEACR 
opinions as to whether such repercussions violate the implicit right to strike in the 
principle of freedom of association. 
Legal Sanctions 
According to the CFA, "no one should be penalised for carrying out or attempting to 
carry out a legitimate strike". 221 Therefore, sanctions for strike action should only be 
imposed on strike action where the initial prohibitions are in conformity with the 
principle of freedom of association. 222 In consideration of a complaint made to the 
CFA concerning the status of the common law in Australia whereby a strike will 
constitute a breach of the employment contract attracting possible civil liability in 
contract or tort, the CFA concluded: 
[t]he Committee could not view with equanimity a set of legal rules which: (i) 
appears to treat virtually all industrial action as a breach of contract on the part 
of those who participate therein; (ii) makes any trade union or official thereof 
who instigates such breaches of contract liable in damages for any losses 
incurred by the employer in consequence of their actions; and (iii) enables an 
employer faced with such action to obtain an injunction to prevent the 
commencement (or continuation) of the unlawful conduct. The cumulative 
effect of such provisions could be to deprive workers of the capacity lawfully 
220  Complaint presented by the United Trade Unions of Casablanca against the Government of 
Morocco, Document Vol. LXV, 1982, Series B, No. 1, Report 214, Case 1017, paras 101-104. 
221 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 590. 
2.22 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 177. 
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to take strike action to promote and defend their economic and social 
interests. 223 
If lawful strike action attracts civil or criminal sanctions, the implicit right to strike is 
violated. This can also occur if overly harsh sanctions are applied to unlawful strike 
action. Unlawful strikes may occur for a variety of reasons relating to the working 
conditions or the legal framework of a particular State. Where unlawful strikes occur, 
the sanction applied in response should be reasonable: "all penalties in respect of 
illegitimate actions linked to strikes should be proportionate to the offence 
committed".224 Further, to maintain harmony in industrial relations "the authorities 
should not resort to arrests and imprisonment in connection with the organization of 
or participation in a peaceful strike ... [S]uch measures entail serious risks of abuse 
and a serious threat to freedom of association". 225 
Dismissals 
One possible repercussion of exercising the right to strike is dismissal. The 
deprivation of employment is a significant potential sanction attaching to strike action 
and can operate as a powerful disincentive to striking. The possibility for serious 
curtailment of the right to strike through the mass dismissal of workers leads the CFA 
to conclude that "the dismissal of [workers] because of a strike, which is a lawful 
trade union activity, constitutes serious discrimination in employment and is contrary 
to Convention No 98. 226 Furthermore, the CFA considers that a large number of 
223 Complaint against the Government of Australia presented by the International Federation of Air 
Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA), Document Vol. "XXIV, 1991, Series B, No. 1, Report 277, Case 
1511. For discussion of the CFA conclusions in this complaint see K. McEvoy and R. Owens, 'On a 
Wing and a Prayer: The Pilots Dispute in the International Context' (1993) 6 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 1. 
224 Complaints against the Government of Morocco presented by the International Miners' 
Organization (IMO), the Organization of African Trade Unity (OATUU) and the Democratic 
Federation of Labour (CDT), Document Vol. UCXII, 1989, Series B, No. 2, Report 265, Case 1490, 
para 239. 
225 Complaints against the Government of Morocco presented by the Democratic Confederation of ' 
Labour (CDT), et al, Document Vol. LXXV, 1992, Series B, No. 1, Report 281, Case 1574, para 221. 
226 Complaint presented by the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession 
against the Government of Honduras, Document Vol. LXVIII, 1985, Series B, No. 2, Report 239, Case 
1271, para 274. 
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dismissals during a labour dispute "involves serious risks of abuse and a serious threat 
to freedom of association". 227 
The conclusions of the CFA with respect to complaints concerning dismissals provide 
a guide for application of the principle in practice: 
• workers should not be dismissed or refused re-employment on account of 
having participated in a strike and it is irrelevant whether such dismissal 
occurs in advance, during or after a strike; 228 
• the dismissal of employees present during a failed strike ballot constituted a 
sanction for attempting to carry out lawful strike action; 229 
• the dismissal of 17 workers after an unlawful 6 hour sit down strike was not 
a proportionate response, demonstrated an inflexible attitude and threatened 
the principle of freedom of association; 230 and 
• the principle of freedom of association cannot be avoided by manipulating 
circumstances so as to separate the fact of the strike from the fact of the 
dismissals; in such cases, if the strike was the cause of the dismissal then it 
will be in breach of the principle of freedom of association, irrespective of 
an attempt on the part of the employer to attribute the dismissal to another 
cause. 231 
227 Complaint presented by the National Union of Workers in the Construction, Wood and Building 
Materials Industries against the Government' of Costa Rica, Document Vol. LXIII, 1980, Series B, 
No. 3, Report 204, Case 982, para 369. • 
228 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 593. In response to a complaint made to the CFA, the 
Government of the United Kingdom argued that it was not impermissible to dismiss workers during a 
strike because the wording of CFA conclusions provided that workers were "not to be dismissed after 
the conclusion of a strike". The CFA held that this view was fallacious and could not be sustained: 
Complaint against the Government of the United Kingdom presented by the National Union of Seamen 
(NUS), Document Vol. LXXIV, 1994, Series B, No. 1, Report 277, Case 1540, para 90. 
22
9 Complaint against the Government of Turkey presented by the International Federation of Air Line 
Pilots Associations (IFALPA), Document Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 3, Report 295, Case 1755, 
para 343. 
239 Complaint presented by the Single Union of Employees of Scala (SUTS) against the Government of 
Peru, Document Vol. LXIII, 1980, Series B, No. 3, Report 204, Case 960, para 291. 
231 An example of this occurred in a complaint presented against Chile where the dismissal of workers 
occurred after strike action had taken place and was put down to an unrelated cause by the Chilean 
Government. The CFA concluded that "these measures [the dismissals] came very shortly after action 
had been undertaken by trade union organizations in support of their claims, and in particular after a 
fairly protracted strike ... there is reason to conclude that they (the employees) have been penalised for 
their trade union activity": Complaints presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, et al, against the Government of Chile, Document Vol. LXV, 1982, Series B, No. 2, 
Report 217, Case 823, para 510. 
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Payment for Periods of Strike Action 
It is not contrary to the principle of freedom of association for employers to deduct 
wages for days that employees did not work due to industrial action, because it neither 
prevents nor undermines the right of workers to strike. 232 Any reduction in wages 
must be commensurate with the period of time that was not worked. 233 In a complaint 
against the Government of India, the CFA concluded that pay deductions that were 
higher than the amount corresponding to the period of the strike were "not conducive 
to harmonious labour relations". 234 The withholding of non commensurate wages 
constitutes the imposition of a penalty, just as forcing an employer to pay an 
employee during a strike would penalise an employer. The substance of labour 
negotiations is concerned with finding a solution to a common problem, not 
penalising parties for their use of legitimate bargaining tactics. 
The above discussion relates to the, compulsory payment or withholding of wages for 
periods of strike action. The CEACR has stated that parties to collective bargaining 
should be free to negotiate the terms of their collective bargains and to include 
payments by employers to employees for periods of strike action in the terms of their 
agreement. The CEACR considers that a restriction on this ability excessively limits 
the subject matter of a strike. 235 
Protection Against Anti -Union Discrimination for Engaging in Strike Action 
According to the CEACR and CFA, Article 1 of Convention 98 protects workers 
against discrimination for engaging in trade union activities. This extends to 
protection against discrimination for engaging in strike action at the time of 
recruitment, the period of employment and at termination. 236 The protection extends 
232 Digest 1996, supra note 103 at para 588. 
233 Complaint against the Government of India presented by the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, 
Document Vol. LXXV, Series B, No. 2, Report 283, Case 1479, para 99. 
234 ibid. 
235 CEACR Individual Observations concerning Convention 87 Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948: Australia, published 1998 and 2000. 
236 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 210. The protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination has also been expressed in other Conventions. In particular the Workers' 
Representatives Convention, 1971 No. 135, Article 1 provides that: "workers' representatives in the 
undertaking shall enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, 
based on their status or activities as a workers' representative or on union membership or participation 
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to any actions which may prejudice a worker or union official in their employment 
including relocation, demotion and deprivation or restrictions of all kinds, for 
example, remuneration, vocational training or social benefits. 237 
The CEACR considers that it is necessary to provide legislative machinery to protect 
against anti-union discrimination. General prohibitions will not be sufficient unless 
they are accompanied by effective and rapid procedures to ensure their application in 
practice. 238  If discrimination is substantiated, compensation for the prejudice suffered 
by the worker as a result of the anti-union discrimination should be available. 
Reinstatement of the worker with back payment of unpaid wages and maintenance of 
acquired rights constitutes the best compensatory solution. 239 Where the only remedy 
available for an act of anti-union discrimination is damages, the CEACR considers 
this to be an inadequate remedy: 
[L]egislation which allows the employer in practice to terminate the 
employment of a worker on condition that he pay compensation provided for 
by law in all cases of unjustified dismissal, when the real motive is his trade 
union membership or activity, is inadequate under the terms of Article 1 of the 
Convention, the most appropriate measure being reinstatement. 240 
Furthermore, where reinstatement is impossible, compensation for anti-union 
dismissal should be higher than that prescribed for other kinds of dismissa1. 241 
Conclusion 
The right to strike within the ILO operates as an implicit component of the principle 
of freedom of association, enshrined in the Constitution of the ILO, the Fundamental 
Declaration and the freedom of association Conventions. Member States of the ILO 
are committed to observe and implement the right to strike by virtue of their 
membership of the ILO and commitment to the principle of freedom of association, 
irrespective of ratification of the relevant Conventions. 
in union activities, in so far as they act in conformity with existing laws or collective agreements or 
other jointly agreed arrangements". 
237 General Survey 1994, supra note 40 at para 212. 
238 Ibid, para 214. 
239 Ibid, para 219. 
240 Ibid, para 220. 
241 Ibid, para 221. 
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The ILO has the most developed and sophisticated system of supervision of standards 
in the international human rights system. Despite the absence of express enforcement 
mechanisms, the operation of the supervision system provides detailed information 
about the ratification and compliance status of all Member States and operates as an 
effective international publication device where States are recalcitrant in their non-
compliance with obligations. The recommendations of the CEACR and the 
determinations of the CFA operate together to provide a detailed and comprehensive 
guide to the content of the right to strike implicit in the principle of freedom of 
association. While not formally binding, these principles make up the most 
authoritative and comprehensive set of principles on the right to strike in international 
law. 
The quasi-jurisprudence of the ILO on the implicit right to strike reflects a common 
sense approach to the application of the right in practice. Restrictions and procedures 
governing the exercise of the right are considered to be appropriate. Provisions are 
measured according to a guiding principle whereby impediments to exercising the 
right to strike are legitimate provided that they do not place undue obstacles in the 
way of the exercise of the right. The whole body of quasi- jurisprudence can be 
viewed in the light that parties should be able to voluntarily bargain and workers 
should be able to take strike action as a weapon in that process. 
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Chapter Four 
What is the Right to Strike in International Law? 
Introduction 
Chapters 1-3 comprehensively examined the various sources of international law on 
the right to strike. This chapter identifies general characteristics of that international 
law, and in particular of the right to strike contained in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and ILO standards which bind 
Australia. 
The Right to Strike in International Law 
A Functional Right to Strike 
The right to strike in international law is functional in nature, operating as an element 
of the principle of freedom of association. The right to strike serves the function of 
ensuring that freedom of association is not merely a right of assembly. While freedom 
of association may be constructed as a freedom belonging to individuals, enabling 
them to join together and associate with other individuals, the right to strike is a right 
belonging to the collective. Where freedom of association is exercised in an industrial 
relations context, it has an extremely limited role unless it is supplemented by the 
right of workers to bargain collectively and to strike in order to facilitate equalisation 
of power within the employment relationship.' 
There is no example, under the instruments considered, of an express enactment or 
implicit right to strike outside the principle of freedom of association expressed in the 
context of economic/social rights. In the European instruments, only the 
economic/social rights enactment of freedom of association within the European 
Social Convention (ESC) contains an express statement of the right to strike. The 
Vranken writes, "strike qualifies as an essentially collective right. As such the right to strike 
constitutes a necessary correlation to collective bargaining. Without at least the potential of a collective 
refusal to work, the workers would effectively not be able to bargain collectively": M. Vranken, 'Strike 
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civil/political enactment of freedom of association in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) does not. This pattern is also found in the terms and 
interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the ICESCR. ILO instruments were enacted as 'worker' or economic/social rights and 
contain an implicit right to strike. Accordingly the right to strike in the instruments 
under review is functional, serving the purposes of the social/economic approach to 
freedom of association but not the civil/political version. The civil/political approach 
to freedom of association does not serve the purpose of trade union association even 
where the right to join a trade union is expressly mentioned. 2 It is suggested that there 
is no fundamental or inherent right to strike in international law. The right is only 
found within the functional construction of the principle of freedom of association, 
when enacted in the context of social/economic rights. 
It may be argued that this conclusion that the right to strike operates only as a 
functional right is incorrect, because the right to strike operates as an express righ t  
within the ICESCR and the ESC and therefore has an independent existence. 
However, the expression of the right in these instruments is enacted in the context of 
an elaboration of the principle of freedom of association in the industrial relations or 
economic/social rights context. Both instruments articulate the right to strike within 
generalist articles that elaborate trade union rights stemming from the principle of 
freedom of association. For example, the right to strike in the ICESCR appears in 
article 8(1)(d) after the specific enactment of the right to form and join trade unions, 
the right of trade unions to establish confederations and the right of trade unions to 
function freely, which are specific rights flowing from the primary freedom to 
associate. Rather than operating as expressions of an independent right to strike, these 
instruments demonstrate the connection between freedom of association and the right 
to strike, further underlining the functional nature of the right to strike. 
and the Individual Employment Contract: The New Zealand Case' (1989) 19 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 249 at 264. 
2 The expression of freedom of association in ICCPR Article 22 includes "the right to form and join 
trade unions for the protection of his interests". The same wording is found in Article 11 of the ECHR. 
However in both instances the principle of freedom of association has been held not to encompass the 
right to collective bargaining or the right to strike — see the discussion in chapter 1. 
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A Right to Strike in Customary International Law? 
In generalising about the nature Of the right to strike in international law, it is 
appropriate to touch upon customary international law; as Australia will be bound by 
the right to strike in international law if customary international law encompasses the 
right to strike. Commentators suggest that the right to strike has not achieved the 
degree of State acceptance and practice necessary to constitute a principle of 
customary international law. 3 In Australia it was held by the High Court in Victoria v 
Commonwealth that the right to strike has not attained the status of customary 
international law. 4 The court by majority stated that customary international law 
requires consistency of State practice and acceptance by States that they are so bound, 
and it could find no basis for the existence of a right to strike on those gxounds. 5 
While the decision of a national court does not effect the existence of the right within 
international law, the holding does suggest two things. First, customary international 
law requires acceptance by States that they are 'so bound' and Australia has not 
demonstrated this acceptance. Second, Australian courts are bound by this holding of 
the High Court and thus the Australian legal position on this point is clear unless or 
until a legislative or common law change occurs. 
Construction of Freedom of association 
Freedom of associati6n is either constructed as an individual or collective freedom 
depending upon whether it is viewed through the prism of civil/political or 
economic/social rights. When viewed through the prism of civil/political rights, it is 
considered to constitute a limited individualist freedom to do in association that which 
can be done independently. As striking is a collective activity, it cannot be 
encompassed within this view of freedom of association. However, when viewed from 
the economic/social perspective, freedom of association constitutes a collective 
freedom encompassing the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike. 
3 See P. Alston, 'Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law - Aggressive Unilateralism?' in L. Compa 
and S. Diamond, (eds.) Human Rights, Labor Rights and International Trade (University of 
Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 1996), 71 at 79; R. Birk, 'Derogations and Restrictions on the Right 
To Strike Under International Law' in R. Blanpain, (ed.) Labour Law, Human Rights and Social 
Justice (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001), 95 at 96. 
4 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
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The division in international law between civil/political and economic/social rights is 
outdated but is reflected within European instruments and the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
While an increasing number of authors reject the division, the current pre-eminence of 
the individualist contractualist approach to labour regulation in many Western 
jurisdictions means that a significant change to the enactments of international law is 
unlikely in the near future. 6 Nonetheless, the collectivist construction of freedom of 
association within the social/economic rights is a legitimate accepted principle within 
international law and binding upon Australia through its ratification of the ICESCR 
and ILO Conventions 87 The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 and 98 The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (the Freedom of Association Conventions). The ongoing presence 
of the division does not detract from Australia's existing obligations in international 
law. 
The Right to Strike in the ICESCR and ILO Standards 
The concept of industrial action is not one with a single meaning that holds at 
• all times, for every purpose and in every stage of development of labour 
• relations and labour law.' 
This statement touches upon the difficulties involved in adapting and implementing 
international labour standards with respect to the principle of freedom of association, 
collective bargaining and the right to strike. Strike action is not prone to simplistic or 
universally applicable definitions. Strike action within different labour law systems, 
stages of development and historical periods can fulfil differing purposes and 
ideological positions. The task of the drafters of the ICESCR and ILO Freedom of 
Association Conventions was a demanding one, especially given the need to 
implement standards that would pass the twin tests of time and universality of 
application. 
5 Ibid at 546 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 
6 The contractualist climate is explored within G. Anderson, 'Implementing Collective Bargaining 
Policy through the Restriction of the Right to Strike' in R. Mitchell and J. Min Aun Wu, (eds.) Facing 
the Challenge in the Asia Pacific Region: Contemporary Themes and Issues in Labour law (Occasional 
Monograph No. 5, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of Melbourne: Parkville, 
1997) at 157; and within chapter 7 at 240-243. 
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ILO Instruments and the ICESCR Reflect their Era of Promulgation 
While every effort at universality was made, ILO Conventions and the ICESCR are 
products of the era in which they were promulgated. The ILO Freedom of Association 
Conventions were passed by the International Labour Conference in 1947/1948 in the 
immediate post World War II period. The UN General Assembly passed the ICESCR 
in 1966 during the post war economic boom. The standards, therefore, were 
established during a period of reconstruction and economic promise. Sharard notes 
that the principle of freedom of association enacted at the time represents the political 
and theoretical compromises made in the post war period between the liberal political 
economic model and the perceived need to improve the market position of labour. 8 
Exploring this compromise, Sharard notes that: 
[i]n a pragmatic reconciliation, the state and employers recognised trade 
unions as partners in economic and social processes through various tripartite 
arrangements and schemes facilitating collective bargaining ... Labourism, 
combined with [the adoption of] ... Keynesian welfare capitalism — integrated 
unions into the political economy, with collective objectives and criteria 
partially displacing individual and utilitarian ones. 9 
Therefore, the model of freedom of association was founded during a period where 
the integration of labour into the processes of the State and the facilitation of 
collectivism were acceptable on the basis of this political compromise. In 
consequence, a significant amount of commentary that interprets the instruments 
presupposes the continuation of the Western commitment to collective bargaining, the 
presence of governments that are not inherently hostile to collectivism, and the 
continued role of trade unions as social partners. Further, Mitchell and Min Aun Wu 
argue that by the 1960's it was generally assumed that non-Western States undergoing 
industrialisation would adopt a tripartite collective bargaining model as a 
demonstration of 'convergence theory'. '° Convergence theory suggests that ILO and 
7  R. Ben-Israel, 'Introduction to Strikes and Lock-outs: a Comparative Perspective' in Blanpain and 
Ben-Israel (eds.), Strikes and Lock-Outs in Industrialised Market Economies, (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1994), 1 at 1. 
8 T. Sharard, Competing Models of Worker Representation - The ILO Collective Bargaining Principles 
and Part VIB of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
University of Melbourne: Parkville, 1996) at 1. 
9 Ibid. 
I°  R. Mitchell and J. Min Aun Wu, 'Introduction: Pressures on the Concept of Labour Law in the Asia-
Pacific Region' in R. Mitchell and J. Min Aun Wu, (eds.) Facing the Challenge in the Asia-Pacific 
Region: Contemporary Themes and Issues in Labour Law, (Occasional Monograph No. 5, Centre for 
Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of Melbourne: Parlcville, 1997), x at x. 
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ICESCR standards were developed from the perspective that "national industrial 
relations systems would tend to converge upon a particular model in the process of 
industrialisation"." Thus ILO and ICESCR standards reflect a historical perception of 
universality in the application of the collective bargaining mode1. 12 
A second consequence of the proposition that ILO and ICESCR standards reflect the 
era in which they were promulgated is the failure of the ILO to enact an express right 
to strike. Working from the proposition that freedom of association is collective and 
functional in nature, it was assumed that the principle of freedom of association 
encompassed protection of the right to strike. 13 With hindsight, this presumption is 
regrettable given that the omission has left room for potential challenges to the 
functional collective construction of freedom of association. However, the omission 
has provided interpretative scope for ILO bodies to expand upon the implicit right to 
strike without the restrictions that an express statement of the right may have 
produced. 14 
A third consequence of the proposition that ILO and ICESCR standards reflect the era 
in which they were promulgated is the entrenchment of an express right to strike 
within the ICESCR rather than the ICCPR. This is a reflection of the civil/political — 
economic/social division of rights. At the time of enactment of the ICESCR 
economic/social rights were poorer cousins of civil/political rights. In consequence, 
the ICESCR has historically struggled to attain appropriate recognition. 15 The 
separation of rights in the ICESCR and ICCPR has facilitated the 
individualist/collectivist dichotomy in interpretative approaches to the Covenants. 
II Ibid. 
12 Mitchell and Min Aun Wu note a difficulty in the modem application of convergence theory, 
especially with respect to nations in the Asia — Pacific region:"[w]e must expect divergent approaches 
to the role and concept of labour law; at least be alive to the possible convergence upon something 
other than the Western model of collective bargaining". Mitchell and MM Aun Wu, supra note 10 at xv. 
13 R. Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1988) at 36 —37. 
14 Gemigon, Odero and Guido note that the advantage of an implicit right to strike is that the system 
remains flexible: "without imposing the formal obligations that arise from ratification ... the CFA and 
CEACR, through their body of principles, [are able] to establish valuable points of references to the 
international community". B. Gemigon, A. Odero and H. Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right 
to Strike (International Labour Office: Geneva, 2000) at 60. 
15 See P. Alston and G. Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under the 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 
156. 
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Further, it has facilitated the perception that the fulfilment of economic/social rights is 
dependent upon government action and the allocation of significant financial 
resources. 16 Due in part to the historical distinction between the two types of right; the 
ICESCR still lacks a complaint mechanism. In consequence, the enactment of the 
right to strike within the ICESCR suffers from the general difficulties associated with 
the achievement of economic/social rights. This would not occur if it were recognised 
as a facet of the principle of freedom of association under the ICCPR. 
The wording of the express right to strike in Article 8(1)(d) of the ICESCR has also 
detracted from the impact that the enactment has had. The limitation "provided that it 
[the right to strike] is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country", 
leaves the guarantee of the right open to manipulation by State parties to the 
Covenant. A broad margin of State appreciation in the domestic application of the 
right and the lack of a complaint mechanism has meant that State action does not 
receive the degree of scrutiny required to develop the scope and content of the 
ICESCR right. 
In conclusion, the development of international labour standards on the right to strike 
has been affected by their promulgation during the post World War II era. This has 
had three main consequences. First, the standards are based upon the supposition that 
the governments of States are receptive to the role of trade unions in economic and 
social policy, and the tripartite management of labour relations. The standards also 
reflect the convergence theory that all industrial relations systems will eventually 
converge on a tripartite model of voluntary collective bargaining. Second, the lack of 
an express right to strike in ILO instruments leaves the implicit right to strike open to 
challenge, but allows for flexible interpretation. Finally, the enactment of an express 
right to strike within the ICESCR rather than the ICCPR has adversely limited the 
development of the right. 
16  See D. Beetham, 'What Future for Economic and Social Rights?' in D. Beetham, (ed.) Politics and 
Human Rights (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1995), 41. 
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Flexible, Non Prescriptive Standards 
The right to strike developed through ICESCR and ILO freedom of association 
standards is facilitative and non-prescriptive. Anderson notes that the model "supports 
a basic self help process by which workers may seek to improve their own 
conditions". 17 
The right to strike within the ICESCR is a flexible standard that leaves the margin of 
State appreciation extremely wide. Within the ILO, the tripartite nature of the 
organization has led to a particular sensitivity to the difficulties attaching to the 
development of universal standards applicable across differing levels of 
industrialisation and industrial relations cultures. Standards developed by the ILO are 
"predicated on the possibility of very different legal systems adopting fairly 
standardised norms". 18 While minimum standards of employment may be liable to 
expression through prescriptive norms, the principle of freedom of association is not 
easily adapted and requires flexible, adaptable principles. Kahn-Freund has noted that: 
[t]hose who drafted Conventions 87 and 98 must have been well aware of the 
obstacles to transplantation. In both cases this is shown by the contrast 
between the principle of freedom of organization expressed in strict legal 
terms and that chosen to promote collective bargaining, 'means appropriate to 
national conditions. 19 
ILO standards have developed to be as flexible and non-prescriptive as possible in 
order to adapt to pre-existing State institutions and structures. An excellent example 
of the versatility of ILO standards are the principles developed by the CFA and 
CEACR relating to the imposition of legitimate prerequisites to undertaking strike 
action.20 The standards developed accommodate the imposition of negotiation, 
conciliation, voluntary arbitration, ballots or notice requirements. For each such 
requirement, the standards require that it not unduly impede the exercise of the right 
to strike. This flexible approach has allowed for a range of prerequisites to strike 
17 Anderson, supra note 6 at 159. 
18 S. Cooney and R. Mitchell, 'Labour Relations-and the Law in Three East Asian NICS: Some 
Problems and Issues For Comparative Labour Law Inquiry' (Paper presented at the Global Integration 
and Challenges for Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management in the Twenty-First Century 
Conference, Tokyo, 29 May - 2 June 2000) at 12. 
19 0. Kahn Freund, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1 at 
22. 
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action to come within the principle of freedom of association, while ensuring that the 
primary aim of ensuring that the right to strike may be exercised is fulfilled. A. 
specific illustration of this point is the approach of the CFA to the requirement of an 
absolute majority in a strike ballot. CFA determinations conclude that "particularly 
where trade unions have large numbers of members or cover a large area" 21 absolute 
majorities impede the exercise of the right to strike. This suggests that the right to 
strike may not be impeded in the case of a requirement for an absolute majority at a 
single business or workplace or an enterprise based trade union. In this manner, the 
standards developed by the ILO have been kept flexible and non-prescriptive, 
allowing for differentiation of Member State practice. 
ILO Standards Presuppose the Existence of Voluntary Collective Bargaining 
Structures 
ILO standards with respect to the right to strike presuppose labour relations systems 
based on voluntary collective bargaining. Labour relations systems based upon 
different precepts, such as compulsory conciliation and arbitration, will not be able to 
easily adapt those standards to domestic application. 
The ILO Freedom of Association Conventions, while resisting prescriptive standards, 
are designed to implement the principles of freedom of association through voluntary 
collective bargaining. The clearest indication of this approach is demonstrated in 
Article 4 of Convention 98: 
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, 
to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery 
for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organizations and 
workers' organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions 
of employment by means of collective agreements [emphasis added]. 
The remaining provisions of the freedom of association Conventions reinforce the 
presupposition of the existence of the model. Articles 2 and 3 of Convention 87 
emphasise the voluntary nature of worker and employer organizations, the right to 
freely participate and the independence of these organizations from State interference. 
20 	• For in-depth discussion of the CFA and CEACR principles relating to the imposition of legitimate 
prerequisites to undertaking strike action see chapter 3 at 102-107. 
21 Complaints presented by the National Labour Front, et al against the Government of Brazil, 
Document Vol. LXII, 1979, Series B, No. 3, Report 197, Case 927, para 355. 
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Articles 1, 2 and 3 of Convention 98 further ensure that individuals who act in 
association are not subjected to anti-union discrimination. Further, the preamble of 
Convention 154 The Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 provides that it is 
desirable to make greater efforts to achieve the general principles set out in Article 4 
of Convention 98. Article 5(1) of Convention 154 restates that measures adapted to 
national conditions shall be taken to promote collective bargaining and Article 5(2) 
lists the aims of these measures in greater detail than provided in Convention 98. 22 
The cumulative effect of these provisions is the presupposition of a model consisting 
of free private actors (worker associations (trade unions), employers and employer 
associations), operating voluntarily and free from State interference, negotiating and 
arranging employment matters on a collective basis. The right to strike flows from 
this model as an activity exercised by free trade unions, pursuing the interests of trade 
union members and seeking to compel an employer to enter negotiations or to agree to 
a set of terms through bargaining.23 Equally, employers are private actors with market 
power. This proposition is reinforced by statements of the ILO Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) that: 
22 Article 5(2) of the Convention provides that the aims of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this Article shall be the following: 
(a) Collective bargaining should be made possible for all employers and all groups of workers in the 
branches of activity covered by this Convention; 
.(b) collective bargaining should be progressively extended to all matters covered by subparagraphs 
(a), (b) and (c) of Article 2 of this Convention; 
(c) the establishment of rules of procedure agreed between employers' and workers' organizations 
should be encouraged; 
(d) collective bargaining should not be hampered by the absence of rules governing the procedure to 
be used or by the inadequacy or inappropriateness of such rules; 
(e) bodies and procedures for the settlement of labour disputes should be so conceived as to contribute 
to the promotion of collective bargaining. 
With respect to Article 5(2)(b), subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2 provide: 
(a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or 
(b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and /or 
(c) regulating relations between employers or their organizations and a workers' organization or 
workers' organizations. 
Other instruments that illustrate the model of voluntary collective bargaining include the Labour 
Relations (Public Servants) Convention and Recommendation 1978 (No 151); the Workers 
Representatives Convention 1971 (No 135); the Collective Agreements Recommendation 1951 (No 91); 
the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation 1951 (No 92). 
23 Anderson sums up the equation effectively: "If terms and conditions of employment are fixed 
through a process of voluntary collective bargaining the ability of workers to negotiate effectively 
ultimately is dependant on their ability to organise in trade unions and on their ability to strike where 
necessary to achieve their bargaining goals: In the absence of a legally recognised right to organise and 
strike, the ability of most workers to negotiate effectively is extremely limited." Anderson, supra note 6 
at 157. 
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Nile Committee considers that the freedom, de facto and de jure, to establish 
organizations is the foremost among trade union rights and is the essential 
prerequisite without which the other guarantees enunciated in Convention Nos 
87 and 98 would remain a dead letter. The free exercise of this right ... 
depends on three things, namely the absence of any distinction, in law and 
practice, among those entitled to the right of association, the absence of the 
need for previous authorization to establish organizations, and freedom of 
choice with regard to membership of such organizations... 
The principle of voluntary negotiation of collective agreements, and thus the 
autonomy of the bargaining partners, is the second essential element of Article 
4 of Convention 98. The existing machinery and procedures should be 
designed to facilitate bargaining between the two sides of industry, leaving 
them free to reach their own settlement.24 
The principles relating to the right to strike, implicit in the freedom of association 
Conventions, conform to a voluntary collective bargaining model. While the 
principles sire flexible and prone to adaptation, their appropriate application will 
depend on the extent to which the labour relations system in question applies a 
voluntary collective bargaining model. A pertinent example of the potential for 
difficulty is the Australian federal compulsory conciliation and arbitration system that 
operated from 1904 to 1993. 25 The system was regulated through a central tribunal 
which produced non-consensual binding arbitrated outcomes for the settlement of 
industrial disputes. The resultant awards formed the basis of the wages and conditions 
of affected employees. Over-award bargaining occurred, but the majority of 
employment conditions were settled in a centralised manner. 
The compulsory conciliation and arbitration system controlled wage rates and was 
protective of employee interests. It was considered socially progressive. However, it 
24 International Labour Office, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, General Survey of 
the Reports on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87) 1948 and 
the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) 1949, Report of the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 
81 st  Session 1994, Report III (Part 4B), Geneva (The 'General Survey, 1994'), 1994, paras 44 and 248. 
25  For discussion of the conciliation and arbitration system see B. Creighton, 'One Hundred Years of 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Power: A Province Lost?' (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law 
Review 839; J. Isaac and S. Macintyre, (eds.) The New Province for Law and Order: 100 Years of 
Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004); 
R. C. McCallum, 'The New Millenium and the Higgins Heritage: Industrial Relations in the Twenty 
First Century' (1996) 38 Journal of Industrial Relations 294; M. Pittard, 'The Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act: The Prevention of Strikes and the Recovery of Wages' (Paper presented at the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration After 75 Years: The Federal Arbitration Process, Present 
Problems and Future Trends Conference, Monash University, Faculty of Law, 14th of July 1979); 
J. H. Portus, Australian Compulsory Arbitration 1900 - 1970 (Hicks Smith and Sons Pty Ltd: Sydney, 
1971). 
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lacked three elements crucial to compliance with international standards. First, the 
system did not provide a right to strike. Strike action under the common law 
potentially constituted a breach of contract and trade unions/employees were 
potentially subject to tortious actions. 26 Second, the system did not promote voluntary 
collective bargaining. While above award collective bargaining was a frequent and 
tacitly accepted occurrence it was never 'encouraged' or promoted. 27 Third, the 
system was voluntary in appearance only. Trade unions could choose to participate (as 
they could only access the system if registered) but this choice was illusory as 
remaining outside the system resulted in isolation and often, redundancy. 28 Employers 
did not even have the illusion of choice. If they were named in a claim, they were 
bound by the resultant award. Sharard notes that there were "difficulties in reconciling 
the conciliation and arbitration model and the ILO's scheme based on organisational 
autonomy. „29  
These difficulties in establishing compliance with ILO standards were never 
adequately addressed by the CEACR or the CFA. The CFA was provided with an 
opportunity to do so in a complaint brought to the CFA in the aftermath of the 
Australian Pilots' Dispute. 3° The complaint made by the complainant criticised the 
conciliation and arbitration system and the absence of a right to strike, representing 
"the arbitration system as antithetical to the process of collective bargaining and was 
26 See discussion in chapter 6 at 159-165. 
27 Sharard argues that above award bargaining under the conciliation and arbitration system was 
common and suggests that the system may have operated as a "de facto compulsory recognition” 
system and in reality was a "distinctive collective bargaining system underpinned by minimum 
standards in awards". See Sharard, supra note 8 at 7. It should be noted that there was a formal role for 
bargaining in the form of pre arbitration conciliation. The conciliation element of the system was 
mandatory and did provide scope for official bargaining. In addition, unofficial bargaining was also 
common, before the notification of industrial disputes to the Commission. It also had to occur with 
respect to matters that were outside the Commissions' jurisdiction. For discussion of the relationship 
between the compulsory conciliation and arbitration system and collective bargaining see L. Bennett, 
Making Labour Law in Australia: Industrial Relations, Politics and the Law (Law Book Company: 
Sydney, 1994) at 110- 112. 
28 For discussion of the registration and regulation of federal trade unions under compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration see B. Creighton, W. Ford and R. Mitchell, Labour Law: Materials and 
Commentary (21d ed., Law Book Company: Sydney, 1993) chapters 26 and 28. For discussion of the 
benefits of registration and the role of deregistration of trade unions see Australian Industrial Relations 
Law and Systems: Report of the Committee of Review, Volume Two: Report (Australian Government 
Publishing Service: Canberra, 1985) at 639 — 642. 
29 See Sharard, supra note 8 at 7. 
3° For discussion of the dispute see K. McEvoy and R. Owens, 'The Flight of Icarus: Legal Aspects of 
the Pilots Dispute' (1990) 3 Australian Journal of Labour Law 87; B. Norington, Sky Pirates: The 
Pilots' Strike that Grounded Australia (ABC Enterprises: Crows Nest, 1990). 
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tantamount to impugning the compatibility of the legislatively established arbitration 
system with Australia's international legal obligations". 31 However despite this 
challenge to the Australian model, the CFA sidestepped the opportunity to assess the 
compatibility of the system with international labour standards. Faced with a system 
that was protective of workers' interests and provided trade unions with power and 
influence in the industrial relations process, the CFA failed to engage with the more 
difficult questions relating to compulsion and freedom of association. Instead, the 
CFA stated that as trade union registration within the conciliation and arbitration 
system was voluntary and conferred benefits on trade unions,. the State could impose 
reciprocal obligations. 32 The CFA argued that the initial voluntary entry of trade 
unions into the conciliation and arbitration system justified any subsequent 
compulsion. This determination remains problematic. The voluntariness of trade 
union participation in the system is questionable. Employers did not have a choice 
concerning their participation. This demonstrates the difficulties of applying ILO 
principles relating to strikes and collective bargaining to a labour relations system not 
founded upon the principles of voluntary collective bargaining. 
Despite this illustration of the difficulties, the CEACR considers that the principle of 
freedom of association developed by the ILO does not require a particular model of 
labour relations for implementation: 
far from trying to impose a uniform model of labour relations legislation, it 
endeavours, in cooperation with the other supervisory bodies, to open up a 
dialogue with member States with the aim of bringing national legislation into 
conformity with the Conventions. 33 
This confident assertion does not adequately address the difficulties involved. It is 
true that the CEAC,R and CFA are not attempting to dictate the imposition of a 
uniform model of labour relations. However, the standards developed do conform to a 
certain model and difficulties are faced when those standards are 'transplanted' onto a 
model with substantially different precepts. ILO standards allow for a considerable 
degree of flexibility when applied to a model that is essentially one of voluntary 
31  K. McEvoy and R. Owens, 'On a Wing and a Prayer: The Pilots Dispute in the International Context' 
(1993) 6 Australian Journal of Labour Law 1 at 8; Complaint Against the Government of Australia 
presented by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA), CFA, Report 277, 
Case 1511. 
32  CFA Determination in the Pilots Dispute, supra note 31 at para 229. 
" General Survey, 1994, supra note 24 at para 283. 
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collective bargaining, but are less adaptable when applied outside of that normative 
model. 
Accordingly, the right to strike within the ICESCR and the ILO is a functional right 
operating as a facet of the principle of freedom of association that supports a labour 
relations system of voluntary collective bargaining. ILO principles of freedom of 
association, while flexible and non-prescriptive, are not easily adapted to labour 
relations systems other than voluntary collective bargaining. 
The ILO Model is Consistent with Contraetualist Private Ordering 
The ILO model of voluntary collective bargaining, supported by the right to strike, is 
consistent with the principles of the free market, encouraging the private ordering of 
employment related matters. Sharard notes that while ILO standards are not based on 
a private contractualist model, they are consistent with contractualist private 
ordering. 34 
The essence of the ILO bargaining regime is voluntariness and collectivity. 
Employers and workers organizations are treated as voluntary actors, neither of which 
can be compelled to bargain or reach agreement. Strike action operates within this 
model to provide a mechanism for the exercise of private power supporting 
bargaining. State intervention to compel bargaining would be inconsistent with ILO 
standards and would deprive the process of its voluntary character. In the absence of 
Government intervention, the weapon of the strike is needed to operate as a tool of 
bargaining. 
The concept of voluntariness goes beyond the precept that both parties to the 
bargaining process should be volunteers, only coerced by industrial pressure. It 
extends to the principle that the State should allow the bargaining parties to resolve 
their own disputes. The legal regulation of strikes should be minimal in order to • 
ensure that regulation "does not smother the very system of free collective bargaining 
which the law is designed to protect". 35 This link between voluntariness and the 
34 Sharard, supra note 8 at 4. 
35  P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law (The Carswell 
Company Ltd: Toronto, 1980) at 289. 
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regulation of strike behaviour was explored by Cassim in a discussion of the right to 
strike in South Africa. 36 Cassim argues that the regulation of strike action in South 
Africa threatens to smother the right to strike because the "legally regulated system is 
in conflict with the basic principle of the voluntarist philosophy of allowing industry 
to make its own bargains and disagreements". 37 Weiler has also noted this problem 
with respect to Canada in 1980: "[w]e have gone about as far as we can go in legally 
regulating strike action in Canada. All that remains of the right to strike is the 
irreducible.minimum." 38 There is a tension between the impulse of States to regulate 
strikes due to their potential for economic damage and the need to ensure 
voluntariness in the private ordering of employment affairs. 
The second element in the ILO bargaining regime is collectivity. The freedom of 
association Conventions are couched in the language of collective rights. 39 Article 4 
of Convention 98 requires ratifying States to take action to promote collective 
bargaining. Therefore, the principles relating to strike action implicit in the Freedom 
of Association Conventions support the right of the collective to strike in pursuit of 
collective objectives. 40 
The essential point is that ILO collective bargaining standards are not inconsistent 
with modern deregulationist (or `reregulationisr) free market policies. The standards 
are not contractualist due to their emphasis on collective agreements rather than 
individual contracts, but they do support the private ordering of labour relations by 
employers and employee organizations operating largely free from State regulation. 
The operation of this model requires recognition and protection of the right to strike in 
order to empower workers for the bargaining process. The ILO collective bargaining 
model dictates that labour market conditions should be set by private actors in a free 
market context, utilising the tools of strike action and labour market monopoly, in 
36 M. Y. Cassim, 'Freedom to Strike: The Myth of Voluntarism' (1989) 11 Loyola of Los Angeles: 
International and Comparative Law Journal 281. 
37 Ibid at 281. 
38 Weiler, supra note 35 at 69. 
39 Convention 87, Article 2, sets out the only individually expressed right within the Conventions, the 
right of the individual to form and join a collective worker or employer organization. See Sharard, 
supra note 8 at 3. 
40 Lord Wedderburn, Employment Rights in Britain and Europe: Selected Papers in Labour Law 
(Lawrence and Wisehart: London, 1991) at 138. 
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order to engage in meaningful bargaining. 41 Strike action is a necessary element of 
this model. Employers are free, within the limits of the law, to use the tools of 
incorporation, hiring, firing and managerial prerogative to control their side of the 
bargaining equation, so workers equally must be free to utilise the tools of 
unionisation and collective withdrawal of labour to achieve their employment 
objectives. 
The ILO Principle of Freedom of Association Accommodates Elements of 
Liberal Individualist Ideology 
The final proposition with respect to the right to strike relates more generally to the 
principle of freedom of association. The principle of freedom of association from 
which voluntary collective bargaining and the right to strike are developed is capable 
of accommodating elements of the liberal individualist approach to freedom of 
association. Primarily, it can support the inclusion, in national labour law systems, of 
a right not to associate. However, it will not support the individualisation of labour 
relations or the exclusion of trade unions from the bargaining process. 
The recognition of collective bargaining and the right to strike does not necessitate the 
holding of a view either way on the issue of disassociation. The matter is left to States 
to make their own (ideological) choices concerning whether or not to permit closed 
shops, compulsory membership or protection of the negative right to associate. 42 
41  The issue of trade union monopoly is discussed within the CEACR General Survey, 1994 at 
paragraphs 91 — 96. The discussion suggests that trade union monopoly is in accordance with the 
principle of freedom of association as expressed within the Freedom of Association Conventions 
provided that such monopoly is not imposed by law, "Where is a fundamental difference between, on 
the one hand, a trade union monopoly established or maintained by law and, on the other hand 
voluntary groupings of workers or unions which occur (without pressure from the public authorities, or 
due to the law) because they wish, for instance, to strengthen their bargaining position, coordinate their 
efforts to tackle ad hoc difficulties which affect all their organizations". Monopoly in this sense refers 
to the plurality of trade unions or otherwise. The other form of monopoly that may occur is where a 
trade union has a monopoly over labour in a particular area. This may be a natural result of 
collectivisation in an industry or business area. While this may be portrayed as a labour 'cartel' 
impeding the natural flow of the labour market, monopoly is a potential result of the operation of the 
free market and a potential result of collectivisation of labour. As employers are free to monopolise the 
sources of employment within a particular area, so too must employees be free to form trade unions 
that monopolise labour in a particular area in order to provide an appropriate balancing mechanism. 
42  The CEACR has stated that "systems which prohibit union security practices in order to guarantee 
the right not to join an organization, as well as systems which authorize such practices, are compatible 
with the Convention [No. 87]". General Survey, supra note 24 at para 100. With respect to the right not 
to belong to a trade union, the CEACR has confirmed that such laws are compatible with the Freedom 
of Association Conventions, noting that "[i]n several countries, the law guarantees directly or indirectly 
the right not to join an organization, as well as systems which authorize such practices ... [and that 
132 
However, ILO principles do not encompass individual bargaining. The ILO 
expression of the principle of freedom of association encompasses collective activity; 
Convention 98 requires the promotion of collective bargaining, and strike action is 
collective in nature. Both Australia and New Zealand have been criticised by the CFA 
for their emphasis on individual bargaining. 43 However this criticism has not been 
confined to the Antipodes. In the CEACR's 1994 General Survey the Committee 
expressed a concern that, "in several countries there has been a recent tendency for the 
legislature to give precedence to individual rights over collective rights in 
employment matters". 44 
The commentary of the CEACR reflects a growing conflict between the emphasis on 
collectivity in international labour standards and the rise of individualism in the legal 
structures of Western nations. This issue presents a challenge to Australian 
compliance with international labour standards on the principle of freedom of 
association as will be examined in the following chapters. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the nature of the right to strike in international law and 
more specifically within ILO standards and the ICESCR. The principal expression of 
the right to strike is contained within the ICESCR, however the most comprehensive 
and developed source of the obligation to respect the right to strike is contained within 
the commentary of ILO bodies, specifically the CFA and CEACR. 
The nature of the right to strike expressed within the ICESCR and implicit within the 
principle of freedom of association enshrined in the ILO is flexible, adaptable and 
accommodating. The standards developed are non-prescriptive and designed to apply 
across differing levels of industrialisation and industrial relations cultures. Further, the 
these] are compatible with the Convention [No. 87]". General Survey, supra note 24 at para 101. For 
historical discussion of the practice of closed shop in Australian law see P. Weeks, Trade Union 
Security Law: A Study of Preference and Compulsory Unionism (Federation Press: Annandale, 1995). 
43 See Complaint against the Government of New Zealand presented by the New Zealand Council of 
Trade Unions (NZCTU), Report 292, Case 1698; Complaint against the Government of Australia 
presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU), the International 
Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the 
Maritime Union of Australia, Report 320, Case 1963. 
44 General Survey, supra note 24 at para 236. 
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standards are consistent with the contractualist private ordering of employment terms 
and conditions and are capable of accommodating an express right of disassociation 
where a Member State chooses to implement one. However, despite this flexibility, 
the standards tend to be most suitable for labour relations systems modelled upon 
voluntary collective bargaining, and ongoing trade union participation. This aspect of 
the standards reflects the era in which they were promulgated, the tripartite nature of 
the ILO and the functional interpretative approach taken to the principle of freedom of 
association. 
Ultimately the right to strike in international law is capable of accommodating a 
variety of different approaches provided they occur within the framework of voluntary 
collective bargaining. The design is minimalist in approach, providing State actors 
with a freedom of design within set limitations, given that the ability to strike in 
support of free and voluntary bargaining is not impeded. 
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Chapter Five 
An Entrenched Right to Strike in Australia? 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have explored the content of the right to strike expressed 
within the international instruments that Australia has voluntarily ratified. The 
discussion examined the extent of the obligation to implement the right to strike and 
the model of bargaining framing the right to strike within international standards. The 
thesis will now examine Australian law and practice in order to ascertain the extent to 
which the Australian bargaining model accommodates strike action and complies with 
the international law framework outlined above. 
The role of this chapter is to consider whether, apart from any international law 
obligations there is a right to strike in domestic Australian law and to consider the 
jurisdictional issues that arise through the implementation of a right to strike. This 
will serve to provide the legal and conceptual basis for the following chapter that 
explores the substantive Australian law relating to strikes. Further, the chapter will 
consider the current legal status of international labour law in Australia. 
Federal Regulation and the Application of International Instruments 
Jurisdictional Issues: Constitutional Heads of Power 
The Australian labour relations system is shaped by the federal/state division of 
powers contained in the Australian Constitution, providing the Commonwealth 
Parliament with a limited range of legislative powers, set out largely in s 51. The 
industrial relations power is contained in s 51(xxxv) granting the Commonwealth 
Parliament the power to make laws with respect to "conciliation and arbitration for 
the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any 
one State". 
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A detailed discussion of the conciliation and arbitration power and the difficulty that 
it has presented to the federal regulation of labour relations is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 1 However, discussion is warranted with respect to the extent to which this 
restricted legislative competence has affected the ability of the Commonwealth 
Parliament to implement a right to strike. The narrow scope of s 51(xxxv) means that 
the Commonwealth Parliament does not have the power to pass prescriptive 
legislation regulating terms and conditions of employment or enabling collective 
bargaining. 2 The section only provides for the establishment of mechanisms to 
facilitate the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes 3 that extend beyond the 
limits of any one State. 4 While in practice the power has been used in an expansive 
manner, recent federal governments have sought to bypass its limitations by using 
alternate Constitutional heads of power. 5.In addition, there have been numerous 
attempts via referenda to pass amendments to the Constitution to enhance the scope of 
the power, none of which has met with success. 6 The chapter will now consider the • 
enactment of a right to strike in Australian law through the Industrial Relations 
Reform Act 1993 (Cth) and the subsequent Workplace Relations and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) (WROLAA), addressing constitutional issues 
as they arise. 
The Right to Strike and the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) 
The Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) (`The Reform Act') represented a 
significant shift in the jurisdictional basis of the federal labour law system. Rather 
For detailed discussion of the conciliation and arbitration power in the Australian Constitution see G. 
Williams, Labour Law and the Constitution (Federation Press: Annandale, 1998). 
2 Jumbunna Coal Mine (NL) v The Victorian Coal Miners Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 per Griffiths 
CJ at 332, "Nile power, so far as regards the prevention of disputes, is limited to conciliation for that 
purpose. It does not extend to making laws for what is called 'collective bargaining', except so far as 
collective bargaining may be incidental to such conciliation or to arbitration for the settlement of 
existing disputes." 
3 For discussion of the meaning of industrial disputes in the context of the Australian Constitution, 
s 51(xxxv) see Williams, supra note 1 at 48- 56; 61 -68. 
4 For discussion of the meaning of "beyond the limits of any one State" in the context of the Australian 
Constitution, s 51 (xxxv) see Williams, supra note 1 at 56 - 61. 
5 See W. J. Ford, 'The Constitution and the Reform of Australasian Industrial Relations' (1994) 7 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 105. 
6 There have been at least six failed attempts to alter the conciliation and arbitration power of the 
Australian Constitution to give prescriptive labour relations powers to the Commonwealth Parliament. 
See E. Campbell, 'Southey Memorial Lecture 1988: Changing the Constitution - Past and Future' 
(1989) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 1; M. McKenna, A. Simpson and G. Williams, 'With 
Hope in God, the Prime Minister and the Poet: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum on the Preamble' 
(2001) 24 University of New South Wales Law Journal 401. 
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than near exclusive reliance upon the conciliation and arbitration power, the Act 
sought to achieve extensive coverage through reliance upon a range of other 
Constitutional heads of power. 
The introduction of a right to strike in the Reform Act was facilitated through the 
• external affairs power (s 51(xxxv), by way of reliance upon ratified international 
instruments. 7 The Act provided immunity from civil liability for strike action and 
protection against termination of employment for engaging in strike action. 8 
Division 4 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) as amended by the Reform Act 
(hereafter 'IR Act (as amended)' 9 was headed "Immunity from Civil Liability" and 
s 170PA set out the object of the Division: 
s.170PA(1) The object of this Division is to give effect, in particular situations, to 
Australia's international obligation to provide for a right to strike. This obligation 
arises under: 
(a) Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
• Rights; and 
(b) the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
• Convention 1948; and 
(c) the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949; and 
(d) the Constitution of the International Labour Organization; and 
(e) customary international law relating to freedom of association and the 
right to strike. 
The Act further provided in s 170PA(2) that 
The Parliament considers that it is necessary to provide specific legislative 
protection for the right to strike, subject to limitations compatible with the 
existence of the right, in situations where: 
(a) there exists an industrial dispute involving an employer and one or 
more organizations members of which: 
7 Relevant ILO Conventions were introduced by the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) 
(Reform Act) to form Schedules to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth): Schedule 15 - Preamble 
and Parts land II of the Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise, ILO, No. 87 and Schedule 16 - Preamble and Articles 1-6 of the Convention concerning the 
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, ILO, No. 98. 
8  For discussion of the introduction of a right to strike in the Reform Act see G. McCarry, 'Sanctions 
and Industrial Action: The Impact of the Industrial Relations Reform Act' (1994) 7 Australian Journal 
of Labour Law 198. 
9 The Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) (the Reform Act) amended the terms of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) 1988. Therefore the changes of the Reform Act were enacted in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth). In order to distinguish between the Industrial Relations Act prior to 1993 and 
after 1993, the IR Act as affected by the Reform Act will be referred to as 'the IR Act (as amended)'. 
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(i) are employed by the employer to perform work in a single 
business, part of a single business or a single place of work; 
and 
(ii) are covered by an award; and 
(b) . the employer and one or more of those organizations are 
negotiating an agreement under Division 2. 
The IR Act (as amended) set out a protected action regime that provided immunity 
from liability under civil law for industrial action undertaken during a bargaining 
period for the negotiation of a certified agreement between an employer and 
employees employed at a single business or place of work. I° The Act also set out 
notice requirements," negotiation and ballot requirements, I2 and provided the AIRC 
with the ability to suspend the bargaining period for a range of reasons including 
those related to strike action. I3 
In addition, the Act sought to provide protection for employees against termination of 
employment for engaging in strike action: 
334A(1) The object of this section is to give effect, in certain respects, to 
Australia's international obligation to provide for a right to strike. This obligation 
arises as mentioned in s 170PA. 
334A(2) An employer must not dismiss an employee, injure an employee in his or 
her employment, or alter the position of an employee to the employee's prejudice, 
merely because the employee has engaged or is proposing to engage, in industrial 
action in relation to an industrial dispute that has been notified to the Commission 
or that the Commission has found to exist. 
I° IR Act (as amended) s 170PM. 
I I IR Act (as amended) s 170P11. 
12 IR Act (as amended) ss 170PI and 170PK. 
13 IR Act (as amended) s 170P0. Subsection 1(a) provided that the AIRC can suspend or terminate a 
bargaining period if the Commission is satisfied that: 
(a) a negotiating party that has organised or is organising, or has taken, industrial action to 
support or advance claims that are the subject of the industrial dispute: 
(i) is not genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the other negotiating 
parties in settlement of the industrial dispute; or 
(ii) has failed to comply with any directions by the Commission relating to 
negotiating in good faith; or 
industrial action that is being taken to support or advance claims that are the subject of the industrial 
dispute is threatening: 
(iii) to endanger the life, the personal safety or health, or the welfare, of the 
population or the part of it; or 
(iv) to cause significant damage to the Australian economy or an important part 
of it; ... 
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The use of the external affairs power in the Reform Act to implement legislation 
otherwise outside the ambit of federal powers was not novel in a Constitutional sense, 
but it did represent a new approach to the regulation of labour relations in Australia. 14 
The provisions of the IR Act (as amended) were challenged by the States of Victoria, 
South Australia and Western Australia in Victoria v Commonwealth. 15 These States 
challenged the provisions of the IR Act (as amended) that relied upon the external 
affairs power, arguing that the power of the Commonwealth to legislate with respect 
to external affairs did not extend to treaty obligations unless the subject matter of the 
treaty was one of "international concern". 16 It was argued that this would render the 
provisions invalid as the relevant ILO Conventions covered topics that were more . 
appropriately the internal concern of States. This challenge to the legislation provided 
the High Court with an opportunity to clarify the scope of the external affairs power 
in the Constitution and comment specifically with respect to the provisions 
guaranteeing a right to strike." 
The majority judgment of Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ 
examined the scope of legislative power that the external affairs power extended to 
the Commonwealth Parliament. The judgment restated the established principle that 
the power to legislate for external affairs includes the power to implement treaties, but 
14 A majority of the High Court recognised, in obiter, the use of the external affairs power for federal 
legislative competence in areas outside those expressly enacted in the Constitution as valid in R v 
Burgess; Ex Parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608. See M. Castan and S. Joseph, Federal Constitutional 
Law: A Contemporary View (Law Book Company: Sydney, 2001) at 86. This was subsequently 
confirmed in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. See M. Coper, 'The High Court and the 
World of Policy' (1984) 14 Federal Law Review 294; C. Saunders, 'The National Implied Power and 
Implied Restrictions on Commonwealth Power' (1984) 14 Federal Law Review 267; G. Sawer, 'The 
External Affairs Power' (1984) 14 Federal Law Review 199; J. A. Thonison, 'A Torrent of Words: A 
Bibliography and Chrimology on the Franklin Dam Case' (1985 - 1986) 15 Federal Law Review 145. 
Prior to the use of the external affairs power in the Reform Act, discrimination in employment had 
been prohibited in legislation including the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth), Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act (Cth) and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) that was based upon international Treaties and Conventions of the ILO. 
For discussion of anti-discrimination legislation in the employment context and the use of the external 
affairs power as a basis for legislative competence see J. Macken, P. O'Grady, C. Sappideen, and G. 
Warburton, The Law of Employment (5 th ed., Lawbook Co.: Sydney, 2002) at chapter 15. 
15 (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
16  Ibid at 427. 
17  For discussion of the case generally see K. Eastman, 'The Relationship between International Law 
and Australian law' [1997] Australian International Law Journal 86; G. Williams and A. Simpson, 
'The Expanding Frontiers of Commonwealth Intervention in Industrial Relations' (1997) 10 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 222. For discussion of the case as it relates to the right to strike see R. Dalton•
and R. Groom, 'The Right to Strike in Australia: International Treaty Obligations and the External 
Affairs Power' (2000) 1 Melbourne Journal of International Law 162. 
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it is not confined to this power and is to be construed with all the generality that the 
words 'external affairs' admit. 18 The court further stated that to be a law with respect 
to 'external affairs', the law "must be reasonably capable of being considered 
appropriate and adapted to implementing the treaty". 19 Further, legislation which 
implements a treaty need not comply with all of the obligations assumed under the 
treaty, although substantial deficiency in this area may deny the legislation the 
character of a measure that implements the treaty. 2° 
The majority then considered the specific provisions enacting a right to strike. The 
objects of Part VIB, Division 4 as set out in s 170PA(1) purported to set out the 
international obligations upon which the provisions regulating strike action were 
based. The majority noted that Article 8 of the ICESCR is the only international 
instrument that was relied upon by s 170PA(1) that employs the term 'right to 
strike'. 21 Further, the court noted that Convention No. 87 provides generally for the 
right of workers and employers to freely establish or join representative organizations 
and that Convention No. 98, Article 4 provides that measures appropriate to national 
conditions shall be taken to encourage and promote the development of machinery for 
voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organizations and workers' 
organizations. 22 In addition the court stated that the Constitution of the ILO makes no 
reference to a right to strike, and without making any concessions, the court noted that 
if there is any right to strike within the Constitution of the ILO, it operates as an 
implied right.23 
18 Victoria v Commonwealth, supra note 15 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow 
JJ at 485. A further submission considered by the majority argued that the extent of reliance on ILO 
Conventions within the Act was beyond the contemplation of the authors of the Constitution at the time 
of its adoption and was not encompassed by the grant of power. In response, the majority stated that 
treaties in existence in 1900 embraced a range of topics and that the content of the legislative power of 
the Commonwealth is to be understood accordingly. In support of this argument the majority referred 
to the decision of Evatt and McTieman JJ in R v Burgess; Ex Parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 at 687: 
"[Nut it is not to be assumed that the legislative power over 'external affairs' is limited to the execution 
of treaties or conventions; and ... the Parliament may well be deemed competent to legislate for the 
carrying out of 'recommendations' as well as the 'draft international conventions' resolved upon by the 
International Labour Organization or of other international recommendations or requests upon other 
subject matters of concern to Australia as a member of the family of nations" at 483. 
19 Victoria v Commonwealth, supra note 15 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow 
JJ at 487. 
20 Ibid at 489. 
21 Ibid at 544. 
22 Ibid at 544-545. 
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The fitial obligation relied upon within s 170PA(1) was customary international law 
relating to freedom of association and the right to strike. 24 The majority did not accept 
that customary international law provided a basis for domestic legislation 
implementing a right to strike. Customary international law requires consistency of 
State practice and acceptance by those same States that they are bound to so act. 25 
Upon consideration of the material presented to the court, the majority could find no 
basis for the existence of a right to strike in customary international law. 26 
The majority then determined whether or not there was a relevant instrument on 
which legislation providing a right to strike could be constitutionally based. The 
majority found that the provisions providing a right to strike was validly enacted on 
the basis of Article 8 of the ICESCR, which contained the only direct expression of 
the right to strike within the instruments enumerated. 27 It was considered unnecessary 
to discuss whether the provisions of the ILO Conventions gave rise to an obligation to 
provide a right to strike or whether the activities of agencies of the ILO (such as the 
CFA) give rise to the ability to legislate under s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. 28 
The holding of the court was that as an implementation of Article 8 of the ICESCR, it 
was open to Parliament to conclude that the existence of common law remedies 
against strikes and strike organisers are inconsistent with the right to strike. The 
qualification of common law rights of action by the protected action provisions 
fulfilled, at least in part, Australia's obligations under Article 8 of the ICESCR and 
were not open to challenge on this ground. 29 In addition, s 334A was considered to be 
appropriate to give effect to Article 8. 3° 
The final aspect of the majority judgment to note is the discussion of lockouts. Part 
VIB, Division 4 provided protection for employers who, in breach of their contracts 
23 Ibid at 545. 
24 IR Act (as amended), s 170PA(1)(e). 
25 Victoria v Commonwealth, per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ at 545. 
26 ibid. 
27 Ibid at 546. 
28 Ibid at 545 — 546. 
29 Ibid at 546— 547. 
313 Ibid at 547. 
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with their employees, locked out employees from their place of employment. 31 The 
majority held that this provision did not protect the right to strike, and was not a 
qualification on the right to strike as it could be exercised by the employer in the 
absence of an intention on the part of employees to undertake strike action. 32 The 
majority held that the lockout provisions were not appropriate or adapted to 
implementing Article 8 of the ICESCR (that does not encompass employer industrial 
action). 33 
One question remaining unresolved by the decision in Victoria v Commonwealth is 
whether or not the Commonwealth Parliament has the power to implement legislation 
providing a right to strike based upon the instruments or activities of the agencies of 
the ILO. The question is important, given the limited scope of the development of 
Article 8(1)(d) of the ICESCR, the continued absence of an ICESCR complaints 
mechanism and the possibility of future restrictive interpretations of the ICESCR. The 
issue was side stepped by the High Court when it noted that it was "unnecessary" to 
determine whether the ILO Conventions give rise to a right to strike. 34 In doing this, 
the High .Court deferred consideration of the matter. Dalton and Groom state that, 
[T]he High Court was unwilling to find that the ILO Conventions contain an 
obligation to protect the right to strike; therefore the government could not 
pass legislation pursuant to the external affairs power protecting the right to 
strike, at least in so far as the legislation was based on the implementation of 
ILO convention obligations. 35 
However, the implications of the decision in Victoria v Commonwealth are not as 
drastic as Dalton and Groom suggest. The majority deemed it unnecessary to consider 
whether ILO Conventions would support legislation implementing a right to strike; 
and they did not rule out the possibility. Were the issue to be considered by the court 
in the future, it may be forced to grapple with the question of whether the ILO 
instruments and activities of ILO agencies support the obligation to provide a right to 
strike. This could occur if the legislation was not supported by the ICESCR or if it 
31 IR Act (as amended), s 170PG(3). 
32 Victoria v Commonwealth, supra note 15 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow 
JJ at 546. 
33 Ibid at 546 — 547. However, the majority judgment found that the lockout provisions were validly 
enacted under the conciliation and arbitration power, at 547-550. 
34 Ibid, at 545. 
35 Dalton and Groom, supra note 17 at 165, italics in original. 
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was unclear whether or not the ICESCR enactment of the right to strike extended to 
the scope of any right to strike implemented under the external affairs power. The 
limited terms of the ICESCR and absence of jurisprudential development of the 
content of the obligation could create uncertainty over the scope of a right to strike 
enacted as an expression of the Covenant in domestic law. The decision in Victoria v 
Commonwealth only indicates, at this point, that the ILO Conventions and the 
Constitution make no express statement of the right to strike. It does not indicate 
whether the Court would be prepared to accept the ILO interpretation of the principle 
of freedom of association as a sufficient basis for legislation guaranteeing a right to 
strike under the external affairs power. This may, in future, be a necessary question to 
answer. 
The Right to Strike and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
The passage of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 
(Cth) (WROLAA), was a retreat from the use of international obligations to provide a 
jurisdictional basis and legal imperative for the recognition of the right to strike, but 
not from enactment of the right itself. The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
(WRA) enshrines the right to strike through the protected action provisions, but the 
jurisdictional basis for the legislation is a range of powers including the conciliation 
and arbitration power, the corporations power, 36 and the trade and commerce power 37 
instead of the external affairs power. Ford has noted that: 
[t]he most striking difference from a constitutional point of view, between the 
WR Act and its predecessor, the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) is ..., the 
greatly reduced significance the statute accords the external affairs power. 38 
The main Constitutional head of power relied upon by the WRA is the Corporations 
power. However, evidence of a residual commitment to international labour standards 
remains, and Creighton notes that some provisions of the Act continue to derive their 
constitutionality from the external affairs power, particularly those provisions relating 
36  The Corporations Power - Section 51(xx) grants to the Commonwealth the power to make laws With 
respect to "foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth". 
37  The Trade and Commerce Power - Section 51(i) grants to the Commonwealth the power to make 
laws with respect to "trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States". 
38  W. J. Ford, 'Reconstructing Australian Labour Law: A Constitutional Perspective' (1997) 10 (1) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 1 at 2. 
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to unlawful termination of employment. 39 One of the principal objects of the WRA is 
to "assist in giving effect to Australia's international obligations in relation to labour 
standards".4° With respect to the right to strike, jurisdictional reliance has been 
completely shifted to the Corporations power, the conciliation and arbitration power 
and the trade and commerce power. The only reference remaining to international 
labour standards that could apply to the right to strike is the general object expressed 
in s 3(k). The WRA retains a modified protected action regime but s 334A was 
repealed. 
The importance of the change in jurisdictional reliance is not legal, as the right 
remains enacted and valid. Instead it is political and ideological. Under the Reform 
Act, recognition of the right to strike was explicitly and clearly linked to Australia's 
international obligations. The WROLAA retreated from this position, in line with the 
reluctance on the part of the Howard Coalition Government to look internationally for 
sources of legal norms. The WRA is inward focused, rejecting international 
instruments as a source of inspiration or obligation, and embracing a labour relations 
agenda unencumbered by legislative reliance upon international norms. The change 
may have significance for Australian compliance with international obligations. It 
may also be indicative of the attitude of the Australian Government to the importance 
of compliance as a goal for Australian labour law. 
The enactment of the right to strike within the WRA was considered by the Victorian 
Court of Appeal in National Workforce Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers 
Union.41 The case involved a dispute between a group of labour hire companies and 
three unions engaged in collective bargaining under the terms of the WRA. The 
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) undertook strike action in 
39 B. Creighton, 'The Workplace Relations Act in International Perspective' (1997) 10 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 31 at 33. See Schedule 10 - Convention Concerning Termination of 
Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, ILO, No. 158; and Schedule 12 - Convention Concerning 
Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family 
Responsibilities, ILO, No. 156. 40 wRA  s 3 provides that "the principal object of this Act is to provide a framework for cooperative 
workplace relations which promotes the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia by: 
(k) assisting in giving effect to Australia's international obligations in relation to labour standards". 
41 [1998] 3 V.R. 265. See V. Di Felice, 'Stopping or Preventing Industrial Action In Australia' (2000) 
12 Melbourne University Law Review 310; W. Friend, 'The Right to Strike' (1998) 23 Alternative Law 
Journal 95. 
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accordance with the protected industrial action provisions of the WRA. The other two 
unions attempted to engage in protected industrial action but failed to give the 
requisite statutory notice under s 170MI. 42 The labour hire companies applied to the 
Supreme Court of Victoria seeking injunctions against the three unions on the grounds 
that the unions were committing the tort of inducing breach of contract and argued 
that such injunctions were available as the unions were not engaging in protected 
strike action. With respect to the AMWU, the employers alleged that the statutory 
protection from liability had been removed by s 170MM because the AMWU had 
engaged in industrial action in concert with one or more persons or organizations that 
were not 'protected persons'. 43 
At first instance the case was heard by Harper J. 44 Harper J granted interlocutory 
injunctions against the two unions who had failed to give notice under s 170MI, 
holding that the failure meant that their strike action did not have protected status 
under the WRA. In considering whether or not to exercise his discretion to grant an 
injunction with respect to the AMWU, Harper J found that the only deviation the 
union had made from the protected action provisions was to call the strike in concert 
with two unions who had not given the requisite notice, and there was no evidence 
that the AMWU knew of this failure. 45 Harper J also considered the existence of a 
'right to strike' in Australian law. His honour noted that the right continues to have 
meaning in the context of the WRA, although "hedged about with qualifications", and 
that the right is recognised in international law. 46 His honour concluded, 
It [the right to strike] is also, I think, recognised as a fundamental element of 
industrial relations in Australia. In my opinion, I should not interfere with the 
right to strike in this case merely because the first defendant has acted in 
concert with other unions which did not give the notices which were required 
by the Act. 47 
42 WRA s 170MI(2) requires parties who wish to negotiate a relevant agreement to initiate a bargaining 
period by giving.written notice to the other party that begins 7 days after the day on which the notice 
was given (s 170MK). 
43 WRA s 170MM(1) - industrial action will not be protected action if it is engaged in in concert with 
one or more persons or organizations that are not protected persons. 
" National Workforce Pty Ltd and Others v Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union and Others 
(1997) 75 IR 200. 




Harper J relied upon recognition of the right to strike in international law, in the WRA 
and as a fundamental element of industrial relations in Australia as a ground for 
influencing the exercise of his discretion to grant an interlocutory injunction, and 
refused to grant the requested injunction against the AMWU. 
The labour hire companies appealed to the Victorian Court of Appeal." The court 
held that Harper J's exercise of discretion in refusing to grant an injunction had 
miscarried through the inclusion of a general right to strike as an influential factor. 
The majority stated that, "a right to strike is now generally recognised in the civilised 
world". However, the existence of "some generally recognised right to strike" apart 
from the WRA was irrelevant to the exercise of judicial discretion when the main 
precondition to the plaintiffs claim for an injunction was the failure of the AMWU to 
comply with the protected action provisions." The court concluded that "[c]omplaint 
about non-compliance with the statutory provisions is not well answered by 
considering what might have been, had the Act not intervened". 50 
The decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal, while not denying the existence of 
'some generally recognised right to strike', held that such a right is irrelevant because 
the WRA prescribes the preconditions for the exercise of the right to strike for parties 
bargaining under the federal system. The boundaries of the right to strike are entirely 
defined by the WRA and not by any residual general law right or international law. 
A Right to Strike in the Australian Constitution? 
The next question to consider is whether there is, or is the potential for, an entrenched 
right to strike in the Australian Constitution. 
The Constitution of Australia is not a rights based document. Rather it establishes the 
delineation of power within the Australian Federation and the system of government 
48 National Workforce Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers Union [1998] 3 V.R. 265 per 
Phillips, Charles and Batt B.A. 
49 Ibid at 275 — 276. 
50 nlid. 
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applying at the federal leve1. 51 The positive rights that are enacted are few and far 
between, and relate more to the federal nature of the Australian nation rather than to 
the enshrining of positive rights for citizens. 52 This, and the difficulties associated 
with amending the Constitution, have led to the express terms of the Constitution 
remaining a static blue print for Federation rather than a fluid basis for the protection 
of rights or freedoms. The development of Constitutional rights or freedoms has 
remained the exclusive domain of Constitutional interpretation by the High Court of 
Australia: 
[t]he year 1989 marked the point at which the High Court shifted from being a 
disinterested interpreter of constitutional rights to seeking to robustly construe 
such rights. The work of the Court today reflects this change, with the energy 
of its judges now focused on questions of rights rather than on its traditional 
case-load of Commonwealth powers and Australian federalism. 53 
The text of the Australian Constitution provides little scope for the constitutional 
protection of the right to strike. However, judgments by the 1990's 'reformist' Mason 
High Court have left open the possibility that the right could find Constitutional 
protection. 54 
The possibility for a Constitutionally protected right to strike comes from two 
decisions of the High Court made in 1992. Nationwide News Ply Ltd v Wills 
(Nationwide News) 55 and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 
(ACTV),56 held that the Constitution contains an implied freedom of political 
communication based upon the system of representative democracy enshrined within 
the Constitution, protecting communications necessary to facilitate representative 
democracy. 57 The decision in Nationwide News had a particularly industrial bent. At 
the time, provisions of the IR Act designed to protect the integrity of the AIRC made 
51 G. Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press: South 
Melbourne, 2002). See specifically chapter 2, 'Human Rights and the Drafting of the Australian 
Constitution' at 25 — 45. 
52 There are four main rights entrenched in the Australian Constitution: the free exercise of religion 
(s 116), non discrimination on the basis of residence in any State (s 117), the right not to be prevented 
from voting (s 41) and the right to jury trial for indictable offences (s 80). 
53 Williams, supra note 51 at 1. 
54 For discussion of the significant decisions made under the auspices of the Mason CJ High Court see 
P. Bailey, 'Righting the Constitution without a Bill of Rights' (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 1. 
55 (1992) 177 CLR 1. 
56 (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
57 For contemporary discussion of Nationwide News and ACTV see P. Creighton, 'The Implied 
Guarantee of Free Political Communication' (1993) 23 University of West Australia Law Review 163. 
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it an offence to use words likely to bring it or its members into disrepute, regardless of 
whether the commentary was true or false, or amounted to fair comment. 58 Four 
justices of the High Court (Brennan CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) found that 
the provisions were a valid enactment under the conciliation and arbitration power, 
but they infringed the implied Constitutional freedom of political communication and 
were unconstitutional. 
The finding of the existence of an implied freedom of political communication 
provides a basis for the possibility that there are further implied rights in the 
Constitution. Obiter dicta in ACTV suggested that the possibility of implied rights 
could extend further than the narrow freedom of political communication. In 
particular, Gaudron J expressly mentioned that protection of the system of 
representative democracy may extend to the implication of further freedoms, notably 
freedom of association, 
[t]he notion of a free society governed in accordance with the principles of 
representative parliamentary democracy may entail freedom of movement, 
freedom of association and, perhaps freedom of speech generally. 59 
Recognition by the High Court of an implied principle of freedom of association 
could, depending upon the interpretative approach taken to the implied principle, 
encompass a right to strike. 
The development of protective implied rights within the Constitution was enhanced 
by a series of High Court decisions in 1994 consolidating the freedom of political 
communication. The decisions in Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd 
(Theophanous), 6° Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (Stephens) 61 and 
Cunliffe v Commonwealth (Cunliffe)62 established a broad freedom of political 
communication on the basis that the "freedom of political communication was a 
necessary concomitant of a general principle of representative democracy or 
58 The section impugned was the then, Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), s 299(1)(d)(ii) which 
provided that it was an offence "by writing or speech [to] use words calculated to bring a member of 
the Commission or the Commission into disrepute". 
59 ACTV, supra note 56 per Gaudron J at 210, emphasis added. 
60 (1994) 182 CLR 104. 
61 (1994) 182 CLR 211. 
62 (1994) 182 CLR 272. 
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representative government which permeated, or was 'enshrined' in the 
Constitution". 63 
The holdings of the High Court in 1992 and 1994 led to speculation as to the 
possibility of the future development of implied rights. Kirk suggested that 
recognition by the High Court of the need to protect representative democracy could 
logically extend to the protection of other freedoms. 	his view: 
[t]he constitutional implications that can reasonably be based upon 
representative democracy are the following: freedom of political 
communication, freedom of,assembly for political purposes, freedom of 
association, freedom of movement.. 65 
Kirk acknowledged that a principle of freedom of association based upon the principle 
of representative democracy could theoretically be limited to freedom of political 
association but argued that such a restriction would not be consistent with the 
principle of representative democracy. A system of representative democracy requires 
communication to be free across a range of areas, including the social and 
economic. 66 
Another author to examine the potential of implied freedoms, particularly with respect 
to freedom of association and the right to strike, was Doyle. 67 Doyle asserted that the 
right to strike could be encompassed by the freedom of political communication, 
given that an artificial distinction between communication for political purposes and 
industrial purposes (whereby strikes constitute a form of communication) is spurious 
and unsupportable. 68 Doyle argued that communications and actions of an industrial 
nature also require protection within a system of representative democracy: 69 
[i]t is difficult to make a distinction between 'industrial' and 'political' 
communication. Secondly, even if the distinction were able to be made, it is 
63  M. Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant (Ashgate Publishing 
Company: Sydney, 2000) at 17; See also J. Kirk, 'Implications from Representative Democracy' 
(1995) 23 Federal Law Review 37. 
64 Kirk, supra note 63. 
65 Ibid at 75. 
Ibid at 56. 
67  R. Doyle, 'The Industrial/Political Dichotomy: The Impact of the Freedom of Communication on 
Industrial Law' (1995) 8 Australian Journal of Labour Law 91. 
68 Ibid at 96. 
Ibid at 97. 
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unclear why a democratic society grants protection to 'political' 
communication which is not afforded to 'industrial' communication. 70 
Despite these speculations, the 1994 decisions of the High Court turned out to be the 
"high watermark" of the implied freedom of political communication. 7I The issues 
were reconsidered by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (Lange) 72 and Levy v The State of Victoria and Ors (Levy), 73 where the 
court reformulated the principle of freedom of political communication and narrowed 
its potential scope. 74 
The Lange and Levy decisions retreated from the broad formulation of freedom of 
political communication predominant in the earlier judgments. They confirmed the 
existence of the right, but shifted away from an implied right based upon a general 
principle of representative democracy 'enshrined' within the Constitution and adopted 
a formalistic text based interpretation. Whereas the principle of representative 
democracy relied upon in the earlier cases had been a general principle supporting the 
text of the Constitution, the new approach anchored the freedom strictly within the 
text. Stone argues that: 
[i]n determining the scope of the freedom of political communication, it is 
now clear that the High Court will have regard to text and necessary structural 
implication, rather than a more generally defined concept of representative 
democracy. 75 
The scope of the freedom of political communication was narrowed and defined, 
according to Chesterman, to encompass "communication on government or political 
matters which are or might be relevant to the making of informed decisions about 
voting in elections of members of the Commonwealth Parliament and in referenda to 
amend the Constitution". 76 This approach is significantly more restrictive than the 
previous general principle of representative democracy, leaving far less opportunity 
for expansive interpretation. The broader principle under the earlier decisions could 
7° Ibid at 96. 
71  A. Stone, 'Case Note: Lange, Levy and the Direction of the Freedom of Political Communication 
under the Australian Constitution' (1998) 21 University of New South Wales Law Journal 117 at 117. 
72  (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
73  (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
74 Ibid at 118. 
75 Stone, supra note 71 at 133. 
76 Chesterman, supra note 63 at 18. 
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have been expanded to support freedom of association and perhaps a right to strike. 
Given the absence of constitutional text on which to base such an expansion of the 
principle in future, it would seem that the Lange and Levy decisions have spelled an 
end, at least for the time being, of this possibility. 
The current composition of the High Court militates against the possibility of further 
expansion of the principle of freedom of political communication. Both the Lange and 
Levy determinations were unanimous judgments, in line with a general retreat from a 
reformist agenda. It remains to be seen whether a future High Court will revisit the 
implied freedom and reinstate the wider earlier principle, however it is unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. 
A final point to note is that even if the approach of the High Court were to alter in 
favour Of less formalism, it is questionable whether the right to strike could ever be 
protected by the Constitution as it stands. Such a development would require either 
recognition of strike action as a political communication covered by the existing 
freedom, or recognition of an implied right to associate. Were an implied right to 
associate recognised by a future High Court, to include the right to strike it would 
need to be a functional right of association, encompassing collective activities and not 
an individualist libertarian conception of freedom of association. The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a pertinent example. The inclusion of an express 
principle of freedom of association in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
did not lead to the recognition of the right to strike. The Canadian Supreme Court 
adopted a libertarian individualist approach to interpretation that excluded protection 
of a right to strike. 77 Any future enshrining of the principle of freedom of association 
or recognition of an implied freedom of association in Australia might face the same 
limitations. 
77 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act [1987] 1 SCR 313 (Alberta Reference Case); 
Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada [1987] 1 SCR 424 (Public Service Alliance Case); Retail, 
Wholesale and Department Store Union v Saskatchewan [1987] 1 SCR 460 (Saskatchewan Dairy 
Workers Case); For further discussion see chapter 1 at 36-38. 
151 
The Impact of International Instruments in Domestic Law 
This chapter has surveyed the possible domestic sources of an obligation to 
implement a right to strike. The remaining area to canvass is the obligation created 
under Australian law (if any) by the ratification of international instruments relating to 
the right to strike. Australia has made an international commitment to implement a 
right to strike. The discussion will now turn to the precise effect of that commitment 
in domestic legal terms. 
Australia operates as a dualist system whereby a ratified international instrument does 
not apply automatically in domestic law. The executive arm of the federal government 
has the power under s 61 of the Constitution to enter into international instruments. 
Ratification provides the Commonwealth Parliament with the power to implement 
relevant legislation under the external affairs power of the Constitution. The High 
Court confirmed this in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (Teoh): 78 
[i]t is well established that the provisions of an international treaty to which 
Australia is a party do not form part of Australian law unless those provisions 
have been validly incorporated by statute. This principle has its foundation in 
the proposition that in our constitutional system the making and ratification of 
treaties fall within the province of the Executive in the exercise of its 
prerogative power whereas the making and the alteration of the law falls 
within the province of parliament, not the Executive. 79 
Despite this lack of direct domestic effect, High Court jurisprudence has indicated 
that ratified instruments may have an indirect effect in three different areas, through 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations; through the interpretation of statutes; and 
through the development of the common law. Each of these will now be addressed in 
turn. 
The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations 
In Teoh the High Court held that the ratification of an instrument in international law 
creates a 'legitimate expectation'. 8° The application of this principle to the domestic 
78  (1995) 128 ALR 353. 
79 Ibid at 361-362. 
80 Teoh, supra note 78 per Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 362. For discussion of the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations and the decision in Teoh see A. Abadee, 'Keeping Government 
Accountable for its Promises: The Role of Administrative Law' (1998) 5 Australian Journal of 
Administrative Law 191; M. Allars, 'International Law and Administrative Discretion' in B. Opeslcin 
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ratification of Treaties and Conventions was explored by Mason CJ and Deane J in 
their joint judgment: 
[R]atification by Australia of an international convention is not to be 
dismissed as a merely platitudinous or ineffectual act ... Rather, ratification of 
a convention is a positive statement by the executive government of this 
country to the world and to the Australian people that the executive 
government and its agencies will act in accordance with the Convention. That 
positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation, 
absent statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that administrative 
decision-makers will act in conformity with the Convention ... It is not 
necessary that the person seeking to set up such a legitimate expectation 
should be aware of the Convention or should personally entertain the 
expectation; it is enough that the expectation is reasonable in the sense that 
there are adequate materials to support it. 81 
The doctrine of 'legitimate expectations' is an administrative law principle that the 
publication of a policy or a representation concerning the process of administrative 
decision making by the Government creates a legitimate expectation that the policy or 
representation will be followed. 82 Where an administrative decision-maker makes a 
decision which is inconsistent with a legitimate expectation, then persons affected by 
the decision should be given notice and an opportunity to present a case against the 
taking of such a course. 83 The right .granted is a procedural right, a right to be heard 
where a decision would deviate from a legitimate expectation, and not a substantive 
right or remedy relating to the decision. 
Di Felice argues that the decision in Teoh applies to the application of discretion in 
decision-making by members of the AIRC in the context of s 127 orders that 
industrial action cease or not occur." Di Felice argues that the objects of the WRA 
which encompass both freedom of association and giving effect to Australia's 
international obligations, 85 may create a legitimate expectation with respect to AIRC 
decision-making and particularly the discretion under s 127. 86 
and D. Rothwell, (eds.) International Law and Australian Federalism (Melbourne University Press: 
Melbourne, 1997), 232; W. Lacey, 'In the Wake of Teoh: Finding an Appropriate Government 
Response' (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 221; A. Twomey, 'Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Teoh' (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 348. 
81 Teoh, supra note 78 at 365 per Mason CJ and Deane J (Gaudron J in agreement). 
82 Twomey, supra note 80. 
83 Lacey supra note 80 at 223. 
84 Di Felice, supra note 41 at 346. 
85 WRA s 3(1). 
86 Ibid at 347-348. 
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Teoh is important in the context of the right to strike because the ratification of the 
ICESCR and ILO Conventions gives . rise to a legitimate expectation in administrative 
decision-making. If Di Felice is correct, Australian ratification of the ICESCR and 
Convention 87 and 98 creates a legitimate expectation that the AIRC will exercise its 
decision-making function in accordance with the Conventions. With respect to the 
ILO Conventions, if the approaches of the CFA and CEACR are adopted, then this 
would include the right to strike. However, the impact of the doctrine is limited in 
practice. The AIRC would only have to take the Conventions into account in the 
exercise of their s 127 discretion and would be able to refer to the protected action 
regime as a positive enactment of the obligations contained under the Conventions. 
A further complicating factor is that successive governments have sought to reverse 
the decision in Teoh through the release of 'executive statements' that the ratification 
of international instruments does not give rise to legitimate expectations. There have 
also been three Bills introduced into Parliament that have sought to reverse the effect 
of Teoh, all of which have lapsed. 87 
Interpretation of Statutes 
A second indirect effect of ratification relates to the interpretation of statutes. 
According to Walker, the decision of Mason CJ and Deane J (with the agreement of 
Gaudron J) in Teoh indicated that where a Treaty or Convention is referred to in 
legislation; the Treaty might be used as an aid to interpretation of the statute. 88 If no 
Treaty or Convention is mentioned, the court may refer to a Treaty that was ratified 
prior to the enactment of the statute in order to clarify any ambiguity within the 
provisions of the Act. 89 Walker argues that this approach reflects a presumption of 
interpretation that Parliament intends to give effect to Australia's international 
87 Allars, supra note 80 at 235-237; Lacey, supra note 80. The Bills were: Administrative Decisions 
(Effect of International Instruments) Bill 1995 (Cth); Administrative Decisions (Effect of International 
Instruments) Bill 1997 (Cth); Administrative Decisions (Effect of International Instruments) Bill 1999 
(Cth). 
88 K Walker, 'Treaties and the Internationalisation of Australian Law' in C. Saunders, (ed.) Courts of 
Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (Federation Press: Annandale, 1996), 204. 
89 Ibid at 211. See also the decision of Brennan and Dawson JJ in Lim v Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 38. 
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obligations. 90 While the WRA does not specifically seek to give effect to international 
Treaties and Conventions with respect to the right to strike, one of the stated objects 
of the Act is to assist in giving effect to Australia's international obligations in 
relation to labour standards. 91 If the approach suggested by Walker were to be adopted 
by the High Court, ambiguity with respect to provisions relating to the right to strike 
(protected action provisions) could be resolved in the light of ratified ILO 
Conventions. However, the recent High Court decision in Electrolux Home Products 
Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union (Electrolux) 92 suggests that this approach has 
not been adopted by the current High Court. In Electrolux, ambiguities of 
interpretation with respect to immunities granted to strike action under the WRA were 
given a literal text based interpretation without any reference to international 
standards on the right to strike. 
Development of the Common law 
The third indirect effect relates to the development of the common law. Referring to • 
the decisions of the High Court in Mabo (No. 2), 93 Dietrich v R94 and Teoh, Walker 
asserts that the use of international conventions in the development of the common 
law is well accepted by a majority of the High Court. 95 International treaties and 
Conventions may be used as an aid to the development of the common law in 
circumstances where there is a need to resolve ambiguity, uncertainty or lacunae. 96 
However, Walker is unsure whether an international treaty or convention would be 
sufficient, on its own, to justify a change in the common law.97 
Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed potential sources of an enforceable obligation under 
Australian law to implement a right to strike. Beginning with the enactment of a right 
to strike by the Reform Act, moving through the WRA, the Australian Constitution 
90 Walker, supra note 88 at 211. 
91 WRA s 3(1). 
92 [2004] HCA 40, 2 September, 2004, unreported judgment. 
93 (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
94 (1992) 177 CLR 292. 




and international obligations, the chapter has considered whether there is any explicit 
or implicit mechanism creating an obligation. 
The lR Act (as amended) and the WRA represent limited legislative enactments of the 
right to strike, but neither constitutes a source of binding obligation. Such Acts can be 
repealed at the will of the Commonwealth Parliament. In this respect, the right to 
strike has no more claims to permanence, or to an independent existence, than any 
other right in Australia that is not Constitutionally entrenched. With respect to the 
Australian Constitution, the chapter demonstrated that as presently interpreted there is 
no scope for mandating recognition of a right to strike. Ratified international 
instruments may have indirect effect on the development of the common law, judicial 
interpretation of statutes and under the administrative law doctrine of legitimate 
expectations. However, the dualist nature of treaty implementation in Australia means 
that the Commonwealth Parliament is under no direct domestic mandate to implement 
the terms of such instruments. 
Where does this leave the right to strike in domestic law? The only clear conclusion is 
that Australian workers do not possess a right to strike that is enforceable beyond the 
limits of any right enacted within legislation. At present there is no constitutionally 
entrenched right that may be called upon and international law only has indirect 
domestic effects. As to the future, there are two avenues through which an obligation 
to respect a right to strike may develop. These avenues are the Constitutional freedom 
of political communication and the development of a general law right to strike. 
With respect to the implied freedom of political communication, the potential exists 
for a future High Court to depart from the literalist textual interpretation of the 
Constitution. If this occurred there is scope for the development of a right to strike 
under an implicit protection of freedom of association. However, if the freedom of 
political communication extended to freedom of association, the implied freedom 
could be limited by an individualist interpretation of the freedom excluding the right 
to strike. Further any concomitant freedom of association could constitute a freedom 
of political association rather than industrial association, thus limiting the potential 
scope of the freedom. The development of a constitutionally entrenched right would 
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represent the most effective option, but it is also extremely unlikely given the political 
and legal factors discussed in this chapter. 
The second possible avenue relates to the decision in National Workforce which 
suggested that in Australia there may exist some 'generally recognised right to strike.' 
However, the court did not articulate the source or content of the right and noted that 
any such right has been entirely abrogated by the WRA in the federal regime. It could 
be argued that scope exists for the development of a 'generally recognised right to 
strike' under the common law, in areas in which the WRA does not cover. For 
example, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the law of picketing does not fall 
within the definition of industrial action under the WRA, and remains almost entirely 
within the purview of the common law and other relevant legislation. The future legal 
development of picketing could be affected by this 'generally recognised right to 
strike.' However, this option would not produce a strong right to strike given the 




The Regulation of Industrial Action in Australia 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter conclusively demonstrated the absence of a constitutionally or 
otherwise entrenched right to strike in Australian law. Consequently, Australian 
workers do not possess a right to strike enforceable beyond the limits of any right 
enacted within a legislative regime. This chapter will explore the existing regulation 
of strike law in Australia, providing the substantive basis upon which the assessment 
• of compliance with international law will be undertaken. The discussion will begin 
with the underlying common law position of strike action in Australia, illustrating the 
legal consequences that may attach to strike action that is unprotected by legislation. 
Industrial Action and the Common Law 
At common law, it is generally correct to state that strike action will constitute a 
repudiatory breach of contract by the employee. This provides the basis in law for the 
employer to terminate the employment contract in response to the repudiation. This 
proposition is the foundation of all substantive common law doctrines relating to 
strike action. 
Strike as a Breach of the Employment Contract 
There is no special provision or latitude in the law of contract for strike action; it is 
approached through the application of the rules of contract law.' An employee owes a 
duty to obey the lawful and reasonable commands of an employer. 2 Failure to obey 
such commands will generally constitute a repudiatory breach of contract by the 
employee: lais a general rule it can be safely said that the participation by workers in 
M. Vranken, 'Strike and the Individual Employment Contract: The New Zealand Case' (1989) 19 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 249 at 253. 
2 R v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Company (1938) 60 CLR 601; Laws v London 
Chronicle [1959] 1 WLR 698 per Evershed L at 700: "It is, no doubt, generally true that wilful 
disobedience of an order will justify summary dismissal, since wilful disobedience of a lawful and 
reasonable order shows a disregard — a complete disregard — of a condition essential to the contract of 
service, namely, the condition that the servant must obey the proper orders of the master, and that 
unless he does so the relationship is, so to speak, struck at fundamentally." 
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a strike or other industrial action will be regarded as a breach of contract by those 
concerned". 3 
The English common law position with respect to strike action and breach of contract 
has been authoritatively determined. In the English case of Morgan v Fry,' Lord 
Denning had asserted: 
The truth is that neither employer nor workman wish to take the drastic action 
of termination if this can be avoided. The men do not wish to leave their work 
forever. The employers do not wish to scatter their labour force to the four 
winds. Each side is, therefore, content to accept a 'strike notice' of proper 
length as lawful. It is an implication read into the contract by the modern law 
as to trade disputes. If a strike takes place, the contract of employment is not 
terminated. It is suspended during the strike; and revives again when the strike 
is over.' 
This 'suspension' theory was rejected in the subsequent House of Lords judgment 
Miles v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council (Miles), 6 where Lord Templeman 
reasserted the traditional common law position: 
[a]ny form of industrial action undertaken by a worker is a breach of contract 
which entitled the employer at common law to dismiss the worker because no 
employer is contractually bound to retain a worker who is intentionally 
causing harm to the employer's business.' 
The decision in Miles was approved in Australia in Ansett (Operations) v Australian 
Federation of Air Pilots (Ansett) 8 where Brooking J rejected propositions put to the 
court that strike action acted as suspension of the contract of employment rather than 
repudiatory breach of contract. Earlier decisions of Australian courts and tribunals had 
been more cautious with respect to the effect of strike action on the common law 
employment contract. In an early decision Griffith CJ indicated that strike action on 
the part of an employee does not evidence an intention to bring the contract of 
employment to an end sufficient to demonstrate repudiatory conduct.' Further, 
Macken J sitting on the NSW Industrial Relations Commission in 1987 rejected the 
argument that strike action gives rise to an automatic right to summarily dismiss an 
3  K. D. Ewing, 'The Right to Strike in Australia' (1989) 2 Australian Journal of Labour Law 18 at 18. 
4 [1969] 2 QB 710. 
5 Ibid per Denning L at 728. 
6 [1987] 2 WLR 795. 
7 Ibid per Templeman L at 1097. 
8 [1991] 1 VR 637. 
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employee.' However, the decision in Ansett is the most recent and authoritative case 
on this point. It suggests that despite judicial resistance to the notion that strike action 
always constitutes repudiatory breach, this appears to be the current position under the 
common law." 
In practical terms, the effect of the common law is that all forms of strike action by an 
employee will constitute repudiation of contract. Creighton and Stewart note that even 
'work to rule' campaigns where parties perform their contracts to the letter can 
constitute repudiation where it represents a failure to cooperate.' 
In recognition of the harsh application of this rule in practice, commentators have 
suggested that a strike should operate to suspend a contract of employment, 
enlivening the contract at the end of the action.' This concept of contractual 
'suspension' reflected in the decision of Lord Denning in Morgan v Fry, has been 
adopted in many civil law countries in Europe but has not found favour within 
common law jurisdictions.' 
A final point to note in the context of strike as breach of contract is the impact of 
unfair dismissal legislation. The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRA) provides 
an avenue for employees to request reinstatement where a dismissal has occurred in 
9 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex Pane BHP Co Ltd (1909) 8 CLR 419. 
I° Re Federated Storemen and Packers Union of Australia, NSW Branch (1987) 22 IR 198. 
I I For discussion of strike action as repudiatory breach of contract and the Australian case law on this 
matter see B. Creighton and A. Stewart, Labour Law: An Introduction (3rd ed., Federation Press: 
Sydney, 2000) at 399 — 400; Ewing, supra note 3; K. D. Ewing, The Right to Strike (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1991) at 5 —9; M. J. Pittard and R. B. Naughton, Australian Labour Law: Cases and Materials 
(4 th ed., Butterworths: Cbatswood, 2003) at 300 — 302. 
2 Creighton and Stewart, supra note 11 at 395 citing the English case of Secretary of State for 
Emfrloyment v Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (No 2) [1972] 2 QB 455 
where a work to rule campaign was held to be a breach of the contractual duty of cooperation. 
13  See for example, P. Elias, 'The Strike and Breach of Contract: A Reassesment' in K. Ewing, C. 
Gerty and B. Hepple, (eds.) Human Rights and Labour Law: Essays for Paul O'Higgins (Mansell 
Publishing Limited: London, 1994), 257; Ewing, supra note 3; Vranken, supra note 1. 
14 A. Jacobs, 'The Law of Strikes and Lockouts' in R. Blanpain and C. Engels, (eds.) Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies, (7th ed., Kluwer Law 
International: The Hague, 2001), 585. For discussion of strike as a breach of contract as opposed to 
strike as a suspension of contract see R. Ben-Israel, 'Introduction to Strikes and Lock-outs: a 
Comparative Perspective' in R. Blanpain and R. Ben-Israel, (eds.) Strikes and Lock-Outs in 
Industrialised Market Economies (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1994), 1 at 19— 23; 
Elias, supra note 13 at 257. 
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accordance with the common law but is considered to be unfair.' Significantly the 
availability of this legislative remedy does not affect the common law position. This is 
important because the fact that the act of strike is a breach of contract at common law 
provides the element of unlawfulness necessary for many of the potential actions that 
may be brought against strikers under the common law industrial torts." 
No work — No pay 
The employment relationship between an employer and employee rests upon the 
simple formula of work for wages, whereby the employee provides work and in return 
the employer provides wages. Wages cannot be earned without concomitant service." 
As industrial action usually entails work stoppage, the failure of employees to 
perform work will result in the loss of the right to wages with no general entitlement 
to proportional payment for partial performance unless the employer can be shown to 
have accepted the part performance." 
There is no general provision under the common law to stand down or suspend an 
employee without pay for the pursuit of industrial outcomes.' 9 If the employer has no 
work for the employee to perform, they must either terminate the employment 
contract or pay the employee. At common law, in the absence of express contractual, 
15 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRA) Part VIA, Division 3. The application of Division 3 is 
limited, and certain classes of employee are excluded from the application of the provisions. 
16 The industrial torts are discussed below at page 164. 
17 Automatic Fire Sprinklers v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 per Dixon J at 465: "The common 
understanding of a contract of employment at wages or salary periodically payable is that it is the 
service that earns the remuneration and even a wrongful discharge from service means that the wages 
or salary cannot be earned however ready and willing the employee may be to serve and however much 
he stand by his contract and decline to treat it as discharged by the breach." This point was affirmed by 
the High Court in Byrne v Australian Airlines (1995)131 ALR 422 per Brennan CJ, Dawson and 
Toohey JJ, at 432: "Of course, even if an employee who is wrongfully dismissed chooses to keep the 
contract of employment on foot, he or she cannot claim remuneration in respect of any period after the 
wrongful dismissal because the right to receive remuneration for services is dependent upon the 
services having been rendered." For discussion of the pre Byrne debate see G. McCarry, 'No work, No 
pay' (1983) 57 Australian Law Journal 378; G McCarry, 'No work, No pay: A Replication to Shaw 
QC and McClelland' (1987) 3 Australian Bar Review 174; J. W. Shaw and R. McClelland, 'Selective 
Work Bans: No Work, No Pay Revisited' (1986) 2 Australian Bar Review 250. 
18 Australian National Airlines Commission v Robinson [1977] VR 87; Csomore v Public Service 
Board (NSW) (1986) 17 IR 275. 
19 Hanley v Pease and Partners Ltd [1915] 1 KB 698; Devonald v Rosser and Sons [1906] 2 KB 728; 
Re Application by Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia (1979) 41 FLR 192, per Sweeney J 
at 194: "There [is] no existing right in the employer to deduct payment in the circumstances set out 
(strike, lack of employment availability etc) at common law". For discussion see R. McCallum, 
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statutory, award or industrial agreement clauses to the contrary, an employer remains 
liable for wages so long as the employee remains ready willing and able to perform 
the contract. 2° 
Criminal Liability 
Criminal liability for strike action is an historical anachronism, which persists only in 
so far as relevant laws remain on the statute books. As Sykes notes, criminal liability 
for strike action and the legislation from which it developed, "belong to a past era of 
development and have contributed little to the modern legal situation". 21 In Australia, 
there are only two forms of residual criminal liability, the Commonwealth Crimes Act 
1914" and the possible criminal liability that may attach to picketing action in some 
jurisdictions. 
Strike action that involves picketing is particularly disruptive of the business of the 
relevant employer and may be disruptive to other users of the target business. The act 
of picketing itself has historically been criminally actionable under the crime of 
watching and besetting, although State criminal legislation generally provides an 
exception for picketing involving the peaceful communication of information.' As a 
strike tactic that involves the use of public space and potential public disruption, 
strikers engaged in picketing action may also be left open to a range of potential 
liability for public order offences including traffic or breaching the peace offences.' 
'Exploring the Common Law: Lay-Off, Suspension and the Contract of Employment' (1989) 2 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 211. 
20  For examples of the interaction of the common law with award clauses enabling the withholding of 
payment in certain circumstances see Gapes v Commercial Bank of Australia (1980) 37 ALR 20; 
Welbourn v Australian Postal Commission [1984] VR 257. 
21 E. I. Sykes, Strike Law in Australia (2nd ed., Law Book Company: Sydney, 1982) at 101. 
22 For further discussion of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) see below at 223-224. 
23  For discussion of the crime of watching and besetting and the informational or `persuasional' 
picketing exception see B. Creighton, W. Ford and R. Mitchell, Labour Law: Materials and 
Commentary (2nd ed., Law Book Company: Sydney, 1993) at 1264-1266; Sykes, supra note 21 at 132- 
151. 
24 See for example Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia and 
Others [1986] VR 383; R v Commissioner of Police (Tas), Ex Parte North Broken Hill Ltd (Trading as 
Associated Pulp and Paper Mills and APPM (1992) 1 Tas R 99; 44 IR 214. For discussion of this 
decision see M. Otlowslci, 'The Legal Fallout from the APPM Dispute (1992) 5 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 287. 
163 
Industrial Torts 
The term 'industrial torts' refers to a group of tortious actions that can be used against 
a trade union or employees in the context of strike action. The torts have been - 
adequately canvassed in the literature in this area, so it is not necessary to explore 
them in detail.' For the purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to understand that 
the industrial torts create potential tortious outcomes where actions taken by persons 
in combination with other persons involve an unlawful act. The unlawful act is 
usually furnished through the breach of contract occasioned by a strike. For example, 
the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means applies where two or more people acting in 
combination deliberately inflict loss on the plaintiff through an independently 
unlawful act. 26 One act that will furnish the unlawful element is the breach of the 
employees' contract resulting from employee strike action. 27 Another industrial tort 
targeting trade unions is the tort of interference with contractual relations. It will be a 
tort to knowingly and intentionally interfere with the plaintiffs contractual relations 
where that would cause damage to the plaintiff.' When a trade union calls a strike, it 
is knowingly and intentionally interfering in the target employers' employment 
contracts. 
The danger in the industrial torts for trade unions and employees lies in the ability of 
employers to utilise the torts to obtain interlocutory injunctions, final injunctions and 
compensation for losses suffered during the course of a strike. First, an employer may 
obtain an interlocutory injunction without establishing the tort itself, merely that there 
25 See Creighton, Ford and Mitchell, supra note 23 at chapter 34; Creighton and Stewart, supra note 11 
at 403 — 411; Pittard and Naughton, supra note 11 at chapter 17; Sykes, supra note 21 at chapter 8. For 
recent coverage of the development of the industrial torts in Britain see G. S. Morris and T. J. Archer, 
Collective Labour Law (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2000) at 389 — 434. 
26 See for example Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30; Ansett Transport Industries v Australian 
Federation of Air Pilots (1989) 95 ALR 211; Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores No 1 
Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 602. For specific discussion of the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means see 
M. Otlowski, 'The Demise of Conspiracy by Unlawful Means? Future Directions for Australia' (1989) 
2 Australian Journal of Labour Law 107. 
27 As discussed in Creighton, Ford and Mitchell, supra note 23 at 1181 — 1189, the 'unlawful' element 
in this tort may be furnished by a breach of statute, a common law illegality or a breach of contract. 
28 The earliest recognition of this tort was in the case of Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216 in a non 
industrial context. However, the tort was soon adapted to the industrial context, see: Thomson v Deakin 
[1952] Ch. 646. Recent Australian cases where commission of the tort has been argued include Dollar 
Sweets, supra note 24; Ansett supra note 26; Building Workers Industrial Union of Australia v Odco 
(1991) 29 FCR 104 (the Troubleshooters Case). 
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is a serious question to be answered and the balance of convenience favours the grant 
of an injunction.' Such an injunction will usually cause strike action to cease 
immediately. Second, if the trade union disobeys the injunction it may face significant 
fines for contempt of court." Third, if the matter proceeds to trial on the tortious 
action for a final injunction, the employees or trade union concerned could also be 
pursued for the loss suffered by the employer and possibly others who deal with the 
employer through the commission of the relevant tort.' The loss suffered will often 
be greatest where the strike is most successful, as after all, the point of the strike is to 
inflict damage. 
This discussion has briefly canvassed the underlying common law and criminal law 
position of industrial action in Australia and will now examine the legislation that 
affects the common law position. However, it is important to note that where 
protection for industrial action from the common law is not granted by statute, 
liability under breach of contract and the industrial torts remains a distinct possibility. 
The essential point is that industrial action will almost always constitute a breach Of 
contract constituting repudiation, and this unlawfulness will found liability for 
damages or injunctive relief in a number of tortious actions for damage inflicted by 
strike action. 
29 American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396. 
30  An example of the attitude of the court to industrial action undertaken in breach of injunctive relief is 
found in: Australian Industrial Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union of Australia and Ors (2001) 188 ALR 653 per Merkel J at 658, "The failure by all 
persons interested to seek to enforce the penalty order punishing Mr Johnston for his wilful contempt 
of court had the potential to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. That is especially so in 
view of Mr Johnston's continuing wilful and public defiance of the order." 
31 For example in Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and 
Kindred Industries Union [2000] FCA 708 (29 May 2000), the Federal Court imposed individual fines 
of $20,000 each on two union officials who acted in breach of an injunction and were found to be in 
contempt of court. The Court in Ansett, supra note 26 found that the Australian Federation of Airline 
Pilots had committed the torts of interference with contractual relations (between airline pilots and 
employers; between employers and their contractors), actual inducement of breach of contract, 
interference with trade or business by unlawful means and civil conspiracy by unlawful means. The 
damages awarded were $6.5 million, although they were not actually paid out. For discussion see K. 
McEvoy and R. Owens, 'The Flight of Icarus: Legal Aspects of the Pilots Dispute'(1990) 3 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 87. 
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The Regulation of Industrial Action under the WRA 
Introduction — A Coherent Ideological Foundation? 
The federal labour law system regulated by the WRA is neither conciliation and 
arbitration nor collective bargaining. Rather, it is a uniquely Australian hybrid, 
embracing elements from each system. Within this model, the role of industrial action 
is ambiguous. At best, the model embodies an ideological commitment to the role and 
importance of strike action in a collective bargaining regime. At worst, the continued 
inclusion of the right to strike within the model was a pragmatic political concession, 
included to ensure the passage of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) (WROLAA) through the Australian Senate.' 
The discussion will now canvass the regulation of industrial action within the WRA in 
order to provide a succinct statement of the law to date, and to seek to ascertain 
whether the right to take strike action within the WRA proceeds from a coherent and 
rational foundation. The passage of the WROLAA may have been intended to 
embody a coherent vision for collective bargaining and strike action, but the 
compromise in the Senate, the continued presence of pre-existing provisions of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) and subsequent amending legislation have meant 
that industrial relations regulation continues to be haphazard rather representative of a 
vision for the regulation of strike action. 
The WROLAA sought to implement a system of both individual and collective 
bargaining supported by strike action. It is appropriate to assess that model in the 
context of a normative system of voluntary collective bargaining, based upon the 
model expounded within ILO principles. Consequently, this chapter and the next will 
provide an outline of the Australian bargaining model and the right to take protected 
industrial action, endeavouring to find a coherent ideological basis for the regulation 
of strike action within that system. This will establish a legal framework for the 
assessment of compliance of Australian law to be undertaken in chapter 8. 
32 See Agreement between the Commonwealth Government and the Australian Democrats on the 
Workplace Relations Bill, released October 1996. For discussion of the agreement see M. Pittard, 
'Collective Employment Relationships: Reforms to Arbitrated Awards and Certified Agreements' 
(1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 62 at 63- 64. 
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In addition to outlining the present law, where appropriate, relevant Bills introduced 
into the Commonwealth Parliament to amend the WRA will be canvassed. Beginning 
with the omnibus Workplace Relations (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill (Cth) in 1999, 
and then smaller, single issue Bills, there have been numerous unsuccessful attempts 
to amend the WRA." These Bills illustrate the diverse ideological and structural 
difficulties in attempting to distil an overarching approach to strike action within the 
bargaining model. Further, they offer insight into likely future changes to the Act 
given the prevailing political climate." 
The WRA Model of Voluntary Collective Bargaining 
The federal bargaining model enables parties to bargain over terms and conditions of 
employment, with particular focus on agreements entered into at the workplace or 
enterprise level. The fundamental tenets of the model are expressed in the principal 
objects of the WRA, and emphasise the centrality of enterprise level bargaining and 
the role of arbitration in maintaining a 'safety net' of employment conditions." 
However, the objects offer no insight into the role or ideological foundation of strike 
action within the mo. del. 
Definition of Industrial Action under the WRA 
Section 4 defines "industrial action", for the purposes of the WRA (with the exception 
of Part XA). 36 
Industrial action (except in Part XA) means: 
33 For an overview of the changes that were proposed in the Workplace Relations (More Jobs, Better 
Pay) Bill 1999 (Cth) see C. Jones, 'Second Wave Assault on Unprotected Industrial Action' (1999) 5 
Employment Law Bulletin 35; M. Pittard, 'Change Upon Change: More Second Wave IR Reforms' 
(1999) 5 Employment Law Bulletin 53. 
34 The Coalition Government has held office in Australia since 1996 and was re-elected for .a fourth 
consecutive term on Saturday October 9, 2004. 
35 The principal object of the WRA expressed in s 3 is to "provide a framework for cooperative 
workplace relations, which promotes the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia". 
Section 3(b) provides that it is an object of the WRA to ensure the means: 
(i) for wages and conditions of employment to be determined as far as possible by the 
agreement of employers and employees at the workplace or enterprise level, upon a 
foundation of minimum standards; and 
(ii) to ensure the maintenance of an effective award safety net of fair and enforceable 
minimum wages and conditions of employment. 
36 Section 298B, Part XA, Freedom of Association, contains a similar definition applicable for the 
purposes of Part XA. 
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(a) 	the performance of work in a manner different from that in which it 
is customarily performed, or the adoption of a practice in relation to work, 
the result of which is a restriction or limitation on, or a delay in, the 
performance of the work, where: 
the terms and conditions of the work are prescribed, 
wholly or partly, by an award or an order of the 
Commission, by a certified agreement or AWA, by an 
award, determination or order made by another tribunal 
under a law of the Commonwealth or otherwise by or under 
a law of the Commonwealth; or 
(ii) 	the work is performed, or the practice is adopted, in 
connection with an industrial dispute; 
(b) 
	a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work, or on 
acceptance of or offering for work, in accordance with the terms and 
conditions prescribed by an award or an order of the Commission, by a 
certified agreement or AWA, by an award, determination or order made by 
another tribunal under a law of the Commonwealth or otherwise by or 
under a law of the Commonwealth; 
(c) 	a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work, or on 
acceptance of or offering for work, that is adopted in connection with an 
industrial dispute; or 
(d) 	a failure or refusal by persons to attend for work or a failure or refusal 
to perform any work at all by persons who attend for work, if 
(i) the persons are members of an organization and the 
failure or refusal is in accordance with a decision made, or 
direction given, by an organization, the committee of 
management of the organization, or an officer or a group of 
members of the organization acting in that capacity; or 
(ii) the failure or refusal is in connection with an industrial 
dispute; or 
(iii) the persons are employed by the Commonwealth or a 
constitutional corporation; or 
(iv) the persons are employed in a Territory; 
but does not include: 
(e) 	action by employees that is authorised or agreed to by the employer of 
the employees; or 
(f) 	action by an employer that is authorised or agreed to by or on behalf of 
employees of the employer; or 
(g) 




	the action was based on a reasonable concern by the employee 
about an imminent risk to his or her health or safety; an • 
(ii) 	the employee did not unreasonably fail to comply with a 
direction of his or her employer to perform other available work, 
whether at the same or another workplace, that was safe and 
appropriate for the employee to perform. 
This definition covers a wide range of possible industrial activities. In addition to total 
work stoppage, the definition is capable of covering work bans, go slows, rolling 
stoppages and work to rule. Further, it is capable of encompassing individual 
industrial action. However, there is no obvious section that covers picketing. This is 
significant because if picketing is not covered by the definition, picketing cannot be 
considered to be industrial action for the purposes of accessing the protection from 
liability available under the protected action provisions. Therefore, where parties 
operate a picket in the context of otherwise protected industrial action they could be 
exposed to common law liability. 
The Federal Court examined this issue in the case of Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v 
National Union of Workers.' It was argued before the court that paragraph (c) of the 
definition of industrial action: "a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of 
work, or on acceptance of or offering for work, that is adopted in connection with an 
industrial dispute" is capable of encompassing picketing whereby those involved in 
the picket are imposing a ban, restriction or limitation on the performance of their 
own work. The court noted that the suggested construction was open on the literal text 
of the section, however policy considerations dictated against the interpretation.' The 
majority held that peaceful picketing does not involve a ban, limitation or restriction 
on the performance of work in connection with an industrial dispute: 
[a]ctivity that merely involves communication of information to persons 
entering or leaving the site is not industrial action within the meaning of the 
definition in the WRA. Such activity clearly cannot constitute a ban, limitation 
or restriction on the performance of work by the picketers. If the picketers do 
no more than communicate information, it is immaterial that the recipient of 
37  (1999) 91 FCR 463. The leading judgment was delivered by Wilcox and Cooper JJ, while Burchett J 
delivered a dissenting opinion. For further discussion of the decision see J. Howe, 'Picketing and the 
Statutory Definition of Industrial Action' (2000) 13 Australian Journal of Labour Law 84. 
38 Ibid at 486 per Wilcox and Cooper JJ. 
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the information may be persuaded not to perform, accept or offer for work." 
Even where picketing ceases to be peaceful, or purely informational, it will not come 
under the statutory definition." The majority argued that to determine otherwise 
would provide statutory immunities for protected industrial action involving 
picketing, thus abrogating common law remedies for non-informational picketing: 
[t]o interpret paragraph (c) of the definition of industrial action in such a way 
as to include picketing infringing upon the rights and freedoms of others, 
would be to confer statutory immunity on such conduct .... It would authorise 
interference with the rights, not only of the employer, but also of other 
affected persons who, but for the immunity, would have a right of action at 
common law.' 
The decision in Davids Distribution was applied in Emwest Products Pty Ltd v 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union' and 
appears to represent an established position with respect to the relationship between 
the definition of industrial action and picketing conduct. 
Certified Agreements 
The WRA bargaining model under Part VIB and VID, consists of two types of 
agreements: Division 2 agreements and Division 3 agreements.' 
WRA Part VIB, Division 2 provides for the certification of agreements between 
employers who are constitutional corporations or the Commonwealth and groups of 
employees or organizations of employees in single businesses." Section 17011 
39 Ibid. 
4° Ibid at 491 per Wilcox and Cooper JJ. 
41 Ibid. 
42 (2002) 112 IR 388 at 393. This decision of Kenny J in the Federal Court was affirmed by the Full 
Court of the Federal Court in Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, 
Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2003) 125 IR 449. 
43 For in depth discussion of the WRA bargaining model see Creighton and Stewart supra note 11 at 
148 — 200; Pittard, supra note 32. 
44 WRA s 170LH. 
A "single business" is defmed for the purposes of Part VIB of the WRA in s 170LB as: 
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a single business is: 
(a) a business, project or undertaking that is carried on by an employer; or 
(b) the activities carried on by: 
(i) the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; or 
(ii) a body, association, office or other entity established for a public purpose by or 
under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; or 
(iii) any other body in which the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory has a 
controlling interest. 
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provides for agreements to be certified between the Commonwealth or a 
Constitutional corporation and an organization of employees, where the organization 
has at least one member employed in the single business or part thereof whose 
employment will be subject to the agreement and the organization is entitled to 
represent the industrial interests of the member in relation to the work that will be 
subject to the agreement. Approval must be obtained from a valid majority of the 
persons employed at the time whose employment will be subject to the agreement.' 
Section 170LK provides for the certification of agreements between an employer who 
is the Commonwealth or a Constitutional corporation and a group of employees.' As 
with s 170LJ agreements, such agreements must be approved by a valid majority of 
those employed at the time whose employment will be subject to the agreement. 
Section 170LK agreements can be negotiated between an employer and their 
employees without the involvement of any employee organizations and where they 
are involved, they are not parties to any subsequent agreement.' 
WRA Part VIB, Division 3 provides for the certification of agreements between 
parties to an industrial dispute in a single business." These agreements maybe 
entered into by an employer, carrying on a single business, which is or was party to an 
industrial dispute and one or more organizations of employees, in order to settle the 
(2) For the purposes of this Part: 
(a) if 2 or more employers carry on a business, project or undertaking as a joint venture or 
common enterprise, the employers are taken to be one employer; and 
(b) if 2 or more corporations that are related to each other for the purposes of the Corporations 
Act 2001 each carry on a single business: . 
(i) the corporations may be treated as one employer; and 
(ii) the single businesses may be treated as one single business. 
(3) For the purposes of this Part, a part of a single business includes, for example: 
(a) a geographically distinct part of the single business; or 
a distinct operational or organizational unit within the single business. 
45 WRA s 170LJ(2). 
46 WRA s 170LK(1). 
47 Under s 170LK(4) an employer must give all employees notice that any relevant proposed party to 
the agreement who is a member of an organization that is entitled to represent their industrial interests 
in relation to the work in question, may request the organization to represent the person in meeting and 
conferring with the employer about the agreement. Where a member of the organization involves an 
organization, the employer must give the organization a reasonable opportunity to meet and confer with 
the employer about the agreement — s 170LK(5). 
48 WRA s 170LN provides that Division 3 of Part VIB covers agreements entered into: 
(a) to settle, further settle or maintain the settlement of, or to prevent, industrial disputes; or 
(b) to prevent industrial situations from giving rise to industrial disputes. 
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dispute, maintain a settlement or prevent further disputes. ° Agreements under 
Division 3 must be approved by a valid majority of the persons employed at the time 
whose employment will be subject to the agreement." 
The AIRC is responsible for certifying Division 2 and Division 3 agreements. To 
obtain certification, an agreement must pass the 'no-disadvantage test', that is, the 
agreement must not disadvantage employees in relation to their terms and conditions 
of employment under a relevant award.' If the only reason an agreement is not 
certified is because it does not pass the no-disadvantage test, the agreement will be 
taken to have passed the test if the AIRC is satisfied that certifying the agreement is 
not contrary to the public interest." 
Once certified, Division 2 and Division 3 agreements apply until their nominal expiry 
date passes and they are replaced by a subsequent agreement." While in operation 
they prevail over any award or order of the AIRC or prior agreement to the extent of 
any inconsistency with that award or order, and bind successor employees and 
employers." 
Certification of Multiple Business Agreements 
There is facility within the WRA for the certification of multiple-business agreements 
where the Full Bench of the AIRC is satisfied that the agreement is in the public 
49 WRA s 170L0. 
WRA s 170LR. 
51 WRA s 170LT(2) and 170)CA. For discussion of the no-disadvantage test and see 0. Merlo, 
'Flexibility and Stretching Rights: the No Disadvantage Test in Enterprise Bargaining' (2000) 13 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 207; R. Mitchell, R. Campbell, A. Barnes, E. Bicknell, K. 
Creighton, J. Fetter and S. Korman, Protecting the Worker's Interest in Enterprise Bargaining: The 
'No Disadvantage' Test in the Australian Federal Jurisdiction, Final Report, Prepared for the 
Workplace Innovation Union, Industrial Relations Victoria, (Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations Law, University of Melbourne: Parlcville, 2004). The no-disadvantage test will only remain a 
valuable tool for protecting employee terms and conditions under certified agreements as long as the 
award system remains relevant. In the Federal Court in obiter dicter Ryan J remarked, "[it may be that, 
in future, if the designated award that provides the criteria for the application of the no-disadvantage 
test is not adjusted to reflect market trends evidenced by relevant certified agreements and Australian 
Workplace Agreements, the utility of the no-disadvantage test in ensuring minimum standards will 
gradually diminish": Maritime Union of Australia v Burnie Port Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 101 IR 
435 at 451. 
52 WRA s 170LT(3). Subsection (4) provides an example of a case where the AIRC may be satisfied 
that certifying an agreement is not contrary to the public interest: where making the agreement is part 
of a reasonable strategy to deal with a short term crisis in, and to assist the revival of, the single 
business or part. 
53  WRA s 170LX(2). 
172 
interest, having regard to whether the matters could be more appropriately dealt with 
by a single business agreement.' A multiple-business agreement will have no effect 
in so far as it is inconsistent with a single business agreement.' The protected action 
provisions examined later in this chapter do not apply to negotiations for a multiple-
business agreement." 
Australian Workplace Agreements 
The other form of agreements catered for under the WRA are Australian Workplace 
Agreements (AWAs) and allow for an individual employer who is a Constitutional 
corporation, the Commonwealth or is in Victoria or a Territory, and an individual 
employee to enter into an agreement establishing the terms and conditions of the 
employee's employment." In order to be valid (AWAs have no effect except as 
provided under Part VID), the AWA must be filed with the Office of the Employment 
Advocate, must comply with filing requirements and pass the no-disadvantage test. 
Once approved, an AWA operates to the exclusion of any relevant award that would 
otherwise apply and prevails over pre-existing certified agreements, where that 
possibility has not otherwise been excluded within the terms of the certified 
agreement. 59 
The Role of the AIRC and Arbitration 
While the system has moved inexorably away from tribunal arbitration and national 
uniform standards towards enterprise bargaining, there remains a role for the AIRC 
and the processes of conciliation and arbitration. Creighton and Stewart note that it is 
54 WRA s 170LY. 
55 WRA s 170LC. For examples of successful applications to certify multi-business agreements see 
Application for Certification of Multiple Business Agreement by Ambulance Service Victoria — 
Metropolitan and Ors (1999) 45 AILR para 4-013; Application for Certification of Multiple Business 
Agreement by McDonald's Australia Limited and the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees 
Association, AIRC PR 943252, 30 January 2004, per Munro.J, Drake SDP and Thatcher C. 
56 WRA s 170LC(5). 
57 WRA s 170LC(6). 
58 Part VID, ss 170VC; 170VF and 495 (Victoria). The Act also allows for the negotiation of AWAs 
covering waterside workers, maritime employees and flight crew officers where the employees' 
employment is in connection with constitutional trade and commerce: WRA ss 170VC(d), (e) and (f). 
For discussion of the AWA bargaining regime see R.C. McCallum, 'Australian Workplace Agreements 
- An analysis' (1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 50; A. Stewart, 'The Legal Framework for 
Individual Employment Agreements in Australia' in S. Deery and R. Mitchell, (eds.) Employment 
Relations: Individualisation and Union Exclusion (Federation Press: Annandale, 1999), 18. 
WRA s 170VQ. 
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"important to appreciate that awards still play a crucial role in the federal industrial 
relations system, and in the broader society". 60 
The processes of conciliation and arbitration under the WRA are set out in Part VI, 
"Dispute Prevention and Settlement". They are designed to ensure that wages and 
conditions are protected by enforceable awards acting as a safety net of "fair 
minimum wages and conditions of employment". 61 The function of the AIRC is 
twofold: to establish a minimum level of wages and conditions for Australian 
workers, while ensuring that the objects of the WRA in setting terms and conditions 
of employment by agreement at the workplace or enterprise level are achieved.' 
The AIRC has a pared back award making function whereby awards only act as a 
floor of minimum standards and conditions. Section 89 directs the AIRC to prevent 
and settle industrial disputes so far as possible by conciliation, and by arbitration, "as 
a last resort and within the limits specified within the Act". Where matters proceed to 
arbitration, the scope of the award allowable under the Act is limited to 20 defined 
matters.' Where parties wish to have matters regulated outside the scope of those 20 
matters, they must reach a bargained agreement. 
Protected Industrial Action 
The right to strike in the WRA exists in the right to take protected industrial action in 
support of bargaining for a certified agreement or an AWA. As noted by the court in 
National Workforce Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers Union, the 
protected action regime is the sole federal repository of a right to strike and the only 
currently enforceable source of the right. 
The protected industrial action provisions allow parties negotiating certified 
agreements or AWAs to undertake industrial action free from the threat of legal 
liability under the common law, federal or state legislation, and from the threat of 
60 Creighton and Stewart, supra note 11 at 122. 
61 WRA ss 88A (a) and (b). 
62 WRA s 88A. 
63 WRA s 89A. 
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dismissal or victimisation on the basis of that action. There are two types of protected 
industrial action, the first relating to the negotiation of Division 2 or Division 3 
enterprise agreements and the second, the negotiation of Australian Workplace 
Agreements. 
Protected Action for Division 2 and Division 3 Certified Agreements 
Protected industrial action with respect to Division 2 and Division 3 agreements is 
regulated under Division 8 of Part VIB of the WRA, "Negotiations for certified 
agreements etc"." 
Scope of Protected Action 
Where appropriate steps have been taken to initiate a bargaining period, a negotiating 
party (organization of employees, a member of an employee organization employed 
by the relevant employer, an officer or employee of the employee organization or an 
employee who is a negotiating party) is entitled to organise or engage in industrial 
action directly against the employer." The industrial action must be undertaken for 
the purposes of supporting or advancing claims made in respect of the proposed 
certified agreement or in response to a lockout by the employer.' An employer is also 
entitled during a bargaining period to lockout all or any of the employees whose 
employment will be subject to the agreement for the purposes of supporting or 
advancing'claims made by the employer in respect of the proposed certified 
agreement or in response to industrial action undertaken by the relevant employees." 
Where parties apply to the AIRC for certification, the agreement reached must be 
about matters pertaining to the relationship between an employer and relevant 
employees.' Equally, any protected industrial action undertaken in support of 
" [1998] 3 VR 265 per Phillips, Charles and Batt JJ.A at 275 — 276. See the discussion of this case in 
chapter 5. 
65 For general discussion of these provisions see Creighton and Stewart, supra note 11 at 155— 167; G. 
McCarry, 'Industrial Action Under the Workplace Relations Act' (1997) 10 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 137. 
WRA s 170ML(2). 
67 Ibid. 
68 WRA s 170ML(3). Section 170ML(4) defines "lockout" for the purposes of this section as the 
employer preventing employees from performing work under their contracts of employment without 
terminating those contracts. Section 170ML(6) provides that an employer is only entitled to lockout 
employees where the continuity of their employment is not affected by the lockout. 
WRA s 170MI(1). 
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negotiations for the agreement must be in support of claims that may be encompassed 
by the resulting certified agreement." The inclusion of claims incapable of 
certification in an agreement will result in a retrospective loss of protection to parties 
who have engaged in industrial action, irrespective of whether or not they believed 
that the agreement was capable of certification or not: 
An honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that a proposed agreement 
satisfies the requirements of s 170LI is a mistake as to the operation of the 
Act. If a person takes industrial action in respect of such a proposed 
agreement, it does not assist the person who makes the mistake that he or she 
believed that the proposed agreement was one which fell within the meaning 
of Division 2 of Part VIB and was capable of being certified under Division 4 
of Part VIB. The Act does not refer to a 'purported' proposed agreement; nor 
does it refer to an 'honest and reasonable, but mistaken belief that a proposed 
agreement under Division 2 is capable of certification under Division 4. On 
the contrary, the nature of the proposed agreement is expressed as an element 
of the protection conferred by s 170ML. 7 ' 
In this context, the courts have had cause to consider whether claims made by 
employee organizations relating to employment entitlements and associated matters 
such as compulsory bargaining fees are matters pertaining to the relationship between 
employers and employees. If not, any agreements reached including such claims are 
not capable of certification and industrial action undertaken is not protected. 
Employee Entitlements 
As a result of a number of high profile corporate collapses in Australia, the trade 
union movement advocates the establishment of trust funds into which employee 
entitlements can be paid, as and when they fall due, to insulate employees against 
corporate insolvency?' In Transfield Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, 
Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (Transfield),' the AFMEPKIU 
included a claim in negotiations for a certified agreement for employee entitlements to 
be paid to the Manusafe trust fund established by the Australian Metal Workers 
" Electrolwc Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2004] HCA 40, 2 September, 2004, 
unreported judgment. 
71 Ibid per McHugh J at para 120. 
72 For discussion of the high profile corporate collapses and subsequent attention to the issue of 
employee entitlements see R. Campo, 'The Protection of Employee Entitlements in the Event of 
Employer Insolvency: Australian Initiatives in the Light of International Models' (2000) 13 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 236; D. Noakes, 'Corporate Groups and the Duties of Directors: Protecting the 
Employee or the Insolvent Employer?' (2001) 29 Australian Business Law Review 124. 
73 AIRC, Print PR908287, 30 August, 2001, per Munro J. 
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Union. Munro J held that the claims for payment to Manusafe did not pertain to the 
relationship between employers and employees due to the discretionary nature of the 
trustees' obligation to make payouts under the trust. Therefore, any industrial action 
undertaken by the AFMEPICIU was not protected action.' 
The matter was revisited again in Electrolux Products v Australian Workers Union,' 
after the AMWU had addressed the problems with the Manusafe trust deed identified 
in Transfield, by removing the trustee discretion. Merkel J agreed that the new 
proposed term in the certified agreement did pertain to the relationship between 
employers and employees." 
Union Bargaining Fees  
A union bargaining fee is a fee imposed upon non-union employees for the services of 
the union in negotiating a universally applicable certified agreement. In an effort to 
combat falling trade union density, employee organizations sought to include these 
terms in their ambit of claims for the purposes of bargaining a certified agreement. In 
the Electrolux case the ambit of claims included a compulsory bargaining fee of $500 
to be paid to the Australian Workers Union for all new employees employed after the 
certification of the agreement." 
At first instance, Merkel J held that the clause did not pertain to the relationship 
between employer and employees. Merkel J then considered whether or not the 
industrial action lost protected status due to the inclusion of an uncertifiable matter. 
74 The Trans:field decision came before the Federal Court in Transfield Ply Ltd v Automotive, Food, 
Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2001] FCA 1533, unreported judgment, 
31 October 2001 per Moore J. The AFMEPKIU had amended the terms of their claims, removed the 
discretion in the trust deed and sought to undertake protected industrial action in support of the revised 
claims. Transfield sought an injunction on the basis that the action was in breach of Munro's original 
s 127 order. Moore J held that the claims were sufficiently altered that there was no breach of the 
original order. 
75 [2001] FCA 1600, unreported judgment, 14 November, 2001 per Merkel J. 
76 Ibid, para 34. Merkel J stated at para 34: "[in my view, the Substance of the employee entitlement 
claim, the central and critical aspects of it, and its subject matter, relate to payments by the employers, 
as such, for the benefit of employees, as such. The payments relate to particular aspects of the 
remuneration to be received by employees for service to their employer ... and belong to, and are 
within the sphere of, the relationship between Electrolux and its employees, as such": For further 
discussion of the case law as at 2002 see J. Cantatwanti and Y. Shariff, 'Major Tribunal Decisions in 
2001' (2002) 44 Journal of Industrial Relations 211 at 212 — 216. 
77 Electrolux Decision, supra note 75. For further discussion see L. A. H. Johns, 'To Certify or Not to 
Certify - That Is (Still) the Question' (2003) 16 Australian Journal of Labour Law 108. 
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Merkel J held that the bargaining fee clause was a discrete, significant and substantive 
matter, significant enough that the relevant action lost protected status. It was unlikely 
that the legislature "intended that protected action was able to be taken to advance or 
support claims in respect of a substantive, discrete, and significant matter that does 
not pertain to the requisite relationship, or that an agreement about such a matter is to 
be capable of certification".' 
The union appealed the decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court, where the 
decision was overturned on the issue of bargaining fees." The court, rather than 
focusing on the proposed terms of any consequential certified agreement, considered 
s 170ML(2)(e), that the claims made during a bargaining period must be "genuinely 
made in respect of the proposed agreement". 
With respect to s 170ML(2)(e), the court stated that the only essential, for the 
purposes of the section, were that the claims be genuinely made in respect of the 
proposed agreement: 
[p]rovided the claims are genuinely made, it does not matter that others may 
think them unrealistic. In the industrial relations arena, as in other spheres of 
life, extravagant claims are often made. Mostly, an extravagant claim is 
unsuccessful; but sometimes it is conceded, perhaps in a modified form." 
Accordingly, the court held that the purpose of the industrial action in the case fell 
within the terms of s 170ML(2)(e). Further, the action would not be denied protected 
status because of the possibility that the insertion of a bargaining fee clause could 
cause difficulty at the point of certification under s 170LI(1). 8 ' 
The decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court was overturned on appeal to the 
High Court in Electrolux Home Products Ply Ltd v Australian Workers' Union 
(Electrolux). 82 The High Court held (Kirby J in dissent) that a claim for a bargaining 
fee does not pertain to the relationship between employer and employee, that an 
78 Ibid, para 52. 
79 Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union and Ors v Electrolux 
Home Products Pty Ltd and Ors [2002] FCAFC 199, 118 FCR 177, per Wilcox, Branson and Marshall 
JJ. 
8° Electrolux Full Federal Court, supra note 79 at 194, para 91. 
81 Ibid at 195, para 90. 
82 Electrolux Home Products, High Court, supra note 70. 
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agreement containing such a provision cannot be certified and that industrial action 
undertaken in support of a matter that does not pertain to the relationship between 
employer and employee cannot be protected action. Further, the Coalition 
Government has procured an amendment of the legislation in order to prevent the 
certification of agreements containing bargaining fees clauses, designating such 
clauses to be `objectionable'." 
The political and legal debate over union bargaining fees was less about the legal 
dimensions of protected action, and more concerned with the role of trade unions in 
bargaining." The High Court in Electrolux affirmed that the bargaining model does 
not encompass demands made by parties outside the context of certified agreements 
and parties may not undertake protected action in support of such demands. The 
implications of limiting protected action to claims that may be certified in a certified 
agreement and of allowing the loss of protection to occur irrespective of the 
motivations of the parties was explored by Kirby J in a dissenting opinion: 
[t]o expose an industrial organization of employees to grave, even crippling, 
civil liability for industrial action ... is to introduce a serious chilling effect 
into the negotiation that such organizations can undertake on behalf of their 
members. It would be a chilling effect inimical to the process of collective 
bargaining, including by such organizations on behalf of their members as 
contemplated by the Act." 
83  After two unsuccessful attempts in 2001 and 2002 (Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of 
Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2001 (Cth); Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of 
Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002 (Cth)) the Coalition Government passed the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Act 2003 (Cth). The Act inserts new provisions 
preventing employee organizations from demanding the payment of a bargaining fee from another 
person or undertaking industrial action with the intention of obtaining agreement to the payment of a 
bargaining fee. The AIRC is directed to refuse to certify agreements containing objectionable 
provisions — s 170LU(2A). 
84  J. Cantanzariti, Y. Shariff and S. Brown, 'Major Tribunal Decisions in 2002' (2003) 45 Journal of 
Industrial Relations 166 at 179 note that "Nile debate surrounding union bargaining fees is not so 
much a technical legal argument over statutory interpretation as it is a political struggle waged by 
various unions in a desperate bid to keep themselves from the fringes of Australian industrial relations, 
and ultimately, from industrial oblivion". This may overstate the matter, but is demonstrative of the 
political and ideological aspects of the bargaining fees debate. 
85 Electrol Home Products, High Court, supra note 70, per Kirby J at para 192. In the aftermath of 
the High Court decision in Electrolux, concern has been raised over the legitimacy of a range of terms 
included in agreements certified by the AIRC. At the time of writing, the implications of Electrolux 
have been considered by the AIRC in K L. Ballantyne and National Union of Workers, AIRC, PR 
952656, 22 October, 2004, per Ross VP where the AIRC was called upon to determine the validity of a 
number of clauses in an existing certified agreement. 
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Rights versus Interests Disputes . 
The WRA scheme of protected industrial action utilises a rights/interests distinction 
whereby protected action is available for disputes of interests but not of rights." 
Section 170MN provides that protected industrial action cannot be undertaken by an 
employer, employee or employee organization during the currency of a certified 
agreement, or during the currency of an award created under s 170MX(3)." Such 
action will only be permitted after the nominal expiry date of the relevant certified 
agreement or s 170MX(3) award has passed. Contravention of s 170MN is not an 
offence, but it is a contravention to which a penalty (fine) attaches." 
It remains unclear whether or not the prohibition on industrial action during the 
currency of a certified agreement extends to industrial action in pursuit of interests 
established within the existing agreement. This matter was considered by the Federal 
Court in Emwest Products Ply Ltd v AFMEP&KIU." During the course of 
negotiations with Emwest for a certified agreement in 2000, AFMEP&KIU raised the 
issue of redundancies within their claims. However, the parties were unable to reach 
agreement and it was decided to leave redundancy out of the final agreement, to be 
revisited in 2001. The 2000 agreement was certified in April 2001, had a nominal 
expiry date of June 30 2003 and contained a no extra claims clause. In July 2001 the 
union notified the employer that they wished to enter into a new agreement 
concerning redundancy and purported to take protected industrial action in support of 
their claim. 
Emwest commenced proceedings in the Federal Court, obtaining an interlocutory 
injunction under s 127 of the WRA ordering that the industrial action cease." At the 
hearing for final injunctive relief, the question in issue was whether or not the 
86 For discussion of rights versus interests dispute resolution in Australia and New Zealand see M. 
Vranken, 'Demise of the Australasian Model of Labour Law in the 1990's' (1994) 16 Comparative 
Labour Law Journal 1 at 13 — 16. For discussion of the rights versus interests debate generally see C. 
Provis, 'Rights Disputes v Interests Disputes: A Distinction for Australia?' (1993) 6 Australian Journal 
of Labour Law 205. 
87 Awards made under s 170MX(3) relate to the termination of a bargaining period. For discussion of 
s 170MX(3) awards see below at 189. 
88  WRA s 170ND(b). 
89 Em west Products Pty Ltd, supra note 42. 
90 Emwest Products Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union [2001] FCA 1334. 
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prohibition in s 170MN extended to the industrial action undertaken by the union. 
Emwest argued that s 170MN extends to industrial action taken for the purpose of 
advancing any claim relating to the employment of any employee Covered by the 
certified agreement. In response, the union argued that s 170MN only extends to 
industrial action taken for the purposes of advancing claims in respect of those 
matters agreed within the scope of the certified agreement. 
The matter was heard by Kenny J who noted that s 170MN(1) is a limited prohibition, 
"not extending to industrial action taken for a non-prescribed purpose, even where 
there is a relevant certified agreement". 91 Consequently, the section will only be , 
breached where the industrial action in question has a prescribed purpose, such 
purpose being that of "supporting or advancing claims against the employer in respect 
of the employment of employees whose employment is subject to the agreement"." 
With respect to the no extra claims clause, Kenny J noted that parties were free to 
exclude the possibility of further claims by including a no extra claims clause in their 
agreements. However the clause in this case did not prevent the union from engaging 
in protected industrial action because the parties had contemplated further 
negotiations concerning redundancy when the clause was drafted, and it had to be 
read subject to those intentions.' 
The decision in Emwest suggests that s 170MN only applies to industrial action over 
existing rights contained within a certified agreement. However, subsequent decisions 
have suggested that Emwest may be confined to its own facts. In National Fleet 
• Network v AFMEP&KIU (National Fleet Network)," Munro J distinguished Emwest 
on the grounds that the parties in the case had a pre-existing certified agreement 
which was incorporated into the existing agreement and the matter at issue was 
covered by the old ageement. 95 In Integrated Metal Services,' Williams SDP noted 
that: 
91 Ibid at 397. 
" Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 (2002) 115 IR 222. 
Ibid at 239. 
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[t]he decision in Ernwest ... is one that is based upon its own particular facts. 
It is not, in my view, authority for any general proposition that s170MN(1) of 
the Act does not apply to industrial action taken for the purpose of supporting 
or advancing claims relating to terms and conditions of employment not dealt 
with in an extant certified agreement.' 
However, in the case, Williams SDP was not called upon to determine whether or not 
the industrial action was outside the scope of the certified agreement as a prior 
certified agreement had been incorporated in the same manner as in National Fleet 
Network and covered the additional claims." 
The Bargaining Period 
The protected action provisions require parties to initiate a 'bargaining period' in 
order to engage in protected industrial action. The AIRC must not arbitrate the 
relevant industrial dispute during the bargaining period." A bargaining period may be 
initiated by an employer, an organization of employees or an employee acting on his 
or her own behalf, and on behalf of other employees, who want to negotiate a 
Division 2 or Division 3 agreement in relation to a single business or part of a single 
business.' To initiate a bargaining period, the initiating party is required to give 
written notice to the other negotiating parties, and the AIRC, of their intention to enter 
into a Division 2 or 3 agreement.' The bargaining period will commence at the end 
96 Integrated Metal Services Pty Ltd, s 127(2) application to stop or prevent industrial action, AIRC, 
PR934714, 14 July 2003 per Senior Deputy President Williams. 
97 Ibid at para 9. 
98 The Coalition Government has attempted to pass legislation that would impact upon the decision in 
Emwest. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Improved Remedies for Protected Action) Bill 2002 
(Cth) Schedule One, s 1, WRA s 127 aimed to include a new subsection 127(3D) which would direct 
the AIRC to consider, when making an order under s 127, whether a person or organization engaging in 
the industrial action is a person whose employment is subject to, or is an organization that is bound by, 
a certified agreement that has not yet reached its nominal expiry date, and the undesirability of the 
occurrence of industrial action that is not protected action. However, the Bill passed through the Senate 
in a substantially amended form, excluding the proposed subsection 3D. The final version of the Act 
was limited to the insertion of a provision allowing the AIRC to make an interim order under s 127: 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Improved Remedies for Unprotected Action) Act 2004. 
WRA s 170N(1). 
100 WRA s 170MI(1). 
101 "Negotiating Party" is defined under WRA s 170MI(3) as: 
(a) the initiating party; 
(b) if the initiating party is an employer who intends to try to make an agreement under section 
170LJ or 17OLL or Division 3 — the organization or organizations who are proposed to be 
• 	bound by the agreement; 
(c) if the initiating party is an employer who intends to try to make an agreement under section 
170LK — the employees at the time whose employment will be subject to the agreement; 
(d) if the initiating party is an organization of employees — the employer who is proposed to be 
bound by the agreement; 
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of seven days after the day on which the notice was given or if the notice was given to 
different persons on different days — the later or latest of those days.' 
Protected Action during a Bargaining Period 
Once the bargaining period has come into effect, the negotiating parties may 
undertake protected industrial action. Immunity is conferred under s 170MT against 
s 127 orders, against any law (whether written or unwritten) in force in a State or 
Territory, and against dismissal or discrimination from having engaged in the 
action.' However, immunity does not extend to industrial action that has involved, or 
is likely to involve, personal injury; or wilful or reckless destruction of, or damage to, 
property or the unlawful taking, keeping or use of property; or defamation.' 
Industrial action will lose protected status unless an application is made to the AIRC 
to certify the terms of an agreement within 21 days of the day on which an agreement 
was made.' 
Notice 
Where a negotiating party intends to undertake protected action they must give three 
working days notice of that intention to the other negotiating parties.' However, if 
action occurs in response to industrial action by the other negotiating party, then all 
that is required is notice of the intention to take action.' 
(e) if the initiating party is an employee acting on his or her own behalf of other employees — the 
employer who is proposed to be bound by the agreement and the employees whose 
employment will be subject to the agreement. 
102 WRA s 170ML. 
103  WRA ss 170MU(1) and (2). Section 170MU(3) sets out. a reverse onus of proof where an employee 
alleges that an employer has contravened subsection (1) by providing that in proceedings under 
s 17ONF for an alleged contravention of subsection (1), it is to be presumed, unless the employer 
proves otherwise, that the alleged conduct of the employer was carried out wholly or partly because the 
employee was proposing to engage, was engaging, or had engaged, in protected action. 
104 WRA ss 170MT(2) and (3). 
105 WRA s 170MS. 
106  WRA ss 170M0(3)-(5). Commenting on the content required in such a notice, the Full Court of the 
Federal Court in Davids Distribution supra note 37 per Wilcox and Cooper JJ at 495 stated in obiter 
dicter "[w]e think s 170M0(5) was designed to ensure that industrial disputants who are to become 
affected by protected action, in relation to which their usual legal rights are significantly diminished, 
are at least able to take appropriate defensive action ... It will be apparent we think it necessary, and 
sufficient, for parties to describe the intended action in ordinary industrial English .... it follows that a 
notice that refers only to 'bans and rolling stoppages' without any indication of the nature of the bans 
or the location of the rolling stoppages, does not adequately disclose the nature of the intended action". 
107 WRA s 170M0(2). 
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Notice of intention to undertake industrial action may be given before the 
commencement of the bargaining period so that industrial action and the bargaining 
period could start on the same day. However, s 170MP provides that industrial action 
undertaken by a negotiating party will not be protected unless the relevant party has 
genuinely tried to reach agreement with the other negotiating party and has complied 
with any relevant AIRC order, before undertaking action. Parties who engage in 
protected action on the first day of a bargaining period run the risk of losing protected 
status if it is subsequently held that they have not genuinely tried to reach agreement 
with the other party, or if they have not complied with relevant AIRC orders. 
Secret Ballots  
There is no requirement in the protected action scheme for holding a secret strike 
ballot. However the AIRC may intervene in proposed protected action by ordering a 
secret strike ballot of the members of an employee organization or of employees 
engaged in negotiations for a Division 2 or 3 agreement.' Section 135 empowers the 
AIRC to order a secret ballot if it considers that a ballot could prevent industrial 
action or resolve matters in dispute. 
Where the AIRC has ordered a secret ballot, any industrial action taken will not be 
protected action unless the ballot occurs and the industrial action is approved by a 
majority of valid votes cast in the ballot.' If the results of the ballot indicate that a 
majority of members who recorded a valid vote were not in favour of engaging in 
industrial action, then the members of the organization are not required to obey any 
direction or request of the organization in relation to engaging in or supporting in any 
way the industrial action."° 
The Federal Government has attempted to introduce a compulsory secret ballot 
system to be administered to relevant employees prior to undertaking protected 
108 WRA s 135. Section 137 sets out the scope of directions for secret ballots that are to be administered 
by the AIRC. The section provides that directions given by the AIRC... shall provide for all matters 
relating to the ballot concerned, including the following matters: 
(a) the questions to be put to the vote; 
(b) the eligibility of persons to vote; and 
(c) the conduct of the ballot generally. 
109 WRA s 170MQ(1). 
WRA s 140(1). 
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industrial action.' The proposed changes would mean that protected action could not 
proceed without AIRC authorisation. The motivation behind the proposed changes, 
according to a 2002 Bills Digest (discussion paper), is to "ensure that those 
participating in the action have decided upon the action and have not been misled by 
union officials"." 2 This is despite the fact that the provisions would apply to unionists 
and non-unionists alike. The discussion paper notes that the aim of Coalition policy in 
introducing secret ballots is to curb industrial activity, although "disputes are resulting 
in few days lost per employee"." 3 Therefore, "the main role of the amendments will 
be to act as an influence for unions in particular to reassess their industrial action 
options, allowing a shift of negotiating power to employers".' 
Provisions Relating to Organizations of Employees  
Where protected action is to be carried out by an employee organization, the 
organization must ensure that the action is duly authorised by the committee of 
management, the action occurs in accordance with internal organization rules and that 
written notice of committee authorisation is lodged with the AIRC." 5 
Suspension of the Bargaining Period 
The logic of the protected action provisions dictates that the right to strike is subject 
to the supervision of the AIRC to ensure that the use of industrial strength can be 
mitigated where protected action poses a significant threat to the wider community. 
Section 170MW allows for suspension or termination of a bargaining period if the 
AIRC is satisfied that any one of a number of circumstances relating to the norms of 
the regulatory system, social welfare concerns or trade union matters, exists or has 
existed.'" An order in any of these circumstances may not be made except on 
111 This was proposed in the Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 
1999 (Cth), the Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 
2000 (Cth) and the two Workplace Relations (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bills 2002 (Cth), all 
of which stalled in the Senate. 
112 Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002 [No 1], Bills 
Digest No. 116 2001 — 02, Prepared by Steve O'Neill, Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations 
Group, Published by the Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002 at 1. 
113 Ibid at 7 and 20. 
114 Ibid at 20. 
115  WRA s 170MR(1). Section 170MR(4) provides that where a notice of authorisation is duly lodged, 
it will be presumed that the internal rules of the organization have been complied with. 
116 WRA s 170MW(1). 
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application by a negotiating party unless the circumstance is one of social welfare, 
where the AIRC may act on its own initiative or on the basis of an application by a 
negotiating party or the Minister." 7 
Bargaining in Accordance with the Norms of the System  
The AIRC may suspend or terminate a bargaining period where one of the negotiating 
parties: 
• did not genuinely try to reach an agreement with the other negotiating 
parties before organising or taking industrial action or is not genuinely 
trying to reach agreement"' or 
• has failed to comply with any directions of the AIRC that relate to the 
proposed agreement or to a matter that arose during negotiations for the 
proposed agreement;' ' 9 or 
• has failed to comply with a recommendation of the AIRC under s Ill AA 
relating to the proposed agreement or a matter that arose during 
negotiations for the proposed agreement. 12° 
Where a bargaining period relates to employees employed in part of a single place of 
business, the ARC may suspend or terminate the bargaining period if the initiating 
party is not complying with an award, order. , certified agreement or direction of the 
ARC in relation to another part of the single business.' 
Social Welfare 
The AIRC may intervene where industrial action, taken to support or advance claims 
in respect of the proposed agreement, is threatening to: 
• endanger the life, the personal safety or health, or the welfare of the 
population or of part of it; or 
• cause significant damage to the Australian economy or an important 
part of it.'" 
117 WRA ss 170MW(8)(a) and (b). 
118 WRA ss 170MW(2)(a) and (b). 
119 WRA s 170MW(2)(c). 
120 WRA s 170MW(2)(d). Section 111AA governs AIRC recommendations made by consent where the 
AIRC is exercising powers of conciliation in respect to a particular matter. 
121 WRA s 170MW(6). 
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The leading case on these provisions is CFMEU v Coal and Allied Operations Pty 
Ltd.' The CFMEU had initiated a bargaining period and had taken protected 
industrial action at the Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd Hunter Valley No 1 Mine. 
The CFMEU sought an order from the AIRC that the bargaining period be terminated 
on the grounds that the industrial action was threatening to endanger the life, personal 
safety and health of the people of the Newcastle and Hunter regions and that the strike 
was causing significant damage to the Australian economy, or the part of the 
Australian economy located in the Newcastle and Hunter regions.' At first instance, 
Boulton J agreed with the submissions of the unions and terminated the bargaining 
period. Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd appealed the decision to the Full Bench of 
the AIRC where the decision was overturned.' The Full Bench considered that 
Boulton J had erred in the exercise of his discretion by giving too much weight in his 
consideration to the potential escalation of the industrial dispute and potential damage 
that could occur, rather than the actual industrial action that was occurring at the time 
of the application.' Commenting on the application of s 170MW(3), Munro J stated 
that: 
[s]ection 170MVV(3) is a most important part of the section [170MW]. The 
way in which it is interpreted and applied has serious consequences for 
disputing parties and for the public at large. Its operation involves the 
resolution of the competing rights of registered organizations and employers to 
take industrial action against each other with impunity and of the community 
and the economy to be protected from serious harm arising from such 
action.' 
The matter was subsequently appealed to the Federal Court, which overturned the Full 
Bench decision.' The employer appealed to the High Court where the decision of the 
122 WRA ss 170MW(3)(a) and (b). 
123 (1997) 77 IR 269. 
124  The CFMEU was seeking the exercise of the arbitral powers of the AIRC to settle the dispute. If the 
bargaining period could be terminated on the grounds set out in s 170MW(3), the AIRC could proceed 
to arbitrate the dispute, and make a binding award under the terms of s 170MX which would not be 
limited to the scope of allowable award matters under s 89A. For discussion of s 170MX awards see 
footnote 137 of this chapter. 
125  Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (1998) 80 
IR 14 per Giudice P, Munro J, and Larkin C. 
126 Ibid per Munro J at 59. 
127 Ibid per Munro J at 51 —52. 
128  Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and Ors v Giudice and Ors (1998) 159 ALR 1, 
per Spender, Moore and Branson JJ. 
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AIRC Full Bench was preferred.' Commenting on the exercise of the discretion 
under s 170MW(3), the majority noted that: 
the nature of the threat to which a decision-maker must be satisfied under 
s 170MW(3) of the Act involves a measure of subjectivity or value judgment 
.... The presence of the words "significant" and "important" in 
s 170MW(3)(b) indicate that the decision-maker must have some basis for his 
or her satisfaction over and above generalisedpredictions as to the likely 
consequences of the industrial action in question.'" 
An example of a successful application to suspend a bargaining period is JSM 
Trading Ply Ltd v AFMEPKU."' The AIRC suspended a bargaining period applying 
to Esso Gas Plants at Longford and Long Island in Victoria for four weeks to enable 
the completion of key maintenance tasks at the site. Lacey SDP held that if the 
maintenance were not carried out, gas supplies to Victorian consumers and businesses 
in the middle of winter would end up being restricted, which could endanger the 
welfare of the part of the population that uses gas in Victoria. 
Trade Union Related Matters 
The AIRC may intervene to suspend or terminate a bargaining period where industrial 
action is being organised or taken by an organization and 
• the action is undertaken in order for an employee organization to obtain 
industrial coverage over employees who are not members or not entitled to 
membership in the organization;'" or 
• the action relates, to a significant extent, to a demarcation dispute;'" or 
• the action contravenes an order of the AIRC that relates, to a significant 
extent, to a demarcation dispute.' 
129 Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 174 ALR 
585, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ. 
130 Ibid, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ, Callinan J in agreement, at 594. 
131 A1RC PR 903260, 9 April, 2001 per Lacey SDP. 
132 WRA s 170MW(4). 
133 WRA s 170MW(5)(a); "Demarcation Dispute" is defmed in s4 of the WRA for the purposes of the 
WRA as including: 
(a) a dispute arising between 2 or more organizations, or within an organization, as to the rights, 
status or functions of members of the organizations or organization in relation to the 
employment of those members; or 
(b) a dispute arising between employers and employees, or between members of different 
organizations, as to the demarcation of functions of employees or classes of employees; or 
(c) a dispute about the representation under this Act, or the Registration and Accountability of 
Organizations Schedule [Schedule 1B] of the industrial interests of employees by an 
organization of employees. 
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• Effect of Suspension or Termination of Bargaining Period 
Where the AIRC has suspended or terminated a bargaining period, any action 
undertaken by a negotiating party or any other person in respect of the proposed 
agreement will not be protected action while the bargaining period is suspended.'" 
Where the AIRC terminates a bargaining period on social welfare grounds, the AIRC 
must, as soon as practicable, exercise its powers of conciliation with respect to the 
industrial dispute.' 36 Where conciliation fails, the AIRC is directed; if it considers it 
appropriate and if it is satisfied that the negotiating parties have not settled the matters 
at issue and are not likely to settle such matters through further conciliation, to 
exercise its powers of arbitration to make an award dealing with the matters at issue.' 37 
The power of arbitration granted under this section may only be exercised by a Full 
Bench of the AIRC.'" 
Protected Action and Secondary Boycotts 
Due to the regulation of secondary boycott action under the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth), there is little regulation of secondary boycotts within the WRA. 139 However, 
there is specific provision against secondary boycott conduct in relation to protected 
action contained in s 170MM which provides that industrial action will not be 
protected if it is engaged in, or organised, in concert with one or more persons or 
organizations that are not protected persons, or if it is organised other than solely by 
- one or more protected persons.' 
134 WRA s 170MW(5)(b). 
136 WRA s 170MW(9). 
136 WRA ss 170MWX(1) and (2). 
137  WRA s 170MX(3). In such a case, the AIRC exercises its powers of arbitration to make an award 
under s 170MY. Section 170MY(2) provides that the power to arbitrate and make an award under 
s 170MY is not limited by the list of allowable award matters set out in s 89A. For an example of the 
application of s 170MX and the factors that affect the grant of an award, see CFMEU v Coal and Allied 
Operations Ply Ltd (1999) 93 IR 82; AIRC, PR R9753. 
138 INTRA s 170MX(4). 
139  For discussion of the regulation of secondary boycotts under the TPA see below at 214. 
140  WRA ss 170MM(1) and (2). For the purposes of section 170MM, "protected person" is defined in 
subsection 3 as: 
(a) an organization or employees that is a negotiating party; or 
(b) a member of such an organization who is employed by the employer; or 
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In practice, the terms of s 170MM have extended beyond deliberate secondary 
boycott behaviour on the part of employee organizations. In National Workforce ply 
Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers Union, the Australian Manufacturing 
Workers Union (AMWU) initiated a bargaining period and sought to engage in 
protected industrial action at the same time as two other unions."' The other unions 
had failed to give appropriate notice and were held not to have initiated bargaining 
periods. An injunction under s 127 was granted against the AMWU because it had 
engaged in industrial action with non-protected persons despite the fact that it had 
believed that the other unions were also protected persons and had itself complied 
with the process. 
Pattern Bargaining 
Pattern bargaining involves the initiation of several bargaining periods at several 
connected workplaces, with simultaneous industrial action. Provided that each union 
follows the correct process, each incidence of industrial action will be protected, 
allowing unions to seek similar outcomes with respect to each work site. 
In Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and 
Kindred Industries Union and Ors (Australian Industry Group) 142 a campaign by 
Victorian unions called 'Campaign 2000' utilised pattern bargaining to pursue 
uniform industry-wide certified agreements. The Australian Industry Group applied to 
the AIRC for termination of the bargaining periods involved, on the grounds that the 
negotiating parties were not genuinely trying to reach agreement. Munro J noted that 
the existence of pattern bargaining in itself is not sufficient to terminate a bargaining 
period on the ground that the parties are not genuinely trying to reach agreement.'" 
However, the existence of pattern bargaining could suggest that parties are not trying 
to genuinely reach agreement: 
(c) an officer or employee of such an organization acting in that capacity; or 
an employee who is a negotiating party. 
141 National Workforce, supra note 64. 
142 AIRC, PR T1982, Munro J, 16 October 2000. 
143 Ibid at para 46. Munro J at para 46 also objected to the use of the word "pattern" in this context 
noting that, "I do not use the expression "pattern" to describe such demands. The notion of pattern 
demands or pattern bargaining lacks precision. It also has a partisan pejorative content." (Emphasis 
added). 
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I see no reason why such claims may not be advanced in a way that involves a 
genuine effort to have each employer concede the benefit sought. In such • 
cases, the "pattern" character of the benefit demanded, its source and even the 
uniform content of it, may be a cogent demonstration that the negotiation 
conduct is genuinely directed to securing agreement from the other party. But 
advancement of such claims in a way that denies individual negotiating parties 
opportunity to concede, or modify by agreement, cannot satisfy the test 
established by the Act. Nor can the advancement of such claims in a way that 
effectively seeks agreement from or through entities that are not the 
negotiating party to whom industrial action or the relevant bargaining period is 
directed. The party initiating bargaining about such "common claims" must be 
genuinely trying to reach agreement.'" 
Subsequent to the decision in Australian Industry Group, the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Act 2002 (Cth) inserted a legislative note after 
s 170MW(2) which directs attention to the decision in Australian Industry Group and 
the fact that parties engaged in pattern bargaining may not be genuinely trying to 
reach agreement. When the legislation was first introduced it contained provisions 
enabling the AIRC to terminate a bargaining period where it believed that a party was 
not genuinely trying to reach an agreement with other negotiating parties as a result of 
a process of pattern bargaining.'" The AIRC was to be directed to consider a range of 
factors sourced from Australian Industry Group, the existence of which would tend to 
indicate that the first negotiating party was not genuinely trying to reach agreement 
with the other negotiating parties: 
• one party shows an intention to reach an agreement with persons in an 
industry who are or could become negotiating parties to another agreement 
with that party; or 
• one party shows an intention to reach an agreement with all persons in an 
industry who are, or could become, negotiating parties with that party; or 
• one party shows an intention primarily to reach an agreement with a person 
other than the negotiating parties; or 
• one party shows a refusal to consider or respond to proposals made by other 
negotiating parties.'" 
1" Ibid at para 49 per Munro J. 
145  The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Bill 2002 Cth, Explanatory Memorandum, page 6. 
146 /bid. 
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However, the Government was unable to pass the legislation in the Senate and had to 
compromise with the mere insertion of the legislative note. 
Coercion 
Section 170NC provides that: 
A person must not: 
(a) take or threaten to take any industrial action or other action; or 
(b) refrain or threaten to refrain from taking any action; 
with intent to coerce another person to agree or not to agree to making, 
varying, terminating, or extending the nominal expiry date of, an agreement 
under Division 2 or Division 3. 
This section does not apply to action that is protected action.' 47 Employers must not 
coerce or attempt to coerce an employee of an employer with respect to making or 
withdrawing a request for the involvement of a union organization as the employees' 
representative with respect to the making of a non-union certified agreement under 
Division 2. 1 " Contravention of these provisions is not an offence, but the provision is 
a penalty provision under the WRA and fines may attach.' 49 
It is likely that unprotected industrial action undertaken in the Federal regime is 
automatically a breach of the coercion provision. This effect of the section was 
highlighted by the High Court in Electrolux, where six High Court judges held that 
unprotected industrial action undertaken in support of claims in a proposed certified 
agreement constituted coercion under the section.'" The finding was made 
irrespective of the fact that the parties believed that the action they were undertaking 
was protected action and the claims made were genuine. The implications of the 
decision in Electrolux are that procedural errors or the inclusion of claims unrelated to 
the relationship between employer and employee in the protected action process will 
result in lost protection and an apparently automatic breach of the coercion 
provisions. 
147 WRA s 170NC(2). 
148 WRA s 170NC(3). 
149 WRA s 170ND. 
15° Electrolux Home Products, High Court, supra note 70. 
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Protected Action for Australian Workplace Agreements 
In accordance with the approach of the WRA, whereby parties may take protected 
industrial action in support of a proposed agreement, negotiating parties to an AWA 
are able to take protected industrial action. 
The protected. action provisions applying to negotiations for an AWA are set out in 
Division 8 of Part VID. Parties engaged in negotiations for an AWA need not initiate 
a bargaining period. Limited immunity will be conferred if the party initiating the 
industrial action or lockout provides the other party with three working days' notice 
of their intention to take such action."' Where the employer or employee gives the 
requisite notice and engages in protected action for the purposes of negotiations for an 
AWA, the same degree of immunity and protection against dismissal or 
discrimination is conferred on the employer or employee as that conferred under the 
protected action provisions that apply to negotiations for a Division 2 or Division 3 
agreement.'" 
The inclusion of AWA protected action provisions creates a difficulty because 
industrial action is generally considered to be collective in nature.'" Employers may 
engage in lockout behaviour in an equally effective fashion regardless of whether they 
are locking out one individual or many individuals. However it is questionable 
whether work stoppages engaged in by a single individual would have any significant 
effect on an employer unless that individual has a high level of personal bargaining 
power. Furthermore, the risk to the business of an employer in locking out a single 
employee, as opposed to a group of employees, is considerably reduced.'" 
A further difficulty with the AWA protected action provisions relates to the ability of 
the AIRC to terminate AWA protected action. Where AWA protected action occurs, 
the parties are not required to initiate a bargaining period. This means that there is no 
AWA equivalent to the suspension or termination of a bargaining period applicable to 
Division 2 and 3 agreements, affecting the ability of the AIRC to intervene in 
151 WRA s 170WD(1). 
152 WRA ss 170WC and 170WE. 
153 McCarry, supra note 65 at 141. 
154 For discussion of this issue see Stewart, supra note 58 at 33-36. 
193 
particularly intractable disputes. In the case of The Australasian Meat Industry 
Employees Union v G and K O'Connor (G and K O'Connor),' an application was 
made to the AIRC for an order under s 127 directing that an employer lockout of 
employees in support of AWA negotiations cease. The lockout had been in place for 
in excess of eight months when the order was sought and the employees concerned 
had little success in finding alternative employment or financial support. The 
difficulty for the AIRC in this case was that there was no bargaining period to be 
terminated. Further, as the action was AWA protected action, it appeared that an order 
under s 127 would not be enforceable against the employer due to the immunity 
granted to AWA protected action in s 170WC.' 56 Despite the fact that the order may 
not be enforceable against the action undertaken by the employer, Justice Boulton 
made an order under s 127 directing that the lockout stop, noting that: 
any uncertainty as to enforceability should not cause the Commission to 
refrain from making an order in this case. It is appropriate that an order be 
made even if only to show the Commission's judgment that the lockout and 
dispute have gone on for too long and that there should be renewed efforts by 
the parties to resolve their differences other than by industrial action.' 
The combination of the inability to suspend or terminate a bargaining period and the 
fact that s 127 orders will not be enforceable means that there is no capability within 
the AIRC to terminate a particularly long or protracted AWA dispute. This is of 
concern especially in a circumstance where individual employees are locked out of 
employment for a protracted period. 
The AWA protected action provisions have been listed for repeal before the Federal 
Parliament, in the Workplace Relations Amendment (Australian Workplace 
Agreements Procedures) Bill 2000 (Cth). 158 The rationale behind the proposed 
amendments appears to have been that in practice the provisions have been 
155 (1999) 97 IR 251. 
156 There was some dispute in G and K O'Connor, supra note 155 as to whether or not s 170WC 
conferred immunity against an AIRC order under s 127 in the same terms as the immunity granted to 
protected action in support of negotiations for collective certified agreements, as s 170WC does not 
include the specific express statement of immunity against s 127 orders found in s 170MT(1). 
However, Boulton J at 256 stated that "I am inclined to the view that s 170WC(1) may constitute a bar 
to an action in the Court to enforce an order made under s 127". Enforcement of AIRC orders and 
decisions is a matter for the courts. 
'57 G and K O'Connor, supra note 155 at 258. 
158 For discussion of this Bill see S. McCrystal, 'Employee Protection or Flexibility and Efficiency?' 
(2001) 26 Alternative Law Journal 136. 
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insignificant and were originally introduced only to ensure AWA's appeared to be on 
an even playing field with enterprise agreements where "protected industrial action 
for trade union negotiations is a reality"." 9 The Federal Government argues that the 
provisions "are not relevant to the negotiation of individual as distinct from collective 
agreements".'" 
Other Provisions Relating to Industrial Action under the VVRA 
Strike Pay 
Under both the common law and the WRA, the logic applied to strike action dictates 
that just as employers are deprived of the benefit of their employees' labour and 
experience a loss of profit, so too should employees be deprived of income during a 
strike. Under s 124 of the WRA, the AIRC has no power to deal with claims by 
employees for payment in relation to a period during which those employees were' 
engaged in industrial action. Under Part VIIIA the payment of remuneration to 
employees or indirectly via employee organizations for periods during which they 
were on strike is unlawful. Payments are not to be made or accepted in relation to 
periods of industrial action under any circumstances over which the Commonwealth 
Parliament has legislative competence.' 6 ' While the making of payments in relation to 
periods of industrial action is not an offence under the Part, the provisions are penalty 
provisions to which fines attach. 162 
The effect of these provisions is that parties to negotiations for a Division 2, Division 
3 or AWA agreement cannot include strike pay as part of their proposed agreement. It 
would be a contravention of Part VIIIA for parties to agree that employees or an 
organization will be paid for a period of time during which they were on strike. 
Where employees engage in industrial action that does not include a complete 
stoppage, the legislation is unclear on their entitlement to remuneration. McCarry 
notes that the provisions of Part VIIIA would extend to enable an employer to 
159 McCallum, supra note 58 at 56. 
160 Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business submission to the Senate 
Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education Legislation Committee inquiry into 
the Workplace Relations Amendment (Australian Workplace Agreements Procedures) Bill 2000 at 53. 
161 WRA ss 187AA and 187AB. 
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withhold remuneration from employees who have engaged in a limited work ban or 
'go slow' campaign. 163 More recent commentary suggests that it remains unclear at 
law as to whether or not there has to be a complete cessation of work before the 
prohibition against payments applies, or whether it will apply where work restrictions 
are limited.' 
Stand Down Clauses 
Parties to certified agreements may include stand down clauses in a certified 
agreement or make an application to the AIRC for the inclusion, variation or omission 
of a stand down clause. 165 These clauses enable an employer to stand down employees 
without pay for reasons including the effect of industrial action by any.persons on the 
employers' business including the employers' own employees.'' 
162 WRA ss 187AA(3), 187AB(4) and 187AD(1). 
163 McCarry, supra note 65 at 150. 
164 The Law Relating to Industrial Action in the Building and Construction Industry, Discussion Paper 
18, Prepared by the Faculty of Law at Monash University for the Royal Commission into the Building 
and Construction Industry, November 2002, at 45 (hereafter 'the Cole Royal Commission Discussion 
Paper'). The Discussion paper notes that during the 1998 Waterfront Dispute, the Federal Government 
actively encouraged the employers (Patrick Stevedores) to refrain from paying their employees for any 
period of industrial action, regardless of whether or not it constituted a total stoppage. This point has 
also made by Dabscheck: "Peter Reith [Then Federal Minister for Workplace Relations] drew Patrick's 
attention to Section 187AA of the [WRA], which says employers must not make payment to employees 
if they are involved in industrial action .... Patrick informed the Port Botany workforce they would not 
receive any pay until the overtime bans were lifted. The workers concerned maintained their bans, 
receiving no pay for work performed in non-overtime, or normal hours." B. Dabscheck, 'The 
Waterfront Dispute: Of Vendetta and the Australian Way' (1998) 9 Economic and Labour Relations 
Review 155 at 170. Ryan J considered the issue of part payments in the Federal Court in the case of 
Independent Education Union of Australia v Canonical Administrators, Barkly Street, Bendigo and 
Others (1998) 157 ALR 531 in a case involving selective work bans. Ryan J appeared to accept in the 
case that the common law rules on acceptance of part performance are preserved by para (e) of the 
definition of "industrial action" in s4 of the WRA, whereby "[the] action .... Could only have lost its 
prima facie character as "industrial action" if it were shown to have been authorised or agreed to by the 
employer as contemplated by para (e) of the definition [of industrial action]" at 548. In this case, Ryan 
J did not accept that the partial performance involved in the case had been authorised or agreed to by 
the employer and therefore, the employees were not entitled to payment for the periods of industrial 
action. An additional complication is that the Coalition Government has demonstrated the desire to 
ensure that employees are not entitled to be paid for any work done on any day that industrial action is 
undertaken: the Workplace Relations Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill (Cth) 1999 proposed to 
insert provisions to prevent payment for any day on which any form of industrial action occurred. 
165 WRA s 170MD(6). 
166 WRA s 126. 
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Section 127 Orders 
A . section 127 order is an order of the AIRC directing that industrial action cease or 
not occur. 
Section 127 Orders and Bans Clauses 
Section 127 orders are a legislative descendent of bans clauses, which were award 
clauses that prohibited industrial action by parties bound by the award.' Bans clauses 
were widely utilised during the 1960s, but after a concerted industrial campaign of 
non-participation and non-payment of fines and the jailing of a prominent union 
official, the clauses fell into disuse.'" There are no modern WRA provisions enabling 
the insertion of a bans clause.' With respect to the WRA and s 127, the AIRC has 
stated that the jurisprudence developed governing the insertion and enforcement of 
bans clauses does not continue to apply to s 127: 
[a]n order under s 127 may be accurately described as a legislative descendant 
of the bans clause. We accept that there are some points of the principles 
applied in relation to bans clauses that may be similar to those applicable to 
the exercise of the discretion under s 127 ... [But] it is appropriate for the 
discretion under s 127 to be exercised in a fully contemporary context without 
inhibitions based on precepts formulated for purposes and objectives that may 
have no counterpart in the current Act.' 
167 Coal and Allied Operations Ply Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union and Ors (1997) 73 IR 311 per Munro J, Harrison SDP and Leary C at 329, para 2.5.6. 
168 For discussion of the use (and consequent disuse) of bans clauses see L. Bennett, Making Labour 
Law in Australia: Industrial Relations, Politics and Law (Law Book Company: Sydney, 1994), 
chapter 2; J. Kerr, 'Recalling the Northern Territory Cattle Station Industrial Award Case of 1965 and 
the O'Shea Case of 1969' in Arbitration in Contempt (HR Nicholls Society: Melbourne, 1986), 174; 
L. W. Maher, 'The Bans Clause and Federal Strike Law - The End of an Era?' [1975] Business Law 
Review 22; M. Pittard, 'The Conciliation and Arbitration Act: The Prevention of Strikes and the 
Recovery of Wages' (Paper presented at the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration After 75 Years: 
The Federal Arbitration Process Conference, Present Problems and Future Trends, Monash University, 
Faculty of Law, 14th of July 1979); Pittard and Naughton, supra note 11 at 1192— 1197. 
169 The argument is made by both Creighton and McCarry that the absence of an express bans clause 
provision in the WRA does not exclude the possibility that there remains a residual jurisdiction in the 
AIRC to insert bans clauses into awards: B. Creighton, 'Section 127 of the Workplace Relations Act 
and the Regulation of Industrial Conflict' in R. Naughton, (ed.) The Workplace Relations Act in 
Operation: Eight Case Studies (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Occasional 
Monograph Series No 7, University of Melbourne: Parlcville, 1998), 49 at 52; McCarry, supra note 65 
at 142. 
' 7° Coal and Allied, supra note 167 at 329. 
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Elements of an Order Under s 127 
Section 127 of the WRA allows the AIRC to make orders to stop or prevent industrial 
action. The section provides that: 
if it appears to the AIRC that industrial action is threatened, impending or 
probable, in relation to: 
(a) an industrial dispute; or 
(b) the negotiation or proposed negotiation of an agreement under 
Division 2 of Part VIB; or 
• 	(c) work that is regulated by an award or certified agreement; 
the AMC may, by order, give directions that the industrial action stop or not 
occur. 
The AIRC is directed by the Act to hear and determine an application under s 127 as 
quickly as practicable."' An order under s 127 will not apply to picketing as picketing 
is not encompassed by the definition of industrial action in s 4• 72 
The scope of the discretion 
Section 127 orders require an exercise of discretion on the part of the ARC: 
This discretion is apparently at large ... Accordingly, the identification of 
considerations relevant to the exercise of any such discretion should be guided 
by the objects of the Act and an understanding of the relationship of the power 
and the effect of its exercise to the scheme of the Act.' 
The leading case with respect to s 127 orders is the decision of the AIRC Full Bench 
in Coal and Allied Operations Ply Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, 
Printing and Kindred Industries Union and Ors.' In considering an application for 
an order under s 127, the Full Bench identified three types of industrial action relevant 
to the exercise of the discretion under s 127, namely prohibited action, protected 
action and unprotected action. 
171 WRA s 127(3). 
172 Davids Distribution, supra note 37. 
173 Coal and Allied, supra note 167 at 316 — 316, para 2.2. 
174 Coal and Allied, supra note 167. For discussion of the decision in Coal and Allied see V. Di Felice, 
'Stopping or Preventing Industrial Action in Australia' (2000) 12 Melbourne University Law Review 
310; A. Forsyth, 'A New Handbrake on Industrial Action or Not? A Note on Cases Relating to s 127 of 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 Cth' (1998) 11 Australian Journal of Labour Law 152. 
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Prohibited Industrial Action 
Prohibited industrial action is action prohibited under the WRA, for example 
engaging in boycott conduct or undertaking industrial action before the nominal 
expiry date of a certified agreement.' AIRC decisions suggest that a s 127 order in 
respect of prohibited industrial action would not be automatic, but would most likely 
result.'" 
Protected Industrial Action 
There is no guidance in the terms of s 127 as to whether orders can be made where 
industrial action is protected action. Section 170MT(1) states that s 127 orders have 
no effect against protected action. In Coal and Allied, the Full Bench stated that where 
industrial action is protected action, the AIRC must take into account that any 
resultant order will have no effect on protected action, but may still make an order.'" 
Unprotected Industrial Action 
Unprotected industrial action is action that is not specifically prohibited under the 
. WRA, but is not protected action. A wide range of industrial action may fall within 
the boundaries of unprotected action, however a s 127 order will not be automatically 
available: 
The scheme of the Act does not in our view clearly imprint the discretion 
granted by s 127 with any guiding requirement to the effect that any industrial 
action that is not protected action should be directed to cease. The norms of 
the system reflected in the Act are not so specific that all unprotected 
industrial action must be taken to be of itself unjustifiable ..... [t]here is 
nothing in the Second Reading Speech or in the provisions of the Act from 
which it should be inferred that unprotected action is per se to be treated as 
illegitimate to a degree that warrants it automatically being subject to 
direction.' 
175 Coal and Allied, supra note 167 at page 322, para 2.5.4. 
176 See Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied 
Services Union of Australia v AG Coombs Fire Protection (1998) 87 IR 110 and Di Felice, supra note 
174 at 315. 
177 Coal and Allied, supra note 167 at 330 — 332, para 2.5.7. 
178 1bid at 324 and 329, paras 2.5.4 and 2.5.6. At 323, para 2.5.4 the Full Bench stated that "[c]learly, a 
relatively wide range of industrial action may fall outside the class of protected action. Thus, any 
industrial action that is for a purpose extraneous to supporting claims made in respect of the proposed 
agreement would appear not to be protected action. Action taken against more than one employer, or in 
concert with organizations not negotiating parties in a bargaining period, or in concert with fellow 
members of an organization who are not also fellow employees, or for economic or social campaigns, 
or to secure union organizational objectives would each appear incapable of being protected action 
















Decisions of the AIRC and Federal Court subsequent to Coal and Allied have 
developed principles guiding exercise of the discretion under s 127 in cases of 
unprotected industrial action. Di Felice surveyed these cases and extracted a set of 
relevant factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion:'" 
• the purpose of the industrial action — is the action directed at advancing claims 
related to a proposed agreement, or to industrial factors or some other cause? 
• the economic impact of the industrial action on the employer concerned, 
although this will not be a significant factor in its own right; 
• the public interest; 
• the history of industrial action by the respondent party; 
• the conduct of the parties to the dispute; and 
• freedom of expression.'" 
The Federal Government has sought to limit the scope of the discretion under s 127. 
The Workplace Relations Amendment (Improved Remedies for Unprotected Action) 
Bill 2002 (Cth) directed the AIRC to hear s 127 applications within 48 hours and set 
out provisions for the AIRC to make 'interim' orders where the ARC was satisfied 
that the industrial action was not protected action (or had not formed a view on that 
matter). The Bill proposed a list of factors for the ARC to take into account in the 
granting of an interim order including potential damage to any industry, escalation of 
the action, pattern bargaining and WRA notice requirements.' Further, the Bill 
directed the ARC to have regard to the undesirability of the occurrence of 
of s 127 with respect to economic or social campaigns see N. Luxton, 'Section 127 and Protest Action: 
The 'Scrap the Lap' Campaign Case' in R. Naughton, (ed.) The Workplace Relations Act in Operation: 
Eight Case Studies (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Occasional Monograph Series 
No 7, University of Melbourne: Parlcville, 1998), 55. 
179 Di Felice, supra note 174. 
180 Di Felice, supra note 174 at 326 notes that the issue of freedom of expression was raised in 
Communications Electrical Energy Information Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of 
Australia v Commissioner Liang of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Another 
(1998) 86 IR 142 which involved industrial action protesting against proposed changes to Western 
Australian industrial legislation. In the Federal Court, at 158, French J stated: "the effect of a particular 
order on freedom of action and specifically on freedom of expression is a matter relevant to and 
properly to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion". 
181 Workplace Relations Amendment (Improved Remedies for Unprotected Action) Bill 2002 (Cth), 
Schedule 1, s L 
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unprotected industrial action:" When the Bill was passed into law in 2004, all 
substantial provisions had been removed, except the ability of the AIRC to make an 
interim order under s 127. 1" 
Enforcement of s 127 orders 
The Federal Court, on the application of a person or organization affected by a s 127 
order, may grant an injunction to stop contravention of the order if it is satisfied that 
the order has been contravened or is likely to be contravened: 84 The granting of an 
injunction by the Federal Court is not a matter of right; rather the Federal Court 
retains discretion and, in exercising injunctive powers, will apply the equitable 
principles pertaining to injunctive relief.' Failure to comply with an injunction of the 
Federal Court constitutes contempt of court and may form the basis for a range of 
penalties, including the cancellation of the registration of any organization involved in 
the contempt. 
Section 127 Orders and Employer Conduct 
As the definition of industrial action under the WRA encompasses lockouts, s 127 
orders can be made by the AIRC against an employer engaging in a lockout. In G and 
K O'Connor the union involved brought an action against an employer who had 
locked out employees for in excess of 8 months in pursuit of negotiations in support 
182  Ibid. In the Second Reading Speech for the Bill, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations 
Abbot stated "[s]trikes cost jobs. Protected action is a privilege, statutorily conferred once certain 
requirements have been fulfilled. When an industrial organization refuses or fails to comply with those 
requirements and unprotected industrial action results, then that organization must be quickly called to 
account. Industrial parties are not exempt from acceptable standards of behaviour and should not be 
able to avoid the rule of law. This Bill will ensure that applications for orders to prevent unprotected 
industrial action are dealt with quickly and that, in dealing with applications, the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission takes into account the undesirability of unprotected action." Commonwealth of 
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 June 2002, Second Reading Speech, 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Improved Remedies for Unprotected Action) Bill 2002 (Cth), Mr 
Abbott, Minister For Employment and Workplace Relations at 4379. 
183  Workplace Relations Amendment (Improved Remedies for Unprotected Action) Act 2004 (Cth). 
184 WRA s 127(6). 
185 Australian Paper Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, 
Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia and Ors (1998) 81 IR 15 per North J at 16 - 17: "The 
power to grant an injunction is a discretionary power in very wide terms ...The Court only acquired 
jurisdiction if the Commission has made an order, but the mere fact that the Commission has made an 
order does not mean that the court is bound to, or will grant, an injunction. The grant of an inunction is 
an independent function performed by the Court .... By conferring a power on the Court expressed in 
terms of a power to grant an injunction, Parliament intended that the Court would be guided by the 
principles established by equity for the grant of an injunction". 
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of proposed AWAs.'" In view of the length of the lockout, and the degree of hardship 
experienced by the employees involved, Boulton J made an order under s 127, noting 
that the order did not represent "a conclusion about the respective merits of the 
positions adopted by the parties in the negotiations or the dispute". 187 
Employee organizations have also sought to utilise s 127 against other forms of 
employer behaviour, particularly termination of employment contrary to the terms of 
a certified agreement.'" Employee organizations have argued that termination of 
employment in these circumstances constitutes industrial action susceptible to an 
order under s 127, because it is action within the definition of industrial action under 
the WRA, in the form of a permanent ban, limitation or restriction on the performance 
of work. 189 This argument was rejected by a Full Bench of the AIRC in AFMEP&KIU 
v The Age Company Limited (the Age Company Limited), I9° where the employer 
concerned sought to enforce compulsory redundancies in breach of an express term of 
a certified agreement. The AIRC distinguished between termination of employment 
and a ban, limitation or restriction on work that would not affect the continuation of 
the employment relationship. Such action would more easily come within the 
definition of industrial action.' 9 ' 
In the Age Company Limited the AIRC refused to make a determination on a 
submission made by the Commonwealth Government that the only employer action 
that would come within the definition of industrial action for the purposes of s 127 
would be a lockout. Instead, they left the question open to be decided in future cases 
on the facts of those cases. This suggests that while the decision excludes termination 
of employment from the definition of industrial action, other employer action short of 
lockout may be susceptible to an order under s 127. 
186 G and K O'Connor, supra note 155. 
187 Ibid per Boulton J at 258. 
188 For example see Australian Flight Engineers' Association v Qantas Airways Limited, AIRC, 
PR Q4688, 7 August 1998, per Whelan C; Australian Federation of Air Pilots v Kendall Airlines (Aust) 
Pty Ltd, AMC, PR 920361, 23 July 2002, per Watson SDP. 
189 WRA defmition of industrial action, s 4(b). 
190 AIRC, PR 946290, 11 May 2004, Per Guidice J, Harrison SDP and Simmonds C. 
191 Ibid at paras 33 — 35. 
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Section 166A — Delay of Tortious Action 
Section 166A of the WRA operates to delay the commencement of tortious 
proceedings in connection with unprotected industrial action. The section provides 
that an action in tort under the law of a State or Territory may not be brought by a 
person "against an organization of employees, or an officer, member or employee of 
such an organization, in relation to conduct which is in contemplation or furtherance 
of claims that are the subject of an industrial dispute", unless a relevant certificate has 
been obtained from the AIRC. 
Where a party wishes to commence tortious action they must notify the AIRC who 
will then conciliate the dispute: 92 Such conciliation may continue until one of three 
things occurs. First, if the AIRC forms the opinion that it is not likely to be able to 
stop the conduct complained of promptly, it must immediately certify in writing to 
that effect.' Second, if the AIRC determines that it would cause substantial injustice 
to the applicant if they were prevented from bringing tortious action during 
conciliation, then the AIRC must immediately certify in writing to that effect.'" 
Third, if the AIRC has not stopped the conduct complained of by the applicant at the 
end of 72 hours after the notice of intention was submitted to the A1RC, then the 
AIRC must immediately certify in writing to that effect. 195 
The process for the delay of commencing tortious action for unprotected industrial 
action does not apply with respect to: 
• conduct that has resulted in personal injury; or wilful or reckless destruction 
of, or damage to, property; or the unlawful taking, keeping or use of property; 
or 
• conduct arising out of a demarcation dispute; or 
• conduct arising out of a dispute over a claim for payment in respect of a period 
during which the employees were engaged or are engaging in industrial action; 
or 
• conduct that is in breach of a direction given by the AIRC or a State industrial 
authority.' 96 
192 WRA s 166A(3) and (5). 
193 WRA s 166A(6)(a). 
194 WRA s 166A(6)(b). 
195 WRA s 166A(6)(c). 
196 WRA s 166A(2). 
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Section 166A does not clearly address whether or not an applicant would be able to 
commence tortious action if the industrial action complained of ceases within 72 
hours and a certificate is not issued. In The Age Company Limited, the Full Bench of 
the AIRC held that cessation of the industrial action complained of within the 72-hour 
period does not prevent the AIRC from issuing a certificate to enable tortious action 
to commence. The AIRC could issue a certificate in these circumstances if the 
industrial dispute was still continuing, if the applicant would suffer substantial 
injustice if a certificate were not issued, or if the dispute continues and the hours 
involved eventually add up to 72.' The Full Bench found that such a construction of 
the section is consistent with restricting the ability to bring an action in tort unless the 
certification requirements are met.'" The decision indicates that if none of the three 
certification criteria are fulfilled, the applicant will not be entitled to a certificate from 
the AIRC, and will be unable to commence tortious proceedings. 
One outstanding s 166A issue relates to the characterisation of applications for 
injunctions against threatened or actual tortious conduct. An action brought in court 
for an injunction to stop or prevent strike action on the basis of an actual or threatened 
tort is an action brought in equity. However, the wording of the section states that in 
order to bring an action in tort, a certificate must be obtained. If this construction of 
s 166A is correct, then the section only operates as a limited immunity against tortious 
proceedings, which are less efficacious in terms of limiting the immediate effects of 
strike action, and not against applications for injunctions, which have a more potent 
immediate impact. In an application by Patrick Stevedores for an injunction against 
tortious behaviour by the Maritime Union of Australia, Beach J stated that: 
[an] application for injunctive relief is not an action in tort under the law of the 
State of Victoria. It is an application seeking that the court exercise its 
equitable jurisdiction to prevent the union and certain of its officials 
committing the tort of intentionally interfering with the performance by 
members of the union of their contracts with Patricks. If Patricks had issued a 
writ seeking no more than injunctive relief, I would have no hesitation in 
concluding that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the present 
application.'" 
197 Ibid at paras 93— 114. 
198 'bid at para 115. 
I " Patrick Stevedore No 1 Pty Ltd and Anor v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 79 IR 268 per 
Beach J at 271 —272. 
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This reflects the approach taken in a number of decided cases. 20° Creighton and 
Stewart argue that this construction is at odds with the purpose of s 166A, the scheme 
of the WRA, and "takes only limited account of the fusion of law and equity and sits 
uneasily with relevant High Court authority". ' 1 
Cancellation and Suspension of Awards and Orders 
Section 187 enables a Full Bench or the President of the AIRC to cancel or suspend 
all or any of the terms of an AIRC award or order upon application by an 
organization, a person interested or the Minister, on the grounds that an organization 
has contravened the WRA, contravened the Registration and Accountability of 
Organizations schedule to the WRA, or an AIRC award or order. An application may 
also be made where a substantial number of the members of an organization refuse to 
accept employment in accordance with existing awards or for any other reason.' The 
power to cancel or suspend an award is used sparingly as it denies affected employees 
the benefit of minimum safety net entitlements.' 
Deregistration of Organizations 
Deregistration entails loss of the right to participate in the bargaining system at the 
federal level and loss of access to the processes of conciliation and arbitration. While 
deregistration operates as a sanctioning device, it also entails a loss of regulatory 
control over the organization concerned.' The relevant provisions are set out in 
WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter Two, Part Three, s 28 and allow an organization, person 
200 See Ansett Australia Ltd v Flight Attendants Association of Australia, (1996), VSC No. E7635, 
unreported judgement, 31 October, 1996 per Hampel J; Tenix Defence Systems Ply Ltd v The 
AFMEP&KI Union and Ors [1999] VSC 40, unreported judgment, 19 February 1999, per Beach J. 
201  Creighton and Stewart, supra note 11 at 414. The reference to High Court authority refers to the 
decision of the High Court in General Motors Holden v Difazio (1979) 141 CLR 659 at 688 where 
Mason J, commenting on the word 'action' in a provision of the then Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1972 (SA) which acted as a limitation on actions in the common law courts, stated that 
"[t]he expression 'cause of action' frequently signifies an antecedent right asserted by a plaintiff. 
However, in the context of a general provision dealing with limitations of actions and applicable to 'all 
actions' ... it should be given the wider meaning 'cause of complaint". 
202 WRA ss 187(4)(b) and (c). 
203 Cole Royal Commission Discussion Paper, supra note 164 at 51. The Commission paper notes a rare 
example where an award was cancelled as a punitive measure — Application by East-West Airlines 
(Operations) Ltd and Ors; Re Cancellation of Pilots Award, AIRC, PR H9340, Full Bench, 19 August, 
1989. At 52, the discussion paper notes that when cancelling the award, the Full Bench "cautioned that 
taking action under the award cancellation provisions was a grave step because of the potential 
consequences for the parties such as dramatic changes to employment contracts, and therefore such a 
step must only be taken after careful consideration and inquiry". 
205 
interested, or the Minister to make an application to the Federal Court for an order 
cancelling the registration of an organization on any one of the following grounds: 
• where the conduct of an organization or a substantial number of the members 
of an organization has prevented or hindered the achievement of an object of 
this Schedule (relating to employee organizations) or the WRA; 205 or 
• where the organization, or a substantial number of the members of the 
organization or of a section or class of members of the organization has 
engaged in industrial action that has prevented, hindered or interfered with 
Constitutional trade and commerce or the provision of any public service by 
the Commonwealth or a State or Territory or authority of same;" or 
• where the organization, or a substantial number of the members of the 
organization or of a section or class of members of the organization has or 
have been engaged in industrial action that has had, is having or is likely to 
have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, health or welfare of the 
community or a part of the community;" or 
• where the organization, or a substantial number of the members of the 
organization or of a section or class of members of the organization, has or 
have failed to comply with an injunction granted under subsection 127(6) or 
(7) of the WRA directing compliance with an AIRC order that industrial 
action not occur or stop; 208 or 
• where the organization, or a substantial number of the members of the 
organization or of a section or class of members of the organization, has or 
have failed to comply with an injunction granted under section 187AD of the 
WRA directing compliance with an AIRC order relating to payment for 
periods of industrial action.' 
If the court finds that a ground for cancellation has been established and does not 
consider deregistration to be unjust, having regard to the degree of gravity of the ° 
matters constituting the ground on which the cancellation would be based, the court is 
204 Creighton and Stewart, supra note 11 at 390, note that deregistration operates as a "double edged 
sword". 
205 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 28(1)(a). 
206 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 28(1)(b). 
207 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 28(1)(c). 
208 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 28(1)(d). 
209 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 28(1)(e). 
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directed to cancel the registration of the organization.' An alternative to cancellation 
is s 29 of the Schedule, which enables the court to suspend any of the rights, 
privileges or capacities of the organization or its members, give directions as to the 
exercise of any suspended rights or privileges, or restrict the use of the funds or 
property of the organization. 2 " If an alternative order is made, deregistration is 
deferred until the orders cease to be in force or until an application by a party to the 
proceeding is made and the court considers it just to determine the question of 
deregistration. 212 
The Right to Strike and WRA Freedom of Association Provisions 
The Federal labour laws have always contained provisions designed to protect the 
right of an employee to join a trade union and not face victimisation on the basis of 
. that choice.' In practice, such provisions were quasi criminal in nature, with a 
correspondingly onerous burden of proof.' The right to belong was dominant. Where 
the right not to belong was considered, it was usually addressed through the inclusion 
of conscientious objection prbvisions. 215 
The WROLAA introduced Part XA of the WRA, titled Freedom of Association. The 
Part was designed to implement the right of all employees and employers to choose 
whether or not to join an industrial organization and face no adverse consequences as 
a result of that choice. Part XA is relevant to the right to strike as issues surrounding 
the right to belong or not to belong are often connected to industrial action. 
210 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 28(3). The wording of the section is that the Court must 
cancel the registration of the organization subject to subsection (4) and s 29 of the Schedule. 
211 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 29(2)(c). 
212 WRA Schedule 1B, Chapter 2, Part 3, s 29(3). 
213 R. McCallum, 'A Priority of Rights: Freedom of Association and the Waterfront Dispute' (1998) 24 
Australian Bulletin of Labour 207 at 210; For detailed discussion of the history of the protection of 
union membership in Australian law see P. Weeks, Trade Union Security Law: A Study of Preference 
and Compulsory Unionism (Federation Press: Sydney, 1995) at chapter 5, 150 — 172. 
214 McCallum, supra note 213 at 210. 
215  For discussion of conscientious objection to union membership in Australian law and protections 
available to non-employees and self-employed persons see Weeks, supra note 213, chapter 6. 
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The Operation of Part XA 
The principal enactment of freedom of association is contained within Division 3 of 
Part XA, preventing discriminatory behaviour by parties to employment related 
matters. Under s 298K(1) an employer must not do any of the following for a 
prohibited reason, or for reasons that include a prohibited reason, 
(a) dismiss an employee; 
(b) injure an employee in his or her employment; 
(c) alter the position of an employee to the employee's prejudice; 
(d) refuse to employ another person; 
(e) discriminate against another person in the terms or conditions on which the 
employer offers to employ the other person. 216 
Section 298L(1) sets out the prohibited reasons that effect a breach of s 298K(1). Four 
of these relate to industrial action, providing that conduct will be for a prohibited 
reason if it is carried out because the employee, independent contractor or other 
person concerned: 
(d) has refused or failed to join in industrial action; or 
(f) has made, proposed to make or has at any time proposed to make an 
application to an industrial body for an order under an industrial law for the 
holding of a secret ballot; or 
(g) has participated in, proposed to participate in or has at any time proposed to 
participate in a secret ballot ordered by an industrial body under an industrial 
law; or 
(1) in the case of an employee or independent contractor, who is a member of an 
industrial association that is seeking better industrial conditions — is 
dissatisfied with his or her conditions. 
There are also provisions in Part XA designed to stop employees, independent 
contractors or industrial associations from discriminating against each other, an 
employer or any other person including discrimination involving industrial action. 
Section 298N provides that an employee or independent contractor must not cease 
work in response to an employers' enforcement of industrial rights or membership of 
an industrial association. Section 298P prohibits industrial action taken against an 
employer in order to force that employer to join or resign from an organization or 
encourage or incite the employer to demote or terminate the employment of an 
216 Section 298K(2) repeats these provisions with respect to independent contractors and 'persons' who 
have entered into a contract for the services of an independent contractor. 
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employee (or any other prejudicial conduct) on any prohibited ground (ie - their 
membership, non-membership or actions in relation to an industrial association). 
Industrial action undertaken with this purpose would not be protected action under the 
WRA. 
Sections 298Q and 298S prohibit conduct by an industrial association against an 
employee or an independent contractor where that action is designed to prejudice that 
person in their employment or possible employment with the intention of coercing the 
person to join in industrial action or dissuading or preventing the person from making 
an application for the holding of a secret ballot. 
Finally, the provisions impact upon the internal security devices of industrial 
associations. An industrial association must not impose a penalty, forfeiture or 
disability upon a member or officer of that industrial association: 
• with the intent to coerce the member to join in industrial action; or 
• because the member has refused or failed to join in industrial action; or 
• because the member has or has proposed to make an application to an 
industrial body for the holding of a secret ballot; or 
• because the member has participated in, proposes to participate in or has at 
any time proposed to participate in a secret ballot ordered by an industrial 
body under an industrial law.' 
Reverse Onus 
The freedom of association provisions operate under a reverse onus, set out in s 298V, 
whereby if it is alleged that the conduct in question was, or is, being carried out for a 
particular reason or with a particular intent, and that to carry out the conduct for that 
reason and that intent would constitute a contravention of the Part, then the 
presumption arises that the conduct was or is being carried out for that reason or that 
intent. The operation of the reverse onus in practice was considered by the Federal 
Court in Davids Distribution.' The majority noted that where an application for 
interlocutory injunctive relief is made alleging a breach of s 298K, the applicant for 
217 WRA s 298R. 
218 DaVidS Distribution, supra note 37. 
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injunctive relief must establish that there is a serious question to be tried that the 
conduct complained of was encompassed by s 298K and occurred for a prohibited 
reason. This will raise the rebuttable presumption under s 298V. 219 
Remedies 
Division 6 sets out the remedies for a contravention of Part XA. Contravention does 
not constitute an offence, but substantial fines and a range of other orders may be 
made upon application by a party with standing under Division 6. 220 
WRA Construction of Freedom of Association 
A central theme explored in chapter 1 and chapter 3 was the ILO construction of 
freedom of association in a functional manner wherein the right to strike operates as a 
facet of freedom of association. The enactment of freedom of association within Part 
XA does not conform to the ILO model and is not designed to operate in a functional 
manner. Rather, it is static, enacted along the competing interpretative tradition of an 
individualist freedom of association, encompassing only the right to belong or not to 
belong. The objects of the Part, to ensure that employers, employees and independent 
contractors are free to join or not to join and not to be victimised as a result of their 
choice, support this restricted construction of freedom of association.' The objects 
do not purport to protect the activities of an organization once a member's right to 
belong or not belong is assured and, indeed, in providing protection for union 
dissenters (who, for example, decline to join in industrial action) undermine 
democratic decisions of the collective. 
219 Ibid. 
2" WRA s 298X. 
221 WRA s 298A. 
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However, despite this lack of provision for collective activity in the literal text of Part 
XA, judicial interpretations have placed a broader construction on the provisions, 
extending their role beyond the individualist interpretation. In Davids Distribution, 
Wilcox and Cooper JJ note that Part XA must be read within the context of the Act as 
a whole: 
[I]n the context of the Act, Part XA does not stand alone. It is aimed at 
ensuring that employees may band together, if they wish, for collective 
bargaining of the type provided in the Act to achieve the broader objectives of 
the Act as contained in section 3. 222 
Wilcox and Cooper JJ compare the provisions in Part XA to US provisions designed 
to ensure "the right to participate in protection [sic] union activities, including the 
taking of collective industrial action against an employer to seek to obtain better 
industrial conditions"." They argue in favour of a whole of Act approach, with a 
broader approach to freedom of association than a literal construction of Part XA 
would suggest. 
• Another example is Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd.' The case involved a branch manager of the ANZ, Ms 
Buckland, who was also prominent in the Finance Sector Union (FSU). During a 
dispute between the FSU and the ANZ, Ms Buckland participated in protected 
industrial action. She was instructed by senior management to attend a 'formal 
counselling session' where it was suggested that she had failed in her duties as a 
manager by failing to persuade her employees that ANZ had taken a valid position in 
industrial negotiations. The ASU brought proceedings in the Federal Court alleging 
that Ms Buckland had been prejudiced in her employment for the prohibited reason 
that she was an officer or member of an industrial organization, and was dissatisfied 
with her terms and conditions of employment. The ASU also alleged that she had 
been prejudiced by reason of having taken part in protected industrial action.' 
Wilcox J was satisfied that the 'formal counselling' was action that had the effect of 
222 Davids Distribution, supra note 37, per Wilcox and Cooper JJ at 500. 
223 Ibid. Their honours refer to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USCA ss 152(3), 157, 
158(a)(1)and(3), 163. 
224 (2002) 114 lit 352. 
225 WRA s 170MU. 
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making Ms Buckland's job less secure and that this action had been undertaken for 
the prohibited reasons outlined. 
A complicating factor was Ms Buckland's managerial position. Wilcox J found that 
the senior manager responsible for the formal counselling session: 
thought it was her duty to ensure (or at least urge) the attendance of her staff 
[at work, ie: not to participate in the protected industrial action, and] must 
have thought she had a duty to work herself, whatever her legal right not to do 
so. And he must have thought it a betrayal for her, not only to fail to urge the 
staff to work, but to give a lead in the opposite direction by stopping work 
herself' 
In determining an appropriate penalty for ANZ, Wilcox J noted that it is important, 
for the purposes of freedom of association, that employees be able to participate in 
industrial activities and voice their concerns in a media context:' 
The right of freedom of association has always been protected under 
Commonwealth industrial law. As Ms Howell says [counsel in the case], the 
freedom to join and actively participate in industrial activities is frustrated "if 
employees are not free to articulate their dissatisfaction with respect to work 
related matters, both as between themselves and through media"." 
The case suggests that the freedom of association provisions interact with protected 
action to ensure that all employees have the right to engage in industrial activities. 
Furthermore, the decision of Wilcox J affirms that Part XA does not merely protect 
the right to belong, but encompasses the activities of the collective once formed and 
the freedom to actively participate in industrial activities. 
When viewed in this manner, Part XA provides an extension of the protections 
established under the protected action provisions. The WRA establishes a framework 
for collective bargaining in which the right to participate in industrial action operates 
as a fundamental element. In order to establish and maintain employment terms and 
conditions, employees have a right to join industrial organizations, a right to 
participate in collective action and a right to be protected in that participation by the 
freedom of association provisions. This demonstrates a willingness on the part of the 
226 Finance Sector Union v ANZ, supra note 224, at para 146 per Wilcox J. 
227 Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2002] FCA 
1035, unreported judgment, Federal Court, per Wilcox J. 
228 Ibid at para 13. 
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judiciary to engage with freedom of association from a functional perspective despite 
the literal text of Part XA. 
Freedom of Association and Unprotected Industrial Action 
Where an employee engages in protected industrial action, they will be protected 
against dismissal, victimisation or discrimination by the protected action provisions of 
the WRA. Where employees and employee organizations engage in unprotected 
industrial action, the issue arises as to whether those employees may be dismissed, 
victimised or discriminated against as a result of participation. 
This question arose in Davids Distribution after the court held that peaceful picketing 
was not industrial action under the WRA and therefore could not be covered by the 
protected action provisions!' Fifty-two employees who had participated in the 
peaceful picket were dismissed. The Court had to consider whether the dismissal 
occurred for the prohibited reason that the employees were members of an industrial 
association and were dissatisfied with their conditions of employment. In determining 
whether or not to grant an injunction, Wilcox and Cooper JJ held that there was a 
serious question to be tried in the case as to "whether the dismissal of the employees 
for engaging in the collective industrial action ... was conduct falling within 
ss 298K(2) and 298L(1)(1) of the Act" despite the fact that the action was 
unprotected."' 
The issue of unprotected industrial action was also addressed in the case Australian 
Workers Union v Johnson Matthey (Aust) Ltd (Johnson Matthey).' Johnson Matthey 
dismissed two employees on the basis that they were intending to undertake 
unprotected action. The Australian Workers Union argued that the termination was in 
contravention of the freedom of association provisions on the grounds that the 
employees were members of an industrial association and had intended to engage in 
industrial action. The employer argued that the intended industrial action was not 
protected. In obiter dicter, Marshall J noted that: 
229 Davids Distribution, supra note 37. 
239 Ibid per Wilcox and Cooper JJ at 501. 
231 [2000] 171 ALR 410. 
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[w]here it is alleged that a breach of s 170MU(1) of the Act has occurred by 
reference to an employee's proposal to engage in protected action, it does not 
matter that the proposed protected action when later engaged in did not, in 
fact, become protected action because a non-protected person happened to join 
in the action. 232 
Davids Distribution and Johnson Matthey suggest that Part XA may be used where an 
employee is discriminated against, victimised or dismissed as a result of engaging in 
unprotected industrial action. However, this use of the provisions has not yet been 
fully explored. 
Secondary Boycotts 
Unprotected industrial action remains vulnerable to common law and statutory 
penalties. One of those potential sources of illegality arises from the prohibition on 
secondary boycotts contained within Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth) 
(TPA). The purposes of the TPA, stated in s 2, are to enhance the welfare of 
Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for 
consumer protection. The secondary boycott provisions are contained in Fart IV of the 
TPA, which aims to encourage competition by prohibiting conduct that would be 
'anti-competitive' in effect; thereby substantially lessening competition in a market or 
markets. 
A typical secondary boycott would involve an industrial dispute between A, an 
employer and the employees of that employer, B. Other persons, C, who are not 
employees of A, refuse to handle goods or provide/use services which are supplied by 
or to be supplied to A. Therefore the actual boycott will affect third parties, D, who 
supply or are supplied goods or services by A through the actions of C. 233 
232 Ibid per Marshall J at 418. The statement was °biter dicter because the subsequent industrial action 
was held to be protected action by the court and therefore it was not called upon to determine the 
application of Part XA to unprotected industrial action. 
233 Pittard and Naughton describe a principal characteristic of a secondary boycott as action "often 
taken by one group of workers in support of claims not on their own behalf but in support of claims of 
workers employed by another employer and the action is directed to a customer or supplier of that other 
employer": Pittard and Naughton, supra note 11 at 1067. 
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The first legislative provisions governing secondary boycotts in Australia were 
introduced in July 1977 as a result of the recommendations of the parliamentary 
Trade Practices Act Review Committee (the 'Swanson Committee Report').' 
Section 45D was inserted into the TPA in 1977. 235  Sections 45D(A-C) were amended 
in 1978 extending liability to actions "hindering overseas or interstate trade or 
commerce". 236 In 1980 the legislature inserted s 45E prohibiting "boycott 
agreements". 237 
In 1994, the Keating Government moved those boycott provisions of 'industrial 
application' from the TPA to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), creating a new 
Division 7 of Part VI.' The key provisions of the IR Act as amended were s 162 and 
s 163 proscribing secondary boycotts of an industrial nature and s 162A which 
exempted peaceful picketing from the effect of the legislation. The legislation also• 
channelled litigation through the AIRC and the short lived Industrial Relations Court 
of Australia. 
In 1996, the WROLAA repealed the secondary boycott provisions and restored them 
to the TPA. 239 The structure of the restored provisions is different to the old TPA 
234 Report of the Trade Practices Act Review Committee, (Australian Government Publishing Service: 
Canberra, 1976) (the 'Swanson Committee Report'). 
235 Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977 (Cth). 
236 Trade Practices Amendment Act 1978 (Cth). 
237 Trade Practices (Boycotts) Amendment Act 1980 (Cth). The introduction of s 45E followed the 
decision in Leon Laidely Ply Ltd v Transport Workers Union and Ors (1980) 28 ALR 129, where an 
agreement reached between a trade union (the Transport Workers' Union) and a fuel supplier (Amoco) 
to discontinue supply of petrol to a third party (Laidley), was held not to constitute a secondary boycott 
as the dominant purpose under which Amoco had acted was held to be to reduce industrial action at its 
own sites and not to damage the business of Laidley. Section 45E sought to outlaw such agreements, 
that exploit the requirement of s 45D that the dominant purpose of the conduct be to damage the 
business of the third party. For discussion of the Laidley decision, see: D. Shavin, 'Restrictive Trade 
Practices' (1980) 8 Australian Business Law Review 211. 
238 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth), s43. The provisions of the TPA were reviewed by the 
Senate Standing Committee on Employment Education and Training, prior to the introduction Of the 
Reform Act and the findings were published as: The Operation of Sections 45D and 45E of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974. For discussion of this Report see J. Pahnos, 'Sections 45D and 45E Reviewed' 
(1994) 7 Australian Journal of Labour Law 102. For discussion of the changes made by the Reform 
Act to the substantive secondary boycott provisions see D. B. Moore, 'Industrial Action and Secondary 
Boycotts' (1994) 22 Australian Business Law Review 370. 
239 Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth), s 3 and Schedule 17. 
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provisions, but the effect is substantially the same, meaning that pre-1993 decisions 
are relevant to the operation and interpretation of the 1996 legislation.' 
The Modern Legislative Provisions 
The main provisions concerning boycotts are s 45D and associated sections. They are 
not industrial in nature or designed specifically to apply to the industrial context but 
the most common application of the sections is to industrial disputes. 
Section 45D(1) outlaws secondary boycotts engaged in for the purpose of causing 
substantial loss or damage. The section provides that: 
a person must not, in concert with a second person, engage in conduct: 
(a) that hinders or prevents: 
(i) a third person supplying goods or services to a fourth person 
(which is a corporation and which is not an employer of the 
first person or the second person); or 
(ii) a third person acquiring goods or services from a fourth person 
(which is a corporation and which is not an employer of the 
first person or the second person); and 
(b) that is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the 
effect, of causing substantial loss or damage to the business of the fourth 
person. 24 ' 
The section will also apply in a circumstance where the fourth person is not a 
corporation but the third person is a corporation and the conduct would have or be 
likely to have the effect of causing substantial loss or damage to the business of the 
third person.'" 
In an industrial context, s 45D would operate to outlaw the following circumstance: 
Z is a trade union in dispute with an employer, D. In order to place pressure on D, Z 
approaches another trade union, A, and requests that they use their membership in 
order to disrupt the flow of goods and services to D. A approaches their members, B, 
employed by C. C has a number of supply contracts with D. A and B act in concert in 
240 R. McClelland, 'Sections 45D and 45E of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Reborn or Misconceived?' 
(1997) 16 Australian Bar Review 118 at 118. 
241 TPA s 45D(2) provides that a person is taken to engage in conduct for a purpose mentioned in 
sub section (1) if the person engages in the conduct for purposes that include that purpose. 
242 The necessity for corporate involvement exists because the constitutional validity of s 45D rests 
principally on the corporations power. 
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order to hinder or prevent C supplying goods or services to D. In this case, D must be 
a corporation, and neither A nor B must be employees of D. If D is not a corporation, 
the requirements will be met if C is a corporation and the effect of the action taken by 
A and B would be to cause substantial loss or damage to the business of C. 
One of the more. contentious elements of s 45D is the meaning of 'purpose' under the 
• section and whether parties who transgress the provisions in the pursuit of 
employment or industrial outcomes have the relevant 'purpose' of inflicting loss or 
damage on the target of the action. Purposes in this sense could be considered to 
encompass either the immediate purpose of the action, to place pressure on a target 
party through the infliction of loss or damage, or an ultimate purpose of achieving an 
industrial outcome. Cases decided before 1993 indicated that parties could transgress 
s 45D if their immediate purpose was to inflict loss or damage even if this purpose 
was part of a wider industrial agenda.' 
When the boycott provisions were moved to the IR Act in 1993, the word 'ultimate' 
was placed before the word purpose in order to accommodate the concept that the 
ultimate purpose of a boycott may not be to inflict damage but to achieve industrial 
outcomes.' However, when the provisions were transferred back to the TPA, any 
requirement of dominant or ultimate purpose was removed and the pre-1993 approach 
to purpose prevails. The concept of 'industrial outcomes' is now only retained within 
the defence to actions under s 45D contained in s 45DD." 
The boycott provisions under the TPA extend liability from secondary boycotts to 
primary boycotts in certain circumstances. Under s 45DB, a person must not, in 
concert with another person, engage in conduct for the purpose, and having or likely 
to have the effect, of preventing or substantially hindering a third person (who is not 
an employer of the first person) from engaging in trade or commerce involving the 
movement of goods between Australia and places outside Australia. While, on the 
face of it, the section would appear to prevent a primary boycott taking place 
243 See Devenish and Others v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (1991) 99 ALR 275 per. Brennan, Dawson 
and Toohey JJ; J Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders and Labourers Federation (WA Branch) (1992) 
111 ALR 502 where French J summarises the law related to 'purpose' at 536-537. 
244 Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (as amended) s 162(1). 
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involving an employee of the third person and a non-employee participant (ie a trade 
union official), the section would not prevent such a boycott due to the operation of 
the defence provisions under s 45DD(1), which would provide a defence to an 
employee of the third person, if the boycott behaviour related to the employment 
terms and conditions of that person. Therefore, the section prevents boycott behaviour 
only where neither the first or second parties are employees of the third party. 
An example of a breach of s 45DB occurred in Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission v Maritime Union of Australia and 0rs 246 where the Maritime Union of 
Australia (MUA) and four union officers admitted breaches of s 45DB. The MUA, in 
concert with MUA officers (non employees of the relevant employers) prevented 
cleaning operations taking place on various ships involved in international trade. This 
case involved a primary boycott, undertaken in an industrial context, which 
constituted a breach of the TPA. 
Section 45DC ensures that liability for action contravening the secondary boycott 
provisions attaches to employee organizations where officers or members of the 
organization are involved. In a reversal of the position at common law, the section 
deems conduct engaged in by the members or officers of an employee organization to 
be conduct engaged in by the organization itself' The effect of this presumption is 
that any loss or damage suffered by a person as a result of the conduct complained of 
is taken for the purposes of the TPA to have been caused by the employee 
organization involved. This enables the applicant to access the financial resources of 
the organization. 
An earlier version of s 45DC (s 45D(5)) was held to be unconstitutional by the High 
Court in 1982. The earlier version deemed an employee organization to have acted in 
concert with its officials or members, unless it could establish that it "took all 
reasonable steps to prevent the participants from engaging in that conduct". 2" In 
245 See discussion of s 45DD below at 220. 
246 (2001) 187 ALR 487. 
247 Mclelland, supra note 240 at 130. 
248 TPA, as enacted in 1982, s 45D(5). 
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Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd" a 
majority of the High Court held that the provision went beyond the scope of the 
corporations power under which it was enacted. The court held that the provision 
attached liability to an organization unless it could demonstrate not only that it had 
not been involved or connected with the events, but also that it had taken active steps 
to prevent the conduct.' Mason J noted that: 
[i]n substance s 45D(5) is a law which makes a trade union responsible for a 
boycott affecting a corporation when that boycott is imposed by members or 
officers of the trade union, a responsibility which the trade union can only 
avoid if it demonstrates it has taken the action mentioned in the subsection. As 
such it is a law about trade unions; to me it has a very remote connexion with 
corporations, a connexion so remote that the provision cannot be characterised 
as a law with respect to corporations of the relevant class.' 
The issue that remains unresolved is whether or not the modern version of s 45DC is 
validly enacted. The current section lacks the requirement that the trade union have 
taken all reasonable steps to prevent the conduct, however, it is still a provision 
which, according to Mason J: "makes a trade union responsible for a boycott affecting 
a corporation when that boycott is imposed by members or officers of the trade 
union".' The secondary boycott provisions still rest on the corporations power and 
the deeming provision makes a trade union responsible for the actions of its officers 
or members where a breach of the TPA is concerned. The only substantive difference 
is the removal of the requirement for the trade union to actively suppress the 
behaviour involved, however this does not appear to have been the sole factor in the 
High Court decision. The modern deeming provision may be unconstitutional on the 
ground that it bears an insufficient connection to the corporations power. 
Section 45DD provides a defence to an action under s 45D and related sections where 
the transgressing parties' actions were motivated by employment terms and 
conditions of employment. Section 45DD(1) provides that a person will not 
contravene ss 45D(1), 45DA(1) or 45DB(1) by engaging in conduct if the dominant 
purpose for which the conduct is engaged in is substantially related to the 
249  (1982) 150 CLR 169. For discussion of the judgment in this case see M. T. Corrigan, 'Actors and 
Announcers Equity Association of Australia and others v. Fontana Films Pty. Ltd. - Case Note' (1983) 
13 Federal Law Review 346. 
259 Ibid per Mason J at 210. 
251 Ibid. 
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remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or working conditions of that 
person or of another person employed by an employer of that person. The exception 
applies to action that would otherwise contravene the section taken by an employee 
against their Own employer and not action taken against their employer in sympathy 
with the employees of another employer with whom their employer does business. 
Therefore, if industrial action is taken by two sets of employees in dispute with their 
employers, and the employers happen to do business with each other, the action will 
not be boycott behaviour if each set of employees is genuinely in dispute with their 
own individual employers. Section 45DD(2) extends this protection to employee 
organizations where an employee engages in boycott conduct in concert with an 
officer of an organization, the conduct only involves the employees and trade union 
officials, and the dominant purpose of the conduct is substantially related to the 
remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or working conditions of the 
aforementioned employees. 
The defence provisions included in s 45DD are subject to a further limitation 
concerning the concept of 'dominant purpose'. The defence will only be operative if 
the dominant purpose of the conduct related to remuneration, conditions of 
employment, hours of work or working conditions of that person or of another person 
employed by an employer of that person. The provision mirrors the defence provided 
under the boycott provisions enacted prior to 1993, in s 45D(3). In practice the 
defence has been construed in a narrow manner, looking only at the purpose of the 
immediate action, rather than considering any longer term industrial objectives as the 
active dominant purpose. 2" The practical use of the provision has been limited by this 
narrow construction of dominant purpose, however cases in the early 1990s indicated 
a shift in judicial attitude, recognising that a broader industrial purpose could 
constitute a dominant purpose for the purposes of the defence!' 
252 ibid. 
253 This is the view reflected by Smithers J in the oft cited case Wribrass v Swallow (1979) 38 FLR 92. 
254 For example see GTS Freight Management Ply Ltd v Transport Workers Union (1990) 95 ALR 195; 
Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Meat and Allied Trades Federation of Australia 
(1991) 104 ALR 199 and discussion of these cases in R. Naughton, 'Trade Union Liability for Acts of 
Members - Implications for s.45D' (1991) 4 Australian Journal of Labour Law 151. 
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The final section relating to boycott behaviour is s 45E. The section prevents parties 
reaching an agreement concerning the provision of goods or services where that 
agreement would prevent or hinder the supply or acquisition of goods or services. The 
section applies to two forms of transactions: 
• a "supply situation" - where one party (A) has been accustomed, or is under an 
• obligation to supply goods or services to another party (B); 255 and 
• an "acquisition situation" - where one party (A) has been accustomed, or is 
under an obligation, to acquire goods or services from another person (B). 256 
Section 45E(2) prohibits agreements that would hinder or prevent the carriage of 
business in a supply situation. Where a supply situation exists: 
A must not make a contract or arrangement or arrive at an understanding with 
an organization of employees, an officer of such an organization, or a person 
acting for or on behalf of such an officer or organization, if the proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding contains a provision included for the 
purpose, or for purposes including the purpose of: 
(a) preventing or hindering the first person from supplying or continuing 
to supply such goods or services to the second person; or 
(b) preventing or hindering the first person from supplying or continuing 
to supply such goods or services to the second person, except subject 
to a condition: 
(i) that is not a condition to which the supply of such goods 
or services by the first person to the second person has 
previously been subject because of a provision in a 
contract between those persons; and 
(ii) that is about the persons to whom, the manner in which 
or the terms on which the second person may supply 
any goods or services. 
This prohibition is repeated in s 45E(3) with respect to acquisition situations. An 
exception to the provisions is contained in 45E(4) where a contract, arrangement or 
understanding made in writing, otherwise in contravention of s 45E, was made or 
arrived at with the written consent of the second person. 
An example of the operation of s 45E in practice occurred in the Troubleshooters 
Case. 257  The case involved a labour hire company called 'Troubleshooters' who 
provided contracted labour to building sites. The Building Workers Industrial Union 
255 TPA s 45E(1)(a). 
256 TPA s 45E(1)(b). 
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of Australia (BWIU) sought to persuade builders to refrain from contracting with 
Troubleshooters for their labour supply by suggesting that there would be ongoing 
difficulties at building sites if they continued to contract with Troubleshooters. The 
Federal Court held that s 45E was breached because the builders were accustomed to 
acquiring labour from Troubleshooters, and the trade union officials sought to arrive 
at an understanding with the builders concerning the ongoing contractual 
arrangements between the builders and Troubleshooters. The Court held that the 
"clear purpose of those involved in the incidents was to terminate the supply of 
services by Troubleshooters to the builders and incidentally to deter the builder 
acquiring services in the future". 258 
Enforcement under the TPA 
Enforcement action with respect to breaches of the secondary boycott provisions must 
be taken in the Federal Court. The ACCC may bring an action for the contravention of 
ss 45D, 45DB or 45E and the court may impose a penalty of up to $750 000 for each 
act or omission.' Section 76(2) prevents the imposition of this penalty against an 
individual for contravention of the boycott provisions. An individual who has suffered 
loss or damage as a result of the boycott conduct may seek injunctions under s 80 and 
damages under s 82 by 'private enforcement. 
Where an application under the TPA involves an application for injunctive relief the 
provisions of ss 80AA and 80AB must be considered. Section 80AB of the TPA 
allows the court to stay the operation of an injunction under s 80 where the conduct in 
question involves a breach of the secondary boycott provisions and there is a 
proceeding in either the AIRC under Division 7 of Part VI of the WRA or in a State or 
Territory relating to a breach of a relevant State or Territory law. This section only 
allows for the stay of an injunction if the Court considers that such a stay would be 
likely to facilitate the settlement of the dispute by conciliation and would in all the 
circumstances be just.' If the requirements of s 80AB are not met, the court may 
allow the injunction to take effect under s 80AA. 
257 The Troubleshooters Case, supra note 28. 
258 Ibid at 768 per Wilcox, Burchett and Ryan JJ. 
259 TPA s 76(1A). 
260 TPA s 80AB(1)(e). 
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Boycott Provisions under the VVRA 
WRA Part VI, Division 7 provides for conciliation of boycott disputes by the AIRC. 
The Division applies where there is an actual, threatened, impending or probable 
boycott, and the dispute relates, or may relate, to work done or to be done under an 
award or certified agreement; or the dispute involves an organization of employees, or 
officer or member of such an organization.' The Division allows for conciliation of 
disputes as an alternative to injunctive relief under the TPA. However the Division 
does not affect the operation of the TPA.' 
Commonwealth Crimes Legislation 
There are two provisions in the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 that may operate to 
criminalise industrial action, although these provisions are rarely, if ever, used in 
practice. 263 
Section 30J provides that if at any time the Governor-General is of the opinion that 
there exists in Australia a serious industrial disturbance prejudicing or threatening 
trade or commerce with other countries or among the States, he may make a 
Proclamation to that effect, which Proclamation shall remain in operation until it is 
revoked. 
While a proclamation is in effect under s 30J: 
any person who takes part in or continues, or incites to, urges, aids or 
encourages the taking part in, or continuance of a lock out or strike: 
(a) in relation to employment in or in connexion with the transport of 
goods or the conveyance of passengers in trade or commerce with 
other countries or among the States; or 
261 wRA s 156. 
262 WRA s 162. 
263 The sections have not received significant practical, academic or judicial attention. For discussion of 
the role of Part IIA and the history of the use of the provisions, see R. Douglas, 'Keeping the 
Revolution at Bay: The Unlawful Associations Provisions of the Commonwealth Crimes Act' (2001) 
22 Adelaide Law Review 259. 
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(b) in relation to employment in, or in connexion with, the provision of 
any public service by the Commonwealth or by any Department or 
public authority under the Commonwealth, 
shall be held to be guilty of an offence under the Act and can be subjected to 
imprisonment for up to 12 months.' There has only ever been one proclamation 
issued under the provision and no prosecutions were made during the proclamation. 265 
The second provision is s 30K which provides that it will be an offence where: 
anyone, by violence to the person or property of another person, or by spoken or 
written threat or intimidation of any kind to whomsoever directed, or, without 
reasonable cause or excuse, by boycott or threat of boycott of person or property: 
(b) compels or induces any person employed in or in connexion with the 
provision of any public service by the Commonwealth or by any 
Department or public authority under the Commonwealth to surrender 
or depart from his employment; 
(c) prevents any person from offering or accepting employment in or in 
connexion with the provision of any public service by the 
Commonwealth or by any Department or public authority under the 
Commonwealth; 
(d) obstructs or hinders the transport of goods or the conveyance of 
passengers in trade or commerce with other countries or among the 
States; 
(e) compels or induces any person employed in or in connexion with the 
transport of goods or the conveyance of passengers in trade or 
commerce with other countries or among the States to surrender or 
depart from his employment; or 
(f) prevents any person from offering or accepting employment in or in 
connexion with the transport of goods or the conveyance of passengers 
in trade or commerce with other countries or among the States.' 
The section appears to be of little practical significance in the modern workplace 
relations context. However, in 1993, Creighton, Ford and Mitchell noted that potential 
does exist for prosecutions under the provision: 
[t]he fact remains ... that s 30K could be used as the basis for criminal 
proceedings against individuals who participate in, or help to organise, a wide 
range of industrial action in the Commonwealth public sector and in the • 
transport industry. Furthermore, such proceedings may be initiated by any 
person. 267 
264 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 30J(2). 
265 Creighton, Ford and Mitchell, supra note 23 at 1150. 
266 Legislation enacted within the States also allows for the declaration of a state of emergency and 
consequent restrictions upon freedom of action. For discussion see: H.P. Lee, Emergency Powers (Law 
Book Co: Sydney, 1984). 
267 Ibid at 1150. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed Australian federal law with respect to the right to strike. 
Beginning with the underlying position at common law, moving through the protected 
action regime and finally examining alternative statutory actions against industrial 
action, the chapter has demonstrated that the approach to regulation is at once both 
comprehensive and haphazard. With the notable exception of the protected action 
regime, the laws outlined have not been developed in a holistic approach, but as a 
reaction to circumstance. 
The next chapter will make observations about the Australian regulatory model, 
identifying the existence of consistent themes and approaches within the regulation 
and developing propositions about the right to strike in Australian law. This will 
encompass the material canvassed in chapters 5 and 6. This will provide the 
conceptual framework against which the thesis will assess the state of compliance of 




The Nature of the Right to Strike in Australian Law 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 outlined the regulatory regime relating to strike action in the federal labour 
law system. It demonstrated that there is a complex array of provisions throughout 
three different Acts and a significant body of common law relevant to discussion of 
the right to strike in the federal labour law system. The foregoing analysis has also 
shown that it is not possible to consider the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
(WRA) in isolation. In order to understand the federal regulation of the right to strike, 
it is necessary to appreciate the diverse factors involved and the range of regulatory 
mechanisms. 
Drawing upon the survey of law in chapters 5 and 6, and the historical outline in the 
introduction, this chapter will make observations concerning the nature of the right to 
strike within the federal system, noting the relationship between the regulation of 
strikes, the bargaining model and international law. The chapter foreshadows the 
discussion of compliance with international law in chapter 8. 
The Nature of the Right to Strike in Australian Law 
The right to strike in Australian law does not operate in a vacuum. It is one part of a 
bargaining model that regulates the employment terms and conditions of a large 
proportion of the Australian working population. It is impossible to view the right to 
strike in isolation from this context, and the following observations orientate the right 
to strike within the political, historical and international context. 
The Australian Bargaining Regime is Consistent with the ILO Bargaining Model 
According to International Labour Organization (ILO) instruments and the quasi 
jurisprudence of ILO bodies, the fullest expression of the principle of freedom of 
association is found in the development of the necessary infrastructure and 
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mechanisms to facilitate and promote voluntary collective bargaining.' The federal 
labour law system is a sufficiently realised model of voluntary collective bargaining 
to enable meaningful measurement of Australian compliance with ILO standards on 
the right to strike. 
Historical Context 
The compulsory conciliation and arbitration model did not constitute a model of 
voluntary collective bargaining in which an implicit right to strike could operate as a 
component of the principle of freedom of association. The model was fundamentally 
divergent from the ILO model with respect to the requirements of voluntariness and 
collective bargaining. While registration within the system was voluntary (and for 
employees, by and large restricted to registered trade unions), participation in the 
system entailed compulsory submission to binding arbitration. Voluntariness for 
employee organizations was only genuine to the extent that registration constituted a 
'choice'. Employers, once 'roped in' to a dispute by an employee organization had no 
choice but to submit to binding arbitration. Further, the model was not based around 
the precept of collectiv.e bargaining. 2 The majority of employment terms and 
conditions were established through awards with unofficial and tacitly accepted over-
award bargaining occurring outside the arbitral process. 3 
The non-voluntary arbitral elements of the conciliation and arbitration system made 
measuring compliance with ILO Freedom of Association Conventions 4 extremely 
difficult. The ILO model is entirely based on the negotiation of employment terms 
and conditions by employers, employees and employee organizations in a voluntary 
ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, General Survey of the Reports on the 
Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), 1948 and the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), 1949, Report III (Part 4B), International 
Labour Conference, 81st Session, 1994 ('General Survey'), Chapter X, Promotion of Collective 
Bargaining, paras 235-265. 
2 'Roping in' refers to the process by which a registered trade union would create a dispute with a 
group of employers in order to enliven the jurisdiction of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC) and obtain an award, binding on all named employers. For discussion of the 
process of 'roping in' and award making see: B. Creighton and A. Stewart, Labour Law: An 
Introduction (3rd ed., Federation Press: Sydney, 2000) at 68 — 70; S. Kollmorgen, 'Genuineness in 
Industrial Demands' (1993) 6 Australian Journal of Labour Law 257. 
For discussion of conciliation and arbitrations see the Introduction at 3-7. 
ILO Convention 87, Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention 1948 and ILO 
Convention 98, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (the 'Freedom of 
Association Conventions'). 
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setting, where the strike weapon may be utilised by employees' and their 
organizations as leverage. As discussed in chapter 4, the Australian compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration model could be used to illustrate the difficulties in 
measuring compliance by a non-voluntary system. 5 The discussion demonstrated that 
while ILO standards are flexible, they do not easily translate when applied to models 
that deviate from the essential components of voluntariness and collectivity. When 
examining the conciliation and arbitration model in the Pilots' Dispute, the 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) focused on the voluntary nature of 
registration by employee organizations to avoid the more complex issues raised by 
compulsion in the system. As contemporary commentary noted: 
[to]provide for an internally coherent legal system which is also consistent 
with international Conventions [would entail] a fundamental rethinking of the 
law in relation to industrial relations in Australia. 6 
The discussion in chapter 4 demonstrated that the ILO model has developed from the 
functional collective• interpretative approach to freedom of association dominant in the 
ILO. Meaningful compliance with ILO principles on freedom of association requires 
the existence of an industrial relations system comprised of freely operating actors, 
whereby the content and level of bargaining are self regulated. The absence of these 
factors within conciliation and arbitration fundamentally affected the ability of the 
Australian model to comply with the Freedom of Association Conventions. Any 
measurement of compliance beyond the superficial must have concluded that the 
differences in fundamentals between the systems meant that compliance could not 
have been meaningfully measured. 
The Australian model is now orientated to voluntary collective bargaining, with only a 
residual role for conciliation and arbitration. The model has altered from one of 
centralised compulsory conciliation and arbitration, with allowance for and toleration 
of, over award bargaining, to a decentralised, enterprise-focused system of voluntary 
collective bargaining. 
5 See discussion in chapter 4 at 125-130. 
6 K. McEvoy and R. Owens, 'On a Wing and a Prayer: The Pilots Dispute in the International Context' 
(1993) 6 Australian Journal of Labour Law 1 at 27. 
229 
Modern Context 
The two basic components of the ILO bargaining model are voluntariness and 
collectivity. The ability to establish compliance with the right to strike in international 
law requires the existence of a bargaining model containing these two central 
_elements. Absent these components and the model becomes insufficiently similar to 
the ILO model to enable the meaningful measurement of compliance. Significantly, 
the model enacted in the federal labour law system is both voluntary and collective in 
nature. 
Voluntariness 
The federal model provides the bargaining parties with a sufficient degree of 
voluntariness to allow for the meaningful measurement of compliance. The elements 
of compulsion remaining in the system are limited to union recognition, through 
federal registration of employee organizations, and arbitration, to establish a safety net 
of minimum terms and conditions. Beyond the safety net, a settlement cannot be 
imposed by an external party. 7 Further, the voluntary nature of the system is 
strengthened by the Part XA Freedom of Association provisions whereby 
voluntariness encompasses the right to belong or not to belong to an industrial 
association. The individual has the choice to join an industrial association and the 
choice to pursue voluntarily bargained outcomes either through association or not. 
Collectivity 
The federal labour law system operates as a model of collective bargaining. The . 
following analysis will demonstrate the collective nature of the system through the 
forms of bargaining that may be utilised by parties and will address objections that 
may be raised to this assertion. 
The main mechanism for the establishment of terms and conditions of employment 
under the WRA is enterprise bargaining for the creation of Division 2 and 3 certified 
7 The exception to this proposition is the imposition of s 170MX awards after the termination of a 
bargaining period in exceptional circumstances by the AIRC. For discussion of s 170MX awards see 
chapter 6 at 189. 
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agreements. 8 These agreements may be made between a union and an employer or by 
a group of employees and an employer. Whether a trade union is involved or not, the 
mechanism is collective, utilising the involvement of trade unions or spontaneous 
groupings of employees. This form of bargaining is the central mechanism for the 
regulation of terms and - conditions of employment. Certified agreement making 
operates against a backdrop of employment regulation through the award safety net. 9 
Where terms and conditions of employment are sourced from awards, this is also 
collective in nature, as an award represents the arbitrated outcome of an industrial 
dispute between an employee organization and an employer. 
A secondary form of agreement making under the WRA is individual agreement 
making through Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). 1° This form of 
agreement making is designed to operate through individual bargaining. However, the 
ability to create AWAs does not detract from the assertion that the federal labour law 
system is collective in nature. The uptake of AWAs represents an extremely small 
proportion of all bargained outcomes under the federal regime." In addition, research 
into the form and content of AWAs has revealed a trend of non-individualised 
outcomes. A study conducted by Fetter and Mitchell demonstrated that many AWAs 
do not operate as entire agreements. Instead they are used to effect small alterations to 
collectively negotiated agreements pertaining to particular individuals. 12 Further, as 
well as enabling individual workers to negotiate customised agreements tailored to 
their particular circumstances, the system facilitates the use of standardised AWAs. 
Employee parties to standardised agreements are nominally individualised, but are 
governed by identical terms and conditions to their colleagues. I3 While standardised 
8 For discussion of Division 2 and 3 certified agreements see chapter 6 at 170-173. 
9 For discussion of the award safety net see chapter 6 at 173-174. 
I° For discussion of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) see chapter 6 at 173. 
"According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, as at May 2002 only 2.0% of the Australian 
Workforce had some terms and conditions of employment regulated by registered individual 
agreements: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004 Labour Statistics in Brief (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Catalogue Number 6104.0, 2004) at 6. 
12 R. Mitchell and J. Fetter, Human Resource Management and the Individualisation of Australian 
Industrial Relations (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Working Paper No 24, 
Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne: Parlcville, 2002) at 20-21. 
13  For discussion of standardised AWA terms and conditions see R. McCallum, 'Australian Workplace 
Agreements: An Analysis' (1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 50; A. Stewart, 'The Legal 
Framework for Individual Employment Agreements in Australia' in S. Deery and R. Mitchell, (eds.) 
Employment Relations: Individualisation and Union Exclusion, An International Study (Federation 
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AWA's are not collectively negotiated, these outcomes illustrate the presence of 
collective content even in the context of individual agreement making. 
In theory, it can be argued that the existence of the AWA regime may undermine the 
assertion that the federal labour law system is collective in nature. However, the 
reality of low take up rates, standardised terms and the use of AWA's for minor 
variations to collectively negotiated outcomes suggests that these agreements do not 
detract from the collective nature of the model to any significant extent. The pre-
eminence of collectively negotiated certified agreements, entered into against a 
backdrop of the collectively managed award safety net, suggests that the federal 
model is predominantly collective in nature. I4 
Compatible models 
The federal bargaining model is designed to operate on a voluntary and collective 
basis. Accordingly, in measuring compliance by the federal right to strike with ILO 
standards, the models in which the laws and standards operate are compatible and 
susceptible to meaningful measurement. There may be specific difficulties, 
particularly relating to individual agreements, free market operation and bargaining 
levels, however the models are compatible and there is no initial obstacle to 
measuring compliance. 
Specific Legislative Enactment of a Right to Strike in Australia is Necessary; 
Any Resultant Right to Strike will be Contingent and Susceptible to Abolition 
There is no entrenched right to strike in Australian law and no currently defined or 
accepted source of a legal obligation upon the Federal Government to provide or 
respect the right to strike. I5 The only source of obligation is sourced from 
international law through ratified international instruments. However, these do not 
create domestically binding legislative obligations. 
• Press: Leichardt, 1999), 18; M. Wooden, The Transformation of Australian Industrial Relations 
(Federation Press: Sydney, 2000) at chapter 4. 
4 While the federal labour law system remains predominately collective in nature, this does not mean 
that the concept of 'collective' bargaining is designed to include unions or that the Federal Government 
would not prefer a decollectivised model. For discussion of this point see A. Coulthard, 'The 
Decollectivisation of Australian Industrial Relations: Trade Union Exclusion under the Workplace 
Relations Act' in S. Deery and R. Mitchell, (eds.) Employment Relations: Individualisation and Union 
Exclusion, An International Study (Federation Press: Leichardt, 1999), 48. 
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In consequence, specific legislative enactment of a right to strike is necessary in the 
federal labour law system in order to meet Australia's international obligations. The 
common law is inherently hostile to concerted collective action and has not developed 
a right to strike. I6 Legislation is necessary in order to overcome the consequences that 
attach to strike action at common law and provide a right to strike free of potential 
adverse legal consequences. I7 The protected action regime is an example of a specific 
legislative enactment of the right to strike. 
As a result of the lack of an entrenched right to strike in Australian law, the existence 
of the right to strike will remain contingent and susceptible to abolition. As there is no 
domestic source of a binding obligation to respect the right to strike, the continued 
presence of the right is dependent upon the willingness of the Government of the day 
to continue to respect the existence of the right. Both the existence and the form of the 
right are susceptible to amendment or repeal, provided that the Government can 
obtain the passage of appropriate legislation through the Commonwealth Parliament. 
Therefore, there is no guarantee of the existence of the right into the future. 
15 For discussion of the sources of legal obligation to respect the right to strike in Australia see 
chapter 5. 
16  The traditional hostility of the common law in England to collective action, and to attempts by 
Parliament to protect collective action, were famously described by Sykes and Glasbeek: "it is 
incontrovertible that the common law became a reactionary force checking the growth of collective 
action in industry ... A cycle was set up: the judiciary would declare certain industrial activity illegal 
because of a contravention of a (newly discovered) ancient common law principle ... Parliament would 
declare the principle to be no longer binding on respectable trade unions; the statute would then be 
interpreted by the courts in such a manner that the ambit of protection it afforded was severely limited; 
or alternatively, it would be decided that although the statutory protection extended to certain acts 
which were ingredients of the now "permitted" nominal wrongs, it did not extend to those same acts 
when they also constituted wrongs not specifically protected by the statute. Frequently, of course, these 
individual cases of action had never been thought to be actionable wrongs before. The merry-go-round 
would therefore be set in motion again". E. I. Sykes and H. J. Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia 
(Butterworths: Sydney, 1972) at 366-367. See also: K. D. Ewing, The Right to Strike in Britain: 
Lectures on the Common Law (vol. 2) (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1989) at 2-20. 
The developments in the English common law as a reaction to the passage of legislation granting 
specific legislative immunities to trade unions as discussed by Sykes and Glasbeek, and Ewing, were 
adopted by the Australian courts without the adoption of similar legislative immunities by the 
Australian Parliament: See E. I. Sykes, Strike Law in Australia (2°6 ed., Law Book Company: Sydney, 
1982) at 185-189. 
17  For discussion of the position of strike action at common law see chapter 6 at 159-165. 
233 
The Enactment of the Right to Strike in Australia is Open to Manipulation 
Under the Industrial Relations Act 1993 (Cth) (as amended by the Industrial Relations 
Reform Act 1993 (Cth)) (the 'IR Act (as amended)'), the protected action regime 
utilised the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) obligation to implement a right to strike for jurisdictional competence 
through the constitutional external affairs power. 18 The domestic implementation of 
the ICESCR was constitutionally restricted to the enactment of legislation reasonably 
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the Covenant. I9 
This fact provided a constitutional limitation on the content of the right to strike 
enacted on this basis. For example, the High Court held provisions under the IR Act 
(as amended) enabling employers to lockout their employees to be unconstitutional as 
an implementation of the ICESCR. 2° 
The Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) 
(WROLAA) shifted the jurisdictional basis of the protected action regime to, amongst 
others, the corporations power. This removed any obligation on the Commonwealth 
Parliament to ensure that the implementation of the right to strike reflects the form or 
content of ratified international instruments. This has removed any limitation (other 
than existing constitutional limitations on the scope of power of the federal 
government) on the form that the right to strike in domestic law takes. In 
consequence, the enactment of the right to strike is susceptible to manipulation for 
political purposes. An example is the political debate over pattern bargaining. 2I The 
trade union movement engages in pattern bargaining as an exercise of the right to 
strike in an effort to obtain negotiated outcomes applicable in an industry wide 
context. This is antithetical to the stated objectives of the Federal Government to 
achieve enterprise based localised outcomes. 22 Accordingly, the Federal Government 
has attempted to manipulate the parameters of the right to strike under the protected 
action regime in order to deny trade unions the ability to take protected action where 
18 For discussion of the jurisdictional basis of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) as amended by 
the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) see chapter 5 at 136-143. 
19 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 489. 
20 Ibid at 546-547. 
21 For discussion of pattern bargaining see chapter 6 at 190-192. 
22 For discussion of the use of pattern bargaining by trade unions and resistance from the Federal 
Government see: B. Ellem, 'Trade Unionism in 1999' (2000) 42 Journal of Industrial Relations 59; M. 
Watts, 'Wages and Wage Determination in 2000' (2001) 43 Journal of Industrial Relations 177. 
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the action is used to achieve outcomes contradictory to the policy objectives of the 
Coalition Government. 23 
The Right to Strike in Australia Operates as a Distinct Discrete Enactment and 
Not as a Facet of the Principle of Freedom of Association 
Unlike the construction of freedom of association adopted by the ILO, the right to 
strike in the federal labour law system is enacted separately to the principle of 
freedom of association. The right to strike exists in the protected action regime, 
serving the specific purpose of supporting the processes of bargaining for certified 
agreements and AWAs. The principle of freedom of association is contained within 
Part XA of the WRA, a separate and discrete enactment. In practical terms, this means 
that the WRA right to strike does not operate as an implicit element of the principle of 
freedom of association. It does not further the principle of freedom of association or 
provide a support mechanism for employees to associate and act in association. The 
distinction may appear academic, but it is extremely important in the context of 	. 
measuring compliance. The ILO right to strike serves the purposes of association and 
is facilitative in nature. This encompasses a broad range of potential associational 
activities. The WRA right to strike, disconnected from the principle of freedom of 
association, serves the purposes of facilitating the bargaining regime. It does not 
extend beyond this narrow focus. Therefore, the breadth of the right to strike under 
the WRA may be manipulated by changing the bargaining environment and is not 
dependant upon a construction of legitimate associational objectives. 
The enactment of freedom of association within the WRA is effected in practice by 
judicial interpretation of the freedom of association provisions. As discussed in 
chapter 6, the interpretation of the freedom of association provisions suggests that Part 
XA is not a discrete enactment. The Federal Court has suggested that freedom of 
association interacts with the protected action provisions to ensure that all employees 
23 See for example the Workplace Relations Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Bill 2002 (Cth), and the 
significantly reduced version that was passed through the Commonwealth Parliament, Australian 
Workplace Agreement (Genuine Bargaining) Act 2002 (Cth). 
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have the right to engage in industrial activities. 24 However, while this judicial 
approach to freedom of association may extend the interaction between the right to 
strike and freedom of association beyond the literal text of the provisions, it does not 
overcome the differential enactment of the right to strike and freedom of association. 
Further, the impact of the 'whole of Act' judicial interpretative approach is dulled by 
the approach of the Federal Court to the freedom of association provisions more 
generally, which has occurred through a prism of individual rights rather than 
collective content. 25 The capacity to strike free of legal liability under the WRA is 
limited to the pursuit of predefined bargaining outcomes and does not exist in the 
broader occupational sense envisioned by the operation of the right to strike as a facet 
of the principle of freedom of association in international law. 
Protected Action and Non-Protected Action 
For the purposes of measuring compliance with international obligations, discussion 
of the right to strike must distinguish between protected action and non-protected 
action. The protected action regime establishes a model of bargaining within which 
strike action may be pursued free of potential legal liability. Provided that strike 
action conforms to the requirements of the protected action provisions, parties may 
exercise the right to strike. When measuring compliance, the relevant issue is the 
extent to which the protected industrial action provisions are compatible with the 
requirements acceptable in international standards. In this respect, the analysis must 
examine the requirements of notice, ballots, the extent of permissible strike action and 
the limits on such action. In this context the existence of the right to strike is not 
questioned. The analysis focuses on the extent to which the right provided within the 
WRA is an unhindered right. 
24 See Davids Distribution Ply Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 91 FCR 463; Finance Sector 
Union of Australia v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2002) 114 IR 352. For discussion 
of the relationship between Part XA and the protected action provisions see chapter 6 at 207-214. 
25 Quinn argues that "the dominant approach [to interpretation of Part XA] perceives the principle [of 
freedom of association] as an individual right protecting discrete individual decisions ... [this] tends to 
limit the application of the Act's protections to conduct directed against specific individuals in relation 
to their individual actions and attributes; thus it protects the right of the individual to chose [sic] to be 
or not to be a union member". D. Quinn, 'To Be or Not to Be a Member — Is that the Only Question? 
Freedom of Association under the Workplace Relations Act' (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 1 at 2. 
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Non-protected action is all possible industrial action that will be unprotected by the 
protected action regime. Where strike action is legitimate action within the ILO 
construction of freedom of association, but is unprotected by the WRA protected 
action provisions, the right to strike may be denied due to the potential liability that 
attaches to unprotected action. 26 Accordingly, the discussion will establish those areas 
of 'legitimate strike action' (within the ILO construction of freedom of association) 
that are unprotected in the federal model. 
The WRA Enactment of the Right to Strike Lacks Internal Coherence 
Standards developed by the ILO reflect the central tenet that strike action may be 
undertaken in support of the occupational activities of workers' organizations. The. 
standards support this central premise, and restrictions and limitations on the ability to 
take strike action are assessed in accordance with the goal of ensuring that the right to 
strike maintains this function. ILO standards are developed with a coherent purpose. 
The right to strike expressed within the protected action provisions lacks a central 
tenet. The role or purpose of protected action is not spelled out within the WRA 
objects or the Act itself, so there is no internal tool of measurement. Further, the 
actual provisions are neither consistent nor coherent, making it difficult to distil a 
central or dominant purpose to the enactment. 
The role of the right to strike within a bargaining model will vary depending upon the 
objectives behind a specific enactment. A legislative enactment of the right to strike 
could serve the purpose of establishing compliance (or ostensible compliance) with 
international obligations. However, the protected action provisions have not been 
enacted to fulfil this objective. Reference to international labour standards does • 
remain within the introductory objects of the WRA; however the jurisdictional basis 
of the protected action provisions is based on the corporations power (and other 
powers) removing all obligation to conform to international standards within the 
domestic enactment. 27 Further, the WRA separation of freedom of association and the 
right to strike does not reflect the functional inclusive approach manifested in ILO 
26 See chapter 6 at 159-165. 
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standards. Finally, the role of strike action within the WRA is considerably more 
restricted in terms of potential range than either the ICESCR or ILO standards. 
Another purpose that could be served by the legislative enactment of a right to strike 
is to support a system of voluntary collective bargaining. The protected action 
provisions play this role, provided that parties are engaged in a form of voluntary 
collective bargaining conforming to the preferred model of the Federal Government. 
The protected action provisions acknowledge the need to provide a mechanism for 
parties to engage in bargaining under a model where compulsory arbitration no longer 
applies beyond the safety net. However, the provisions do not support true voluntary 
collective bargaining. Protected action is not available to determine the level of 
bargaining or the potential content of bargaining. Further, the ability of parties to 
pursue individual industrial action suggests that strike action was not designed to 
serve the purposes of collective bargaining. 
The next purpose that may be ascribed to strike action under the functional freedom of 
association model of voluntary collective bargaining is to even the power imbalance 
between employers and employees, by providing employees with a weapon equivalent 
to the organizational and managerial power of employers. However, the protected • 
action model does not seek to even any perceived imbalance, as employers and 
employees may undertake protected action equally. There is no suggestion that 
parties, even those negotiating AWAs, do not enter the negotiating process as equals 
and the weapons of strike and lockout are available equally. 
The final role or purpose that may be ascribed to a legislative enactment of the right to 
strike is to support the regulation of employment through the operation of free market 
forces. On a superficial level the protected action provisions serve the private ordering 
of employment relations by providing immunity for strike action utilised in support of 
agreements negotiated freely between the parties and not imposed by the State or a 
public body. However, the protected action model only enables the right to strike to 
operate within tightly defined parameters, providing the right to strike in the context 
of a specific bargaining framework. The right to strike is available for the private 
27 For discussion of the jurisdictional basis of the WRA see chapter 5 at 143-146. 
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ordering of employment relations in the context only of negotiations for Division 2 or 
3 certified agreements or an AWA, applicable at a single business or enterprise where 
the content of such agreement is artificially limited and tightly controlled. Beyond this 
restricted framework, the parties are not able to utilise the right to strike to enter 
agreements beyond enterprise level, agreements involving trade union related matters 
or even negotiate over retrospective strike pay. The bargaining relationship is tightly 
circumscribed by the WRA. This model is not based upon the interplay of free market 
forces as it only allows those forces to operate in a closely controlled environment. 
The protected action provisions are not based upon any clear or established rationale 
for the existence of, or recognition of, the right to strike. Instead, if there is a purpose 
or rationale for the protected action provisions, it lies in ensuring that the right to 
strike is restricted in application to the attainment of bargaining outcomes consistent 
with the aims of Government policy. 28 
Conclusion - Challenges to compliance 
The preceding discussion of Australian law relating to the principle of freedom of 
association and the right to strike illuminated challenges for the federal labour law 
system in establishing compliance with international standards. In concluding the 
discussion of Australian law, the analysis will draw out these challenges as a prelude 
to the task of measuring compliance undertaken in chapter 8. 
Australian law is not immune from concerns expressed by the Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) over the growing 
rise of individualism within industrialised economies. 29 ILO bargaining principles 
encompassing the right to strike do not embrace individualisation. The inclusion of 
28  For discussion of the Coalition Governments' industrial relations agenda see Wooden, supra note 13 
at 178-184. 
29 In the 1996 General Survey, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) stated: "the Committee would like to express concern at two trends 
occurring in certain industrialized countries in particular, which have a negative impact on collective 
rights and hence on collective bargaining. First, in several countries there has been a recent tendency 
for the legislature to give precedence to individual rights over collective rights in employment matters". 
General Survey, supra note 1 at para 235. For discussion of the rise of individualism and contractualism 
in Australia see P. Waring, 'The Rise of Individualism in Australian Industrial Relations' (1999) 24 
New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations 291. 
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individually bargained agreements with access to protected industrial action poses an 
obstacle to Australian compliance with ILO standards. The Federal Government 
argues that it does not "promote" either collective or individual bargaining, but 
establishes "choices" for workers and business. 30 However, the emphasis placed on 
AWAs and a failure to actively promote collective bargaining has drawn criticism 
from the CEACR and the CFA. 3I In reality, the provision of "choice" in bargaining 
structures is an edifice masking a predilection for individual bargaining, and 
constitutes an undermining of trade union strength. As Moir notes: "part of the theory 
behind individual bargaining involves a rejection of collective bargaining and trade 
unionism".32 A similar view is expressed by Wedderburn: "[Ole new individualism 
recoils from freedom of association the more it incorporates an effective right to 
organise", 33 and, it follows, an effective right to strike. The first challenge to effective 
compliance by federal labour law is the role of individualism in the Australian 
bargaining regime. 
Related to the difficulties surrounding the individualisation of Australian labour law, 
is the promotion of an industrial relations agenda in Australia that challenges the 
necessity for recognition of the right to strike in order to ensure reciprocity in labour 
relations. Historically, in collective bargaining systems, strikes were accepted as a 
necessary, if unpalatable, weapon of the labour movement, without which bargaining 
was rendered meaningless in the face of the greater collective resources of 
employers. 34 
3° CEACR Individual Observations Concerning Convention 98, Australia, published 1999 and 2000; 
Complaint against the Government of Australia presented by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions IICTFU), the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), the Australian Council 
of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), Document Vol. LXXXIII, 2000, 
Series B, No. 1, Report 320, Case 1963. In an appearance before the Conference Committee on the 
Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference (the Conference Committee) in 1998, 
the Australian Government argued that Australia maintained adequate scope for collective bargaining 
and that AWAs provide an alternative to collective bargaining rather than their replacement: ILO 
Conference Committee Observation 1998, Australia, paras 21 and 61. 
31 See CEACR Individual Observations Concerning Convention 98, Australia, published 1999 and 
2000 and Complaint against the Government of Australia, supra note 30. 
32 M. Moir, 'Individual and Collective Bargaining in Australian Labour Law: The CRA Weipa Case' 
(1996) 18 Sydney Law Review 350 at 359. 
33 Lord Wedderbum, Employment Rights in Britain and Europe: Selected Papers in Labour Law 
(Lawrence and Wisehart: London, 1991) at 151. 
34 For example,.Weiler argues that strike action is necessary to ensure that collective bargaining is not 
rendered "collective begging". P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian 
Labour Law (Carswell Company Ltd: Toronto, 1980) at 67. The general point has been made by a 
numerous commentators including R. Hyman, Strikes, (Fontana-Collins: London, 1972) at 60; 0. 
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However, this conception of the necessity for the right to strike has come under attack 
from modern human relations and management theorists. 35 These writings critique the 
construction of employment in terms of power, arguing that employers and employees 
share more interests in common than those that divide them. 36 Trade union 
intervention is characterised as third party interference in the labour market, creating 
labour cartels monopolising and increasing the price of labour. According to this 
argument, the presence of trade unions creates unnecessary tension and conflict in an 
otherwise harmonious relationship between employer and individual employees. 
Market theories are applied to the labour market, hypothesising that employers will 
pay wages appropriate to attracting the best employees, and employees in turn, will 
have the ability to contract with those employers offering the best wages and 
conditions. 37 This construction of employment reasserts the principles of common law 
contract and the free market, viewing employment through the prism of individual 
rights and individual contracts. 38 The partial application of this model in practice can 
Kahn-Freund and B. Hepple, Laws Against Strikes (Fabian Research Series: London, 1972) at 7-9; 0. 
Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (2nd ed., Stevens and Sons: London, 1977)at chapters 1 and 3; T. 
Sharard, Competing Models of Worker Representation - The ILO Collective Bargaining Principles and 
Part VIB of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
University of Melbourne: Parlcville, 1996) and Lord Wedderbum, 'Freedom of Association and 
Philosophies of Labour Law' (1989) 18 The Industrial Law Journal 1. 
35 For discussion of the views of Modern human relations and management theorists see S. Deery and 
R. Mitchell, 'The Emergence of Individualisation and Union Exclusion as an Employment Relations 
Strategy' in S. Decry and R. Mitchell, (eds.) Employment Relations: Individualisation and Union 
Exclusion (Federation Press: Annandale, 1999), 1. 
36 In Australia, these views are exemplified by the writings of the so-called 'New Right'. The New 
Right agenda has been fostered by the H.R. Nicholls Society, which campaigns for industrial relations 
reform along New Right policy lines. During the 1980's, the views of the Society were considered to 
represent a radical perspective on Australian industrial relations: B. Creighton, 'Trade Unions, the Law 
and the New Right' in K. Coghill, (ed.) The New Right's Australian Fantasy (Penguin Books: Fitzroy, 
1987), 74. However, since the election of a Coalition Government in 1996, many of the proponents of 
these views, including Tony Abbott, Peter Costello and Peter Reith have been prominent in mainstream 
politics holding Ministerial Portfolios (both Tony Abbott and Peter Reith have been the Minister for 
Workplace Relations). Information on the H.R. Nicholls society sourced from www.hrnicholls.com.au . 
Examples of this view include: P. Costello, 'Dollar Sweets: Confronting Union Power' (1985-6) 39 
IPA Review 49; P. Gorringe, 'A Contracting Theory View of Industrial Relations' (Paper presented at 
the Light on the Hill: Industrial Relations Reform in Australia: the Proceedings of the H.R. Nicholls 
Society Queen's Birthday Weekend Conference, Mooloolaba, 6 - 8 June 1987). 
37 
 
Decry and Mitchell, supra note 35. 
38 For discussion of this model see Moir, supra note 32; Sharrard, supra note 34; T. Sheppard, 
'Liberalism and the Charter: Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike' (1996) 5 Dalhousie 
Journal of Legal Studies 117 at 134-5. 
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be seen in the context of industrial relations and labour law under Thatcher in the 
United Kingdom and in New Zealand during the 1990's. 39 
The construction of the labour market in economic contractualist terms may be 
appropriate to a select group of high level, highly skilled employees, but it does little 
for the bulk of employees with essentially fungible skills. ° While the construction of 
the employment relationship through the prism of power has its weaknesses, the 
recognition of the right to strike is necessary in order for individual units of fungible 
labour to bargain collectively. This is the approach adopted by the ILO, and the 
predominance of the alternate view within the Federal Government in Australia poses 
a significant challenge to compliance. 
Another obstacle to effective compliance relates to the basis of the employment 
relationship in common law contract. While strike action outside the protected action 
regime remains a breach of contract under the common law, workers will continue to 
face obstacles to exercising the right to strike. Strongly criticised by the CFA in 1991, 
common law breach of contract continues to provide a basis for injunctive relief and 
civil remedies outside the parameters of the WRA. 4I As noted by Vranken, "the 
common law, built on the pillars of property and contract, cannot accommodate a 
39  For an example of the Thatcher model of contractualist industrial relations see S. Mills, 'The 
International Labour Organization, the United Kingdom and Freedom of Association: An Annual Cycle 
of Condemnation' (1997) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 35; Wedderburn supra note 34; For 
discussion of the model in New Zealand in the 1990's see G. Anderson, 'Implementing Collective 
Bargaining Policy through the Restriction of the Right to Strike' in R. Mitchell and J. Min Aun Wu, 
(eds.) Facing the Challenge in the Asia Pacific Region: Contemporary Themes and Issues in Labour 
law (Occasional Monograph No. 5, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of 
Melbourne: Parkville, 1997), 157; B. Brooks, 'De-Regulating the Labour Market: Reflections on the 
New Zealand Experience' in C. Engels and M. Weiss, (eds.) Labour Law and Industrial Relations at 
the Turn of the Century, Liber Amicorum in Honour ofRoger Blanpain (Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague, 1998), 651; A. Honeybone, 'Introducing Labour Flexibility: The Example of New Zealand' 
(1997) 136 International Labour Review 493. 
40 Moir, supra note 32 at 362. 
41  Complaint Against the Government of Australia presented by the International Federation of Air 
Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA), Document Vol. IAXIV, 1991, Series B, No. 1, Report 277, Case 
1511, para 236. The CFA stated: "The Committee cannot view with equanimity a set of legal rules 
Which: 
• appears to treat virtually all industrial action as a breach of contract on the part of those who 
participate therein; 
• makes any trade union or official thereof who instigates such breaches of contract liable in 
damages for any loses incurred by the employer in consequence of their actions; and 
• enables an employer faced with such action to obtain an injunction to prevent the 
• commencement (or continuation) of the unlawful conduct. 
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right to strike". 42 The common law serves to support a contractualist focus and will 
remain a challenge for compliance unless or until the WRA operates as an inclusive 
whole. 
The difficulties in establishing an inclusive and holistic workplace relations system 
have led to the existence of a hybrid labour relations structure that is neither true 
conciliation or arbitration nor voluntary free collective bargaining. This uneven 
development exaggerates the lack of a coherent approach to the right to strike. 
Nominally included as a means to even the balance between labour and management, 
the right can be wielded by individuals, unionists and non-unionists alike, and may 
only be protected if used to obtain an agreement at an enterprise level. The protected 
strike action provisions, rather than facilitating a coherent 'whole' approach to 
bargaining are designed to encourage agreement-making that conforms to ideological 
and political objectives. This creates a challenge to compliance between the functional 
ILO right to strike and the nebulous WRA enactment. 
The final challenge to compliance is the conflicting ideological approaches to the 
principle of freedom of association between ILO bodies and the WRA. Freedom of 
association within the ILO is constructed both collectively and functionally. This view 
of freedom of association is consistent across international enactments of freedom of 
association from a socio-economic rights perspective, but has not held true in 
common law jurisdictions (such as Canada and the United Kingdom)43 and is 
divergent from the enactment of freedom of association within the WRA. As the 
functional collective approach to freedom of association constitutes a central and 
inescapable foundation of ILO jurisprudence concerning the role and function of 
voluntary collective bargaining and the right to strike, this clash of ideology may 
prove an intractable stumbling block in establishing and maintaining compliance. 
The cumulative effect of such provisions could be to deprive workers of the capacity lawfully to take 
strike action to promote and defend their economic and social interests". 
42  M. Vranken, 'Strike and the Individual Employment Contract: The New Zealand Case' (1989) 19 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 249 at 264. 






This chapter will consider the extent to which the federal labour law system complies 
with voluntarily assumed international obligations with respect to the right to strike. 
Measuring compliance is not a simple matter of comparing Australian law with the 
international counterpart (although this chapter will undertake this exercise), because 
the international standards are not prescriptive norms. Owing to the collective and 
ideological content of the principle of freedom of association, the international 
standards are facilitative. Further, there is an inescapable connection between strike 
action and collective bargaining. Strike action does not occur in a vacuum but 
operates as an element of the broader bargaining regime. The following analysis will 
explore the question of compliance through both detailed comparison and 
consideration of the role accorded to strike action in the federal bargaining model. 
Complexity in Measuring Compliance 
Chapter 7 outlined potential obstacles to full compliance by Australian law with 
international standards on the right to strike. There is an additional obstacle arising 
from the nature of comparative study. Further, there are multiple levels of analysis of 
compliance. 
The Challenge to Compliance Arising out of Comparativism 
The object of this thesis is to assess the extent to which Australian law complies with 
voluntarily assumed international obligations. The exercise is not a comparison 
between domestic and internationally derived models, however there are lessons from 
the comparative process that are valuable for measuring compliance with international 
standards. 1 
For discussion of comparative literature examining the potential pitfalls involved with the 
comparative exercise see the Introduction at 17-19. 
245 
This study avoids the challenge faced by the comparative exercise of comparing 
domestic legal systems, with differing cultural, social and historical underpinnings, 
because the analysis involves international standards developed for universal 
application in domestic legal regimes. This avoids the need to tackle Kahn-Freund's 
warning concerning the wholesale transplantation of 'rules and institutions'. 2 
However, the lesson to be learned from the comparative exercise is that it is important 
to be aware of legal, social and economic contexts even when dealing with 
internationally developed 'universal' standards. 3 
Straightforward prescriptive international norms present few obstacles provided that 
the relevant domestic regime has the existing political, legal and economic 
infrastructure to enable measurement. However, non-prescriptive norms, like the 
principle of freedom of association, are more difficult to assess. Non-prescriptive 
norms cannot be measured in terms of straightforward legal responses. Rather, these 
- norms are' pliant, requiring flexibility in adaptation and measurement. International 
Labour Organization (ILO) standards concerning the right to strike have developed 
from the principle of freedom of association and are non-prescriptive, flexible norms. 
They are not susceptible to simplistic measurements, and therefore the analysis must 
encompass social, economic and historical factors, bargaining models and ideological 
factors. 
Equally, although ILO standards are designed to be universal in application, they have 
not developed in a vacuum. The ILO model developed out of a particular view of 
bargaining, freedom of association and the role of strike action. 4 The challenge for the 
measurement of compliance is to adequately accommodate the contextual factors at 
play in both the domestic and international models. 
2 0. Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1 at 27. 
3 For example, Von Prondzynski warns that "Nile danger in applying international standards ... is to 
assume that there is one global scale on which performance of individual states can be measured". E 
von Prondzynski, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study (Mansell 
Publishing Ltd: London, 1987) at 25. 
See discussion in chapter 1 at 34-36. 
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The Framework for Measuring Compliance 
The analysis of compliance will proceed on the basis that there are two levels at which 
compliance may be usefully measured. The first of these is the formal legal structure, 
that is, the framework established under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
(WRA) for parties to pursue the right to strike and the legal framework applicable to 
unprotected strike action. The second level of analysis is the practical, exploring the 
effect of the legal framework in practice. 
• Regulatory Framework 
The first and most important level at which compliance will be analysed is the legal 
framework in which the right to strike is regulated. This will involve examining legal 
rules and arrangements to establish the manner in which they accommodate the right 
to strike. ILO standards require that parties be able to freely pursue strike action 
within acceptable predefined limitations. The analysis will examine the legal 
framework to ascertain whether the limitations placed upon the exercise of the right to 
strike conform to this requirement. 
The analysis will address the two forms of potential strike action identified in chapters 
2-4. The first is strike action that constitutes the legitimate exercise of the right to 
strike implicit in the principle of freedom of association, the exercise of which should 
not be unduly impeded. The second is strike action exceeding the legitimate exercise 
of the right to strike, which may be restricted but which should not attract 
disproportionate penalties. For the purposes of measuring compliance, the phrase 
'legitimate strike action' means strike action that is encompassed by the principle of 
freedom of association within ILO standards. Equally, the phrase 'illegitimate strike 
action' will be used to refer to strike action that falls outside the principle of freedom 
of association within ILO standards. 
Practical Operation 
The second level of analysis involves the application of the legal framework in 
practice. Where the practical effect of the legal framework is different from the strict 
application of the law, or where the legal framework has been manipulated to obtain 
an alternative result, the impact of the law will be considered. Further, are proposals 
introduced to alter the existing legal regime. While these proposals have not become 
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part of the legal structure, they demonstrate the application of the legal framework 
and the reaction of the Federal Government to the manner in which the system 
operates in practice. 
The analysis of practical impact is less useful for measuring compliance than the' 
analysis of legal regulation. The ILO tests compliance on the basis of the legal 
framework, rather than its practical application. ILO bodies consider the practical 
operation of legal structures, but will not excuse or justify an infringement of 
international standards by a legal rule on the basis of the application of the rule in 
practice. An example is CEACR commentary with respect to the Commonwealth 
Crimes Act 1914.5 Provisions in the legislation enabling restrictions on the right to 
strike have been consistently criticised by the CEACR as representing an 
unacceptable infringement on the right to strike. The CEACR accepts that the 
provisions have rarely, if ever, been used in practice, however the CEACR continues 
to call for the repea1. 6 The practical operation of provisions that infringe the right to 
strike may provide some amelioration of non-compliance, but will not excuse the 
infringement. 
Laws that have remained dormant or have had a muted effect in practice may regain 
legal significance at a future time. The existing political, economic or social context 
that has affected the practical impact of law may change and affect the manner in 
which the law is applied, interpreted or enforced. In order to ensure both present and 
future compliance, laws and legal structures must comply with the right to strike, and 
the lack of practical effect of structures that infringe the right to strike cannot justify 
or excuse that infringement. 
5 For discussion of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) see chapter 6 at 223-224. 
6 In the 1993 Direct Request on Convention 87, The Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, the CEACR requested information on the practical application of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). This was followed up in the 1995 Direct Request on Convention 87 where the 
CEACR noted "with interest" that the Australian Government was considering repealing ss 30J and 
30K of the Crimes Act. In the 1998 and 2000 Observations, the CEACR repeated its concerns over the 
continued application of the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act and in 2000 expressed the "firm 
hope" that the Australian Government would take measures to amend the legislation. In the 2003 
Observation, the CEACR stated: "The Committee ... reiterates its hope that the Government will take 
measures to amend this legislation, and requests the Government to keep it informed of any practical 
application of these provisions". 
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The practical impact of provisions cannot be determinative of compliance. However, 
without the practical element, analysis may be subject to criticism as a strictly 
legalistic exercise. The measurement of compliance on the practical level involves 
taking economic, social and ideological issues into account, and thus addresses the 
challenge to comparativism discussed in the previous section. Further, practical 
analysis provides evaluation of the federal model in a holistic manner. 
Protected and Non-Protected Action 
The final challenge to be addressed in measuring compliance relates to the structure of 
the model of voluntary collective bargaining adopted by the WRA. As discussed in 
chapter 7, the model provides immunity for strike action falling within the defined 
parameters of 'protected action' . 7 Action undertaken outside these parameters remains 
vulnerable to potential common law or statutory liabilities. This means that there are 
two dimensions to measuring compliance within the federal model. The first 
dimension is the scope of legitimate strike action that is not protected under the WRA 
protected action provisions. The second dimension is the nature of the legal 
framework for protected action, in particular, the legal requirements for obtaining 
protection for strike action. ILO standards require that where the right to strike is 
exercised, obstacles should not exist that would render the right non-existent or 
extremely difficult to utilise in practice. This dimension requires assessment of the 
model provided for protected action, measuring the extent to which it enables the right 
to strike to be exercised freely. 
Measuring Compliance — Australian Law, ICESCR and ILO Standards 
The exercise of measuring the extent to which the federal bargaining model complies 
with international standards concerning the right to strike must distinguish between 
ICESCR and ILO standards because of the different levels of elaboration of standards 
under each instrument. 
7 See chapter 7.at 236-237. 
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)8 
The first instrument considered here that sets out international standards on the right 
to strike is the ICESCR. 9 The right to strike within Article 8(1)(d) of the ICESCR 
provides that State parties undertake to ensure the right to strike "provided that it is 
exercised in accordance with the laws of the particular country". The absence of an 
effective ICESCR complaint mechanism means that the development of principles 
governing the implementation of this guarantee has been limited to observations of 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) on Reports of 
ICESCR signatory States. There are no guidelines establishing the content or extent of 
the right. CESCR commentary is arbitrary, elaborating only on those areas in which it 
has identified concerns with Member State practice. The absence of a General 
Comment on the scope and content of Article 8 means that there is no consistent body 
of principles against which the content of the obligation can be measured. 
Accordingly, in the context of the ICESCR it is necessary to measure compliance in a 
general, rather than a particular, sense. 
The literal content of Article 8(1)(d) suggests that the federal labour relations system 
with respect to the right to strike complies with Australia's obligations under the 
Covenant. Craven notes that the main theme emerging from CESCR commentaries is 
the necessity for the right to strike to be implemented through a legislative scheme 
without significant practical or legal impediments to its exercise. 10 The federal 
bargaining model is broadly compliant with this principle. The WRA establishes a 
bargaining regime with a legislatively implemented right to strike. The exercise of the 
right to strike by employees and employee organizations in the form of protected 
action will not attract legal liability and employees are protected against dismissal. 
8 The discussion of the ICE SCR draws upon the material set out in chapter 2. 
9 Given the general nature of Article 8(1)(d) of the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it is not feasible to apply the two levels of analysis (legal and practical) 
discussed earlier in the chapter to the ICESCR standard. The discussion will focus on elaborating the 
content of the expression of the right to strike within the ICESCR. 
10 M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on 
its Development (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995), 278-281. 
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This analysis is supported by CESCR Observations on Australian State Reports 
concerning the domestic implementation of the ICESCR. I I The CESCR has not 
expressed concern over the specific existence of a right to strike in Australia, although 
it has noted the limitations on the extent of the enactment, particularly in connection 
with restrictions on the right to strike in essential services. 12 The CESCR has 
recommended that restrictions on the right to strike in Australia should be limited to 
essential services in the strict sense of the expression, in accordance with ILO 
Convention No 87, the Freedom of Association and Right to Organise Convention, 
1948, and to those civil servants who exercise the functions of the State. I3 
CESCR commentary provides little constructive analysis or discussion of the content 
of the right to strike contained within the ICESCR upon which to develop a more 
robust assessment of the WRA bargaining model and protected action. It is therefore 
difficult to measure compliance in further detail. However, the increasing willingness 
of the CESCR to use ILO standards for guidance with respect to the content of the 
ICESCR right to strike suggests that a measurement of compliance on the basis of 
ILO standards may reflect future expectations for compliance with the ICESCR. 
The ICESCR is a generalist human rights instrument. The objective of the universal 
application of the Covenant is served through a lack of specificity. Despite the 
generalist and undeveloped nature of the ICESCR, the CESCR has been willing to 
state that the implementation of the right to strike in the area of essential services 
should conform to standards expressed in ILO quasi-jurisprudence. While it appears 
that Australia formally complies with the ICESCR right to strike, substantive 
compliance with the content of the right is not yet measurable, or is only measurable 
according to ILO standards. 
11  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Australia, 01/09/2000, United Nations Doc. No. E/C.12/1Add.50, at 68, paras 378 and 
379; Third Periodic Report: Australia, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, United Nations Doc. E/1994/104/Add.22 —23 July 1998. Australia's fourth 
periodic report under Article 16 is due to the CESCR on 30 June 2005. 
12  CESCR Concluding Observations, Australia, 2000, supra note 11 at para 394. 
13 Ibid. 
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As noted in chapter 2, it remains unclear whether or not implementation of the right to 
strike under the ICESCR is limited to the promotion and protection of the specific 
employment interests of trade union members, or whether the right extends to broader 
social and economic issues affecting workers generally: 4 The right to form and join 
trade unions under Article 8(1)(a) is limited to the promotion and protection of the 
economic and social interests of the trade union members, but this limitation is not 
repeated in Article 8(1)(d). Accordingly, it is unclear whether or not the ICESCR right 
to strike extends to issues of broader social concern. The location of Article 8(1)(d), 
within an Article protecting trade union interests, and the general limitation contained 
within Article 8(1)(d) itself, suggests that interpretation of the Covenant may 
encompass limitations on the exercise of the right to strike in line with Article 8(1)(a). 
However, this argument must be balanced against the willingness of the CESCR to 
utilise ILO standards for the enunciation of the content of the right.' 5 ILO principles 
on the scope of legitimate strike action arebroader than the limitation in Article 
8(1)(a), suggesting that Article 8(1)(d) could be interpreted in a broader sense. Were 
the narrow interpretation to be accepted, Australian law would remain broadly 
compliant, as the right to strike is restricted to enterprise bargaining over matters 
related to the employment relationship (although this may be considered to constitute 
a narrow application of the right). However, under the broader interpretation, the 
narrow scope of the right in Australia would be non-compliant. 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Standards 16 
The ILO principles concerning the right to strike are the most comprehensive in 
international law. As noted, ILO standards operate within a model of voluntary 
collective bargaining. The Australian system, having adopted such a model, can be 
appropriately measured against ILO principles. 
As explained in chapters 1 and 3, there is no express right to strike in ILO 
instruments, as it is constructed as implicit in the principle of freedom of association. 
In this context, two of the challenges to Australian compliance raised in chapter 7 
14 See chapter 2 at 58-60. 
15 See chapter 2 at 55-57. 
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were the modern ideological challenge to the necessity for the right to strike in labour 
relations and competing approaches to the principle of freedom of association. I7 
While it is important to acknowledge the existence of these challenges, the ILO 
interpretative approach to freedom of association is binding upon Australia in 
international law while Australia remains a party to relevant ILO Conventions or a 
Member of the ILO. Consistency in approach at international level and in domestic 
commitment is important in order to ensure that the right to strike is not diminished or 
sacrificed in favour of domestic economics, politics or short term gains and to ensure 
that international obligations are met. 
Utilising the tools of black letter analysis and discussion of the practical impact of the 
law, the analysis will now measure the degree to which the WRA model of protected 
action. complies with ILO standards on the right to strike. The analysis will address 
the two dimensions outlined in the preceding discussion, namely the extent to which 
the model permits the exercise of legitimate strike action through the protected action 
framework and then, the content of protected action itself, examining possible 
impediments to the exercise of the right in practice. 
Dimension One - The Scope of the Right to Strike 
The ILO model provides for voluntary collective bargaining wherein State parties set 
the parameters of their domestic bargaining structures. The ILO model does not 
dictate the form or content of structures governing the role of strike within those 
systems beyond three basic principles: 
1. the structure should support a right to strike broad enough to encompass 
legitimate expressions of the right to strike; 
2. the structure should not hinder the exercise of the right to strike or impose 
obstacles that would render the exercise of the right in practice nugatory; and 
3. legal responses to illegitimate strike action should be measured and 
proportionate. 
16  The discussion of Australian compliance with ILO Standards draws upon the enunciation of 
standards set out in chapter 3 and the statement of Australian law set out in chapter 6. 
17 See chapter 7 at 239-243. 
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The Australian model of voluntary collective bargaining operates in accordance with 
normative collective bargaining principles. Where parties bargain within the system, 
they are able to avail themselves of the protections afforded by the protected action 
regime, including the right to strike. Where parties bargain or seek outcomes outside 
the set parameters of the model, the protections are not available. However, the model 
fails to accommodate all of the ILO requirements set out above. Structurally, the 
model accommodates a form of the right to strike, allowing parties to take unhindered 
strike action in limited circumstances. However, this right to strike is not broad 
enough to encompass all legitimate strike action and allows for the imposition of 
disproportionate legal responses to both unprotected legitimate strike action and 
illegitimate strike action. 
ILO standards require legitimate strike action to fall within the scope of action 
protected from liability or, at least, unhindered by other laws. The Australian model 
provides protection for strike action supporting negotiations for an enterprise level 
agreement and compatible with all legislative prerequisites. All other strike action: 
socio-economic, multiple business, industry, sympathy or trade union orientated, is 
denied protection and must run the gauntlet of compensatory or injunctive remedies 
available to those with a cause of action. This is the crux of the compliance issue in 
Australia. ILO bodies consider that where legitimate industrial action falls outside the 
scope of the protected action provisions, the right to strike is effectively denied. It has 
been the consistent view of the CEACR that where legitimate strikes in Australia are 
unprotected, the failure of Australian law to accord protection to the strike action 
constitutes a breach of the obligation to respect the right to strike. I8 
In contrast to the CEACR view, the Australian government argues that the failure to 
provide express protection to the right to strike in all forms recognised under the 
principle of freedom of association does not constitute a failure to comply with 
18 The CEACR Observations of 1999 and 2001 noted the possibility that in Australia legitimate 
unprotected industrial action could be subject to injunctions or civil liabilities and requested that all 
legitimate strike action be brought under the protected action scheme: CEACR Individual Observation 
concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organization, 
1948, Australia, 1999; CEACR Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organization, 1948, Australia, 2001. 
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international standards, because the exercise of the right to strike outside the protected 
action regime is not expressly prohibited under Australian law: 
[t]he Government reiterates in its report that the Act does not expressly 
prohibit strike action (except in relation to the period during which a collective 
agreement under the Act is in operation) but rather provides for certain 
industrial action to be protected from civil liability; in its view, the conditions 
to be fulfilled before taking industrial action ate reasonable and appropriate in 
the context of the national system as a whole. I9 
This argument by the Federal Government conceives of the federal labour law system 
as an interrelated whole, providing scope for voluntary collective bargaining in the 
context of the objectives of the system. The circumstances in which strike action is 
protected conform to the vision of the system as instituted, wherein strikes are 
protected if parties are pursuing bargaining outcomes expressly sanctioned by the 
system. However, this argument has been consistently rejected by the CEACR, which 
has reiterated that all forms of strike action considered legitimate in the context of the 
principle of freedom of association should be encompassed by a voluntary collective 
bargaining model. 20 
The ongoing dialogue between the Federal Government and the CEACR reflects a 
difference of approach with respect to the role of strike action within a bargaining 
model and a differing construction of the concept of unlawfulness. The disagreement 
over these matters has resulted in a compliance impasse whereby the CEACR asserts 
non-compliance and the Government reasserts its earlier position. 21 
The role of strike action within a bargaining model that is structured in accordance 
with the principle of freedom of association is conceived in different terms by the 
CEACR and the Federal Government. The functional interpretative approach adopted 
by the ILO in the enunciation of standards supporting the principle of freedom of 
19 CEACR Individual Observation Australia, Convention 87, 2001. 
29 CEACR Individual Observations Australia, Convention 87, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2004. 
21  Ibid. In the 2001, 2003 and 2004 Observations, the pattern is repeated. The CEACR sets out the 
position of the Federal Government (as set out above) and the CEACR calls for reform of the law. The 
2003 and 2004 Observations use the strongest possible CEACR language to note "with regret that the 
Government reiterates that it is not contemplating any legislative reform to bring its legislation into 
conformity with the Convention". For discussion of the language used by the CEACR see chapter 3 
at 80-83. 
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association, constructs the right to strike as facilitative of freedom of association, 
serving the function of balancing relative weights of industrial parties in the context of 
a voluntary and deregulated bargaining regime. This approach requires that the right 
to strike facilitate the functioning of the system as a tool of voluntary bargaining. This 
construction of freedom of association necessitates the inclusion of a broader right to 
strike than that provided under protected action in the federal labour law system 
because the protected action model does not allow for the parties to be voluntary 
actors setting their own bargaining parameters. On the contrary, it allows for a limited 
balancing of bargaining power in a limited bargaining model. 
There is a further difference in approach between the Federal Government and the 
CEACR to the concept of unlawfulness and strike action. The CEACR considers that 
the existence of civil or other penalties for legitimate but unprotected strike action is 
in violation of the right to strike. As noted, the Government response - that 
unprotected strike action is not expressly prohibited, and further that the limitations on 
protected action are reasonable and appropriate in the context of the national system - 
provides no answer. It merely deflects the critique and avoids directly dealing with the 
non-compliance issue raised. While it will not be illegal for an employee organization, 
or an employee, to engage in strike action falling outside the protected action regime, 
it will be unlawful in the sense that it could form the basis of any number of claims 
under the common law or statute. Further, it could be subject to injunctive relief and 
subsequent contempt proceedings. 22 Expressly rendering unprotected strike action 
illegal would be a serious breach of freedom of association, but it does not logically 
follow that a failure to render such strike action illegal means that no breach of the 
principle has occurred. The CFA stated as early as 1991 that the common law regime 
and injunctive relief available against otherwise legitimate strike action in Australia 
was in violation of the principle of freedom of association and, with the exception of 
the limited protected action regime, this has not changed since 1991. 23 
22 See discussion in chapter 6 at 159-165. 
23 Complaint Against the Government of Australia presented by the International Federation of Air 
Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA), Document Vol. DOCIV, 1991, Series B, No. 1, Report 277, Case 
1511. 
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Accordingly, where the protected action regime fails to protect legitimate strike action 
against legal process and civil liability, the federal system is incompatible with the 
principle of freedom of association and the right to strike. It is insufficient to suggest 
that strikes are not 'prohibited' to avoid this conclusion. 
The following discussion will explore the parameters of the federal WRA protected 
action regime in order to establish the scope of legitimate strike action that will or will 
not be protected. 
Definition of Strike Action 
ILO standards governing the right to strike implicit in the principle of freedom of 
association provide that a definition of strike action should not exclude forms of 
action that constitute legitimate exercises of the right to strike. Strike action should 
encompass all nuances of concerted action that may be undertaken in support of the 
collective. The parties should be free to choose the form of action, provided the action 
remains peaceful. 
The regulation of industrial action in the federal jurisdiction reflects the approach 
taken by ILO standards. The definition of "industrial action" in the WRA is 
expansive, encompassing the traditional view of strike action as a total stoppage of 
work and a range of other practices including work bans, go slow, rolling stoppages or 
work to rule. 24 The application of the broad definition means that if industrial action is 
undertaken in accordance with the protected action provisions, parties to the action 
may choose the form that their action will take. 
The broad WRA definition of industrial action means that the lawfulness or otherwise 
of the majority of strike action will not be determinable on the basis of the form that 
the action takes. This is appropriate in the context of ILO standards. However, there 
are two issues arising from the definition that cause potential compliance difficulties. 
These are the exclusion of peaceful picketing and the inclusion of individual strike 
action. 
24 See chapter 6 at 167-170. 
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Exclusion of Peaceful Picketing 
The decision in Davids Distribution25 held that peaceful picketing was excluded from 
the definition of "industrial action" under , the WRA.26 Where parties engage in 
peaceful picketing, their action cannot be protected for the purposes of the protected 
action regime. 27 As peaceful picketing is a legitimate form of strike action under ILO 
standards, this exclusion does not comply, especially if peaceful picketing remains 
potentially subject to legal sanctions. 
The effect of the decision in Davids Distribution on otherwise protected action 
involving peaceful picketing has not yet been fully explored in the case law. If strike 
action undertaken in accordance with the protected action regime includes peaceful 
picketing, does the entirety of the strike action lose protected status, or only the 
picketing element of the action? If the former applies then the loss of protection 
would leave the action open to potential legal liability as unprotected action. In such a 
case, the form that legitimate strike action takes would determine lawfulness, and this 
would breach ILO standards. However, if it was only the picketing element of the 
action that was denied protection, then compliance would be more difficult to 
measure. Peaceful picketing of itself is not inherently unlawful. If the participants in 
the action are protected by the protected action regime from claims under the law of 
contract (breach of contract) or the industrial torts (such as interference in contractual 
relations),28 then there is nothing inherently unlawful in the act of peaceful picketing 
itself. This would suggest that provided the act of picketing remains free of legal 
sanction and the remainder of the action is protected, the exclusion of peaceful 
picketing from the definition of "industrial action" under the WRA would not create a 
significant compliance problem. 
Individual Action 
The WRA definition of "industrial action" encompasses action undertaken by a 
collective but is also capable of encompassing activities of an industrial nature 
25 Davids Distribution Ply Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 91 FCR 463 (Davids Distribution). 
26 See discussion of the decision in Davids Distribution in chapter 6 at 169-170. 
27 Davids Distribution, supra note 25. 
28 See discussion in chapter 6 at 159-165. 
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undertaken by an individual.29 The definition does not require collectivity to be 
present in order to satisfy its terms, whereas ILO standards do not include individual 
action within the definition of strike action. However, this difference is not material 
because the ILO standards do not specifically exclude the possibility of individual 
industrial action. Therefore the inclusion of scope for individual industrial action 
within the definition of "industrial action" in the WRA, however unlikely it is that 
individual action will occur in practice, does not create a compliance problem in and 
of itself. On the contrary, the flexible nature of the ILO standard allows for 
differentiation of approach within national legislation. 
However, the difference is indicative of a broader ideological conflict. The ILO model 
aims to ensure the free pursuit of voluntary collective bargaining, whereby the right to 
strike is a weapon possessed by the collective who may utilise strike action to serve 
associational objectives and to maintain a balance of power in the bargaining 
equation. The ability to pursue individual strike action in the federal WRA bargaining 
model demonstrates a significantly different approach to the role and purpose of strike 
action within Australian law. Strikes are seen as serving the functional role of 
supporting negotiation within bargaining. This is a significantly more limited 
conception of the role of strike action in a model of voluntary collective bargaining to 
that embraced by the ILO. 
The ability of the WRA definition of "industrial action" to encompass individual 
action does not create a compliance problem at this preliminary definitional stage. 
However, it foreshadows a substantial differentiation in approach to the role and 
function of strike action by the federal WRA model and the ILO quasi-jurisprudence 
which creates compliance difficulties to be discussed below. 
The Legitimate Objectives of Strikes 
Within ILO standards, strike action undertaken for the furtherance and defence of the 
interests of workers or employees is encompassed by the principle of freedom of 
association. Strikes aimed at protecting the occupational interests of strikers, 
including strikes related to the social or economic policies of government are 
29 See chapter 6 at 169. 
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legitimate, while strikes of a political nature are not. The following discussion will 
consider the motivations required of strikers in order to undertake protected action 
under the WRA. Outside the protected action regime, questions of motivation or 
purpose are not relevant in any cause of action that may exist against strike 
participants, except perhaps in the context of occupational health and safety or an 
order under s 127. 30 
In the federal system the protected action model serves the specific purpose of 
facilitating bargaining for collective or individual agreements. 3I Section 170ML 
provides that protected status is only available where the purpose of the action is to 
support or advance claims in respect of the proposed certified agreement that is the 
subject of the bargaining period, or in response to such action by the other party. The 
only acceptable motivation is the advancement of interests relevant to the agreement 
to be negotiated. Further, the AIRC can terminate a bargaining period, removing the 
ability to take protected action, where parties are not genuinely trying to reach 
agreement.32 In addition, certification of an agreement requires that the agreement 
pertain to the relationship between an employer and employees. 33 Strike action, in this 
context, is for one purpose only, and the provisions are designed to stop parties 
utilising the protected action provisions if they have other agendas. 
ILO standards accord legitimacy to strike action engaged in for socio-economic, trade 
union or sympathy purposes. The focus of protected action on the terms of collective 
agreements excludes all three of these possible motivations from protection. 
Socio-Economic Motivations 
Strike action with socio-economic motivations will only be protected under the WRA 
protected action provisions if the action is also directed at advancing interests in 
relation to a proposed certified or individual agreement. Therefore, issues of broader 
social or economic concern may only be valid motivations for strike action if they 
313 For discussion of the relevance of 'motivation' to cases of action against parties engaged in 
unprotected industrial action see B. Creighton and A. Stewart, Labour Law: An Introduction (3'd ed., 
Federation Press: Sydney, 2000) at 408. 
31 See discussion in chapter 6 at 175-182. 
32 WRA s 170MW and see discussion in chapter 6 at 185-189. 
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coincide with specific proposed clauses in an agreement. All specific provisions must 
pertain to the relationship between employer and employee. 34 Regardless of the 
intention or motivations of the claimant, where claims are made in a proposed 
agreement that are not capable of certification, protected action will lose protected 
status.35 
Trade Union Motivations 
A strike undertaken by an organization which relates to matters of internal trade union 
security, industrial coverage, a demarcation dispute or the status of organizations, will 
not receive protection under the WRA protected action regime. Strike action aimed at 
achieving outcomes of this nature may pertain to a relevant proposed certified 
agreement by seeking relevant clauses in the proposed agreement, but would not meet 
the requirement that they pertain to the relationship between an employer and 
employee. 36 Further, the AIRC is able to suspend or terminate a bargaining period, 
removing protected status, where a strike involves a demarcation dispute or industrial 
coverage. 37 
Sympathy Strikes 
Sympathy strikes, where an organization engages in industrial action which has the 
purpose of supporting claims made by another organization, will not be covered by 
the protected action provisions. Further, such action could affect the protected status 
of the strike action undertaken by the organization that is being supported. Industrial 
action will lose protected status where it is engaged in, or organised, in concert with 
one or more persons or organizations that are not protected persons if there is any 
degree of "acting in concert" involved. 38 
33 WRA s 170MI and Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2004] HCA 40, 
2 September, 2004, unreported judgment. 
34 WRA s 170MI; Electrolux, supra note 33. 
35 Ibid. 
36  For discussion of the requirement that an agreement pertain to the relationship between employer and 
employee see Electrolux, supra note 33 and K L. Ballantyne and National Union of Workers, AIRC, 
PR 952656, 22 October, 2004 and chapter 6 at 175-180. 
37 WRA s 170MW. 
38  WRA s 170MM. For an example of the loss of protection for "acting in concert" see: National 
Workforce Pty Ltd and Others v Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union and Others (1997) 75 IR 
200; National Workforce Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers Union [1998] 3 V.R. 265 and 
the discussion in chapter 6 at 189-192. 
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ILO standards dictate that parties are able to undertake strike action in sympathy with 
other workers. Secondary boycott conduct is unlawful under both the TPA and 
WRA.39 Protected industrial action will lose protection if it involves a secondary 
boycott.4° Significantly, the CEACR has been critical of this situation in Australia on 
numerous occasions. 41 
Conclusions — Legitimate Strike Objectives and Australian Law 
The protected action regime under the WRA does not comply with ILO standards in 
that it fails to encompass the full range of objecti ves of strike action considered 
legitimate within ILO quasi-jurisprudence. In confining the scope of potential 
protected action to the certified agreement concerned, the model fails to recognise the 
broader construction of freedom of association adopted*by the ILO. Within the ILO 
framework, the occupational interests of workers and employers are construed to 
extend beyond the regulation of the employment relationship and to include trade 
union affairs, broader socio-economic issues and sympathy strikes. The exclusion of 
these legitimate objectives from the protected action model is not in conformity with 
ILO standards. - 
Level of Bargaining 
Under ILO standards, the level at which parties bargain is a matter to be determined 
between the parties themselves. Strike action is a legitimate industrial tactic to 
facilitate the resolution of disputes concerning the level at which agreements will be 
made. In this model, the market determines bargaining levels and workers' 
organizations can legitimately influence the market through the use of strike action. 
39 See the discussion of secondary boycotts in chapter 6 at 214-222. 
40 WRA s 170MM. 
41 The CEACR has been consistently critical of the Australian secondary boycott regime. In the 1999 
Observation, the CEACR reaffirmed its view that a general prohibition on sympathy strikes could lead 
to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action, provided that the initial strike that they are 
• supporting is lawful. These Observations were repeated in the 2001 and 2003 Observations. CEACR 
Individual Observations Australia, Convention 87, 1999, 2001 and 2003. In the 2004 Observation the 
CEACR stated "The Committee recalls once again that a general prohibition of sympathy strikes could 
lead to abuse .... The Committee again expresses the firm hope that the Government will amend the 
legislation [the TPA] accordingly, and requests it to continue to provide information on the practical 
application of the boycott provisions". CEACR Individual Observation Australia, Convention 87, 
2004. 
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Under the federal WRA model of voluntary collective bargaining, protected strike 
action is not available to facilitate disputes concerning the level at which bargaining 
takes place. Protected action is only available where parties choose to bargain at a 
level permitted by the WRA. A bargaining period may only be initiated in relation to • 
the negotiation of an agreement to apply to employees employed in a single business 
or part of a single business. 42 That is, protected action will only be available where 
parties choose to negotiate an agreement at enterprise level. While an agreement 
covering more than one place of business can be certified, strike action undertaken in 
support of that agreement will not be protected.43 This approach to voluntary 
collective bargaining restricts the ability of the parties to undertake negotiations as 
voluntary actors in a free market bargaining environment. The scheme of the WRA 
pre-determines the market in which bargaining can take place. This constraint is 
incompatible with ILO standards that dictate that the parties themselves must be free 
to choose the level at which they bargain. 
Notably, CEACR commentary has been critical of the restriction on the availability of 
protected action to bargaining at the enterprise level, arguing that it 
effectively denies the right to strike in the case of the negotiation of multi-
employer, industry wide or national level agreements, which excessively 
inhibits the right of workers and their organizations to promote and protect 
their economic and social interests. 44 
The criticism was repeated in 2003 and 2004 where it was noted that workers 
organizations should be able to take industrial action in support of multi-employer 
agreements.45 
The restriction of protected action to enterprise level bargaining denies protection to 
parties engaging in other effective forms of strike action, including those carried out 
beyond the enterprise level. Strike action, as a display of bargaining strength, can be 
potent when conducted across employers, unions or industries. Restricting protected 
42 See discussion in chapter 6 at 170-172. 
43  For discussion concerning the certification of multi-business agreements see chapter 6 at 172-173. 
" CEACR Individual Observation Australia, Convention 87, 1999. This statement was repeated in 
2001: CEACR Individual Observation Australia, Convention 87, 2001. 
45  In 2003 and 2004 the CEACR stated that "workers' organizations should be able to take industrial 
action in support of multi-employer agreements without running the risk of being sanctioned", CEACR 
Individual Observations Australia, Convention 87, 2003 and 2004. 
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action to the level of the enterprise operates as a restraint on the effective exercise of 
the right to strike, rendering it a less potent and less threatening workers' right. 
The passage of proposed legislation to prevent the practice of pattern bargaining 
would exacerbate non-compliance." The tactic of pattern bargaining has been 
successful when undertaken by unions working Within the limitations of the current 
protected action model. The tactic remains vulnerable under the existing regime 
because it risks a declaration that the parties are not "genuinely trying to reach 
agreement".47  However, the passage of the proposed law would further hinder the 
choices of industrial parties in this area as to the level at which they wish to bargain. 
Strikes Undertaken During the Currency of an Agreement 
It is not contrary to the ILO principle of freedom of association to restrict the ability 
of parties to take strike action during the currency of a collective agreement. Such 
restriction, however, should only apply to those rights established under the 
agreement and should not prevent strike action relating to the further occupational 
interests of the workers subject to the agreement. 
This approach to strike action undertaken during the currency of a collective 
agreement embraces a rights/interests distinction. This has, in principle, been adopted 
by the federal WRA mode1. 48 However, the law remains unclear on whether or not 
strike action undertaken in furtherance of an interest dispute during the currency of a 
collective agreement can be protected action. 49 ILO standards require that parties be 
able to exercise the right to strike in these circumstances, which means that the WRA 
model is non-compliant if such action cannot be protected. The increasing use of 'no 
extra claims' clauses in certified agreements further muddies the water. Parties should 
be able to negotiate their own terms; however the blanket inclusion of no extra claims 
46 For discussion of pattern bargaining see chapter 6 at 190-192. 
47 See the decision of Munro J in Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, 
Printing and Kindred Industries Union & Ors, A1RC, Print T1982, 16 October 2000. 
48 WRA s 170MN. This also applies during the currency of a s 170MX(3) award. For discussion of the 
rights/interests distinction under the WRA bargaining regime see chapter 6 at 180-182. 
49 See Emwest Products Ply Ltd v AFMEP&KIU [2002] 112 IR 388 per Kenny J; Integrated Metal 
Services, unreported judgment, A1RC, PR934714, 4 July 2003, SDP Williams and chapter 6 at 180- 
182. 
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terms in certified agreements could have the effect of denying the right to strike for 
interest disputes during the currency of certified agreements. 
The Repercussions of Strike Action 
ILO standards pertaining to the principle of freedom of association provide that 
participation in legitimate strike action should not have legal repercussions, and that 
where parties engage in illegitimate strike action, it will not be contrary to the 
principle of freedom of association to impose legal sanctions provided that the 
sanctions are proportionate to the offence committed. 
In the federal WRA model, the distinction between protected and unprotected 
industrial action is not based on the ILO construction of the legitimacy or otherwise of 
strike action. Participants in protected action are protected from legal sanctions and 
can freely exercise a right to strike. All other strike action is subject to common law, 
statutory and injunctive action. 50 The repercussions of strike action under the federal 
model need to be examined at two levels. First, the repercussions that flow from 
undertaking legitimate unprotected action and second, those that affect illegitimate 
unprotected action. 
Legitimate Unprotected Industrial Action 
It has already been noted that unprotected legitimate strike action attracts legal 
sanctions and this is incompatible with ILO freedom of association principles. The 
potential legal consequences in common law contract, tortious action, injunctive relief 
or breaches of the TPA secondary boycott provisions were canvassed in chapter 6. 51 
The CFA summed up the position of unprotected legitimate strike action in 1991: 
The Committee cannot view with equanimity a set of legal rules which: 
(i) appears to treat virtually all industrial action as a breach of 
contract on the part of those who participate therein; 
(ii) makes any trade union or official thereof who instigates such 
breaches of contract liable in damages for any losses incurred 
by the employer in consequence of their actions; and 
5° See chapter 6 at 159-165. 
51 See chapter 6 at 159-163 for common law contract, 164-165 for tortious or injunctive relief and 214- 
222 for discussion of the TPA secondary boycott regime. 
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(iii) enables an employer faced with such action to obtain an 
injunction to prevent the commencement (or continuation) of 
the unlawful conduct. 
The cumulative effect of such provisions could be to deprive workers of the 
capacity lawfully to take strike action to promote and defend their economic 
and social interests. 52 
An area of law that was not canvassed in 1991 as it had not yet been enacted is the 
position of unprotected legitimate strike action under s 127 of the WRA. 
Section 127 Orders  
Legitimate unprotected industrial action may be subject to an order under s 127 of the 
WRA.53 Section 127 orders may be issued by the AIRC to stop impending, probable 
or actual industrial action. As outlined in chapter 6, the leading case with respect to 
s 127 orders, Coal and Allied, classified industrial action under the WRA as 
prohibited, protected and unprotected. 54 The application of s 127 orders and the 
exercise of discretion by the ARC with regard to prohibited and unprotected action 
are relevant to this discussion. 
Prohibited industrial action is actively prohibited, for example, in relation to boycott 
conduct or strike pay. 55 An order under s 127 that action cease because it relates to a 
claim for strike pay or to secondary boycott conduct would be a prima facie breach of 
ILO standards, as both are legitimate expressions of the right to strike implicit in the 
principle of freedom of association. 
Unprotected industrial action is action that is neither prohibited nor protected by the 
WRA. Where unprotected industrial action takes place, s 127 orders may be granted at 
the discretion of the AIRC. However, the availability of s 127 orders (and subsequent 
injunctions in the Federal Court) against legitimate unprotected action is incompatible 
with ILO principles on freedom of association. On the practical level, the existence of 
the ARC discretion enables the ARC to take into account a wide range of factors 
52 Complaint against the Government of Australia, supra note 23, para 236. 
53 For discussion of s 127 orders under the WRA see chapter 6 at 197 - 202. 
54 Coal and Allied Operations Ply Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union and Ors (1997) 73 IR 311. 
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related to the industrial action, which, to some degree, ameliorates the non-
compliance. 
Illegitimate Unprotected Industrial Action 
Employees involved in illegitimate unprotected industrial action may be subjected to 
legal sanctions or dismissal. ILO standards require that legal responses to illegitimate 
strike action be proportionate to the degree of illegitimacy involved. 
Legal Sanctions 
Certain forms of strike action, for example, strikes undertaken for political purposes 
or non-peaceful strikes, fall outside the principle of freedom of association and are 
illegitimate. The issue to be considered is whether the legal response in the federal 
model to illegitimate action is proportionate to the offence committed. 
Illegitimate strike action can be subjected to an array of sanctions. First, under the 
common law, a strike will constitute a breach of the employment contract, rendering 
the employee concerned liable to dismissal. The breach of employment contract will 
form the basis of potential liability under the industrial torts pertaining to combination 
between workers and trade unions. Further, the TPA prohibits secondary boycotts and 
contains substantial penalties. In addition, a range of possible consequences may flow 
from the application of provisions of the WRA including orders under s 127. 
The sanctions reflect the development of common law rules designed to stifle • 
combination and punish strikers. 56 The laws have not developed to maintain 
proportionality or on the foundation of an existing right to strike. They reflect the 
haphazard and reactive approach to the development of law in the context of the 
existence of the conciliation and arbitration system and the hostility of the common 
law to combination. 57 
55 For discussion of the prohibition of boycott conduct see chapter 6 at 189-190. For discussion of the 
prohibition of strike payments see chapter 6 at 195-196. 
56  E.I. Sykes and H.J. Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia (Butterworths: Sydney, 1972) at 366-367 and 
see chapter 7 at 232-233. 
57 Ibid. 
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In consequence, illegitimate industrial action may be subject to an array of sanctions 
disproportionate to the illegitimacy involved. With the notable exception of s 127 
orders, there is no attempt to quantify the degree of the offence committed, the degree 
of illegitimacy or to impose an appropriate sanction. Appropriate sanctioning of 
illegitimate industrial action requires a re-examination of the law and the development 
of a process flexible enough to accommodate both minor and substantial deviations. 
This would constitute a radical readjustment of the law, especially the common law, 
and a rethinking of the manner in which the regulatory system approaches all forms of 
industrial action. 
Dismissal from Employment  
The dismissal of a worker in consequence of participation in legitimate strike action 
constitutes serious discrimination in employment and a curtailment of the right to 
strike under ILO standards. Termination of the employment of a worker for 
participation in illegitimate strike action may be disproportionate to the offence 
committed. 
A worker cannot be dismissed under the federal system for engaging in protected 
strike action. 58 However, unprotected strike action can result in dismissal under the 
common law doctrine of repudiation of contract. Any strike action by an employee 
may constitute a breach of contract enabling the summary termination of the 
employment contract by the employer. The availability of unfair dismissal provisions 
to many employees with does not overcome the non-compliance involved. 59 
With respect to illegitimate action, dismissal may constitute a disproportionate 
Sanction, given that the cause of action is not linked to the seriousness of the offence 
committed. Any strike action, from the smallest and least disruptive act to the most 
serious act, potentially constitutes grounds for termination. The nature of the offence, 
58 WRA s 170MU. See discussion in chapter 6 at 175. 
59 The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, interpreting Article 8(1)(d) 
of the ICESCR stated that "[t]he Committee does not find satisfactory the proposal to enable 
employees who go on strike to have a remedy for unfair dismissal. Employees participating in a lawful 
strike should not ipso facto be regarded as having committed a breach of the employment contract": 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 04/12/97, E/C.12/1/Add.19, para 11. 
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• the extent of damage inflicted or the consequences of the breach are irrelevant to the 
employers' right to dismiss. 6° 
• ILO quasi-jurisprudence regards excessive sanctioning of illegitimate strike action as 
a breach of the principle of freedom of association and a threat to the capacity to carry 
out legitimate strike action. The lack of proportionality in the sanctions for 
illegitimate strike action in Australia creates a compliance impasse which can only be 
resolved by the adoption of wholesale reforms. 
Unprotected Strike Action by Workers in Essential Services 
ILO standards provide that it will be permissible to restrict otherwise legitimate strike 
action where it could impede the functioning of an essential service or where strike 
action by employees is incompatible with the function of their particular office. A 
restriction of this type may only occur in exceptional circumstances and may not be 
based on the economic impact of strike action. Categories identified by ILO bodies in 
which it is permissible to restrict the right to strike are: 
• public servants exercising authority in the name of the State; 
• acute national emergency; or 
• essential services - those services the interruption of which would endanger the 
life, personal safety or health of the whole or a part of the population. 
Under the WRA, where workers in essential services are concerned, strike action may 
attract additional penalties due to the nature of the work that they perform. Where 
essential service employees are engaged in protected action, the AIRC may terminate 
a bargaining period, leaving any resultant action open to potential liability. 61 This will 
be discussed further below. 62 In addition, where essential service employees are 
engaged in unprotected action there are provisions that may affect them in addition to 
other potential liabilities affecting unprotected action: deregisiration of an 
. organization and the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The issue with respect to compliance is 
whether or not these provisions apply to workers in essential services in the strict 
definition of the term. 	 • 
60 See chapter 6 at 159-163. 
61 See chapter 6 at 186-188. 
62 See below at 279. 
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Deregistration of an Organization 
An organization registered in the federal system may be deregistered by the AIRC on 
the grounds that the organization or its members have engaged in strike action 
interfering with trade or commerce or the provision of any public service. 63 
Deregistration of an organization prevents that organization participating in the 
federal workplace relations system and from engaging in protected action. This means 
that the organization is denied the right to strike. The grounds for deregistration do not 
constitute grounds which would justify the restriction of the right to strike under ILO 
standards as neither trade and commerce generally, nor the provision of a public 
service, are essential in the strict sense of the term. This point has been made by the 
CEACR, which considers that the effect of deregistration provisions is to prohibit 
strikes in such circumstances. 64 This provision exceeds restrictions on strikes in 
essential services permissible under the principle of freedom of association and, 
despite the fact deregistration is not commonly used in practice, it is non-compliant. 
Commonwealth Crimes Legislation 
The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) is independent of the WRA and is applicable to all 'strike 
action although the impact of the Act on protected action is unclear. 65 Sections 30J 
and 30K operate to enable general prohibitions of strikes or lock-outs and may 
criminalise conduct threatening .trade or commerce between Australia and other 
countries or between States, or interference with the Commonwealth public service or 
the transport industry. These provisions are incompatible with ILO standards that only 
permit a general prohibition in times of acute national emergency. Further, the 
possible restrictions under ss 30J and 30K are well in excess of the strict ILO 
definition of essential services. The inclusion of the provisions in criminal legislation 
is contrary to ILO standards concerning acceptable sanctions for illegitimate strike 
action. 
63 WRA s 294. See discussion in chapter 6 at 205-207. 
64 CEACR Individual Observation Australia, Convention 87, 2001: "registration of an organization 
may be cancelled where it or its members engaged in industrial action interfering with trade or 
commerce or the provision of any public service (s 294), which for practical purposes prohibits strike 
action in such circumstances". 
65 See chapter 6 at 223-224. 
270 
The provisions are redundant in practice. However, CEACR Observations have 
repeatedly recommended the repeal of the provisions as they are incompatible with 
the principle of freedom of association and remain a threat to the right to strike. 66 
Payment for Periods of Strike Action 
Under ILO standards on the principle of freedom of association it is permissible to 
deduct wages from employees for periods of strike action, provided that such 
deductions are commensurate with the period that was not worked. However, parties 
should be free to negotiate over the issue of payment for strike action in the terms of a 
collectively negotiated agreement. 
Part VIIIA of the WRA expressly outlaws any payment of remuneration for a period 
of industrial action. 67 Whether or not employees can be paid for partial stoppages 
remains unclear. The Coalition Government has sought to ensure that no remuneration 
is paid to an employee for any day on which strike action occurred in any form. 
The ILO is critical of these provisions arguing that they excessively limit the subject 
matter of strike action. The CEACR acknowledges that it is permissible to deduct 
wages where strike action occurs, but it is contrary to the principle of freedom of 
association to prevent workers negotiating with an employer over the question of 
strike pay. 68 
The Federal Government argues that it is not inconsistent with the principle of 
freedom of association for an employer to refuse to pay wages to an employee in 
connection with a strike. 69 Further it states that Part VIII is a reflection of the common 
law rule that denies remuneration to workers who do not perform the work required 
66 See above at footnote 6. 
67 For discussion of Part VII see chapter 6 at 195-196. 
68 CEACR Individual Observations Australia, Convention 87, 2003 and 2004: "Noting with regret that 
the Government reiterates that it is not contemplating any legislative reform to bring its legislation into 
conformity with the Convention ... the Committee recalls that .... Providing in legislation that workers 
cannot take strike action in support of a claim for strike pay is not compatible with the principles of 
freedom of association". 
69 In the 2003 and 2004 Individual Observations on Convention 87, the CEACR repeated the view of 
the Federal Government that "the prohibition in the legislation is compatible with freedom of 
association principles and merely reflects the common law rule that denies remuneration to workers 
who don't perform the work required by their contract of employment, as confirmed by national 
courts". CEACR Individual Observations Australia, Convention 87, 2003 and 2004. 
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by their contract of employment. 70 However, these arguments fail to address the 
substance of the CEACR critique. The CEACR considers that, in accordance with the 
principle of freedom of association, employers and employees should be free to 
choose the subject matter in contest during collective bargaining, including the right 
to be paid for periods of strike action. This would not make it mandatory for 
employers to pay remuneration for periods of strike action. The reference to the 
common law doctrine of no work, no pay is also fallacious. It suggests that a 
provision breaching the principle of freedom of association is legitimate because it is 
based upon a common law doctrine that breaches the principle of freedom of 
association. In any event, the common law doctrine does not prevent parties 
renegotiating contractual terms after the cessation of strike action that include a 
provision providing for payment for periods relating to strike action. 7I The WRA 
goes further than the common law, not merely permitting employers to withhold 
remuneration, but mandating non-payment and making it unlawful to negotiate the 
matter in subsequent bargaining rounds. 
The Federal Governments proposal to ensure that no payment is made to employees 
for any day on which any act of strike action occurs, would compound existing non-
compliance. This would introduce a penalty for industrial action where the loss of 
income related to the industrial action could be higher than the man-hours lost to the 
employer (for example - where one day's wage is lost for a .half-day or hour long 
strike). This would penalise the employee, encourage parties to avoid short, temporary 
or partial work bans in favour of daylong total stoppages, and provide a potential 
profit to the employer in terms of unpaid man-hours. This scenario is not designed to 
facilitate voluntary collective bargaining but to interfere with the bargaining process 
and further restrict the degree to which bargaining represents the voluntary actions of 
the parties involved. 
Protection Against Anti Union Discrimination for Engaging in Strike Action 
ILO standards on the principle of freedom of association dictate that workers should 
be protected against discrimination on the basis of their involvement with a trade 
70 ibid. 




union, extending to participation in strike action. ILO quasi-jurisprudence states that it 
is important to implement legislative machinery to deal with potential and actual 
discrimination, including the provision of adequate and appropriate compensation. 
However, damages should not be the only remedy as this may allow employers to take 
the calculated risk of discriminating and paying damages to achieve a desired 
discriminatory outcome. Compensatory mechanisms should encompass reinstatement, 
back payment of wages and maintenance of accrued rights. 
Under the WRA, protection for employees against anti union discrimination is 
provided in Part XA, dealing with freedom of association. 72 These provisions prevent 
discrimination or victimisation against employees on the grounds of their involvement 
in trade union activities. The legislative scheme of Part XA is comprehensive and 
generally compliant with ILO standards by protecting a limited non-functional 
construction of the principle of freedom of association. The reverse onus of proof, 
requiring employers to rebut the presumption that they have acted in breach of the 
provisions where the employee makes out a prima facie factual circumstance, is 
highly protective of workers in a scenario where "the real reason for [the conduct may 
be] impossible, or nearly impossible, of demonstration through ordinary forensic 
processes". 73 The remedies available for a breach of the freedom of association 
provisions are in accordance with ILO standards, encompassing the imposition of 
penalties, the payment of compensation or reinstatement. 74 
The main shortcoming of Part XA is that it does not protect employees against 
discrimination or victimisation for participation in all forms of legitimate strike 
action. The provisions encompass a broad range of potentially discriminatory conduct. 
However, they do not expressly protect against discrimination or victimisation on the 
grounds that a party has engaged in legitimate but unprotected strike action. On the 
basis of the express legal framework, there is no interplay between Part XA and the 
right to strike. This expression of freedom of association sits uncomfortably with ILO 
standards that do not separate the right to strike and the principle of freedom of 
association, requiring protection to apply to all legitimate activities of trade unions. 
72 See chapter 6 at 207-214. 
73 Per Smithers and Evatt JJ in Bowling v General Motors-Holden Pty Ltd (1975) 8 ALR 197 at 204. 
74 WRA s 298U. 
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Amelioration of this position and a degree of protection against discrimination or 
victimisation relating to legitimate unprotected industrial action may be found in 
judicial interpretations of Part XA. As discussed in chapter 6, members of the 
judiciary have been increasingly willing to construe Part XA in the context of the 
WRA as a whole. 75 Recent case law has demonstrated that the protections available in 
Part XA may extend to legitimate unprotected industrial action. In both Davids 
Distribution76 and the Finance Sector Union Case, 77 the Federal Court recognised that 
Part XA interacts with other Parts of the WRA in order to protect the activities of 
industrial organizations, in accordance with the broader objectives of the Act. 
However, whether or not the approach of the court in these cases will lead to broader 
protection for legitimate unprotected action, especially in the light of the High Court 
decision in Electrolux which applied a strict literalist interpretation to the protected 
action provisions, remains to be seen. 78 The suggestion, however, is that a whole-of-
Act approach, enabling the freedom of association provisions to be applied to 
legitimate unprotected action, would create a greater degree of compliance with ILO 
standards. 
Dimension Two — The Operation of Protected Action 
The preceding section examined the distinction between action that is protected and 
action that is not protected in order to measure the range of action considered 
legitimate under ILO standards but unprotected by the federal model. A number of 
deficiencies in the federal model have been noted. The discussion will now examine 
the pre-requisites and procedural requirements for undertaking protected action. The 
analysis will measure the protected action process against ILO standards in order to 
examine whether the provision of the right to strike in the federal model excessively 
hampers or limits the taking of action that is protected. 
75 See chapter 6 at 210-213. 
76 Davids Distribution, supra note 25. 
77 Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2002) 114 IR 
352. 
78 Electrolux, supra note 33. 
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Prerequisites to Taking Protected Industrial Action 
The ILO model of voluntary collective bargaining supported by the right to strike 
requires that the model of bargaining in operation should not hinder the exercise of 
the right to strike or render it nugatory in practice. Accordingly, the ILO model is 
capable of supporting pre-requisites to strike action. However, such pre-requisites 
must serve an independent purpose and not exist merely as an obstacle to the exercise 
of the right. 
Negotiation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
ILO standards accommodate the imposition of prerequisites of negotiation or 
conciliation to assist in avoiding strike action. Arbitration will only be encompassed 
by the principle of freedom of association if parties voluntarily submit, or where it is 
Used to break a prolonged deadlock. Where the latter option is available, the deadlock 
provision must be tightly monitored to ensure that parties do not push for an arbitrated 
outcome by prolonging strike action. The overriding consideration is that a negotiated 
outcome will be preferable to an imposed solution. 
Negotiation and Conciliation 
The protected action regime requires that parties genuinely try to reach agreement 
with each other before undertaking protected industrial actio *n. 79 If the AIRC 
considers that a party has not genuinely tried to reach agreement then the industrial 
action may lose protected status. This requirement is in accordance with ILO 
standards and is consistent with the goal of encouraging genuine bargaining. 
Arbitration 
Under the WRA bargaining model, there is no conciliation or arbitration prerequisite 
to undertaking protected strike action. However, non-voluntary binding arbitration 
may be imposed when a bargaining period is terminated by the AIRC, resulting in the 
production of a s 170MX award. 8° Arbitration in this context does not operate as a 
pre-requisite to strike action, but provides for the resolution of disputes threatening 
79 WRA s 170MP. Section 170MOP requires that a party must comply with any order made by the 
AIRC in connection with the negotiations before undertaking action. See discussion in chapter 6 at 186. 
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public safety or economic stability. The provisions encourage negotiation, and the 
arbitrated outcome may only apply to matters left unresolved in the dispute. 81 
The availability of s 170MX orders after the termination of a bargaining period in the 
context of protracted disputes could encourage parties to manipulate the availability of 
protected action in order to seek an arbitrated outcome. Section 170MX awards are 
not limited to 20 allowable award matters, 82 providing an incentive to manipulate 
strike action to achieve a legally binding award beyond the minimum safety net. 83 
Manipulation of strike action in this manner is inconsistent with ILO standards. 
However, in practice the AIRC can prevent such abuse. For example, in Coal and 
Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union 
(CFMEU), 84 the CFMEU sought AIRC orders terminating a bargaining period on the 
basis of their own industrial action that they claimed was threatening to endanger the ' 
life, personal safety and health of the people of Newcastle and the Hunter Regions. 85 
Termination of the bargaining period would enable the AIRC to make an award under 
s 170MX. On appeal the Full Bench of the AIRC refused to terminate the bargaining 
period noting the consequences of terminating a bargaining period given the 
"competing rights of registered organizations and employers to take industrial action" 
involved. 86 While the legal framework and availability of s 170MX awards may 
provide an avenue for parties to abuse the availability of binding arbitration, on the 
practical level AIRC interpretation and approach to s 170MX awards provides 
compliance with ILO standards. 
- A further issue is the role of compulsory arbitration in the federal system through the 
award safety net. 87 The safety net is maintained through the traditional mechanism of 
conciliation and arbitration where an organization creates an 'industrial dispute' by 
80 See discussion of the creation of s 170MX awards in chapter 6 at 189. 
81 WRA s 170MX(3). 
82 WRA s 170MY(2). 
83 Under WRA s 89A an AIRC award made in resolution of an industrial dispute is limited to 20 
allowable award matters. For discussion of the award safety net see: chapter 6 at 173-174. 
84 Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd .v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (1998) 80 
IR 14. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid per Munro J at 52. 
87 For discussion of the award safety net see chapter 6 at 173-174. 
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serving a `log of claims' on an employer. 88 The process results in an arbitrated award, 
compulsorily imposed upon the employer concerned. This issue is not relevant to this 
discussion of strike regulation but it raises interesting and difficult questions around 
the nature Of the federal labour relations model as a hybrid system, the compatibility 
of the Australian approach with the principle of freedom of association, and the use of 
binding arbitration to establish minimum employment terms and conditions. 
Strike Ballots 
ILO standards provide that a ballot of affected employees prior to undertaking strike 
action is an acceptable pre-requisite to strike action provided that the ballot method, 
quorum and majority vote required do not make the exercise of the right to strike very 
difficult or impossible in practice. 
Under the WRA protected action model there is no compulsory strike ballot before 
parties initiate a bargaining period and undertake protected action. 89 Where a strike 
involves a workers' organization, it is required to comply with its own internal 
constitutional requirements which may involve the imposition of a strike ballot. 90 A 
strike ballot may be externally imposed where the AIRC is of the opinion that the 
prevention or settlement of the dispute would be furthered through a simple majority 
ballot. 91 These provisions are in compliance with ILO standards: 
The Federal Government has sought unsuccessfully to introduce legislation imposing 
compulsory strike ballots for all protected action. 92 This proposed amendment would 
not be contrary to ILO standards provided that the ballot regime does not hinder the 
exercise of the right to strike, is carried out efficiently and effectively, and the 
proposed ballots do not require an absolute majority. 93 
88 For discussion of the process of award making under conciliation and arbitration see Creighton and 
Stewart, supra note 30 at 123-148. 
89 See chapter 6 at 184-185. 
99 WRA s 170MR. 
91 WRA s 135. 
92 Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999 (Cth), the Workplace 
Relations Legislation Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2000 (Cth) and the two 
Workplace Relations (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bills 2002 (Cth). 
93 As noted in chapter 3, the CFA has consistently concluded that requirements for absolute majorities 
excessively hinder the right to strike: Complaints presented by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions, the Federation of Peruvian Light and Power Workers and Various other Trade Union 
Organizations against the Government of Peru, Document Vol. LXV, 1982, Series B, No. 1, Report 
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The majority of the proposed secret ballot regime is in accordance with ILO 
standards. However, the ballot process proposed by the Federal Government would be 
supervised and administered by the AIRC, introducing an additional level of 
complexity. This goes beyond the simple imposition of a secret ballot requirement, 
instituting an onerous supervisory structure. A discussion paper released with the 
latest version of the Bill states that the "main role of amendments will be to act as an 
influence for unions in particular to reassess their industrial action options, allowing a 
shift in negotiating power to employers". 94 The paper suggests that the supervision 
process proposed is designed to 'influence' unions to 'reassess' their options 
concerning industrial action, suggesting that the proposed amendments go beyond 
ensuring that appropriate consent is obtained before industrial action is undertaken. 
The supervision would act as a barrier to undertaking industrial action, making the 
exercise of the right to strike more difficult in practice. This would reduce compliance 
with 'respect to international standards if passed into law. 
Notice Requirements 
ILO standards encompass notice requirements as a pre-requisite to the undertaking of 
legitimate strike action provided that notice requirements facilitate negotiation and do 
not act as mandated time restrictions on strike action. 
Under the federal WRA bargaining model, parties must give 7 days' notice of their 
intention to initiate a bargaining period and 3 days' notice of their intention to 
commence protected industrial action, unless they are acting in response to industrial 
action by the other party. 95 In practice this means that a strike may be undertaken with 
a minimum of 7 days' notice, if the strike notice is given to the other party during the 
original term of notice to initiate a bargaining period. This process does not constitute 
an undue obstacle to undertaking protected action. It provides time for parties to 
214, Case 1081, para 266. However, these complaints have largely been in the context of industry wide 
bargaining or large trade unions and it remains unclear if a requirement of an absolute majority in a 
dispute involving an enterprise based trade union would be unduly restrictive given that there are 
significantly fewer obstacles to achieving an absolute majority. See discussion in chapter 3 at 105-106. 
94 Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002 [No 1], Bills Digest 
No. 116 2001 —02, Prepared by Steve O'Neill, Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group, 
Published by the Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002 at 20. 
95 See discussion of notice requirements in chapter 6 at 183-184. 
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negotiate in order to avoid strike action. The possibility of parties simply waiting for 
the period of notice to expire before undertaking strike action is countered by the 
ability of the AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining period where it considers 
that a party to protected industrial action has not genuinely tried to reach agreement. 96 
Responsibility for Declaring that Prerequisites Have Not Been Met 
ILO standards require that responsibility for declaring that prerequisites to legitimate 
strike action have not been met should always lie with an independent impartial body, 
preferably judicial, not administrative and never the employer. Under the federal 
system, responsibility for the administration of the WRA, bargaining periods and 
protected industrial action lies with the ARC and the Federal Court which are both 
impartial third parties. Accordingly, the WRA is compliant in this respect. 
The Course of the Strike 
In accordance with normative voluntary collective bargaining principles, ILO 
standards require legitimate strike action to be allowed to run its natural course 
without interference. The ability of workers to organise and pursue their occupational 
interests through strike action will be threatened where interference is permitted 
(unless interference relates to essential services). This discussion will examine areas 
of the federal WRA model where interference in the course of protected action may 
occur. Interference may be the result of actions by the authorities (AIRC, Federal 
Court or the relevant Minister) or action by the parties themselves. 
Action by Authorities 
Action on the part of authorities may take the form of ARC orders suspending or 
terminating a bargaining period or AIRC/Federal Court orders under s 127. 
Suspension or Termination of a Bargaining Period 
A bargaining period may be suspended or terminated where the AIRC considers that 
the parties have not engaged in bargaining in accordance with the norms of the system 
by not complying with AIRC Orders or not genuinely trying to reach agreement 
WRA s 170MW(2)(a) and (b); See discussion in chapter 6 at page 186. 
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throughout the bargaining process. 97 If a bargaining period is suspended or 
terminated, any strike action undertaken during the suspension or termination will be 
unprotected. In addition the AIRC may order that no new bargaining period be 
initiated if it considers this to be in the public interest. 98 
The suspension or termination of a bargaining period on the ground that the parties 
are not genuinely trying to reach agreement is compatible with ILO standards. Parties 
should not be able to exercise the right to strike without first exploring avenues to 
reach agreement. The ability of the AIRC to stop the initiation of a new bargaining 
period prevents parties from abusing the protected action system, provided that the 
power is used appropriately. 
Section 127 Orders  
Section 127 orders may be issued by the AIRC to stop impending, probable or actual 
industrial action.99 The AIRC in Coal and Allied held that a s 127 order could be 
made against protected industrial action, but s 170MT(1) will exempt protected action 
from the operation of an order made under s 127. 100 This is compatible with ILO 
standards, as s 127 orders cannot interfere in otherwise legitimate, lawful and 
protected industrial action. 
Action by the Participants in Strike Action 
ILO standards do not endorse actions that are contrary to domestic law, as the act of 
combination cannot lend lawfulness to otherwise unlawful acts. Just as otherwise 
lawful actions carried out in combination should be protected, combination itself 
cannot protect individual members from liability under the general law. However, this 
does raise an issue concerning groups and group responsibility where all strike 
participants lose protected status due to the actions of a minority of participants. 
Under the WRA protected industrial action will lose protected status if the action 
involves breaches of the ordinary civil or criminal law, including where action could 
97  WRA s 170MVV(2) and see discussion in chapter 6 at 185-189. 
98  WRA ss 170MW(9A) and (10). 
99  WRA s 127. See discussion of s 127 in chapter 6 at 197-202. 
1°° Coal and Allied, supra note 54 and see discussion of the case in chapter 6 at 198-200. 
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cause physical injury, wilful or reckless destruction of property or defamation. 1°1 In •
consequence the actions of those strike participants that contravene the criminal or 
civil law expose all other strike participants to liability under the common law or the 
WRA. This involves the de facto imposition of collective responsibility for the 
unlawful actions of individuals. Where a person commits an unlawful action, they can 
be held legally responsible for those actions. Under the WRA, where unlawful 
behaviour takes place in the context of protected action, in addition to liability for any 
unlawful behaviour, the other participants in the strike action are also penalised by 
being left open to potential sanctions and common law liability for engaging in strike 
action. This penalisation of strike action is contrary to ILO standards that encompass 
the proportionate sanctioning of illegitimate strike action but not the sanctioning of 
legitimate strike action, where a penalty is already available for unlawful behaviour. 
This area of the WRA must be reconsidered in order to avoid non-compliance. The 
collective should not be denied protection for the actions of individuals where those 
actions are otherwise unlawful and subject to civil or criminal causes of action. A 
better approach would be to remove the shield of protection for civil or criminal 
liability for otherwise unlawful actions, but continue to protect the industrial action 
itself. This would enable participants in strike action to pursue their right to strike 
without fear of potential collective liability arising through the unlawful actions of 
individuals. 
Action by Employers 
CFA determinations provide that the hiring of workers to break a strike in a non-
essential service will constitute a "serious violation of freedom of association". 102  It 
will not be in violation of the principle of freedom of association to utilise existing 
labour or replacement workers if this does not threaten the rights of the strike 
participants to collectively bargain. 
WRA s 170MT and see chapter 6 at 175-176. 
102  Complaint presented by the Local Federation of Trade Unions of Casablanca (Moroccan 
Federation of Labour against the Government of Morocco), Document Vol. LXVIII, 1985, Series B, 
No. 3, Report 241, Case 1282, para 419. 
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Assessing compliance in this area is difficult. In the context of the legal framework, 
there is no ban in the WRA on hiring replacement workers and no attempt made to 
qualify when such action would or would not interfere with the right of workers to 
strike. However, for practical purposes, the employers' ability to hire replacement 
labour is limited by WRA provisions that prevent an employer dismissing an 
employee on the basis of their involvement in protected strike action. 103 However, this 
would not prevent an employer from engaging casual labour on a short term basis 
during the course of the strike. In consequence, it would appear that the WRA model 
is non-compliant to the extent that there are no legal restrictions on the ability of an 
employer to hire temporary workers to replace those workers on strike. However, it is 
unclear how it would be possible to regulate a voluntary collective bargaining system 
to prevent employers' engaging temporary workers and ensure that such labour, if 
hired, is not used to undermine the right of the relevant workers to strike, and continue 
to maintain the voluntary nature of the bargaining process. 
Errors of substance or process 
The 2004 High Court decision in Electrolux highlighted the consequences of failing to 
meet a procedural or substantive requirement of the protected action regime. 1°4 The 
Australian Workers Union (AWU) had been involved in lengthy and protracted 
litigation over the inclusion of a union bargaining fee payable by non-union members 
within their list of claims for a certified agreement. At the time that bargaining 
commenced, it was unclear whether the claim would relate to the relationship of an 
employer and employee, whether it was necessary for certification that all clauses in 
an agreement pertain to the relationship between employer and employees, or whether 
protected industrial action could be undertaken in support of uncertifiable claims. 
After contradictory lower court decisions, 1°5 the High Court held that this was not a 
matter pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee, that an 
agreement containing such a clause could not be certified and any industrial action 
103 WRA s 1790MU. For discussion see chapter 6 at 175-176. 
104 Electrolux supra note 33. For more extensive discussion of Electrolux and the requirements for 
certification of an agreement see chapter 6 at 175-179. 
1°5 Electrolux Products v Australian Workers Union [2001] FCA 1600, unreported judgment, 14 
November, 2001 per Merkel J; Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union and Ors v Electrolux Home Products Ply Ltd and Ors [2002] FCAFC 199, 118 FCR 
177. 
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undertaken in support of such an agreement was not protected. 1°6 In the course of the 
judgment the High Court noted that in this context it is irrelevant if a party has a 
"reasonable belief' that their action is protected. 107 
Electrolux involved an error of substance by the AWU resulting from an incorrect 
interpretation of the legislative requirements. However, the courts have been equally 
strict with procedural failings. An example is National Workforce Pty Ltd v Australian 
Manufacturing Workers Union, 108 where the Australian Manufacturing Workers 
Union (AMWU) correctly followed all procedural requirements for protected 
industrial action but lost protection because they acted in concert with two unions who 
were unprotected parties due to errors that they made in the protected action 
procedure. All three unions lost protection regardless of their clearly expressed 
intention to comply with the substance and process of the law, and in the case of the 
AMWU, their belief that the other two unions were protected parties. The outcomes of 
these cases demonstrate that the courts are unwilling to consider either procedural 
errors, or difficulties in the application of a complex legal structure, as mitigating 
circumstances in a failure to comply with the protected action regime. 
A further problem highlighted in Electrolux is the potential for parties to breach the 
coercion provisions. Section 170NC of the WRA creates the civil offence of coercion 
where a party takes or threatens to take any industrial action with intent to coerce 
another party into entering a Division 2 or 3 certified agreement, unless they are 
engaged in protected action. 109 The aim of undertaking protected industrial action is to 
obtain a certified agreement on acceptable terms. If parties attempt to undertake 
protected action, but are unsuccessful due to a substantive or procedural defect, then 
their intention to enter a certified agreement will operate as intention to coerce for the 
purposes of s 170NC. The six member majority in Electrolux held that in consequence 
of the loss of protection, the AWU action breached the coercion provision. 110 The 
decision suggests that a breach of s 170NC will be an automatic consequence of 
failing to comply with the protected action provisions. This prompted Kirby J in his 
1°6 Electrolux, supra note 33. 
107 Ibid at para 120 per McHugh J. 
108 [1998] 3 VR 265. See the discussion of this case in chapter 5 at 144-146. 
109 See chapter 6 at 192-193. 
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dissenting judgment in Electrolux to warn that the approach adopted by the majority 
introduces a "serious chilling effect into ... negotiations" for a certified agreement. 111 
The intention to conform to the legal requirements, an error of process or a pre-
existing confusion in the law will not excuse a failure to comply with the letter of the 
law and may expose organizations to an automatic finding of coercion. 
The approach of the court in Electrolux is entirely at odds with a system of collective 
bargaining based on ILO standards concerning the principle of freedom of 
association. A voluntary system of free collective bargaining cannot work to the full 
advantage of all parties when it is restricted by excessive legalism, overburdened with 
complex regulation, and when parties may inadvertently fall foul of the substantive 
and procedural requirements resulting in a retrospective loss of protection. 112 
Bargaining is not an exact science, but the approach of the High Court is to require 
exact compliance with law and process despite the immense complexities inherent in 
industrial relations. The fear of retrospective loss of protection and exposure to 
liability will inevitably inhibit workers in exercising their right to undertake protected 
action. 
Strikes Undertaken by Workers in Essential Services 
ILO standards encompass the restriction of otherwise legitimate strike action where it 
could impede the functioning of an essential service or where strike is incompatible 
with the function of a particular office. 
The WRA protected action provisions do not distinguish between essential and non-
essential services. All participants in the federal regime may undertake protected 
action without discrimination on the basis of occupation. The restriction of strike 
action in the context of essential services occurs through provisions enabling the 
AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining period where the protected industrial 
11° Electrolux, supra note 33. 
Ibid per Kirby J at para 192. 
112 The Full Court of the Federal Court in the Electrolux decision stated: "Fundamental to Part VIII of 
the Act [the collective bargaining regime] is the notion that, within strict and objectively definable 
limits, organi7ations, employees and employers are entitled to engage in industrial warfare ... If that 
purpose is to be achieved, a high degree of certainty is essential. If parties are to make rational and 
confidential decisions about their course of conduct, they need to know where they stand". Electrolwc, 
2001, supra note 105 at para 92-93. 
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action threatens essential services. 113 The ILO construction favours the declaration of 
certain services as essential, whereas the federal model allows strikes in all services; 
until such time as the strike constitutes a threat to public safety. The federal approach 
has merit. Rather than seeking to designate certain industries as essential, the 
Australian system allows for strikes in all services, only placing limitations on strikes. 
where they become problematic from an essential service perspective. This is a 
practical and flexible approach to the regulation of essential services. However, the 
issue from the compliance perspective is whether the provisions exceed permissible 
restrictions on the right to strike in essential services within the strict ILO definition 
of the term. 
Under the protected action regime a bargaining period may be suspended or 
terminated by the AIRC where protected industrial action is threatening to endanger 
the life, personal safety or health of the population, or part of the population, or where 
it threatens to cause significant damage to the Australian economy, or a significant 
part of it. 114 
Public Safety 
The ability of the AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining period in circumstances 
where life, personal safety or the health of the population, or part of the population, is 
endangered is compatible with restrictions on the right to strike allowed by ILO 
standards. The only difficulty with the federal approach is to the potential for 
expansive interpretation of the concept of risk to life, health and personal safety. 
However, AIRC decisions demonstrate that it the AIRC is mindful of the tension 
between allowing the free operation of market forces and the protection of public 
safety that is inherent in an application under these provisions. 115 Provided that AIRC 
interpretation of the section continues to be restrictive rather than expansive, the 
application of the provision in practice will remain compliant. 
113 See discussion in chapter 6 at 185-189. 
114 WRA s 170MW(3). See discussion in chapter 6 at 186-188. 
115 See Coal and Allied Operations v CFMEU, supra note 84 , where Munro J stated at 51-52: "Section 
170M1A/(3) is a most important part of the section [170MW]. The way in which it is interpreted and 
applied has serious consequences for disputing parties and for the public at large. Its operation involves 
the resolution of the competing rights of registered organizations and employers to take industrial 
action against each other with impunity and of the community and the economy to be protected from 
serious harm arising from such action." 
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Economic Loss 
The ability of the AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining period which is 
threatening to cause significant damage to the Australian economy or an important 
part of it, is not compatible with permissible essential services restrictions on the right 
to strike in ILO standards. Economic damage is not relevant to designation of 
essential services under ILO standards unless the damage constitutes a threat to public 
safety. Despite restrictive judicial interpretation of the words "significant" and 
"important" in s 170MW(3), 116 the section operates on the premise that economic 
damage is, of itself, sufficient to restrict the right to strike, and this is not compatible 
with ILO standards. The measure of a successful strike campaign is often the degree 
of economic damage inflicted on the employer. But, the more economically successful 
a strike is, the more likely it is that the AIRC may suspend or terminate the bargaining 
period. Conversely, where an employer exercises a successful lockout, the infliction 
of significant economic damage on the employees concerned will rarely constitute 
grounds to suspend or terminate a bargaining period, as economic damage to 
employees does not translate as easily to economic damage to the economy. 
It must also be acknowledged that the economic damage provision serves a public 
interest purpose. It is conceivable that the economic impact of successful strike action 
could be severe enough to threaten public safety. However, this circumstance is 
adequately addressed through the public safety provision in s 170MW(3)(a). 117 Where 
economic damage constitutes a threat to public safety, this provision will allow 
suspension or termination of a bargaining period without the necessity for a separate 
specific threat to the Australian economy. 
The economic damage provision has been the subject of scrutiny by ILO bodies. The 
CFA considered the provision in the context of a complaint made in the aftermath of 
116 Commenting on the application of s 170MW(3), the High Court in Coal and Allied Operations Pty 
Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 174 ALR 585 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and 
Hayne JJ, Callinan J in agreement, at 594 stated that "the nature of the threat to which a decision-maker 
must be satisfied under s 170MW(3) of the Act involves a measure of subjectivity or value judgment 
... The presence of the words 'significant' and `ithportane ... indicate that the decision-maker must 
have some basis for his or her satisfaction over and above generalised predictions as to the likely 
consequences of the industrial action in question". For further discussion of the decision in Coal and 
Allied see chapter 6 at 186-188. 
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the 1998 Australian waterfront dispute. I18 The CFA considered the ability of the 
AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining period in the context of economic damage 
inflicted upon the Australian economy as a consequence of protected strike action 
undertaken at various ports during the waterfront dispute. The CFA concluded that the 
removal of protection where strike action threatens to cause significant damage to the 
economy is not in accordance with the obligation to provide a right to strike and 
"economic damage is not of itself relevant" as a basis for identifying work as an 
essential service. I19 The CFA commented that "while the economic impact of 
industrial action and its effects on trade and commerce may be regrettable, such 
consequences do not, in and of themselves, render a service essential". 12° However, it 
was also suggested that it would be permissible, given the importance of the maritime 
industry to the supply of essential goods and services in Australia, to declare the 
wharves a public service which would justify legislation establishing a minimum 
service to be maintained in times of dispute, negotiated on a tripartite basis. 
The CEACR has also been critical of the economic damage provision, while 
acknowledging the potential negative economic effects of strike action. I21 In 2003, the 
CEACR criticised the federal provision, but conceded that in situations where 
economic damage is "irreversible" or "out of proportion to the occupational interests 
of the parties to the dispute", it would be preferable for the authorities to establish a 
system of minimum service in public utilities rather than an "outright ban" on strike 
action. I22 
117 See discussion above at 285. 
118  Complaint against the Government of Australia presented by the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions IICTFU), the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), Document Vol. 
LXXXIII, 2000, Series B, No. 1, Report 320, Case 1963. 
119 Ibid, para 229. 
129 Ibid, para 230. 
121 CEACR Individual Observation Australia, Convention 87, 1999: "the denial of protection to strike 
action in these circumstances goes beyond the definition of essential services accepted by the CEACR 
and CFA, namely those services whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health 
of the whole or a part of the population". In the CEACR Individual Observation Australia, 
Convention 87, 2001, in response to Federal Government comments that the AIRC has a discretion in 
the application of the section noted that "there remains a very real possibility for workers and their 
organizations to be subject to sanctions for taking such strike action and industrial action threatening to 
cause substantial damage to the Australian economy is essentially prohibited". 
122 CEACR Individual Observation Australia, Convention 87, 2003. The CEACR reiterated its concern 
regarding the restriction of the right to strike in respect of economic damage but noted, in response to 
the complaint made to the CFA, Complaint against the Government of Australia, supra note 118, that 
in order to avoid damages which are irreversible or out of proportion to the occupational interests of the 
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Resolution of Disputes 
ILO standards require the provision of speedy, adequate and impartial mechanisms to 
resolve disputes where workers in essential services are denied the right to strike. In 
the federal system this is provided through AIRC conciliation and arbitration in the 
event of termination of a bargaining period and may lead to the imposition of an 
arbitrated award. 123 This process is compatible with ILO standards provided that the 
initial restriction of strike action is appropriate. 
AWA Protected Action 
The provisions enabling individual employers and employees to engage in protected 
industrial action for the purposes of negotiating an AWA are difficult to measure for 
the purposes of compliance. 124 While ILO standards on the principle of freedom of 
association do not encompass individual strike action, they do not specifically exclude 
the possibility. ILO freedom of association standards have not yet developed 
sufficiently to deal with the challenges posed by individualism and contractualism. 125 
ILO bodies are mindful of the issue but the quasi-jurisprudence has not yet developed 
sufficiently to enable measurement of the Australian legal regime against ILO 
standards. 
The AWA protected action regime raises questions over whether or not providing an 
individual right to strike is meaningful in any practical sense for the pursuit of 
bargained outcomes. For the vast majority of employees, the exercise of an individual 
right to strike will not produce useful results. A single employee is extremely unlikely 
to be able to inflict any degree of damage on the business of an employer that the 
employer cannot counter through shifting and reallocating employment 
responsibilities or through the hiring of replacement casual staff. However, a single 
employer can inflict significant damage on an employee through the use of a lockout. 
An individual employee will rarely have the financial resources to forego a single full 
parties to the dispute, as well as damage to third parties, the authorities could establish a system of 
minimum service in services which are of direct public utility rather than impose an outright ban on 
strikes. 
123 WRA s 170MX. 
124 See chapter 6 at 193-195. 
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pay, let alone survive a protracted dispute with their employer. I26 The AWA protected 
action provisions are a bastardisation of the right to strike, enabling only employers to 
achieve employment related outcomes. As confirmed by the High Court in Victoria v 
Commonwealth, employer lockouts are not encompassed within ILO or ICESCR 
standards on the right to strike. I27 For these purposes, as they are not specifically 
eschewed by those standards, there is nothing to measure for compliance purposes. 
However, to the extent that the provisions undermine freedom of association by 
manipulating the right to strike to encompass employer lockouts, the provisions stand 
as a challenge to the effective recognition of the functional principle of freedom of 
association encompassing the right to strike within Australian law. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has consolidated the material covered in the preceding chapters and has 
drawn together international standards on the right to strike and Australian law to 
measure the degree of compliance within the federal bargaining model. The analysis 
has uncovered significant difficulties with respect to the scope of action that is 
protected by the protected action regime. These findings will be summed up in the 
overall Conclusion to this thesis. 
125  See the discussion of the challenges posed by individualisation and contractualism in chapter 7 
at 239-243. 
126 For example, see The Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v G and K O'Connor (1999) 97 
IR 251. 
127 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and 




The Dimensions of Compliance: Summary of Key Compliance Findings 
Chapter 8 examined the two dimensions to the Australian compliance problem. The 
first dimension relates to the scope of protected action, and the areas of legitimate 
strike action encompassed and excluded by the protected action provisions. The 
second dimension relates to the protected action model, and the extent to which it 
enables the limited provision of a right to strike to be undertaken free from legal 
interference. 
The key compliance findings arising out of the analysis related to the first dimension 
of compliance, the scope of protected action are: 
1. The protected action model fails to protect the full scope of legitimate strike 
action encompassed by the international normative principle of freedom of 
association. Where legitimate strike action is unprotected, the federal system is 
in breach of the principle of freedom of association. 
2. The protected action model Only protects strike action supporting claims 
related to a proposed certified agreement, pertaining to the relationship 
between employer and employees. This is significantly narrower that the range 
of claims that can be supported by ILO standards on the right to strike and 
unduly interferes with the content of a proposed certified agreement. It 
restricts the right to strike by removing the ability of workers and unions to 
utilise the right to strike in negotiations over the proposed content of an 
agreement. 
3. The restriction of protected action to negotiations for enterprise level 
agreements removes the ability of parties to strike in support of their preferred 
level of bargaining. The passage of legislation designed to deny the ability of 
parties to engage in pattern bargaining will increase non-compliance. 
4. The Prohibition on undertaking protected action during the currency of 
collective agreements is compatible with the principle of freedom of 
association, provided that protected action is permitted for interest disputes 
that arise during the term of the agreement. Judgments confining the decision 
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in Emwest to its facts' and the widespread use of 'no extra claims 'clauses 
threaten compliance with respect to the use of the right to strike for interest 
disputes. 
5. The ability of the AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining period where 
protected industrial action involves boycott conduct or pertains to trade union 
related issues is incompatible with the principle of freedom of association. 
6. The outlawing of secondary boycotts under the WRA and TPA is incompatible 
with the principle of freedom of association. 
7. The availability of s 127 orders against unprotected strike action that is 
legitimate by ILO standards (for example, boycott conduct or strike action in 
support of multi-employer agreements) is contrary to the principle of freedom 
of association, although this breach of international standards is ameliorated 
by the existence of the AIRC discretion in exercising the power. Proposed 
legislation designed to reduce the discretion will remove the ameliorative 
effect. 
8. Sanctions available under the common law and legislation in Australia against 
illegitimate strike action (for example, political strikes) are disproportionate to 
the degree of illegitimacy and threaten the right of workers to take legitimate 
strike action. 
9. The prohibition on strike pay is in breach of the principle of freedom of 
association because it does not permit parties to a collective agreement to 
freely negotiate the subject matter of their agreement. 
The key compliance findings arising out of the analysis related to the second 
dimension of compliance, the content of protected action, are: 
10. The definition of "industrial action" under the WRA is sufficiently broad to 
enable industrial actors to determine the form of strike action undertaken in 
the context of the protected action model. However, the failure of the 
definition to encompass peaceful picketing could restrict the scope of the right 
to strike if picketing action undertaken during protected action results in a loss 
of protection for the entirety of the action. 
I Emwest Products Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union (2002) 112 1R 388. See discussion in chapter 8 at 264. 
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11. The system of prerequisites for undertaking protected industrial action are 
reasonable, designed to facilitate negotiation and do not hinder the exercise of 
the right to strike. However, the passage of proposed compulsory secret ballot 
legislation requiring AIRC supervision of all ballots has the potential to make 
the ballot process unduly onerous in practice. 
12. The regulatory approach to the protected action regime is complex and 
legalistic. A failure to comply in either process or substance (for example, as 
to the permissible subject matter of bargaining) will result in a loss of 
protection. This approach places a heavy burden on parties attempting to 
exercise the right to strike and ignores the complexities and industrial realities 
of collective bargaining. 
13 The strong likelihood that a failure to comply with the protected action 
provisions in process or substance will result in a breach of the coercion 
provisions places a heavy burden on participants in industrial action and 
unduly restricts the right to strike. 
14. The loss of protection for all participants where there has been a breach of the 
civil or criminal law by an individual strike participant potentially penalises 
parties for engaging in peaceful strike action and is contrary to the principle of 
freedom of association. 
15. The ability of employers to hire new employees with the aim of breaking a 
strike is contrary to the principle of freedom of association. However, it is 
unclear what regulatory mechanism would enable the•WRA to overcome this 
element of non-compliance. 
16. The ability of the AIRC to terminate or suspend a bargaining period where 
public safety is threatened accords with the principle of freedom of 
association. 
17. Provisions allowing for suspension or termination of a bargaining period 
where significant economic damage is inflicted on the economy, deregistration 
of organizations where strike action interferes with trade or commerce or the 
Commonwealth public service, and provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
go significantly beyond the ILO definition of essential services and do not 
comply with the principle of freedom of association. 
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• 18. The AWA protected action regime is not an enactment of the right to strike 
implicit in the principles of freedom of association and is not capable of 
measurement in this assessment of compliance. 
The Right to Strike in International and Australian Law 
In light of the detailed assessment of the state of compliance of the federal labour 
relations system with international standards on the right to strike, it is appropriate to 
return to the conclusions made in chapters 4 and 7 concerning the right to strike in 
international and Australian law. The discussion has demonstrated that Australian law 
does not comply with international standards on the right to strike. To the extent that 
the WRA provides for the right to strike in the protected action regime, the federal 
model complies with international standards in a limited sense. Participants in the 
federal system may strike free from potential liability in support of negotiations for an 
enterprise level, single business agreement provided that the claims made pertain only 
to the relationship between employers and employees. The prerequisites for taking 
such protected action are reasonable and do not hinder the exercise of this limited 
right to strike. 
However it is in the broader context of the scope of protected action, where the 
federal system is significantly non-compliant. The system fails to provide protection 
for a broad array of legitimate strike action and necessitates a legalistic approach to 
enforcement whereby procedural or substantive errors will result in lost protection and 
potential liability. This broader dimension of non-compliance stems from the differing 
approaches of the ILO and the Federal Government with respect to the role of strikes 
within voluntary collective bargaining and from differing approaches to the principle 
of freedom of association. 
A review of the five propositions made in chapter 4 concerning international law, in 
the Australian context and in the light of the discussion of Australian law, reveals 
these tensions. 
Proposition One — The right to strike, as developed within the ICESCR and ILO 
standards are products of the era in which they were promulgated and presuppose the 
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continuation of the Western commitment to collective bargaining, the presence of 
governments that are not inherently hostile to collectivism and the continuation of the 
role of trade unions as social partners. 
The presupposition in international standards of continued commitment to 
collectivism, collective bargaining and the continued social role of trade unions means 
that ILO standards are out of alignment with the commitment to individualism and 
contractualism that has dominated Australian labour relations since 1996. The 
changes to the model of collective bargaining in 1996 was not predicated upon a 
commitment to unfettered collective bargaining or the continuation of the role of trade 
unions as full social partners. On the contrary, the move from compulsory conciliation 
and arbitration to bargaining in Australia coincided with a renewed hostility to the 
role of trade unions and a desire to explore forms of bargaining that deviated from 
traditional trade union based approaches. This reflects the challenges to Australian 
compliance identified in chapter 7 relating to the rise of individualism and emphasis 
on contractualism in Australian labour relations. 2 
The new approach in the federal labour relations system is evident on a number of 
fronts. Bargaining as an integral part of the system was not enshrined as a tool of the 
collective operating through trade unions. Instead, its use was left open to individuals 
in the form of AWAs and groups of employees operating at the initiative of 
employers, and independent of trade unions, utilising non-union agreements. The 
place of strikes within the bargaining system was not designed to facilitate free 
collective bargaining. It was tolerated as a sweetener for the loss of compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration and as a tool to control the level at which bargaining takes 
place. Only those using collective power on a small scale, at the enterprise or 
individual level, have access to the right to strike without fear of legal repercussion. 
Broader expressions of collective power, extending beyond a single business and into 
traditional industry based trade union strength, continue to run the gauntlet of 
potential civil liability or injunctive relief. 
2 See chapter 7 at 239-243. 
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Over the past decade in the federal bargaining system in Australia there has been no 
sustained commitment to collective bargaining based on a free market model or the 
continuation of the role of trade unions as social partners. The failure of the protected 
action regime to adequately protect legitimate expressions of the right to strike 
reflects a lack of commitment to free market based collective bargaining. The 
inclusion of individual bargaining and the failure to promote collective bargaining 
reflects a degree of hostility to collectivity unanticipated by ILO standards. Finally, 
the denial of protection to strikes dealing with social and economic issues, sympathy 
matters or trade union concerns, and the inclusion of scope for non-union agreements, 
reflects the failing of the supposition that governments will remain committed to the 
role of trade unions as social partners. 
Proposition Two — The right to strike as developed in international standards is 
facilitative, non-prescriptive and adaptable. The model supports a basic self help 
process in which workers seek to improve their own employment conditions. 
ILO standards and Australia both utilise a model of free collective bargaining, 
however the ILO model supports a basic self-help process, whereas the Australian 
model manipulates the right to strike and the use of self-help in order to dictate 
bargaining outcomes. 
The examination of the details of the protected action model reveals that on the whole, 
the prerequisites to notice and the process for protected action support a basic self-
help process enabling workers to seek to improve their own employment conditions, 
within the limited parameters of that model. There are specific difficulties within the 
model relating to the degree of legalism and interference with the content of 
agreements; however a sustained commitment to international compliance would 
assist in overcoming these issues if there wdre not a much more significant problem. 
The difficulty is that the broader bargaining regime does not support a self-help 
process for workers to seek to improve their employment terms and conditions 
beyond enterprise level agreements pertaining to the relationship between employers 
and employees. There is no recognition in the federal bargaining model of the scope 
of legitimate strike action recognised by the ILO or of the necessity of a free market 
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model to enable parties to negotiate the level of bargaining or the content of 
agreements. 
As discussed in chapter 7, the Australian enactment of the fight to strike is open to 
manipulation for political or economic purposes and the model lacks internal 
coherence. The Australian model does not operate on the basis of a free market self-
help model. The lack of internal coherence and susceptibility to manipulation 
combine to ensure that the right to strike serves a political/ideological agenda rather 
than one which operates as an implicit element of the principle of freedom of 
association in a self help orientated bargaining regime. 
Proposition Three — The right to strike as expressed within the ILO is a functional 
right, operating as a facet of the principle offreedom of association supporting a 
labour relations system offree collective bargaining. ILO principles, while flexible 
and non-prescriptive, are not easily adapted to labour relations systems not based 
upon the voluntary collective bargaining model. 
The federal system is compliant to the extent that its provisions represent a voluntary 
collective bargaining model wherein strike action may be undertaken in support of - 
bargaining. However, measuring compliance is more difficult where the model ceases 
to be collective (through individual bargaining) or ceases to operate within the free 
market, confining strike action to strictly defined parameters. 
A significant reason for this is the competing approaches to freedom of association 
evident within the federal model and the ILO regime. The right to strike in Australia 
operates as a distinct discrete enactment and not as a facet of the principle of freedom 
of association. Judicial interpretations of Part XA have assisted in ensuring that the 
WRA enactment of freedom of association interacts with the rest of the legislation in 
a more holistic manner than that envisioned by the orginal enactment. However, such 
judicial inroads cannot overcome the physical and ideological separation of freedom 
of association and the right to strike within the bargaining model. 
Operating as an implicit element of the principle of freedom of association, 
international standards on the right to strike are necessarily facilitative. Strike action 
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facilitates bargaining and the pursuit of the purposes of association. The isolation of 
freedom of association in the WRA, the focus on the right not to belong and the 
discrete enactment of the right to strike means that the WRA enactment of the right to 
strike is divorced from the functional role that the right to strike plays in international 
standards. 
Proposition Four - The model of voluntary collective bargaining supported by the 
right to strike is voluntary in the sense that bargaining parties are voluntary actors 
and legal regulation should be kept to a minimum. This model supports the private 
ordering of labour relations by employers and employee organizations operating 
largely free from State regulation. 
ILO standards support a right to strike that fulfils the purpose of empowering workers 
in the bargaining process. The logic behind this equation is based on a minimum of 
State regulation providing an avenue for free market forces to determine employment 
terms and conditions. In this free market context, labour is able to form collectives 
(employee organizations), as employers may form corporate structures, and exercise 
the right to strike in order to influence bargaining outcomes. 
In the federal regime, the application of this model is constrained in the protected 
action provisions. Within the context of protected action, employers and trade unions 
may negotiate, bargain and strike free from state interference (unless strike action 
proves economically destructive). However, this is not the free market model 
envisioned by ILO standards. The State, rather than reducing regulation and allowing 
the free interplay of market forces, has played an active and increasingly re-
regulationist role. A true free market based bargaining regime would allow parties 
bargaining power, supported by strike action, to dictate the content and level at which 
they choose to bargain. The federal system does not operate in this manner. Employee 
organizations cannot bargain beyond the scope of the narrowly interpreted employer-
employee relationship, cannot take strike action in support of the type of agreement 
they wish to enter, and the issue of remuneration for periods relating to strike action 
has been removed from the industrial agenda. 
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The federal bargaining system is not free market based, and State intervention is not 
kept to a minimum. The State has consistently interfered with the operation of the 
protected action model, resulting in less space for genuine voluntary collective 
bargaining supported by the right to strike. Bills to restrict the practice of pattern 
bargaining, increase the burden of balloting procedures and reduce the content of the 
subject matter of bargaining would exacerbate this problem if passed into law. 
Excessive legalism in approach to the regulatory regime also has a 'chilling' effect on 
bargaining and imposes an undue restriction on the right to strike. 
The fact of non-compliance with ILO standards over the lack of choice within the 
protected action regime can be directly linked to the inability of the Federal 
Government to accept the logic of the right to strike with the concomitant potential for 
industrial disputation and interruption. The institution in the federal system of a free 
market bargaining model based on the principle of freedom of association would 
require the concession that employee organizations must be free to exercise market 
power. This concession would require the Federal Government to back away from its 
preferred level of agreement (single business/enterprise), from the restriction of 
subject matter of such agreements and allow the parties to negotiate these matters 
based on their relative bargaining strengths. It is the failure of the system to fully 
embrace the voluntary and free market aspects of the ILO model that generates 
ongoing compliance difficulties concerning the right to strike. 
Compulsion under conciliation and arbitration has been replaced in the WRA with 
compulsion to bargain in a manner that suits the policy and ideological objectives of 
the government of the day. This 'compulsion' is maintained by the continuing 
existence of civil and injunctive remedies applicable to any exercise of the right to 
strike outside the narrow parameters of protected action. 
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Proposition Five — The ILO model of voluntary collective bargaining based upon the 
principle of freedom of association and supported by the right to strike can support 
the inclusion of a right not to associate in organizations but will not support the 
individualisation of labour relations or the exclusion of trade unions from the 
bargaining process. 
Proposition five reflects concerns within ILO quasi-jurisprudence relating to the rise 
of individualistic ideals in the labour relations context across Western industrialised 
economies, and the erosion of the fundamental precept of collectivity. 
The Australian labour relations system provides an example of the ideological 
tensions, although masked by the rhetoric of 'choice' in bargaining structures. The 
enactment of freedom of association provisions enshrining the right to choose, or not 
to choose, to join in association does not offend ILO standards as the freedom of 
association principle does not exclude such legislation. However, the inclusion of 
AWAs and non-union agreements, the inclusion of individual 'bargaining' and 
individual 'strike action' and the persistent failure of the system to promote collective 
bargaining are a practical manifestation of the concerns expressed by ILO bodies. 
The Nature of the Australian Compliance Problem 
The difficulties in compliance that the federal labour law system faces are not of a 
specific piece meal nature. There are no intractable compliance difficulties with 
respect to the specifics of the regulation of protected action. To the extent that there is 
a functional right to strike in the form of protected action, the model is technically 
compliant. The protected action regime represents a workable model of the provision 
of the right to strike in the context of a voluntary collective bargaining regime. 
It is in the broader substantive sense of compliance that the federal model requires 
significant attention. The failures of compliance identified in this study cumulatively 
point to a failure in labour relations to acknowledge the right to strike as a tool of 
bargaining. This tool is designed to even the playing field in the context of a voluntary 
free market based system of collective bargaining. The tool is not designed to be used 
as an instrument of policy or as a right conceded only in the context of an extremely 
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limited bargaining scenario where outcomes conform to those considered appropriate 
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